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ABSTRACT
This thesis constitutes a detailed assessment of the legal position of women in Bangladesh and 
argues that, despite some recent reforms purporting to improve their status, there is no real 
change in the situation of patriarchal domination. It is further argued that the dominant 
patriarchal structures, with the interlinked forces of religion, tradition and seclusion, are 
sustained not only in family life but also in family law.
The thesis illustrates some confusions in the debates about the legal position of women 
and suggests that the lack of conceptual clarity has handicapped a discussion of the real needs 
of women in family law within a patriarchally-dominated legal framework.
Based on a detailed exposition of family law under the British colonial regime and 
Pakistani state law, the present study focuses on the more recent Bangladeshi legal 
developments. These were officially brought about to meet certain social needs and to 
improve the overall situation of women. However, apart from the reforms concerning the 
Family Courts Ordinance of 1985, and some glimpses of judicial activism, in reported as well 
as unreported cases, the existing family law reforms are shown to be mainly procedural. In 
particular, they appear unable to protect women effectively from violence and economic 
deprivation. While not arguing for absolute gender equality, although this is apparently 
provided as a paper right in the Constitution of Bangladesh, the present study proposes that 
gender equity in family law can be meaningfully developed by better implementation of the 
existing law, prominently by sensitising the judiciary and society about the particular needs 
of women.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The central premise
'Family law and women' has always been a contentious issue. 
In South Asia, as elsewhere, there is a simmering 
discontent that family law does not allow gender equality, 
which is apparently granted at the level of international 
law as well as in the realm of constitutional law. In 
religious and official family law, on the other hand, women 
have only equitable rights. In social reality, women may 
even be denied such equitable treatment. There is, it would 
seem, a popular belief that family law is the last bastion 
in which women need to achieve equal rights with men.
The concept of sexual equality influences the 
discourse about the position of women in family law in any 
particular jurisdiction. But such discourse misses 
important points about the realities of women's lives in a 
patriarchally-dominated society such as Bangladesh. Where 
the ideal concepts underlying the debates do not match with 
social facts, the discussion actually confuses idealised 
positioning and realistic goal achievement.
Focusing on women and family law in Bangladesh, the 
present thesis argues that gender equity, rather than full- 
fledged equality is a desirable and realistic aim for the 
development of Bangladeshi family law. We are mainly
1
dealing with Islamic family law and gender equity here, 
seen in a particular cultural context. Islam qualifies 
sexual equality with special rights and duties for both men 
and women in their social and natural roles and does not 
recognise absolute and undifferentiated equality. Thus, 
traditional models define the complementary roles of the 
sexes, i.e. that women should be protected in return for 
their obedience. But in social reality the situation is 
often not reciprocal when women, in return for their 
submission, are economically deprived and physically 
abused.
The real demands of women in Bangladesh are not
focused on a premise outside the framework of the family 
but on working out a situation within it, where women will
be free from economic deprivation and from violence.
Bangladeshi women are not demanding the same as some 
Western women, i.e. sexual equality, freedom and liberation 
as an individual. Rather they see their roles within social 
contexts and would prefer -gender equity within the
traditional framework. Although there is some influence of 
idealised feminist thinking about sexual equality, women's 
proper place is seen to be within the family in the wider 
context of Bangladeshi society. In other societies, for 
example in Britain, it seems that absolute equality of 
rights is also not witnessed in practice.1 The law, on the
1 See for details Brophy, Julia and Carol Smart: 'From 
disregard to disrepute: The position of women in family 
law'. In Whitelegg, Elizabeth et al. (ed.): The changing 
experience of women. Oxford 1989, pp.207-225.
one hand, formally provides improvements in the legal 
position of women; on the other hand, it maintains its 
support to the patriarchal structures of the family.2
Women in Bangladesh tend to respect and cherish their 
family as the highest priority of their life. What they 
really want is not equality but freedom from violence and 
economic deprivation imposed by men. Thus, it makes not 
much sense to aspire for the distant mirage of sexual 
equality; rather, we shall argue for 'sexual equity' in 
family law in parallel with cultural norms. This is an 
acceptable and sustainable strategy towards the empowerment 
of women, securing their granted basic rights in the 
patriarchal society of Bangladesh. Thus, we are pursuing a 
model of sexual equity here which should enable the women 
of Bangladesh to cope with the reality of their existence 
and to assist them in articulating their grievances within 
that particular social and legal context.
Some recent reforms in the field of family law and 
some favourable judicial decisions exist in Bangladesh, 
purporting to ameliorate the status of women. But such 
vague references to 'amelioration of a depressed class' are 
not readily usable for legal analysis. To analyse how far
relevant laws or decisions are enforced to protect or
safeguard women's interest, or whether they are merely
rhetoric, we have to go into details of the family law
judgements of Bangladesh. The achievement of favourable 
legislation or decisions by itself does not modify
2 Ibid., p .208.
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prevailing attitudes and change the patriarchal system of 
a male-dominated society.
While we are suggesting that gender equity can be 
meaningfully developed in family law by better 
implementation of the existing law, we must also recognise 
the limits of our analysis. Given the restraints of 
postgraduate legal research, the present thesis has to 
focus mainly on the official law and its various 
manifestations. Only extensive fieldwork could provide us 
with the basis for a detailed analysis of socio-legal 
realities.
1.2 The problem in a wider context
Bangladesh has a legal system consisting of two types of 
laws, the general and the personal law. The general law 
could be said to be based on egalitarian principles of 
sexual equality but the personal or family law, based on 
religion, does not operate on the basis of absolute 
equality to men and women.
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women of 18th December 1979 purports 
to guarantee equal rights to women.3 Women in Bangladesh
3 On this Convention see for example Tinker, Catherine: 
'Human rights for women: The U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women'. 
In Human Rights Quarterly. Vol.3, No.2, Spring 1991, pp.32- 
43 .
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are also apparently guaranteed sexual equality by the 
Constitution of Bangladesh and the general law. But 
patriarchal interpretation of the law continues the 
dominance of patriarchal attitudes.4 However, there are 
internal contradictions within the Constitution between 
granting sexual equality and making special laws for women.
All of this influences the position of women in family 
law but the religious and official family laws of 
Bangladesh clearly aim for gender equity rather than 
absolute sexual equality. If the gender equality concept 
were translated into family law, it would disturb the 
equilibrium of the social fabric and the power relationship 
between the sexes. As we shall see, women also benefit from 
living in a patriarchally-dominated system.
Problems arise over abuses of this relative status 
system. The crux of the problem is that many women in 
Bangladesh today are deprived even of the rights granted by 
the religious and state-sponsored family laws. Prominently, 
women are deprived of their rights of maintenance, dower, 
dissolution of marriage, custody, guardianship, and other 
forms of property. Thus, it was found in a study of the 
metropolitan city of Dhaka that 88% of Muslim wives did not 
receive any dower.5 A study of two villages in Bangladesh
4 On this see in detail Bangladesh: Strategies for enhancing 
the role of women in economic development. Washington DC 
1990, (World Bank); Jahan, Roushan: 'Hidden wounds, visible 
scars: Violence against women in Bangladesh'. In Agarwal, 
B. (ed.): Structures of patriarchy: State, community and 
household in modernising Asia. New Delhi 1988, pp.216-226.
5 Akhter, Shaheena: How far Muslim laws are protecting the 
rights of the women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992, p.35.
revealed that 77% of women from families with land did not 
intend to claim their legal share in their parental 
property to retain better links with their natal family.6 
These are instances of the patriarchal arbitrariness of 
Bangladeshi society which regards women's claims to their 
rights as challenging the existence of the patriarchal 
system itself, despite the fact that these claims are based 
on an Islamic obligation or official law.
The usual manifestations of women's subordination in 
a patriarchally dominated society may be identified in 
child marriages, polygamy, unilateral divorce, seclusion, 
dowry and violence against women. Women in Bangladesh are, 
thus, subordinated within an intensely hierarchical system 
of gender relations which constantly attempts to deny women 
not only access to social power and control over their own 
lives but also granted rights to which they are entitled.7 
The material base of patriarchy is men's control of 
property, income and women's labour. With the growth of 
women's studies, more and more authors have identified 
labour, power and sexuality as the main structural elements 
shaping the relationship between gender and power.8
Several recent studies have analysed the life-style
6 Westergaard, Kirsten: Pauperization and rural women in 
Banaladesh-a case study. Comilla 1983, p.71.
7 Kabeer, Naila: 'Subordination and struggle: Women in
Bangladesh'. In New Left Review. No.168, March-April 1988, 
pp.95-121, at p.101.
8 See for example Connell, R.W.: Gender and power. London 
1986, p.104.
and status of women in Bangladesh. Some important studies9 
found that the average Bengali woman, particularly in rural 
Bengal, contributes very significantly in the household,10 
performing laborious jobs which are no less vital than 
those done by men. However, their contributions are not 
adequately recognised and often women are categorised 
together with children as minors appended to men as the 
guardians and breadwinners.11
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, 
persistent poverty, growing landlessness and subsequent
9 For example see Lindenbaum, Shirley: The social and
economic status of women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1974; Sattar, 
Ellen: Women in Bangladesh: A village study. Dhaka 1974; 
Adnan, Shapan et al. : 'Social change and rural women:
Possibilities and participation'. In Role of women in 
socio-economic development in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1977, 
pp.80-93; Islam, Mahmuda: 'Women at work in Bangladesh'. In 
Women for women-Bangladesh 1975. Dhaka 1975, pp.93-120; 
Choudhury, Rafiqul Huda: 'Married women in non-agricultural 
occupations in a metropolitan urban area of Bangladesh-some 
issues and problems'. In Bangladesh Development Studies. 
Vol.v, No.2, April 1977, pp.153-200; Chen, M. and R. 
Ghaznavi: Women in food-for-work: The Bangladesh
experience. Dhaka 1977, (BRAC).
10 Farouk, Abdullah and M. Ali: The hard working poor: A 
survey of how people use their time. Dhaka 1977, p. 42; 
Kabir, Khusi et al.: 'Rural women of Bangladesh: Exploring 
some myths'. In Role of women in socio-economic development 
in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1977, pp.72-79, at p.79; Cain, Mead et 
al.: Class, patriarchy and women's work in Bangladesh'. In 
Population and Development Review. Vol.v, No.iii, Sept. 
1979, pp.400-438, at p.432; Abdullah, Taherunnessa A. and 
Saundra A. Zeidenstein: Village women of Bangladesh:
Prospects for change. New York 1982, p.102; Majumdar, 
Pratima Paul: 'Women work and home'. In Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies Research Report. No.49, 
Dec. 1986, pp.1-167, at p.49; Wallace, Ben J. et al.: The 
invisible resource: Women and work in rural Bangladesh. 
Boulder and London 1987, pp.76-85.
11 Kabeer, Naila: 'Monitoring poverty as if gender mattered: 
A methodology for rural Bangladesh'. In Institute of 
Development Studies Discussion Paper. No.255, Brighton 
198 9, pp.1-49, at p.9.
erosion of supportive networks have been pushing more and 
more women into the labour market.12 Economic pressures are 
forcing women from all segments of society to seek 
employment, in contrast to the earlier situation when only 
women from the poorest and landless families sought paid 
employment. The myth that women's wages merely supplement 
the family income can no longer be sustained. Recent 
studies have demonstrated that income from women's 
productive labour has often become integral to the family's 
survival.13 Women are engaged in domestic labour, in 
agriculture and construction sites in both rural and urban 
areas. Moreover, new forms of urban employment have become 
available for women since the 1980s and women now work in 
the garment, pharmaceutical, plastic and other 
industries.14 It was found that better wage prospects, as 
in the case of garments, improved their chances in the 
marriage market; in some cases dowry demands have been 
dropped in view of the earning potential of the bride.
The enhancement of women's status by employment and
12 Afsar, Rita: Employment and occupational diversification 
of women in Bangladesh. [Asian Regional Team for Employment 
Promotion (ARTEP) Working Papers]. New Delhi 1990.
13 See in particular Hossain, Hameeda et al. : No better
option?: Industrial women workers. Dhaka 1990, pp.34-41;
Begum, Kohinoor: 'Participation of rural women in income-
earning activities: A case study of a Bangladeshi village'. 
In Women's Studies International Forum. Vol.12, No.5, 1989, 
pp.519-528, at p.519.
14 On the garment industry see Khan, Salma: The fifty 
percent: Women and development policy in Bangladesh. Dhaka 
1988, p. 63, where it is reported that according to the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
out of the total work force of 250,000 as many as 225,000 
are women.
other activities, although a viable avenue for the 
emancipation of women, was idealised in Bangladesh by- 
international feminism as bringing sexual equality and was 
seen as a result of international influence. As we show in 
more detail in chapter 4 below, it appears that government- 
sponsored vigorous action to improve the status of women 
was not only to legitimise elite rule but to acquire more 
aid from the donor agencies by giving attention to women.15 
It is argued that not only the government but also non­
government organisations (NGOs) used women's issues as a 
potential source of funding.16 However, female employment 
in Bangladesh did not give women control over production, 
land ownership or income earned.17 Although women have 
greater control of certain forms of production, these are 
usually not substantial enough to transform the core
15 White, Sara C. : 'Women and development: A new imperialist 
discourse'. In The Journal of Social Studies. No.48, April 
1990, pp.90-111, at p.103; Kabeer, Naila: 'The quest for
national identity: Women, Islam and the state in
Bangladesh'. In Institute of Development Studies Discussion 
Paper. No.268, Brighton 1989, pp.1-33. A modified version 
of the article is published in Kandiyoti, Deniz (ed.): 
Women. Islam and the state. London 1991, pp.77-143, at 
p.127; Ahmed, Rahnuma: 'Women's movement in Bangladesh and 
the left's understanding of the woman question'. In The 
Journal of Social Studies. No.30, 1985, pp.41-56, at p.49.
16 White, Sara C.: Arguing with the crocodile: Gender and 
class in Bangladesh. London, New Jersy and Dhaka 1992, 
pp.15-16.
17 Khan, Zarina Rahman: Women. work and values: 
Contradictions in the prevailing notions and the realities 
of women's lives in rural Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992, p.198.
relations of the spouses within household structures.18 
Thus, the economic involvement of women did not lead to 
emancipation and could not create a real dent in the 
patriarchal value system.19 On the other hand there are 
indications that under the pressure of increasing poverty, 
male normative commitment has eroded and that many men 
simply cannot fulfil the traditional role of supporter of 
women and children.20 Drawing on sych observations of 
social problems, it would appear that the lack of 'fit' 
between traditional institutions and values, on the one 
hand, and the countervailing needs of women for protection 
from economic deprivation and violence on the other pose 
the core problems for Bangladeshi law and society in the 
1990s.
The urgency of the matter can be gathered in 
particular from the large volume of cases of violence 
against women in Bangladesh. A case in point is that of 
dowry violence. Women are expected to remain mute and 
suffer innumerable agonies at the hands of their husbands 
and in-laws if they fail to provide handsome dowries. 
Stories of women burnt alive or murdered by their husbands 
and in-laws for failing to procure the required dowry are 
not new any more. Women continue to fall prey to regular
18 Kabeer, Naila: "Gender, production and well-being: 
Rethinking the household economy". In Institute of 
Development Studies Discussion Paper. No.288, May 1991, 
pp.1-50, at p.20.
19 Khan (1992) , p. 198.
20 Cain et al. (1979), p.408.
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harassment and disrespect. It has been rightly pointed out 
that dowry deaths are a gruesome reminder of the 
authoritativeness of patriarchy.21 In one study, dowry 
demands have been identified as one of the major causes of 
murder of women in Bangladesh.22 It has also been reported 
by an Indian author that many women in Bangladesh are 
filing divorce petitions to escape torture at the hands of 
in-laws for failing to meet the expectations of dowry.23 
Cruelty towards women in recent years has increased 
threefold and the overall incidence of violence is now a 
great social problem.24 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, 
and the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance 
of 1983 were hurriedly enacted to contain such problems. 
However, even if women in Bangladesh have secured 
favourable legislation, they could not secure its benefits 
due to impediments to its enforcement. This is also 
reflected in other family law reforms. The reason behind 
this lies in the traditional norms and values in the male- 
dominated patriarchal society of Bangladesh. Violence 
against women is a trend which is deeply related to the 
oppressive structures of the dominant male values of
21 Singh, Indu Prakash and Renuka: 'Dowry: How many more
deaths to its end?'. In Sood, Sushma (ed.): Violence
against women. Jaipur 1990, pp.311-319, at p.311-312.
22 Akanda, Latifa and Ishrat Shamim: Women and violence.
Dhaka 1984, p.5.
23 Ghosh, K.S.: Indian women through the ages. New Delhi
1989, pp.46-47.
24 Sobhan, Salma et al. : The status of legal aid services to 
women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992, p.5.
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Bangladeshi society.25 Although this society is subject to
various forces of modernisation, traditional roles and
values remain relevant for women today.26 Within this
system of structural inequality in society, simply calling
for sexual equality is not a feasible answer. It is
apprehended that South Asian societies will never accept
total equality of the sexes. It has been stated, somewhat
idealistically, by a male author,
They are unequal because they are dissimilar, and 
girls' inequality may in fact be a sign of their 
superiority: In other words females may be given 
special treatment not because they are despised, 
but because they are peculiarly honoured and 
protected.27
This shows that the traditional society and its legal 
structures have the potential to treat women well.
The present thesis comprehensively analyses to what 
extent the legislative enactments in family law, as they 
apply in Bangladesh today, have contributed to giving women 
in Bangladesh a better legal status. This study of women 
and family law in Bangladesh does not aim to examine 
primarily whether the legal reforms reflect Western- 
oriented ideals of equality of the sexes but is arguing
25 Guhathakurta, Megna: 'Gender violence in Bangladesh: The 
role of the state' . In The Journal of Social Studies. 
Vol.30, 1985, pp.77-93, at p.77.
26 Choudhury, Rekha: 'Exploration of women: A study of 
social norms'. In Saraf, D.N. (ed.): Social policy, law and 
protection of weaker section of the society. Lucknow 1986, 
pp.293-303, at p.295.
27 Derrett, J. Duncan M. : 'The legal status of women in India 
from the most ancient times to the present day' . In 
Recueils De La Societe Jean Bodin. Vol.11, Brussels 1959, 
pp.237-267, at p.240.
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that gender equity can be meaningfully developed by better 
implementation of the existing legal framework. The thesis 
attempts to assess to what extent the recent family law 
reforms and their interpretation and application by the 
courts have enhanced the rights and status of women in 
Bangladesh within such parameters.
1.3 Justification of the study
In studies on women and the law, 'law' is now often seen 
from the perspective of feminist scholarship.28 Given our 
premises about inherent gender inequality in South Asia, 
the scope of our present exposition of women and law cannot 
centrally focus on feminist scholarship, however. Rather it 
concentrates on traditional legal scholarship which sees 
law as a major tool to sustain family life, giving 
protection to women within the family. There are criticisms 
that the traditional legal scholarship is a political 
practice which systematically demands obedience of women to 
authority relations constructed from the male standpoint in 
the name of legality.29 In this context, law is regarded as
28 Grbich, Judith: 'Feminist's jurisprudence as women's
studies in law: Australian dialogues'. In Arnaud, A.J. and 
E. Kingdom (eds.): Women's rights and the rights of man. 
Aberdeen 1990, pp.75-148, at p.76; Wetzel, Janice Wood: The 
world of women: In pursuit of human rights. London 1993,
pp.152-177, at p.152.
29 Ibid. , p.78.
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a reflection of the patriarchal normative structures, 
manipulated to perpetuate the oppression of women.30 In 
fact, recently some feminists are alleging that the 
foundations on which traditional jurisprudence rests are 
deeply imbued with masculine perceptions and privilege and 
need to be transformed to a feminist perspective, even a 
7 feminist jurisprudence'.31 This thesis does not explore 
these theoretical debates in depth, as it does not consider 
such feminist perspectives as a suitable platform for a 
discussion of the legal position of women in Bangladesh. 
Moreover feminist writing on the family remains ambiguous; 
sometimes it is critical of the existence of the family 
itself.32 According to some feminist studies, the family is 
the main territory of sexual politics, and marriage itself 
is necessarily oppressive to women.33 Thus, the feminist 
tendency is to assert freedom of sexual life and to break 
through the bonds of marriage.34 While this study 
recognises that the family may be an oppressive institution 
for women, it also sees its potential to honour and protect
30 Singh (1990), pp.14-15.
31 Smart, Carol: 'Feminist jurisprudence'. In Fitzpatrick,
Peter (ed.): Dangerous supplements: Resistance and renewal 
in jurisprudence. London 1991, pp.133-156, at p.133.
32 Flax, Jane: 'The family in contemporary feminist thought: 
A critical review'. In Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.): The 
family in political thought. Brighton 1982, pp.223-253, at 
p.223 .
33 Ibid.. p.227; Millet, Kate: Sexual politics. New York
1970, p.22.
34 Wadia, A.R. : The ethics of feminism: A study of the 
revolt of women. New Delhi 1977, p.137.
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women.
In the context of the present study, particular 
emphasis must be given to Islamic family law, which is 
based primarily on the religion of Islam. Islam places 
women on equal footing with men in the eyes of Allah.35 
However, this definitely does not mean that men and women 
are equal in Islamic law. At the same time, the Quran and 
the early Islamic law are concerned about the betterment of 
the status of women.36 Again, the concern is with equitable 
rights within the family context, not individualised norms 
of absolute equality. Islamic law justifies gender 
differentiations on the ground of creation and nature, 
giving special rights and duties both to men and women.37
35 Hussain, Aftab: Status of women in Islam. Lahore 1987, 
p. 106; Doi, Abdur Rahman I. : Women in shari'ah (Islamic 
law) . London 198 9, p. 4; Siddique, Muhammad Mazheruddin: 
'Islam and the ideal of sex equality'. In Women in Islam. 
2nd ed. Lahore 1959, pp.15-25, at p.16; Al-Abd Al-Hay, 
Abdal Khalek A. : Contemporary women's participation in
public activities: Differences between ideal Islam and
Muslim interpretation with emphasis on Saudi Arabia. Ph.D . 
Thesis, University of Denver, Denver 1983, p.62.
36 For details see Caiman, Leslie J. : Toward empowerment: 
Women and movement politics in India. Boulder, San 
Francisco and Oxford 1992, p.54; Hussain (1987), pp.88-140; 
Khan, Qamaruddin: Status of women in Islam. New Delhi 1990, 
p.13; Doi (1989), pp.7-10; Esposito, John L. : 'The changing 
role of Muslim women'. In Islam and the Modern Age. Vol.7, 
No.l, Feb. 1976, pp.29-56; Othman, Faisal Haji: 'How Muslim 
women have been misunderstood by Muslims' . In Islamiwat. 
Vol.ii, 1990, pp.25-38; Pickthall, Muhammad Marmaduke: 
Islamic culture. Lahore 1958, p.134; Hjarpe, Jan: 'The
attitude of Islamic fundamentalism towards the question of 
women in Islam' . In Boutas (ed.) : Women in the Islamic
societies-social attitudes and historical perspectives. 
Scandinivia 1983, pp.12-23, at p.12.
37 Muthhari, Murtada: The rights of women in Islam. Tehran 
1981, pp.113-123; Misbah, Mohammad Taqi et al.: Status of 
women in Islam. London 1990, pp. 10-11..
15
Islam does not believe in concepts of sexual equality which 
ignore natural differences and the special aptitudes, 
specific powers and faculties of men and women, but regards 
men and women as complementary to each other.38 One sex is 
making up what the other lacks, acting in their specific 
spheres, in different roles. Thus, socially the sexes are 
in an equitable symbiotic relation.
Sharia is the code of obligations covering the legal 
and moral sphere, while fiah is the science of Islamic 
jurisprudence.39 It has been rightly commented that every 
moral obligation defined in the sharia does not form a 
legal obligation under the fiqh.40 Islamic family law 
reforms, until now in Bangladesh, have not been segregated 
from religion, nor is this likely to happen. In the 
chapters below, while focusing on legal reforms, we shall 
explain that Bangladeshi Muslim family law remains firmly 
within the framework of sharia and finds its primary 
justification somewhere in the religious texts or in the 
opinions of Muslim jurists.
The dominant reasoning behind this appears to be that 
law is regarded in Islam as divine and in some sense
38 For details see Siddiqui, Mohammed Mazheruddin: Women in 
Islam. Lahore 1966, pp.21-22.
39 On the principles of Islamic law see Fyzee, Asaf A.A.: 
Outlines of Muhammedan law. 4th ed. New Delhi 1974, pp.14- 
32; Hidayatullah, M.A. (ed.): Mullahs principles of
Mohammedan law. 17th ed. Bombay 1972, pp.xxiv-xxvi; Diwan, 
Paras: Muslim law in modern India. Bombay 1985, pp.16-19 
and 2 6-32.
40 Fyzee, Asaf A.A.: Outlines of Muhammadan law. Bombay 1955, 
2nd ed. p.21.
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unchangeable. Professor Coulson has noted the heavily- 
contested arena of al-hadith and al-rav for accepting human 
reasoning within the broader framework of divine 
revelation.41 Legal reforms were undertaken, as Professor 
Anderson has explicitly analysed, in four different ways.42 
The first method sometimes effected is a procedural device 
ordering the courts not to apply Islamic law in specified 
circumstances, without changing the substantive law. The 
second way was employing thakkavur. the picking and 
choosing from dicta or provisions of other recognised 
schools of thought. The third method was to reinterpret the 
Quran and sunnah through the technique of i~itihad.43 The 
reformers felt at liberty to go back to the Divine Text and 
reinterpret it according to the exigencies of modern time. 
The fourth technique was to introduce administrative 
regulations imposing the results reached by one or more of 
the other three devices. It is relevant to note here that 
the legislative reforms which took place in Bangladesh fall 
squarely under any one or more, of these devices.
Only the law of the majority population in Bangladesh, 
i.e. Muslim family law, will be considered in this
41 See in particular Coulson, N.J.: Conflicts and tensions 
in Islamic jurisprudence. Chicago 1969, pp.1-7.
42 Anderson, J.N.D.: 7 The eclipse of the patriarchal family 
in contemporary Islamic law'. In Anderson, J.N.D. (ed.): 
Family law in Asia and Africa. London 1968, pp.221-234.
43 On this see ibid., p. 225.
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thesis.44 Very little has been written specifically on 
Muslim family law in Bangladesh, and this writing does not 
primarily focus on women.45 On the other hand, while some 
studies have centered on women in Bangladesh and their 
legal status generally, their core theme did not concern 
the impact of family law reforms on women.46 None of the 
existing studies has considered unreported cases of the 
Family Courts in Bangladesh, as the present thesis does. 
Although an extensive sociological study is beyond our 
scope, an attempt will be made here to relate the concerns 
of the family and society about reforms of family law in 
order to provide a fuller understanding of societal and
44 On non-Muslim family laws in Bangladesh, hardly any 
material exists. For details see Rakshit, Mridul Kanti: The 
principles of Hindu law. Chittagong 1985; Menski, W.F. and 
Tahmina Rahman: 'Hindus and the law in Bangladesh'. In
South Asia Research. Vol.8, No.2, Nov. 1988, pp.111-131.
45 Choudhury, Alimuzzaman: The Family Courts Ordinance 1985 
and other personal laws. Dhaka 1987; Choudhury, Obaidul 
Huq: Hand book of Muslim family laws. Dhaka 1993; Rahman, 
Md. Mojibur: Muslim o paribarik ain porichiti. Dhaka 1989. 
On Islamic family law and women in different jurisdictions 
see Nasir, Jamal J.: The status of women under Islamic law 
and under modern Islamic legislation. London 1990; 
Esposito, John L. : Women in Muslim family law. New York 
1982; Layish, Aharon: Women and Islamic law in a non-Muslim 
state-a study based on decision of the Sharia Courts in 
Israel. Jarusalem 1975; Mir-Husseini, Ziba: Marriage on 
trial-a study of Islamic family law. Iran and Morocco 
compared. London and New York 1993.
46 See Sobhan, Salma: Legal status of women in Bangladesh. 
(The Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs) 
Dhaka 1978; Ahmed, Sufia and Jahanara Choudhury: 'Women's
legal status in Bangladesh'. In women for women: Research 
and Study Group (ed.) : The situation of women in
Bangladesh. Dhaka 1979, pp.285-331; Chaudhury, Rafiqul Huda 
and Nilufer Raihan Ahmed: Female status in Bangladesh.
Dhaka 1980; Chaudhury, Rafiqul Huda and Nilufer Raihan 
Ahmed: 'Women and law in Bangladesh: Theory and practice'. 
In Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.viii, No.4, 
Dec. 1988, pp.275-287.
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familial needs, to which legal changes must respond. The 
major problem of the family law system in Bangladesh 
appears to be that it does not take into account the 
reality of the social conditions, particularly women's 
concerns about freedom from violence and economic 
deprivation, either by incorporating them into various 
enactments or by giving them appropriate importance while 
interpreting the law in courts.
The method applied in the present study does not 
differ from that which is commonly used in the legal 
sciences and is not based on empirical investigation. The 
impact of legal practice is revealed by reported and 
unreported cases, from which the views of the judiciary 
about the application of the laws for the upliftment of the 
women of Bangladesh can be analysed. In view of our 
premises, we shall need to focus particularly on the 
question whether judges and legislators are protecting 
women from abuse and exploitation.
1.4 Framework of the study
The main objective of the research, as stated, is to assess 
the effects of recent family law reforms on women in 
Bangladesh. In order to provide a theoretical understanding 
of the subject which concerns women, oppressed and 
suppressed by the patriarchal society, our topic must be
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studied in a sociological context. In fact, the topic of 
women's status would automatically demand a sociological 
approach.
While in the present chapter we have defined the 
parameters of the thesis as a whole, the second chapter 
outlines the forces subordinating women. The subordinate 
status of women in their societal context originates in the 
traditional male-dominated views of their roles in the 
family and society; these have been reinforced by religion, 
tradition, seclusion and patriarchy.
Chapter 2, therefore, begins by focusing on the 
patriarchal arguments for the subordination of women in 
Bangladesh in the socio-cultural setting of women's legal 
status. The factors contributing to women's subordination 
are traced from religion to tradition, patriarchal 
structures to seclusion and various forms of discrimination 
in the socio-legal sphere. The chapter then tries to 
balance the position of women in Bangladesh by 
investigating the forces that-protect and strengthen the 
position of women and discusses various aspects of women's 
power. In this context, matriarchal notions and the sexual 
monopoly of birth, together with the gradually increasing 
socio-economic power of women are analysed as forces which 
maintain the gender balance of society.
In continuing to trace the causes of subordination of 
women in a historical perspective, the contradictory 
attitude of the British imperialist ..government towards 
women in South Asia is analysed in the first part of
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chapter 3, which examines to what extent British colonial 
imperialism contributed to the subordination of women. The 
second part of chapter 3 shows how family law was gradually 
interfered with by the British and considers how the legal 
reforms in British-India regarding the restraint of child 
marriages, women's right to divorce and restriction of 
customary laws have affected the position of Muslim women. 
Further on, for the Pakistani period (1947-71), we examine 
whether the important family law reforms of 1961 actually 
ameliorated the position of women in society and whether 
the judiciary has been taking a positive role in the 
interpretation of this law. The relevant judicial decisions 
discussed in this chapter provide a historical backdrop to 
the more recent family law reforms in independent 
Bangladesh. This approach allows, us a dynamic view of the 
early developments of family law. It also shows that most 
legislation to ameliorate the legal position of women was 
merely rhetoric. At the same time, it has to be noted that 
there are many conflicting claims on the legal system, not 
all of them favouring women.
Chapter 4 provides a detailed exposition and critical 
analysis of family law reforms in Bangladesh in response to 
the needs of the new state, which became independent in 
1971. Women's participation had been most extensive in the 
liberation movement of 1971, in which women from all walks 
of life rendered support to the freedom fighters. The 
independence of the country created a growing awareness 
among women about their social, political and legal rights
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and responsibilities in the new society.
By the Bangladesh (Adaptation of Existing Bangladesh 
Laws) Order. 1972 Bangladesh inherited the legislative 
enactments of the British and Pakistan era. The 
Constitution of Bangladesh (1972) apparently guarantees 
sexual equality. In terms of family laws and the personal 
law system, however, the new state has retained the old 
divisions of personal and general law. Before going into 
details on actual legal enactments and case-law, we first 
consider how women were treated by the Constitution of the 
newly independent country. The analysis of women's rights 
under the constitutional framework indicates the disparity 
between the religious family law and the constitutional 
rights. However, it also reveals the internal 
contradictions within the Constitution between granting 
sexual equality and making special laws for women.
The personal law system is then analysed projecting 
how the Constitution ensures that the personal law system 
continues to survive although it is not in line with some 
basic principles of the Constitution.
In recent years, the Government has amended and 
promulgated several Acts and Ordinances in an effort to 
safeguard the legal rights of the female population and to 
improve their social status.47 Indeed it can not be denied 
that there was immense pressure from women's groups and 
organisations campaigning for legislation against certain
47 Women were 48.59% in a population of 109.9 million in 
1991, see Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Statistical
pocket book of Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992, p.3.
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evils and abuses. However, they were not demanding total 
equality of the sexes within the family, but protection 
from violence and economic deprivation.
The media coverage of domestic violence against women 
also created active pressure for promulgation of some of 
these Acts and Ordinances. The areas of legal reforms 
include marriage and divorce registration, dowry 
prohibition and cruelty to women, and the establishment of 
the Family Courts. Moreover, there were minor amendments to 
the existing legislation on family law.
The major focus of inquiry of this chapter is whether 
the new laws ameliorated women's rights or whether they 
were simply rhetoric. How far in this legislation is there 
a deep-rooted commitment towards actually operating to the 
advantage of women?48
The fieldwork for this thesis involved collection of 
unreported cases from the Family Courts of Dhaka for the 
years 1971-1993. The collection includes unreported cruelty 
and violence cases of the. criminal courts. It is 
significant to mention that the Family Courts were 
established in 1985 by the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 
for marital and family cases arising after 1985. Thirty 
unreported cases altogether were collected, but usually one 
case involved more than one issue.
It has been very difficult to gather these judgements
48 On this see Sobhan, Salma: 'Cost-free legislation? An
evaluation of recent legislative trends in Bangladesh 
relating to women'. In Lawasia. Vol.4, 1985, pp.153-161, at
p .160 .
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from the Family Courts as they had to be photocopied from 
the original judgements of the courts. It was also hard to 
make those decisions accessible for this thesis, as not 
only are they confidential, they are also usually in 
Bangla, the national language of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, 
an attempt has been made in this thesis to analyse the 
unreported decisions of the Family Courts of Dhaka to give 
a more complete picture of the family law situation than 
one gets from reported cases.
The unreported cases are significantly important in 
family issues, as jurisdiction lies with the higher courts
on appeal only in cases of dower over 5000 taka and on the
ground of cruelty under section 17 of the Family Courts 
Ordinance, 1985. The decisions of the Family Courts 
conclusively determine all issues except those where there 
is scope for an appeal. Thus, unless unreported cases are 
analysed, the impact of the legislation can not be 
ascertained in this field.
Chapter 5 aims to explore what is the attitude of the
judges and the opinion of the court regarding women's 
status in Bangladesh and how far they are aware about the 
needs of women. The judge's views on this subject can be 
studied from their statements in court decisions.
This chapter also focuses on the question whether 
women in Bangladesh stand to benefit from judicial activism 
or more sensitivity in issues involving the welfare of
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women and safeguarding them from abuse.49 However, this 
attitude of the judiciary is only reflected in a few family 
law cases and is not a general trend. This could be the 
result of the socio-economic transformation of Bangladeshi 
society. As women's contribution to the national economy is 
gradually better valued and recognised, judicial notice 
will need to be takan of some social changes.
To achieve the aim of studying the effect of family 
law on women in Bangladesh, different issues are analysed 
which make their way to the courts, by first briefly 
tracing their sharia origin and then placing them in the 
context of the modern statutory enactments. In doing so, we 
seek to explore the assumptions behind the issues in 
sharia, any adaptation or reform in the statutes, and 
practice in the courts, especially in the Family Court. 
Registration of marriage and divorce, restitution of 
conjugal rights, polygamy, dissolution of marriage, dower, 
maintenance, custody and guardianship are analysed in turn. 
This also allows us to consider whether the modern legal 
apparatus of reforms is finding expression in social 
reality and how beneficial the modern reforms have been to 
women in practice.
Chapter 6 extends the examination of the issues of 
women in Bangladesh to disputes concerning dowry and 
cruelty to women asking whether the new legislation 
introduced to curb these social evils affecting women was
49 On judicial activism see Malik, Shahdeen: 'Once again
Shah Banu, maintenance and scope for marriage contracts'. 
In 42 DLR (1990) Journal, pp.34-3 9, at p.39.
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successful or not. However, it must be emphasised that by 
far not all dowry and cruelty cases come up to the courts. 
Some tables of crimes against women in Bangladesh are given 
to show generally that cruelty and violence against women 
have tremendously increased in Bangladesh. Violence against 
women has reached the proportion of a national problem. In 
the domain of domestic violence, cruelty to women for dowry 
and other causes has become a grave issue in Bangladesh.50 
The problem has become so disastrous that dowry deaths have 
become an everyday event in South Asia.51 This scenario 
inspired us to separate this issue from the other topics of 
family law and to investigate the dowry problem in the 
context of the actual needs of women to be protected from 
violence and financial constraints. While cruelty to women 
puts the spotlight on the need of women in Bangladesh to be 
protected from physical violence and does not involve the 
sphere of freedom from economic deprivation, dowry problem 
involve both spheres. The urgency of the reforms to check 
these social evils was already felt earlier and the Dowry 
Prohibition Act of 1980 and the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent
50 Islam, Mahmuda: 'Women studies in Bangladesh: An
overview'. In South Asia Newsletter. Center for Asian 
Studies Amsterdam and Documentation Center on South Asia, 
Leiden, No.4, Dec. 1989, pp.1-4, at p.l.
51 The Guardian. 28th July 1980, p. 5; Choudhury, Neerja: 
'Burning of the bride'. In New Internationalist. No.81, 
p.27; Vyas, Neena: 'A mother's crusade'. In Kishwar, Madhu 
and Ruth Vanita (eds.): In search of answers: Indian
women's voices from Manushi. London 1984, pp.206-207; Singh 
and Singh (1990), pp.311-319; Grover, Kanta: Burning flesh. 
New Delhi 1990, pp.20-23; Kumari, Ranjana: Brides are not 
for burning, dowry victims in India. New Delhi 1989; 
Ekelaar, John: 'Scream silently, or the neighbour will
hear'. In The Lawyers. Vol.6, No.4, April 1991, pp.4-11.
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Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 were enacted in response to 
growing evidence of dowry murders. We try to asses here 
whether these Acts or Ordinances were actually beneficial 
to women and can protect them against violence.
The judges of the criminal courts have been 
sympathetic to the plight of women and have been giving 
proper redress to women seeking .protection from violence. 
It is significant that this has been more successful than 
protecting women from economic deprivation. Thus, the 
unsympathetic attitude of the judiciary is more clearly 
reflected in the private sphere than in the public arena of 
violence. However, only a negligible number of cases of 
violence are actually reported.
The issues discussed in chapter 6 fall under the 
jurisdiction of the criminal courts, as dowry murders and 
cruelty to women are criminal offences under the Penal 
Code, 1860. We suggest that the. criminal jurisdiction of 
these issues should also be transferred to the domain of 
the Family Courts, so that any aspect of family law would 
be under one jurisdiction.
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the 
legislative enactments in Bangladesh and discusses the 
trends in judicial decision making.It can be seen that 
there is a wide gap between the theory of religious and 
official family laws, intimately connected with the lives 
of women, and practical application in society. For 
example, child marriages still persist, marriages are not 
registered, divorce in most cases still seems to be the
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prerogative of the man, dowers remain unpaid and there is 
a distinct gap between women's maintenance rights and 
actual practice.
In view of this, an attempt is made to recommend how 
these gaps in law and practice can be narrowed, even if 
they cannot be closed totally by the law. Informal dispute 
resolution through shalish as provided by the legal aid 
centers is given some consideration. There are many 
voluntary legal aid centers in Bangladesh giving women 
opportunities not only to have judicial redress, but also 
legal literacy, shalish and mediation.52 However, the 
limitation of shalish through legal aid is that it does not 
have the same sanction or authority as the Family Courts 
and the parties may simply avoid to appear.53 But as an 
out-of-court settlement, the local arbitration or shalish 
on women is recognised by the Family Courts in Bangladesh. 
Decisions of these shalish could, thus, be legitimised by 
the Family Courts to give women more rights. It seems that 
these alternative structures of justice could give 
practical remedies to women, but they are also dominated by 
patriarchal concerns. Sometimes, recourse to these legal 
aid services means that women are given considerably lesser 
remedies than would be granted by the Family Courts and the 
accused may escape punishment.54
We are arguing that it will protect women more
52 Sobhan et al. (1992) .
53 Ibid. , p . 2 7 .
54 Ibid. , p.30.
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effectively if the judiciary is more sensitised about the 
particular needs of women. What is required now is better 
implementation of the existing legal rights of women, at 
all levels, to secure for them freedom from violence and 
economic deprivation.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL SETTING OF WOMEN’S LEGAL 
STATUS
This chapter analyses the socio-cultural setting of 
Bangladeshi women which indisputably affects their legal 
position. As this study primarily deals with the rights of 
Muslim women, the position of women under Islam is given 
some consideration. By exploring these socio-cultural 
aspects the determinants for the enforcement of the rights 
of women in Islamic and official law can be traced.
This chapter seeks to cover the major factors which in 
their totality and also individually restrict women and 
assign them an role in Bangladeshi society. An attempt is 
then made to strengthen gender analysis in Bangladesh by 
balancing the stress on women's power with the usual male- 
biased perspectives which see - and treat women as passive 
objects.1 Thus, the chapter is progressing from perceived 
notions of female subordination to an analysis of the 
counter forces women have at their disposal. This part of 
our work tries to argue that there are avenues in which 
women are powerful, but these are rarely illuminated as it 
might hurt the ego of the male-dominated patriarchal
1 For a similar approach see White, Sarah: 'Behind whose
throne?: Power and images of women in Bangladesh'. In
Politics. Vol.9, No.2, 1989, pp.28-33, at p.29.
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society.
This discussion of social forces also lays open the 
tensions in family law about sexual equality and argues 
that improving gender equity is a feasible strategy for 
enhancing the freedom of women from economic deprivation 
and violence.
2.1 Perceived notions of female subordination
Women in Bangladesh, as elsewhere, are commonly depicted as 
subjugated and subordinated in a patriarchally-dominated 
society. This image of subordination is enhanced and 
amplified by the traditional views of stereotyped female 
roles in the family and society. The main factors stated to 
contribute to this subordination are the negative impact of 
tradition, religion, patriarchy, seclusion or parda and 
paternalistic attitudes in the socio-economic and legal 
sphere. These factors are analysed here in some detail to 
ascertain to what extent they are causes of the legal 
subordination of women.
This section first discusses briefly the position of 
women in Islam. In the second sub-section, the negative 
impact of traditional cultures on women is analysed to show 
that Bangladesh has a unique cultural amalgamation which 
often negatively oppresses women. We then analyse the 
patriarchal structures of Bangladesh to show how they 
undermine women's position, ask whether seclusion or parda
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is a tool to control women or a system to preserve feminine 
modesty and consider finally, how women are perceived to be 
degraded in the socio-economic and legal spheres.
2.1.1 Women in Islam
The intentions of the early Islamic leaders in Arabia 
towards women and the provisions in Islamic law as found in 
the Quran can be construed as conferring new rights on 
women. In fact, there is a large volume of literature 
asserting that early Islamic law in Arabia explicitly 
conferred rights on women.2 The male-female dynamics in 
Islam are such that there is equality of the sexes in the 
spiritual sphere. The Quran implies equality of all 
believers in terms of equal obligation to pray, to give 
alms and prohibition from evil. There is no concept of 
vicarious liability in Islam and individual persons are 
responsible for their acts and deeds. However, Islam
2 See Hussain, Aftab: Status of women in Islam. Lahore 1987, 
pp.88-14 0; Khan, Qamaruddin: Status of women in Islam. New 
Delhi 1990, p.13; Doi, I. Abdur Rahman: Women in shari'ah 
(Islamic law) . London 1989, pp.7-10; Esposito, John L.:
' The changing role of Muslim women' . In Islam and the 
Modern Age. Vol.7, No.l. Feb. 1976, pp.29-56; Othman, 
Faisal Haji: 'How Muslim women have been misunderstood by 
Muslims'. In Islamiwat. Vol.ii, 1990, pp.25-38; Pickthall, 
Muhammad Marmaduke: Islamic culture. Lahore 1958, p. 134;
Hjarpe, Jan: 'The attitude of Islamic fundamentalism
towards the question of women in Islam'. In Bo Utas (ed.): 
Women in Islamic societies-social attitudes and historical 
perspectives. London 1983, pp.12-23, at p.12.
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contains an ambivalent message concerning equality of the 
sexes. At the higher level, in the individual's 
relationship with the Creator/ there is absolute equality 
among all Muslims. At the levels of worldly affairs and 
social relationships between people, there is inequality. 
Thus, concerning the relationship with a husband, 
competence of evidence etc., there seems to be gender 
inequality. This is implied by several verses of the Quran. 
Thus, verse 2:228 indicates thatjwomen have similar rights 
as men, according to what is equitable, but men have a 
degree of advantage over them.3 According to this verse, 
Allah set men over women as their superiors, but women have 
the right to care and maintenance.4
The basic philosophy behind the differences between 
men and women, in different positions, is justified on the 
ground of creation and nature. According to Islam, social 
laws must be framed in accordance with human nature.5 Islam 
qualifies and defines gender equality with the assertion 
that this is not an absolute and undifferentiated equality 
but one involving special rights and duties for men and 
women. Islam does not believe in the conception of sexual 
equality but regards men and women as complementary to each
3 Ali, Abdullah Yusuf (trans.): The Holy Quran. Lahore 
1934, p.90.
4 Reuben, Levy: The social structure of Islam. London 1962, 
p.92; Siddiqui, Mohammed Mazheruddin: Women in Islam.
Lahore 1966, pp.15-24.
5 Misbah, Mohammad Taqi et al. : Status of women in Islam. 
London 1990, pp.10-11; Muthhari, Murtada: The rights of 
women in Islam. Tehran 1981, pp.113-123.
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other and thus, as equitable in the private sphere.6 Islam 
sees this as natural and idealistic, as men and women are 
playing different roles for the betterment of the Muslim 
society or ummah.
It is, of course, very simple to interpret this gender 
differentiation as deliberate discrimination against women 
and, as we shall see, equally simple for male chauvinists 
to justify the superiority of men.
The reasoning behind the supposed superiority of men 
over women is usually derived from another verse of the 
Quran. Verse 4:34 states that men are protectors (aawwam) 
and maintainers of women because they support them from 
their means.7 The word aawwam used to be generally 
interpreted as 'in charge', an authority or ruler or 
sovereign, which reflects the image of the society.8 But 
recently the word has been understood as a provider, a 
supporter, a manager, a caretaker, a custodian or a 
guardian.9 Asghar Ali, who analysed the concept of sexual 
equality in Islam, has argued, that the divine revelation 
simply says that men are aawwam over women, seeing it as a
6 Siddiqui (1966), p.21-22.
7 Ali (Trans.) (1934), p.190; See also Rahman, Fazlur: 'The 
status of women in Islam: A modernist Interpretation'. In 
Minault, Gail and Hanna Papanek (eds.): Separate worlds: 
Studies of purdah in South Asia. Delhi 1982, pp.285-310, at 
p.294 .
8 Ali, Asghar: The rights of women in Islam. London 1992, 
pp.4 6 -4 7.
9 Hussain (1987), pp.110-111.
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contextual statement and not a normative one.10 Aftab
Hossain has collected material on this and tells us that 
the word aawwam has been interpreted differently by 
different authors. Abdullah Yousuf Ali translates the word 
as 'protector', Pickthall translates it as 'in-charge',
Arbury translates it as 'one who manages the affairs of 
women', Abdul Aziz Jaweesh says that the 'superiority', if 
any, is not for any natural proficiency in one and 
deficiency in another, but it is only on account of the 
liability to maintain.11 The major argument for male 
superiority, then, is that men are protecting women, 
maintaining them or are in charge of women. This is
affirmed by male and female writers who state that men
claim authority over women because they are invested with 
the responsibility of taking care of women, financially and 
otherwise.12 The shariah provides that even if the woman is 
wealthier than her husband, the latter is under an 
obligation to provide for her maintenance. The Hanafi law 
determines the scale of maintenance by referring to the 
social position of both husband and wife, whereas the Shafi 
law only considers the position of the husband and the Shia 
law focuses on the requirements of the wife.13
10 Ali (1992) , at p.46.
11 Hussain (1987), p.110.
12 See Smith, I.J.: 'Islam'. In Sharma, Arvind (ed.): Women 
in world religions. New York 1987, pp.235-281, at p.239.
13 Tyabji, Faiz Badruddin: Muslim law. 4th ed. 1968, pp.265- 
2 66; Ali, Syed Ameer: Mohammedan law. Vol.ii, 4 th ed. 
Calcutta 1917, p.462; Anderson, Norman: Law reform in the 
Muslim world. London 1976, pp.132-133.
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In a Muslim society, therefore, the man has full 
responsibility for the maintenance of not only his wife but 
also his children. At the same time anything a wife earns 
is her own to dispose of, either to use it herself or to 
contribute it to the family budget if she wishes.14
The statement that men are a degree above women means 
that authority within the household has been given to the 
husband in preference to the wife, because a heavier burden 
has been placed on his shoulder.15 Perhaps the picture 
would have been different if females were the maintainers. 
The Quran is silent on the question of what should happen 
when men cease to be providers financially, emotionally or 
otherwise. Therefore it leaves open the question of status 
of women when they are no longer dependent on men as the 
providers or breadwinners. As indicated, recent trends show 
that increasingly families are finding it very hard to live 
on the husband's income alone and many husbands are failing 
to provide their normative commitment.
The notion of superiority and authority should be 
distinguished from the burden to bear responsibility. 
Superiority and authority of obedience in Islam is only 
paid to God.16 But here Islamic traditions have developed 
yet another ambivalent stance on gender relations. While
14 Lemu, B. Aisha and Fatima Heeren: Women in Islam.
Leicester 1976, p.18.
15 Doi (1989), p.41; Muhammad Ali, Maulana: The religion of 
Islam. Lahore 1973, p.532.
16 Siddique, Kaukab: The struggle of Muslim women.
Kingsville 1986, p.26.
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God alone is owed submission in religious terms, socially 
the male's providing position brings with it a female duty 
to subordination.
The debate on the creation of women from Adam's rib is 
a Judeo-Christian tradition intermingled with Islamic 
tradition without any basis.17 However, Islamic law mainly 
gives priority and prerogative to the male Muslims. 
Well-known examples are the male's right to unilateral 
divorce, the male's right to marry up to four wives, the 
male's right to guardianship and custody (above a certain 
legal age), a son's double share in the parental property 
and one man being equated with two women in legal 
testimony. All this denies absolute equality of men and 
women.
The rights given by different schools under the 
different sects of Islam (Shia and Sunni) do vary in 
details. In principle, though, they all subordinate women. 
For example in the Sunni sects (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and 
Hanbali), only the Hanafi school allows women to marry 
without a guardian's approval, or not to veil their face 
and hands and also goes to the extent of allowing them to 
be judges. All the Sunni schools in principle allow women 
to have education, the capacity to buy and sell property, 
to participate in war, to have political rights and to work
17 See for details Hassan, Riffat: 'Made from Adam's rib: The 
women's creation question'. in Al-Mushir Theological 
Journal of the Christian Study Centre. Rawalpindi,
Vol.xxvii, No.3, Autumn 1985, pp.124-155.
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with men,18 but these rights are often subject to various
restrictions and work within limits.
The tendency was to interpret the Quranic provisions
in the light of standards of the prevailing tribal law,
resulting in the loss of women's status and position in the
family as granted by rules of divine origin.19 For this
reason the perception of statuses of Muslim women in the
early period of Islam stands in sharp contrast with their
position in later Muslim society. The actual situation of
women with their rights and privileges has been far removed
from the Islamic ideal.20
Fatima Mernissi has argued in her recent work that the
main problem of Muslim women's subordination is not rooted
in religion or tradition, but in patriarchal influence and
arbitrariness which has dominated women for centuries.
Mernissi, an Arab woman, writes that when she had finished
writing her book, she had come to understand one thing,
If women's rights are a problem for some modern 
Muslim men, it is neither because of the Koran 
nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but 
simply because those rights conflict with the 
interest of a male elite. The elite faction is 
trying to convince us that their egotistic, 
highly subjective and mediocre view of culture
18 See in detail Al-Abd Al-Hay, Abdal Khalek A. : Contemporary 
women's participation in public activities: Differences 
between ideal Islam and Muslim interpretation with emphasis 
on Saudi Arabia. Ph.D. Thesis University of Denver, Denver 
1983, esp. p.137.
19 Coulson, Noel and Doreen Hinchcliffe: 'Women and law
reform in contemporary Islam'. In Beck, Lois and Keddi 
Nekki (eds.): Women in the Muslim world. London 1978,
pp.37-51, at p.38.
20 Ahmed, Akbar S. : Discovering Islam-making sense of Muslim 
history and society. New Delhi 1990, p.185.
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and society has a sacred basis.21
While we agree with this, we would suggest that 
Mernissi seems concerned to protect Islamic traditions from 
the charge of subordinating women. However, these Islamic 
traditions have, to a large extent, been created by the 
very same male elite that Mernissi holds responsible for 
suppressing women. Rana Kabbani in her review of two books 
on women and Islam points out that Muslim patriarchy is at 
last being challenged by Arab women. Women are now arguing 
that men have distorted Mohammed's teachings to entrench 
the male elite.22 The patriarchal structure of the Muslim 
family has been emphasised as the heart of the 
subordination of women in the Muslim societies.23 However, 
patriarchal religious tradition conflicts with feminist 
ideology, whether Islamic or non-Islamic. In view of the 
strong influence of particular religious traditions and 
local authors, we should rather deal with this as an issue 
within a particular society (see chapter 2.1.3 below) than 
on a global basis.
21 Mernissi, Fatima: Women and Islam: An historical and
theological enquiry. Oxford 1991, p.ix.
22 Kabbani, Rana: 'Reclaiming the true faith for women'. In 
The Guardian. Saturday May 23, 1992.
23 Joseph, Suad: Women in the Middle East. Berkely 1985, pp.
; Austin, R.W. J. : 'Islam and the feminine'. In Mac Eain,
Denis and Al-Shahi Ahmed (eds.) : Islam in the modern world. 
London and Canberra 1983, p.36; Shaheed, Farida: 'The
articulation of patriarchy'. In Zafar, Fareeha (ed.): 
Finding our wav-readings on women in Pakistan. Lahore 1991, 
pp.135-158.
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2.1.2 The negative impact of traditional cultures
Bangladesh, formerly East Bengal and then East Pakistan, 
shares two of the oldest and richest cultural traditions of
the world. On the one hand, it roots back to ancient Indie
civilisation and on the other hand to Islamic culture.24 
The crystallisation of the Bengali language from the 
classical Sanskrit during the Indian medieval period
provided the region with a linguistic underpinning for its 
separate cultural identity.25 Moreover when the Muslim 
influence spread to Bengal, the area already had a rich 
accumulation of Buddhist and Hindu cultures of at least 
fifteen hundred years and a complete structure of 
society.26
Most of the original converts to Islam and their
descendants, who were mostly lower caste Hindus,27 did not
24 Smock, Audrey Chapman: 'Bangladesh: A struggle with
tradition and poverty'. In Gillee, Janet Zollinger and 
Audrey Chapman Smock (eds.):- Women-roles and status in 
eight countries. New York 1977, pp.83-126, at p.83.
25 Spear, Percival: 'The medieval Hindu kingdoms from the 
death of Harsha in A.D. 647 to the Muslim conquest' . In 
Spear, Percival (ed.): The Oxford history of India. Oxford 
1958, pp.190-203, at p.197.
26 Ali, Anwar: 'Muslim mind and society in Bangladesh: An 
historical retrospect'. In Ali, Asghar (ed.): Islam in 
South and South-East Asia. New Delhi 1985, pp.185-229, at 
p .185.
27 Smock (1977), p.86; Bertocci, Peter J. : 'Bangladesh-
composite cultural identity and modernization in a Muslim 
majority state'. In Stoddard, Phillip H. et al. (eds.):
Change and the Muslim world. Syracuse 1981, pp.75-85, at 
p. 75; Sarkar, S.: The swadeshimovement in Bengal 1903-
1908. New Delhi 1973, pp.408-409.
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give up many of the local rituals and customs. Like all 
other world religions, Islam has adapted itself to various 
climates and cultures.28 As Islam spread beyond the Arab 
peninsula, many of the customary laws of the converted
populations found expression in the body of Muslim law as
practised in that area.29 In the course of time the
interaction and clash of Quranic reforms with the strong 
social customs of new converts brought about new cultural 
adjustments that eventually lowered women's status.30
Islam, by the time of its entry in the subcontinent, 
already incorporated principles of patriarchal 
arbitrariness and sexual rigidity not compatible with the 
letter and spirit of Quranic provisions and many of
Mohammed's teachings.31 Thus, the form in which Islam 
reached India, more than five centuries after the life of 
Mohammed and through the aegis of Turks, Afghans and
28 Ali (1985), p.226; Ali, Asghar: 'Islamic fundamentalism
and communalism in India'. In Ali, Asghar (ed.): Islam in 
South and South-East Asia. New Delhi 1985, pp.171-197, at 
p. 171. See also on the local nature of Islam, Ahmed, 
Rafiuddin: 'Conflict and contradiction in Bengali Islam:
Problems of change and adjustment'. In Ewing, Katherine P. 
(ed.): Shariat and ambiguity in South-Asian Islam.
Berkeley, Los Angels and London 1988, pp.114-142. For 
religious tolerance and sharing of customs of East Bengali 
Muslims with their Hindu neighbours see Evans, Hugh: 
'Bangladesh: South Asia's unknown quantity'. In Journal of 
the Roval Society of Asian Affairs. Vol.xix, Part.iii, Oct. 
1988, pp.306-317; Mujeeb, M. : The Indian Muslims. London 
1967, p.446.
29 Smith, Donald Eugene: India as a secular state. 
Princeton and New Jersey 1963, pp.39 and 53.
30 Pickthall, Mohammed M. : Cultural side of Islam. Lahore 
1966, pp.146-147.
31 Smock (1977) , p. 89 .
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Mughals, clearly accorded women a subordinate religious and 
social status.32 The reasons for this cannot be researched 
within the ambit of the present thesis, but recent work is 
showing, with particular reference to post-divorce 
maintenance and polygamy, that earlier liberal Islamic 
provisions have over time been interpreted to the detriment 
of women.33 This happened apparently, as many authors have 
indicated, through a combination of male-dominated Islamic 
scholarship and male-centered social development. On the 
latter point the actual situation of women, their social 
status and privilege is usually far removed from the 
Islamic ideal, whether in the tribe, village or city.34 On 
the former point, women are seen as helpless captives under 
men's control.35
While focusing on the patriarchal arbitrariness of 
Islam in India we should also keep in mind that from the 
very beginning of its history in India, Islam has absorbed 
beliefs and practices characteristic of and akin to
32 Ibid. , 85.
33 Rahman, Fayyaz-ur: Muslim women's right to post-
divorce maintenance. Ongoing Ph.D. Thesis, London 1994, 
SOAS; See also Rehana, Firdous: Discussion on polygamy and 
divorce bv Muslim modernist in South-Asia. with special 
reference to their treatment of Quran and Sunnah. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London 1990, SOAS.
34 Ahmed (1990), pp.184-195.
35 Kamali, M. Hashim: 'Divorce and women's right: Some Muslim 
interpretation of S. 2:228'. In The Muslim World. Vol.74, 
1984, pp.85-99.
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Hinduism.36 This is true about Islam in Bangladesh too. As 
a way of life, Bengali Islam has taken in local 
characteristics which make it look different from the ways
of Islam elsewhere in the world.37 Bengali Muslims adhere
simultaneously to the principles of Islam and their Bengali 
culture. To many of them, these two spheres of different 
ideologies do not pose any conflict and contradiction.38 
But there is always a tension about the proper balance 
between these two diverging ideologies.39 When any of the 
ideologies became dominant, as history reveals, conflicts 
and contradictions arose.40 The impact of this can also be 
seen in legal reforms in the British Indian period when 
attempts were made to curtail the effect of Hindu customary 
law on Islamic law (see chapter 3.1.4 below).
This trend can also be felt in Bengali women's lives.
A Bengali woman has acknowledged:
36 Titus, Murray T.: Islam in India and Pakistan. Karachi 
1990, p.156; Ahmad, Aziz: 'Islamic frontiers in Africa and 
Asia-India'. In Schacht, Joseph and C.E. Bosworth (eds.): 
The legacy of Islam. Oxford 1974, pp.130-143, at p.133.
37 Wright, D. : 'Islam and Bangladesh polity'. In South Asia. 
1987, Vol.10, No.2, p.15.
38 Fruzetti, Lina and Akos Oster: 'Muslim rituals: The
household rites and the public festivals'. In Kinship and 
ritual in Bengal: Anthropological essay. New Delhi 1984, 
pp.180-201, at p.181.
39 Khan, Zillur Rahman: 'Islam and Bengali nationalism'. In 
Ahmed, Rafiuddin (ed.): Bangladesh: Society, religion and 
politics. Chittagong 1985, pp.17-27.
40 See for details Khan, Muinuddin Ahmed: 'Social and
political implications of the Islamic reform movements in 
Bengal in the nineteenth century'. In Ahmed, Rafiuddin 
(ed.) : Bangladesh: Society. religion and politics.
Chittagong 1985, pp.81-94.
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Bengali Muslim women live in a cultural 
environment which is a combination of Islamic 
traditions and pre-existing Hindu custom.41
Bengalis have historically acknowledged a continuous
attachment to the Bengali language and culture; this
culture owes more in its development to Hinduism than to
Islam, as indicated in the beginning of this sub-chapter.
Thus for example, the influence of Hindu customs concerning
widow remarriage has obscured the legal right of Muslim
widows to remarry.42 It seems that many widows,
particularly those belonging to respectable families,
preferred not to marry again due to the impact of Hindu
ideas.43 There is also much evidence that South Asian
Muslim marriages are in fact a complex amalgam of the
traditional Muslim contract (nikah) and local customary
traditions. The rituals of birth are also based on local
tradition, very often clearly derived from Hindu notions.44
Some of these customs illustrate the subordination of
women. For example, widows are seen as .inauspicious and not
to be allowed to participate actively in the rituals of
marriage or to wear colourful saris.
The practice of parda or purdah, the seclusion of
41 Abdullah, Tahrunnesa Ahmed: Village women as I saw them. 
Dhaka 1974, p.2.
42 White, Elizabeth Herrick: Women's status in an Islamic 
society: The problem of parda. Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Denver, Denver 1975, pp.1-152, at p.16.
43 Ghosh, K.S.: Indian women through the ages. New Delhi 
1989, p.47.
44 Blanchet, T. : Meanings and rituals of birth in rural 
Bangladesh. Dhaka 1984, pp.75-121.
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women for a variety of reasons, is similarly based on 
Muslim concepts and other pre-Islamic notions of the need ^  
to segregate the sexes. We shall discuss this issue in 
more detail in sub-chapter 2.1.4 below.
It is interesting, perhaps significant, to note that 
the Muslim tradition provides that the family of the groom 
should give a dower, payable on demand to the bride, which 
the Islamic law specifies to be paid to the bride and not 
to the father.45 This dower (mahr) system implied that the 
prestige brought by a chaste woman and by the children she 
would bear was worth a considerable investment. Women's 
primary source of prestige, as we shall see in detail in 
sub chapter 2.2.1 below, was traditionally derived from the 
ability to bear children.
It appears that at some point within this century, 
many Bengali communities began adopting a new, prominently 
Hindu practice whereby the bride's family presents the 
groom with a dowry and assumes most or all of the costs of 
the wedding ritual. This practice indicates a further loss 
of status of the female spouse, who now becomes a minor 
consideration in the often very commercialised context of 
marriage arrangements that involve dowry demands (see for 
details chapter 6.1 below).
Therefore, it would seem to make little difference for 
women whether people follow traditional Islamic law or rely 
heavily on local hybrid customs. Even among those Muslims
45 Mahmood, Tahir: The Muslim law of India. Allahabad 1987, 
3rd ed. p.71.
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who purport to follow classical Muslim law, juristic 
devaluation of the position of women had the clear effect 
of subordinating women. The same people may not even have 
been consciously aware of the fact that', by following some 
aspects of local custom, they were in fact further 
weakening the position of women. Through the interaction of 
the two cultures, women came in many ways to be considered 
as symbols of male status and as emblems of family 
prestige.46 Rather than empowering them with their granted 
official and Islamic rights, they were doubly suppressed.
2.1.3 Patriarchal structures in Bangladesh
The systems of patriarchy in Bangladesh are commonly 
identified by patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence 
(i.e. the practice of women living with their husband's kin 
after marriage) .47 Descent in Bangladesh is mainly 
organised along patrilineal lines. This patrilineal descent 
system has direct relevance to the place of women in 
society. A boy is the perpetuator of the patriline; he will
46 Lindenbaum, Shirley: 'The value of women' . Paper presented 
to the Ninth Annual Conference on Bengali Studies, Columbia 
University, New York 1973.
47 For a general analysis of the concept of patriarchy, see 
Rendall, Vicky: Women and politics. London 1982, pp.15-34; 
McDonagh, R. and R.R. Harrison: 'Patriarchy and relations 
of the production' . In Kuhn, A. and A. Walpe (eds.) : 
Feminism and materialism. London 1978, pp.28-29; Barret, 
M. : Women's oppression today. London 1980, pp.10-11.
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continue the family name. By contrast, a girl is of no use 
in this respect. Her contribution in this sphere will have 
to be made in some other house. "A bird of passage", 
"another's property", "a guest in the parent's house", "a 
thing to be preserved for an outsider", or "a thing which 
has to be given away" are some of the common descriptions 
of a daughter.48 There is a well-known Bengali saying to 
the effect that educating your daughter is like watering 
another man's fields.
In the patrilineal and patrilocal kinship system, a 
son is looked upon as the father's natural apprentice and 
successor or supporter of the parents in old age. Sons are 
supposed to build up family prestige and prosperity. A 
father believes that he will continue to live in this world 
through his son. All these notions work together to give a 
special value to the son.49 The World Fertility Survey of 
1983 studied forty developing countries and found that the 
countries with the strongest preference for a son were 
Bangladesh, Jordan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan and Syria.50
Patrilineal descent clearly plays an important role in 
the systematic devaluation of women by its stress on 
biological paternity as the basis of assigning children and 
by making women more or less irrelevant in genealogical 
reckoning. This of course, as we will show in chapter 2.2.1
48 Towards Equality. (Report of the Committee on the status 
of women in India) New Delhi 1974, pp.56-57.
49 Ibid. , p.57.
50 Mahmuda, Islam: The girl child in Bangladesh: A situation 
analysis. (UNICEF), Dhaka 1990, p.9.
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below, is clearly not the full picture, as women remain the
crucial vehicle by which humankind is perpetuated.
The overwhelming majority of the Bangladeshi
population follows the patrilineal system of descent. Some
tribals in Bangladesh, such as the Garos (in Mymensing) and
Khasiyas (in Sylhet) are matril-ineal, whereas the Santhals
(in Rajshahi) and the Chakmas (in the Chittagong Hill
Tracks) are patrilineal, although it is apprised that:
In all the tribal societies whether Patrilineal 
or Matrilineal, women seemed to be far more 
independent than elsewhere in Bangladesh. In the 
fields, men and women worked side by side, unlike 
the scene in the rest of Bangladesh.51
There seems to be an agreement in the literature that
women are more emancipated in tribal societies than in the
mainstream population.52
In the general population of Bangladesh, according to
one anthropologist's interpretation, whereas the birth of
a son is heralded with the cry of "God is great", the
arrival of a daughter brings only the whisper of the
Quranic prayer in her ear..53 Moreover, one goat is
sacrificed in the naming ceremony of the daughter, which is
known as akika, but two goats in the case of a son. This
difference in response to the sex of a new-born baby is but
the foreshadowing of 'the sharp differences in roles and
51 Sobhan, Salma: Legal status of women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 
1978, p.45.
52 Towards Equality (1974), p.57.
53 See in detail Bertocci, Peter J.: 'Rural communities in
Bangladesh: Hajipur and Tinpara'. In Mahoney, Clarence
(ed.) : South Asia: Seven Community Profiles. New York 1974, 
pp.81-130.
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behaviour patterns that the child will learn and act out 
later in life. It is evident that mothers frequently 
exhibit a strong preference for sons because of the 
realisation that their status within the family and future 
security, if widowed or divorced, depends upon their sons. 
As a consequence of this, we find differential treatment of 
children according to sex. Probably for lack of food and 
care, the mortality rate for girls under 5 ranges from 35 
to 50 per cent higher than that for boys in the same age 
group.54
The social arrangements for patrilocal residence 
further undermine women's autonomy. After marriage, a woman 
is effectively cut off from the potential support of her 
own kin. She is suddenly thrust into a strange environment 
with people whom she does not know, as marriage is usually 
arranged by the guardians. A leading writer reports that 
the bride often becomes little more than a servant to her 
in-laws and she may not even be given adequate care in her 
child-bearing period.55 High maternal mortality results 
from poor diet, repeated pregnancies, unhygienic
54 Mosley, Wiley H. et al. : Demographic characteristics of 
a population laboratory in rural East Pakistan. Dhaka 1970, 
p.5.; De Souza, Alfred: 'Women in India and South Asia: An 
introduction'. In De Souza, Alfred (ed.): Women in
contemporary India and South Asia. New Delhi 1980, pp.1-30, 
at p.23.; Khan, Azizur Rahman and Mahbub Hossain: The
strategy of development in Bangladesh. London 1989, p.169; 
Aziz, K.M.A.: 'Daughters and sons in rural Bangladesh:
Gender creation from birth to adolescence'. In Krishnaraj, 
Maithereyi and Karuna Channa (eds.): Gender and the
household domain: Social-cultural dimensions. New Delhi
1989, pp.55-73, at p.56.
55 Lindenbaum (1973), pp.6-8.
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environments and physical abuse.56
Paramount to the consolidation of a woman's identity 
and status amongst her in-laws is the socio-biological role 
of reproducing the patrilineage ,57 Thus, while the status 
of women is enhanced by the birth of a male child, the 
failure to bear any offspring or a male child has many 
negative effects and may be considered grounds for divorce, 
as we shall see below (chapter 5.5) .
Women's dependency upon and subordination to men is
conditioned by a whole range of institutional practices
embedded in the family and the kin-group. It is these
aspects which provide the constituent elements of the 
well-documented system of patriarchy in Bangladesh which 
institutionalises the female subordination of women and 
their structured dependency on men.58 It appears confirmed, 
then, that the main problem of subordination is not really 
religion or tradition, but patriarchal influence and 
authority. It is men who have interpreted religion,
moulding it to perpetuate the patriarchal domination which 
has strong links with the issue of gender violence. A legal 
analysis of violence and cruelty to women in Bangladesh is 
provided in chapter 6.3 and 6.4 below. It is argued that 
violence against women is deeply related with the
56 Id.
57 Chen, Martha Alter: A quiet revolution: Women in
transition in rural Bangladesh. Dhaka 1986, p.56.
58 Cain, Mead et al.: 'Class patriarchy and women's work in 
Bangladesh'. In Population and Development Review. Vol.5, 
No.3, Sept. 1979, pp.405-438, at pp.406-408.
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oppressive structures of the male-dominated values of 
Bangladeshi society.59
Women's rights under Islamic law are often not 
implemented. Thus, there is evidence that it is usual to 
deprive women of their granted shares of interests for 
keeping the patrimony intact.60 A study of two villages in 
Bangladesh revealed that 77% of women from families with 
land did not intend to claim their legal share in their 
parental property.61 Sometimes women themselves disclaim 
their rights of inheritance to maintain a cordial 
relationship with the natal family, so that they can visit 
them occasionally on naior. Women's renouncing of 
inheritance for naior appears to be a fair exchange because 
their inheritance may be misused by the husband, while 
naior is women's exclusive vacation.62 However, the concept 
of naior is another subtle mechanism of subordination. 
Naior. as a pretext of allowing an outlet for women to 
escape from their own household, is denying their right to 
the parental property. In this social structure of the 
patriarchal family, awarding married daughters their 
rightful shares of money or land was often viewed as
59 Guhathakurta, Meghna: 'Gender violence in Bangladesh: The 
role of the state.' In The Journal of Social Studies. 
Vol.30, 1985, pp.77-90, at p.77.
60 Rahman (1982), p.298.
61 Westergaard, Kirsten: Pauperization and rural women in 
Bangladesh-a case study. Comilla 1983, p.71.
62 Jahan (1975), p.16; Begum, Najmir Nur: Pav or purdah: 
Women and income earning in rural Bangladesh. Polmerston 
North 1987, p.111.
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transferring family wealth to an alien family. Thus the 
Quranic law of fixed shares was viewed as contrary to the 
existing social structure and was often ignored or 
circumvented.63 Moreover, women's of dependance on their 
natal family in cases of future contingency also plays its 
part. Thus, although there is an express prohibition of the 
direct revelation to this effect, women are deprived of 
their property by men who take advantage of their social 
position.
As indicated, a recent study of the metropolitan city 
of Dhaka found that although the Muslim family laws in 
Bangladesh require husbands to give dower to their wives, 
88% of the women in the survey did not receive any dower.64 
A study of Lahore women found that 85% of the wives in the 
survey received little or no maintenance.65 Moreover, 
women's dependance upon men has often been grossly abused 
and there are plenty of cases on cruelty to women and dowry 
(see below chapter 6). Thus, the patriarchal argument that 
women are subordinated by religion is not completely true, 
as even the rights which are granted in the religious law 
are often not enforced in a male-dominated patriarchal 
society. Rather, it seems, the patriarchs of the society
63 Levy (1962) , p. 245 .
64 Akhter, Shaheena: How far Muslim laws are protecting the 
rights of the women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992, p.35.
65 Zia, Shehla et al. : Muslim family laws and their
implementation in Pakistan. Unpublished Research Report, 
Research Wing, Women's Division, Islamabad, May 1984; 
Korson, Henry J. and Michelle Maskiell: 'Islamization and 
social policy in Pakistan' . In Asian. Survey. Vol.xxv, No. 6, 
1985, pp.604-609.
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use religion to preserve their dominance.
2.1.4 Seclusion or Purdah
The word "Purdah" or Parda. which literally means curtain, 
refers to the system for secluding women and enforcing 
standards of feminine modesty and the preservation of 
purity.66 Purdah in its most complete and extreme form has 
two dimensions: Physical segregation of living space, and 
concealment of the female face and body. To fulfil the 
principles of purdah, segregation of living space is 
achieved by setting aside for women areas of the home 
compound which are known as zenana and also by reserving 
enclosed portions of public meeting places and facilities. 
Concealment of the female face and body, when it is 
necessary for women to leave the home, can be provided by 
the portable seclusion of the burkha. a concealing cloak, 
a garment that totally covers the woman from the top of her 
head to the bottom of her feet, with slits through which
66 See in detail Hauswirth, Frieda: Purdah: The status of 
Indian women. London 1932; Jeffery, Patricia: Frogs in a 
well: Indian women in purdah. London 1979; Sharma, U. :
'Women and their af fines: The veil as a symbol of
separation'. In Man. Vol.13, No.l, 1978, pp.220-230; 
Jacobson, D. : Hidden faces: Hindu and Muslim purdah in a 
central Indian village. Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 
Ann Arbor 1973, pp.1-13, at p.12; Thompson, Catherine: 'A
sense of sharam: Some thoughts on Its implications for the 
position of women in a village in central India'. In South 
Asia Research. Vol.2, Nov. 1981, pp.39-53.
53
she can see.67 Although the burkha may seem cumbersome/ by 
wearing it a woman can gain mobility without violating 
purdah restrictions.68
Thus, purdah is a system of secluding women, seen as 
enforcing a high standard of female modesty for the 
preservation of purity of women, oh which the honour of 
traditional men relies.69 Its manifestation in traditional 
Bangladeshi society includes not only restrictions on 
women's movement without proper dress but also includes 
purdah of voice, i.e. the female voice should not be heard 
outside the homestead or bari .70
Here it becomes necessary to engage in a brief 
discussion on the origins of purdah and to probe into the 
query whether purdah is pre-Islamic. It has been argued by 
several authors that the seclusion or segregation of women 
was not an unknown practice in the pre-Islamic age.71 In 
many societies, purdah observance had a meaningful 
correlation to the sense of social prestige and higher 
status.72 When Muslims came into the cities of Syria,
67 Smock (1977) , p. 93 .
68 Izzedin, Nejla: The Arab world. Chicago 1953, p.289.
69 Papanek, Hanna: 'Purdah: Separate worlds and symbolic
shelter'. In Comparative Studies in Society and History. 
Vol.15, No.3, 1973, pp.289-311, at p.289.
70 Ibid. , p.310 .
71 Kabbani (1992), p.37; Levy (1962), p.124; Khan, Mazharul 
Haq: Purdah and polygamy. Peshawar 1973, p.17.
72 Raza, S. Musi: 'Changing purdah system in Muslim
society'. In Islam and Modern Age. Vol.vi, No.4, Nov. 1975, 
pp.40-56, at pp.40-51.
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Mesopotamia, Persia and Egypt, their women adopted the face 
veil as a concession to the prevailing custom, so that they 
would not be misunderstood for women of loose character who 
remained unveiled. Likewise, the custom of seclusion (harem 
or purdah) which originally had been practised in Byzantium 
and Persia, made its way to the Persianised court of 
Baghdad and eventually gained common acceptance in Muslim 
lands .73
It is important to note here the comment of another 
leading scholar that the heavy veiling that we see across 
the Muslim world (and among Muslim communities elsewhere) 
is certainly not Islamic.74 This author also argues that it 
is a relic from Byzantium, which the Arabs took on when 
they conquered Damascus soon after Mohammed's death seeing 
fit to ape the conservative custom of the Christian elite 
which they displaced.75
There is a possibility that the concept of purdah in 
South Asia was further influenced by ancient Hindu notions 
of the purity of women which work together with Muslim 
ideas. For example, it is mentioned in the classical epic 
Mahabharata that women covered themselves completely and 
Indian dramas of the third century depict upper class 
ladies veiled.76 Historically, thus, the practice of purdah
73 Ali (1985) , p.124.
74 Kabbani (1992), p.37.
75 Id.; Levy (1962), p.124; Khan (1973), p.17.
76 Sengupta, Padmini: Women workers of India. New York 1960, 
p.134; Indra, M.A.: The status of women in ancient India. 
Banares 1955, p.272; Mujeeb (1967), p.43.
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or the seclusion of women has evolved with the influence of 
Persian, Arab, Byzantine and Hindu customs, although in all 
areas it was limited to certain upper classes or elite 
groups. It is rightly argued by Linda Grant that the veil 
is pre-Islamic but men have seized the theology and tried 
to subvert it.77
Islamic purdah, as commented by an author, does not 
interfere with the freedom, nor does it impede the progress 
of womanhood in Islam, as it does not mean that women 
should be marooned within the four walls of their houses.78 
The Purdah of burkha can be seen as a liberating factor 
giving physical mobility and access to public space, 
although in limitation. Purdah is actually focused on 
modesty, which depends on female chastity preserving the 
honour or reputation (izzat) of the man and the whole 
family.79 It was further pointed out that in the early days 
of Islam women went out in veils, expounded Muslim law and 
jurisprudence, nursed the wounded on the battlefields and 
led armies against the enemies.80 As another leading
77 Grant, Linda: 'Unveiling the new Muslim-women are 
embracing Islam but some reject interpretations of the 
Koran that subjugate them'. In Life and Times. 19th August 
1992 .
78 Raza (1975), pp.46-47.
79 Pastner, C.: 'Gradations of purdah and the creation of
social boundaries on a Baluchistan Oasis'. In Papanek, 
Hanna and Gail Minault (eds.): Separate worlds: Studies in 
purdah in South Asia. Delhi 1982, p.168 ; Papanek (1975), 
p.289; Papanek, Hanna: 'Purdah in Pakistan: Seclusion and
modern occupations for women'. In Journal of Marriage and 
the Family. Vol.33, No.3, August 1971, pp.516-529.
80 Raza (1975) , p.47.
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s c h ol a r p e r c e p t i v e l y  observes:
When Arab society was productive, creative women 
participated in its activities and shared in the 
general strength and well being. When vitality 
ebbed away and deterioration set in, women 
suffered along with her community.81
In the light of our earlier discussion about the 
concept of equitable rights in Islam as between the sexes, 
however, freedom of movement for some women does not prove 
that women are not subordinated. The case of unusual women, 
who defy the norms come in this category; they are either 
very high or very low in status; they may be present in 
every society. It appears that the ideal type of purdah 
sanctioned in Islam was developed gradually into an extreme 
form. The traditional society added one specific feature in 
the Muslim society, i.e. "purdah of voice and movement".82 
However, it is significant to note that Islam has also 
admonished the believing men to lower their gaze and to be 
modest. However, for women it added that they should not 
display their beauty and ornaments and should draw their 
veils over their bosoms.83 A recent work on parda shows 
that over time the rather mild injunctions to both sexes to 
be modest in behaviour and dress were turned into a strict 
system of segregation of the sexes and restrictions on 
women's activities and movement.84
The justification for purdah, beyond the Quranic
81 Izzedin (1953), p.302.
82 Raza (1975) , p.49.
83 Ali (trans.) (1934), pp.904-905.
84 White (1975) , p.23 .
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verses on modesty which are clearly applicable to both 
sexes, lies in the assumption that women are vulnerable and 
unable to protect themselves from the sexual impulses of 
men. At the same time it implies that men must be protected 
from the temptation of women. Thus, as men are the weaker 
sex in this regard, they really are the ones to be 
veiled.85
Female chastity is seen as essential to family honour: 
in order to protect it, patriarchal structures operate to 
the effect that women must be kept in a world separate from 
men, symbolically sheltered from temptation and assault.86 
Thus veiling is said to protect women from the male gaze, 
from the incitement of lust. This has been described by a 
scholar as a distorted view of liberation which is derived 
from patriarchy, as male medieval theology has been 
exploited to keep women in their place.87 Thus, 
simultaneously women are seen as a threat to the male who 
needs protection from uncontrolled temptation.88 But why 
are women, on the one hand, shown as sexually vulnerable 
and needing protection by purdah, while they are contrarily 
shown as sexually aggressive and need to be segregated to 
protect the men? It is undeniable that, parda also protects
85 Mernissi, Fatima: Bevond the veil-male-female dynamics in 
Muslim society. Rev.ed. London 1985, p. 31.
86 Papanek, Hanna: 'The women field worker in a purdah
society'. In Human Organization. No.23 (Summer 1965), 
p. 160-169.
87 See Grant (1992) .
88 Papanek (1973), p.36.
women from being a sex object and represents a stance 
against pornography, sexual harassment and rape.89 Thus the 
main purpose of purdah appears to be to avoid zina or 
illicit intercourse, which reduces ,a woman and all her 
attributes to a sex object and makes her feel 
psychologically weak, leading to lack of confidence and
self-esteem. It even disables her, as Lama Abu Odeh points
out, from confronting an uncomfortable daily experience.90
The rigidity of the purdah observance clearly depends 
on the economic situation of the family, the age of the
woman, and the place in which the family lives. In a poor
country like Bangladesh, only the more affluent can provide 
the conditions enabling their women to withdraw into 
complete seclusion. This can be done by employing servants 
to relieve women of household tasks requiring them to leave 
the house, or by constructing large living quarters to be 
able to isolate female members from guests, so that even 
the sound of their voices will not be heard.91
In the poorer households,, the younger women are more 
secluded, as the mother or mother-in-law often performs 
such tasks as searching for firewood and drawing water 
which would otherwise have brought the younger women into 
contact with other villagers. By so doing, the older woman 
is not only able to protect the reputation of her daughter
89 Grant (1992) .
90 Odeh, Lama Abu: ' Post-colonial feminism and the veil: 
Thinking the difference'. In Feminist Review. No.43, Spring 
1993, pp.26-37, at p.26.
91 Papanek (1965), pp.160-169; Jeffery (1979), p.6.
or daughter-in-law,92 but also the izzat and honour of the
family. Although this does not seem to be direct
discrimination against such women, this protective attitude
makes them to a certain extent immobile. However the city
women do not usually (unless they are orthodox) wear a
burkha or a veil and they have fewer restrictions placed on
their mobility. It is thus rightly commented that social
(rather than religious) forces are a major factor in the
seclusion of women:
The existing inequality does not rest on an
ideological or biological inferiority, but is the 
outcome of specific social institutions designed 
to restrain her power: namely, segregation and 
legal subordination in the family structure.93
Purdah politics have proved to be an effective tool
for controlling women and buttressing a patriarchal
structure because the division of space does not entail an
equal distribution of decision making and authority.94 Thus
purdah is a complex institution that entails much more than
restrictions on women's physical mobility and dress. It is
used to deny women access to many opportunities in the
outside world which would afford economic independence.95
At the same time it confers upon them social status as a
protected group which is thus, by definition, inferior. In
92 Abdullah (1974), pp.24-26.
93 Mernissi (1985), p.19; Shams,, Shamsuddin: 'Socio-legal 
rights of women'. In Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
Vol.4, No.iv, 1984, pp.213-226, at pp.220-221.
94 Afsar, Haleh and Bina Agarwal: Women, poverty and
ideology in Asia. London 1989, p.18.
95 Jeffery (1979), p.121.
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theory, it both controls women and provides them with 
shelter and security. While men have power and authority 
over women, they are also normatively obligated to provide 
them with food, clothing and shelter.96 Thus, while men
were held responsible for the maintenance of women, they in 
turn relied on women to maintain parda or chastity, modesty 
and purity, which provided a special standing in
traditional society.
The economic realities of the difficult present time 
are working against traditional attitudes to the effect 
that women should remain in the home and not be part of the 
public. Increasing numbers of women are having to work to 
help support the family, often in factories and offices. 
Such realities are certainly not always liberating for
women, who have to struggle with home maintenance along 
with the pressure of a job. Day-care facilities for
children are generally unavailable, and the extended family 
system which used to afford ready baby-sitting for all the 
children in the larger family is tending to break up.97 
Thus the so-called modernisation may not be liberating in 
all spheres. It is also indisputably agreed that in a 
nuclear family women tend to be more emancipated as they 
may have a considerable say in family matters and may have 
much more independence and privilege than in a joint or 
extended family. Moreover in her father's house, which she
96 Cain et al. (1979), pp.434 and 683.
97 Smith, Jane I. : 'Islam'. In Sharma, Arvind (ed.) : 
Women in world religions. New. York 1987, pp.235-281, at 
p.247.
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occasionally visits, a woman has greater mobility (see 
naior at p.51 above). In her natal family, purdah 
observance is less strict, she is relieved of her usual 
household chores and does not have to play the role of 
docile daughter-in-law or obedient wife.98
Even in modern societies, purdah is present, not only 
in the sense of segregation of sexes but in the sense of 
women's aversion of gaze or low voice, i.e. purdah of eye 
or voice (saram) ." This also avoids the loss of family 
honour or dignity and thus maintains the appropriate 
distance from males.100
We can see, thus, that women in Bangladesh are subject 
to clear notions of gender segregation, although there are 
situational contexts in which women are given much greater 
freedom of movement. Depending on the personal views of 
individual women, this will protect them, restrict them, or 
it may lead to conflicts which end up in case-reports.
98 Jahan, Rounaq: 'Women in Bangladesh'. In Women for women 
-Bangladesh 1975. Dhaka 1975, pp.1-29, at pp.15-16.
99 Jeffery (1979), pp.5-6.
100 Thompson (1981), p.39.
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2.1.5 The socio-economic and legal sphere and 
female subordination
Women in Bangladesh are perceived to be degraded to the 
position of second-class citizens because of their 
economic, social, political and legal bondages in relation 
to gender.101 In the context of our present study, it is 
important to emphasise the legal elements, i.e. to show how 
family laws are dominated by the patriarchal system, which 
in turn has been reinforced by notions of segregation and 
seclusion. Although this thesis is primarily focused on 
legal forms of gender discrimination, it is necessary to 
examine briefly some socio-legal relationships to have a 
• fuller picture of the situation.
/
The discrimination against women as women depends on 
many causes. Not only the traditional cultures, patriarchal 
structures or seclusion are responsible, as discussed 
earlier, but also the social science literature, T.V., 
radio, theatre and cinema all depict and perpetuate the 
inferior status of women. It is thus arguable that an 
important reason for women's continued subordination is 
that the social science literature on "Bengali women" deals 
with such women's inferior status rather than emphasising 
the importance of traditional female roles. This clearly 
aggravates the situation. For example, a Bengali scholar
101 On gender see Oakley, A. : Sex, gender and society. London 
1972; Rubin, Gayle: 'The traffic in women: Notes on the
political economy of sex'. In Rieter, Rayna R. (ed.): 
Towards an anthropology of women. London 1975, pp.157-210.
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has simply stated that men dominate all societal spheres,
domestic and non-domestic, and that women suffer from
thorough discrimination underpinned by social and religious
mores.102 Or as a social scientist says,
Bengali women, both rural and urban, traditional 
and modern, live in a social system which
sanctifies an unequal and inferior status for
101women.
*
Such statements do not reflect reality (see chapter 2.2
below) and may be based on personal opinion rather than
fact. To some authors, women are neither expected nor
allowed to look after themselves, to possess individuality
and to nurture aspirations over and above the ideals of
womanhood.104 Some writers go to the extreme when they
state that this female inferiority and perpetual dependence
on men emanates from the social belief that,
A women is physically weak, intellectually poor, 
mentally inconsistent, timid, irrational and 
psychologically emotional.105
Even a prominent legal expert has identified the root 
cause of female subordination as women themselves when 
stating that:
102 Hossain, Monowar and Syed Waliullah: 'Some aspect of 
socio-economic environment in Bangladesh'. Paper presented 
for seminar on Population Policy of Bangladesh, Dhaka 1975, 
May 15-25.
103 Jahan, Rounaq: 'Women in Bangladesh' . Paper presented to 
the Ninth Congress of Anthropologist and Ethnological 
Sciences, Chicago, August 1973. j
104 Such uncritical perspectives are reflected in Huq, 
Jahanara: 'Status of women in Bangladesh'. In Romero,
Flerida P. (ed.): Women and the law. Manila 1983, p.18-41.
105 Islam, Mahmuda: 'Social norms, institutions and status of 
women'. In Women for Women (ed.): The situation of women in 
Bangladesh. Dhaka 1979, pp.225-264.
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There have been several studies of late relating 
to the life style and status of women in 
Bangladesh, all these studies commented that, 
though the average Bengali woman particularly in 
the rural Bengal contributes very significantly 
to the households, doing labourious jobs day in 
and day out and no less vital than that done by 
her close counterparts in the fields, yet her 
worth, in the eyes not of her father, brothers, 
and husband, but also her own is low.106
Thus, by merely restating perceived notions of
traditional cultures, the literature on the position of
women perpetuates these subordinating forces and becomes
itself part of the negative impact of traditional cultures.
It is a sad reflection of the position of women that
statements in the literature showing the inferior status of
women in Bangladesh are made by women themselves, thus
undermining their own sisters. Such an approach does not
see the potentialities women have within their domain of
the household or the sexual monopoly of birth. It is
rightly commented that this damages women:
This predicament is further . exacerbated by
practices such as Polygamy, real and symbolised 
seclusion (purdah) , universal distrust of
feminine emancipation and blatant flouting of
Family Laws Ordinance.107
Again, although it seems that discrimination between 
the sexes does not arise out of discriminatory legislation 
but from social practices, the actual picture is accurately 
described by a woman legal practitioner who comments that 
in the legislation there is a clear trend of "paternalism"
106 Sobhan (1978) , p. 2.
107 Adnan, Shapan et al. : 'Social change and rural women:
Possibilities of participation'. In Hossain, Monowar et 
al. (ed.) : Role of women in socio-economic development in 
Bangladesh. Dhaka 1977, pp.80-93, at p.82.
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which shows women as in need of protection because they are 
weaker, and not as a "privileged class", so that women's 
identity becomes submerged with the stronger identity of 
men.108 Below, we are giving some instances of protective 
legislation in the general law; the disparities in family 
law are discussed in the following chapters.
In the Payment of Wages Act of 1937, it is laid down 
in section 16(1) that no deduction should be made from the 
wages of a person under fifteen years or of a woman for 
breach of contract. In the Workmen's Compensation Act of 
1923, it is provided in section 8(1) that where 
compensation has to be distributed, no payment of a lumpsum 
as compensation to a women or a person under legal 
disability shall be made otherwise than by deposit with the 
Commissioner. One may question the presumption that the law 
makers consider women as minors or as persons of legal 
disability. This paternalistic attitude is not doing women 
any good, rather making them feel weak and fragile.
There are many provisions -in different Acts which tend 
to show the influence of social attitudes and prejudices on 
the legislature. For example, section 23 of the Bangladesh 
Shoos and Establishments Act 1965, section 22 of the Tea 
Plantation Labour Ordinance. 1962 and the Factories Act 
1934, all lay down that women are not to be employed 
between the hours of 8 p.m to 6 a.m.or 7 a.m. Does this not 
imply that women who work in those hours are only 
housewives or prostitutes? Or does it imply that women
108 Sobhan (1978), pp.6-9.
workers are to be protected from the clutches of male 
workers who cannot control their emotions if women work 
besides them in a night shift? What these Acts could not 
hide was that the legislature could not avoid adherence to 
social bondage and myths, though outwardly they show that 
they are favouring women.
However, there are some Acts which provide privileges 
to women, although they are rarely enforced. For example, 
section 47 of the Factories Act of 1965 provides that where 
there are more than fifty women workers ordinarily 
employed, there shall be provided and maintained a suitable 
room or rooms for the use of children (under the age of 6) 
of such women. The Plantation of Labour Ordinance of 1962 
similarly provides, in section 12, that the government may 
make rules that in every tea plantation where forty or more 
workers are employed, the employer shall provide and 
maintain rooms for the use of children of women workers 
under the age of six years. Other Acts providing maternity 
leave and benefits are also highly regarded, for example, 
The Bengal Maternity Benefit Act ^ of 1939 provides under 
section 3(1)and 3(2) that no employer shall knowingly 
employ a woman during the six weeks immediately following 
her date of delivery and also provides that no woman shall 
work during the six weeks immediately following her date of 
delivery. However, the reality is .that, knowing their 
rights of maternity, women may ignore them because of their 
need for survival. This shows the wide gap between the 
legal provisions and their implications in Bangladesh. It
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also shows that the legislature, too, is subordinating 
women as a class.
In a highly stratified society like Bangladesh, the 
intersection of gender relations with those of class means 
that the range of options available to women varies 
considerably across the social order.109 While all women's 
life chances are constrained within’ sometimes rigidly 
defined boundaries, women do not by any means constitute an 
undifferentiated social category. Rural women in Bangladesh 
are a depressed group that may be regarded usually as being 
triply effected as follows:110
(i) as females vis-a-vis males;
(ii) as being rural vis-a-vis being urban;
(iii) (most of them) as being poor (exploited) 
vis-a-vis being rich (exploiters).
In rural Bangladesh, the unequal distribution of 
social power and privilege rests on the ownership of land 
and not primarily on gender as will be further discussed in 
chapter 2.2.2 below. The system of gender stratification 
within households also governs the economic mobility of 
women, independent of class. Although'women as a class are 
also exploited in the field outside the periphery of family 
and kinship (see below, chapter 2.2.2 in more detail), it 
is somewhat surprising to note that lower class women are 
less submissive and appear less dependent than middle class 
women. This may be because they do not have any better
109 Kabeer, Naila: 'Subordination and struggle: Women in
Bangladesh'. In New Left Review. No.168, March-April 1988, 
pp.95-121, at p.104.
110 Adnan et al. (1977), pp. 80-93.
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option. Among the urban squatters, the myth of the male 
bread-winner is often completely eliminated and the concept 
of parda in the strict sense is considered a luxury, as a 
large number of women have no option but to produce their 
own household earnings. Thus, women who are at the lower 
end of the social scale contribute far more substantially 
to the national economy and are much more independent than 
generally assumed or recognised. Thus, in some sense, 
poverty is a blessing for women as it offers a chance for 
them to come out of their seclusion.111
The lower middle class women are the worst effected 
class with regard to exploitation, as they cannot extricate 
themselves from the social bondages connected to the 
protection of men. The role conflicts of working women are 
to a maximum extent found in this class and not in the 
"lower class".112
Thus, the perceived notions of female subordination 
constantly undermine women and do not recognise the power 
women have within the patriarchal structure of the society. 
In the following part of the chapter we will be discussing 
the significant contribution of women in an attempt to 
gauge their real power.
111 White (1992) , p.25 .
112 Rani, Kala: Role conflict in working women. New Delhi 
1976, p.178.
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2.2 Forces counteracting the perceived notions of 
subordination of women
To give a more complete and realistic picture of the socio- 
legal sphere of women's role in society, the forces which 
counteract the subordination of women need to be analysed 
here in some detail. Although comparatively little material 
can be found on the positive aspects of women's roles, it 
is certain that women and their position can also be seen 
in a more positive perspective.
This part of the chapter discusses in particular, two 
aspects of women's power. The first section deals with 
matriarchal sentiments and the sexual monopoly of birth, 
women's inherent power to give birth and to act as the 
major physical and emotional provider for children in their 
very early and formative years. The second section focuses 
in more detail on the recent economic contribution of women 
and projects that many women are building up their own 
support system.
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2.2.1 Matriarchal sentiments and sexual monopoly 
of birth
It is the opinion of many scholars that matriliny was 
widespread in India in pre-Aryan days, and that the Aryan 
patriarchal culture is a superimposed one.113 The 
historical evidence confirms that during the Vedic age 
women enjoyed considerable freedom and equal opportunities 
with men,114 although there will be a trend to exaggerate 
this to uphold the cherished image of the "Golden Vedic 
age". There is no doubt, however, that women as procreators 
were highly respected and that as partners in economic 
activity they played a significant role in decision making. 
Vedic women, mature and educated, had a say in the 
selection of their husbands, and widows often remarried.115 
As progeny was considered more important than chastity, as 
a widow's potential fertility would be wasted, so the 
argument obviously went in favour of widow remarriages.
Today the ambivalence in attitudes to women, a 
manifestation of which may be seen in the low status of 
women in the same communities which also respect and adore 
the "ideal" wife, mother and daughter (putting aside the
113 Towards Equality. p.55.
114 Thapar, Romila: 'Looking back in history' . In Jain 
Devaki (ed.): Indian women. New Delhi 1975, pp.5-15, 
at p.7; Manohar, K. Murali: 'Socio-economic status of 
Indian women'. In Manohar, K. Murali (ed.): Socio­
economic status of Indian women. Delhi 1983, pp.1-30, 
at p .3.
115 Kuppuswamy: Social change in India. Delhi 1972,
p. 178 .
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aspect of Mother Goddess), is attributed to the change from 
matriarchal to patriarchal systems in South Asian 
societies.
On the other hand, women are seen as an embodiment of 
God's power, as the creative power is most obviously 
working in a woman. From this point it is argued that women 
are in fact superior to men because of their special power 
to bear children and nurture, which men do not have. But 
women are hardly given any credit for it.
The conditioning of the girl-child through 
psychological brain-washing and socialisation processes 
which clearly outline the difference between "girl's work" 
and "boy's work," help women themselves to become strong 
and militant advocates of the importance of the mother-wife 
role in a woman's life. However, the conditioning is so 
complete and so successful that in the final analysis, a 
woman is routinely proud of her house and is possessive of 
her kitchen and her larder to such an extent that she 
refuses her husband and other male members to acquire even 
the slightest control over these areas.116
While women in Bangladesh cannot simply be dismissed 
as submissive and subordinate, there are real powers behind 
their veils which are perhaps not so easy to understand. 
The real picture is that there are women who have complete 
domination of their husband's income. These women grasp 
their husband's earnings and decide how and where to spend
116 Chatterji, Shoma A. : The Indian women's search for 
an identity. New Delhi 1988, p.4.
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them. Moreover, when there was no banking system, the keys 
to the sinduk or locker often were in the custody of the 
wife. At the present time there are families where the wife 
controls the finance, especially the expenses for the 
household, but this aspect of women's power is rarely 
emphasised, perhaps because it would be seen as an attack 
on the male ego.
Certain people maintain, though, that nature itself 
has ordained women as goddesses of the home. It is true 
that in the domain of the household, women are the queen 
who rules over the kitchen and who is prosperous with 
children.117 With regard to the rituals within the 
households, especially in the rituals of birth as argued by 
Blanchet,118 women dominate the scene. Women go outside the 
boundaries of the official religion and nourish the 
cultural sphere by local house rituals such as gave-halud 
(purification ritual before marriage), mendi 
(beautification before marriage) and mukhe-vhat (first 
feeding of solids for a child) . This happens also by 
encouraging spiritual powers. For example if a woman does 
not become pregnant, she may be taken by another woman to 
a holy man or saint (known as pir or fakir) and may also be 
taken to the burial place of a saint (known as mazar) where 
she is given an amulet within which a verse of the Quran is 
written, a tabiz, to evict the evil spirits that impede her
117 Malladi, Subbamma: Women: Tradition and culture. New 
Delhi 1985, pp.4-5.
118 Blanchet (1984), p.106.
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fertility. Although it is forbidden in Islam to worship any 
one other than Allah, these practices are widespread. This 
shows that women are maintaining and developing their own 
sphere of religion which is promoted by exclusion from the 
mosque and can be seen as a protest, against male-dominated 
religious structures. Moreover in a purdah society, the 
separate worlds for men and women involve sharp division of 
labour. Men's work is outside the home and women's role 
inside the home. She is the queen of her own domain.119 She 
is the provider of emotional shelter for the children, the 
early moulder of personality, the instructress in basic 
religious observances and cultural attitudes.120 Thus the 
children's training is accomplished basically by the mother 
at home. However, these powers of women are seldom 
acknowledged and the real social position of women is, 
thus, not recognised, especially by outsiders researching 
'oriental' women.
119 Minault, Gail: 'Political change: Muslim women in 
conflict with parda: Their role in the nationalist 
movement'. In Chipp, Sylvia A. and Justin J. Green 
(eds.): Asian women in transition. University Park and 
London 1980, pp.194-203.
120 Patai, Raphael: Society, culture change in the
Middle East. Philadelphia. 1969, pp.167-168; Banu, 
U.A.B. Razia Akter: Islam in Bangladesh. Leiden, New 
York and Koeln 1992, p.3; Gupta, Sen Sarker: A study 
of women in Bengal. Calcutta 1970, p.75.
74
2.2.2 Socio-economic position of women
The position of women in a society cannot be simply 
attributed to their role in providing progeny. There are 
many other socio-economic roles of women than the 
stereotypical ones of mother and wife. The economic roles 
of women are shaped by socio-economic and political 
structures. According to an eminent author, these are 
reflected in women's:
1. Ability to own, or inherit and control, income 
earning assets;
2. Ability to participate in economic activities;
3. Control over their husband's income, which is 
usually determined by the level of their 
education, the age and pattern of their marriage, 
family structure and residential status;
4. Right and ability to control property.121
With regard to the right of women to own or inherit 
and to control property, the image of Muslim women having 
no choice other than submission to male dominance has been 
partially contradicted by Saunders, whose study of women's 
role in a Muslim society shows that women exercise limited 
but important power within the marriage relationships as 
well as in the economic sphere.122 Islamic law allows women
121 Ahmad, Alia: Women and fertility in Bangladesh. New 
Delhi, Newbury Park and London 1991, p.31.
122 Saunders, Margaret 0. : 'Women's role in a Muslim
Hausa town'. In Bourguignon, Erika (ed.): A world of 
women: Anthropological studies of women in the
societies of the world. New York 1980, pp.57-86.
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i the right to inherit and own property in their own
right.123 However, a Muslim woman is entitled to less than 
a Muslim man.124 The alleged reasoning behind this is that 
men are maintaining women (see already above, p.35).
Next to property in serving the purpose of security is 
jewellery, which is regarded as an alternative to land. 
Women may receive jewellery from their parents before their 
marriage, which may be enhanced with the property or gifts 
given at the time of marriage. Some women may be given a 
large quantity of it by their parents at the time of their 
marriage. The jewellery received from the groom's side may, 
however, reduce the amount of dower (see in detail chapter 
5 below, p.286). Moreover, a detailed field study indicates 
that men often buy land by selling women's jewellery and 
then control the income accruing from this land.125 
However, jewellery is still regarded as a reliable form of 
security for women in their rainy days.
A look at the more recent socio-economic position of 
women shows that large-scale migration of men to the cities 
and foreign countries has been creating many female-headed 
households. Headship rates of women in rural areas are much
123 Lateef, Shaheeda: 'In a community'. Paper presented 
in the seminar on the status of women, held in Dhaka. 
May 1973, pp.29-34; Serajuddin, Alamgir Muhammad: 
'Muslim family law and the legal rights of Muslim 
women in South Asia'. In Journal of Asiatic Society of 
Bangladesh (Hum). Vol.xxxii, No.2, Dec. 1987, pp.128- 
147.
124 On Islamic succession law see Ali (1917) , pp.65-116; 
Baillie, Neil B.E.: The Mohummudan law of inheritance. 
London 1874.
125 Westergaard (1983), p.74.
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higher than in the urban ones.126 These households, 
although not matriarchal, certainly give more weight to 
women's decisions and have been described by a Pakistani 
author as "Matri-weighted households".127 In fact, the 
drastic change in women's position within the family and 
kinship structures are most strikingly evident in the case 
of female-headed households.128 It has been argued that 
there are five situational categories of female-headed 
households in Bangladesh.129 They are:
1. Where there is no adult male member because a woman 
is divorced,deserted or widowed and consequently 
becomes the main supporter and chief decision maker 
in the household;
2. Where an adult male member may exist but does not 
contribute significantly towards supporting the 
household;
3. Where the earning male member is a transient who 
does not contribute regularly towards supporting 
the household;
4. Where the male member is an absentee (migrant to 
another country) who may send regular remittances 
but rarely visits the family,* and
5. Where the earning member is a surviving son who is 
subservient to his mother.
Although Ranjana Kumari reported that widowhood was
126 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Statistical pocket 
book of Bangladesh. Dhaka 1987, p.63.
127 Rahat, I . Naveed: Male outmigration and Matri-
weighted households: A case study of a Puniabi village 
in Pakistan. Delhi 1990.
128 See for details, Islam Mahmuda: Women heads of
households in rural Bangladesh: Strategies for
survival. Dhaka 1991, pp.1-81.
129 Islam, Mahmuda: 'Female heads of households'. A
report prepared for UNU, 1987; Hossain et al. (1990),
p.42-43 .
77
suggested as the main cause of female headship,130 
Parthasarathy in a survey found a definite link between 
poverty and female-headedness.131 It was found that in 
1982, 15.4% of households were headed by women in
Bangladesh;132 of these 16.5% were in rural and 6.9% in 
urban areas.133 A study of rural women in Bangladesh who 
were participating in the food-for-work program reveals 
that fifty per cent of these women were the chief income 
earners in their families; also, cases of divorced and 
separated women were more prominent among them.134
However, there is a difference between the female­
headed households where women are the sole providers 
themselves as in cases of widowhood, deserted, divorced or 
separated women and those "matri-weighted households" where 
the male temporarily emigrated. In the latter case, men are 
earning wages in the oil-producing countries or in Indian 
restaurants in overseas, sending remittances to the wife 
who has more authority, influence and responsibility than
130 Kumari, Ranjana: Women-headed households in rural 
India. New Delhi and London 1989, p.5.
131 Parthasarathy, G. : 'Rural- poverty and female heads 
of households'. Paper presented at the seminar 
organized by ISST on "Women's work and development", 
April 1982; Ranjana (1989), p.5.
132 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Year 
Book of Bangladesh. Dhaka 1986, p.82.
133 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Bangladesh Popula 
tion Census 1981: National series, analytical findings 
and national tables (Ministry of planning. Govt, of 
Bangladesh). Dhaka 1984, p.33.
134 De Souza (1980), pp.3-4.
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her absent husband in local, domestic and village 
affairs.135 However, in these households, women are only de 
facto heads; the de-jure heads are often men; an attribute 
of patrilineal and patrilocal societies, which still 
exercise control over the major resources. This leads to 
the re-assertion of male dominance with its ambivalent 
mixture of protection and control.
There is much evidence at the local level that women 
are building up their own support system. For example, in 
certain parts of the country women with some capital buy 
cows and goats and rent them to poor women to raise under 
share cultivation (baraa) arrangements. The tenant gets the 
milk and the first calf, while the owner gets the 
subsequent calves and retains ownership of the cow or goat 
rented out.136 There are, in the banking system, some 
credit facilities offered to women under the Bangladesh 
Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC), 
Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) and under the 
Ministry of Social Welfare and Women's Affairs. There are 
also a few quasi-formal organisations like the Grameen Bank 
and Swanirvor Bangladesh. They have made impressive 
progress in extending credit facilities to rural women. 
Moreover, a number of non-governmental organisation (NGOs) 
are providing credit facilities to women for promoting
135 Rahat (1990), p.13-14.
136 Hossain, Mahbub and Rita Afsar: 'Credit for women's 
involvement in economic activities in rural 
Bangladesh'. In Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies Research Report. No.105, Dhaka, June 1989, 
pp.1-104, at p.7.
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employment and income-generating activities. The major ones 
are the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and 
Proshika Manabik Unnayan Kendra.137 The point which is made 
here is that when women are given access to credit, they 
are transforming expenditure-saving activities into income- 
generating ones and are turning themselves from unpaid 
family workers to income earners for the household.
It is indisputable that women's role and work in the 
household is very demanding and strenuous. Recent studies 
in Bangladesh do not include household work in the labour 
force,138 but in 1961 and 1974 household work was included 
in the labour force surveys.139 Because of this inadequacy 
of official statistics regarding women's participation, the 
extent of female agricultural labour force is shown to have 
dropped officially from about 92% in 1961, to about 70% in 
1974 to 6.5% in 1983/84 to 4% in 1984/85. The variation of 
definition of labour force used by the surveys is largely 
responsible for this distortion.140. Because household and 
other subsistence activities do not fall under the purview 
of work or employment, there is a downward distortion which 
affects the female labour force to the extent that nearly
137 Ibid. , p.14-15.
138 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics:. Report on the 1984- 
85 Labour Force Survey. Dhaka 1986.
139 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Year 
Book of Bangladesh. Dhaka 1987.
140 Mahmud, Shimeen and Hamid Shamim: 'Women and 
employment in Bangladesh'. In Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies Research Report. No.127, Oct. 
1990, pp.1-66, at p.3.
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95% of the active female population of Bangladesh aged ten 
to sixty-four years are excluded from the civilian labour 
force, being buried under the definition of 
"housewives" .141
The perceived reasoning for women's income earning 
capabilities is that women's outside work is an indicator 
of higher female status (see chapter 1, p.8). It has been 
assumed that the situation of women will be changed when 
they become more stable in social standing by their income 
earning capabi
lities and potentialities. A pioneer woman writer extends 
the analysis of Engels that women's entry into waged labour 
is a pre-condition for not only greater gender equality but 
automatic disappearance of any gender inequality.142 The 
author thus focuses on the issue that getting women out to 
work is the key to raising female status in Bangladesh.143 
But, there are numerous problems with this as women have to 
continue with their domestic responsibilities together with 
the workload in an income-earning role. Moreover the 
problem of seclusion is also there. The reasons why women
141 Hamid, Shamim: 'Women's .non-market work and GDP
accounting: The case of Bangladesh'. In Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies Research Report 
No.116, Dec. 1989, pp.1-48, at p. 3; Hamid, Shamim: 
'The value of housewives' time in rural Bangladesh'. 
Paper presented at the 8th Biennial Conference of the 
Bangladesh Economic Association held in Dhaka, July
1988.
142 White, Sarah C. : Arguing with the crocodile: Gender 
and class in Bangladesh. London, New Jersey and Dhaka 
1992, p.24.
143 Ibid. , p. 25.
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are confined in the house are not entirely sociological. 
They are supported by economic structures. There are 
limited opportunities for work outside the household in an 
agrarian economy.144 However, the: rapid growth of many 
industries, e.g. garment, plastic, pharmaceutical etc. have 
given some opportunity to women. But it is reported that 
women enter the employment market on terms different from 
men as they have lower salaries than their male
colleagues.145
There is also a massive migration of mostly landpoor 
and landless families from the rural to the urban centres 
or towns and cities, where the cash earnings are much
higher. But those households which migrated to the cities 
could not always meet their subsistence requirements on the
income of the males alone.146 Women were pressurised to
deploy their labour in market-based activities and to add 
to the male's income in order to ensure the minimum 
requirements of survival.147
Parda considerations have- almost been dispensed with, 
as women are coming out of their indoor situations and take 
up outdoor wage employment in factories, fields and other
144 Ahmad (1991) , p. 80.
145 Hossain, Hameeda et al. : No better option:
Industrial women workers in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1990, 
p . 64 .
146 Greely, M. : Rural technology, rural institution and 
the rural poorest: The case of rice processing in 
Bangladesh. (CIRDAP), Comilla 1982, pp.128-151.
147 Ibid. , p.137.
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public places. It is rightly commented by a scholar148 that 
the institution of parda as well as patriarchy, with their 
traditional restrictions on the income-earning employment 
of women outside the household, have not proved to be rigid 
and inflexible barriers when confronted with the exigency 
of survival.
Women's involvement in economic activities is 
associated with the feminist argument that it will make 
them liberated and independent from men. However, as shown 
earlier, female employment in Bangladesh did not provide 
women control over main production, landownership or income 
earned (see chapter 1, p. 9) .149 Although women have greater 
control of certain forms of production, these are usually 
not significant enough to transform the core relations of 
male power and female subordination within household 
structures.150 Thus, the economic involvement of women by 
wage labour or otherwise could not create any dent in the 
patriarchal norms of society.151
Recent economic pressures^ have the effect that more 
husbands can not maintain their wives and both partners 
have to work for the survival of the family. However, in
148 Oakley (1972) , p. 18.
149 Khan, Zarina Rahman: Women, work and values: 
Contradictions in the prevailing notions and the 
realities of women's lives in rural Bangladesh. Dhaka 
1992, p.198.
150 Kabeer, Naila: 'Gender, production and well-being: 
Rethinking the household economy'. In Institute of 
Development Studies Discussion paper. No.2 88, May 
1991, pp.1-50, at p.20.
151 Khan (1992) , p.198.
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accordance with Muslim law and religion, men have full 
responsibility for the maintenance of their wife and 
children (see for details chapter 5, p.296). In this 
context it should be emphasised that more women in 
Bangladesh should insist that men should fulfil their 
normative obligations and make thus^ free women from 
economic deprivation.
There is no male right in Islam to grasp a wife's 
income; whatever she earns is her own to dispose of, either 
she can use it herself or may contribute it to the family 
budget if she wishes.152 But in the patriarchal society of 
Bangladesh, a wife's income is regarded as the husband's or 
her in-laws' property. Moreover, women in the labour market 
are being marginalised in a double jeopardy as they are 
being used as cheap labour with the false notion that this 
will give them emancipation and enhanced status in the 
society. Thus, women are sacrificing their life and labour 
in the workplace and home to strive for gender equality in 
a society which does not even allow for gender equity. 
Rather than making big promises about gender equality, the 
law should assist women to enjoy the fruits of their labour 
so that they are not economically deprived and victimised.
152 Lemu (1976) , p. 18 .
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ICHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH ASIAN FAMILY LAW PRIOR 
TO THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH
This chapter traces in detail the development of family 
laws in South Asia before the emergence of Bangladesh in 
1971. In our coverage of this necessarily huge area of 
study, we focus on those areas of family law which are of 
particular relevance to the current concerns of Muslim 
women in Bangladesh. The main reason for considering these 
family laws is of course that these laws are, with few 
exceptions, still in operation in Bangladesh today.
The chapter falls into two major sections. The first 
focuses on the development of family laws under British 
rule, while the second and much smaller section 
concentrates on the period between 1947 and 1971, when 
Bangladesh was part of Pakistan.
Our coverage of the British period first investigates 
the contradictory attitudes of the colonialist government 
towards women, not only concerning issues of family law, 
but also women's education, universal adult suffrage and 
prostitution. In chapter 2.1 above, different reasons for 
the subordination of women were depicted, primarily male 
domination by patriarchy and other socio-religious factors. 
In this chapter, the impact of colonisation on women will 
be shown as an added factor for the subordination of women
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in British India. The British interference in the family 
law is considered in some detail in the next sub-chapter, 
showing vividly the gradual interference in the indigenous 
religio-personal laws, contrary to earlier promises of non­
interference. Finally we analyse the relevant legislation 
in this period and examine the common assumption that it 
liberated women. It is shown that the colonial governments 
did not fully support many enactments, although they 
claimed credit for them. The new laws were often enacted as 
a result of the relentless efforts of Indian reformers and, 
increasingly, women's organisations. Moreover, it can be 
shown in many cases that the British administration was not 
seriously interested to implement the new laws.
Our coverage of the Pakistani period analyses the role 
of the state in the struggle between traditional and modern 
views of women's emancipation and touches on the concurrent 
debates and tensions between different shades of Muslim 
opinion on the legal status of women.
We have argued that the actual needs of women in South 
Asia are centred on being protected from economic 
deprivation and violence. In British India those needs were 
not defined and the discourse revolved around sexual 
equality, liberation and independence. In the Pakistani 
period, new legislation brought in to improve the position 
of women could not be translated effectively to satisfy the 
real needs of women.
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3.1 Women and family law in British India
In British India, the encroachment of the colonial 
government on Muslim family law occurred more through 
cases, while for the Hindu family law it was mainly through 
specific statutes. The statutes enacted under the Muslim 
family law, although seen as a significant step to 
ameliorate the legal status of women, were more concerned 
with Islamic debates than whether the reforms were 
beneficial to women.
3.1.1 Women’s inequality and British colonialism
The literature on women's issues in the early twentieth 
century in British India, especially the ideas and images 
in Bengal, part of which is Bangladesh today, centered 
round the discussions on tradition.1 As early as 1904, 
Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, the renowned feminist 
writer, portrayed women as virtual slaves. She showed how 
women were victimised by the established order and 
condemned to a status of insignificance as appendages to
1 Sengupta, Indira Chowdhury: 'Mother India and mother
Victoria: Motherhood and Nationalism in nineteenth century 
Bengal'. In South Asia Research. Vol.12, No.l, May 1992, 
pp.20-37, at p.20.
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their male master.2 She saw the position of women in India 
at that time as steeped in ignorance and superstition in 
their zenana or seclusion.3 However, rather than law 
reform, she suggested the emancipation of women through 
education to challenge the orthodox patriarchal social 
structure.4 Like Rokeya, Katherine Mayo's highly 
sensational, controversial and politically explosive book 
"Mother India" also entered into gender politics.5 The 
picture of women in British India was expressed in that 
book, and others in the period, as completely subordinated 
and degraded, with abuses of child marriage and widowhood, 
premature consummation and pregnancy, female infanticide, 
purdah, temple prostitution and sati.6
Vivid emphasis on the negative aspects of women's 
issues reflected the general backwardness of the country 
and also served to legitimise imperial rule.7 The status of 
women in Indian society was frequently used to reiterate ^
2 Hossain, Yasmin: 'The Begum's dream: Rokeya Shakwat
Hossain and broadening of Muslim women's aspirations in 
Bengal'. In South Asia Research. Vol.12, No.l, May 1992, 
pp. 1-19, at p .3.
3 Hossain, Rokeya Shakwat: 'Stri jatir obonati'. In Kadir, 
A. (ed.): Rokeva Rachanabali. Dhaka 1973, pp.17-31.
4 Hossain (1992), p.4.
5 Mayo, Katherine: Mother India. New York 1927.
6 Mayo (1927); Mayo, Katherine: Slave of the Gods. London 
1933; Cousins, E. Margaret: Indian womanhood today. 
Allahabad 1941; Billington, Mary Francis: Women in India. 
London 1985.
7 For the same effect in the Bengali literature see chapter 
2 (above, p .63).
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British superiority and to justify colonialism.8 The 
British colonial policies with regard to women were 
ambiguous. The British never had any doubt that Indian 
women were inferior to men. Their own Victorian notions 
played a part in structuring gender roles. A number of 
works have explored and examined the contradictory approach 
of the British government to the position of women in 
India.9 For example, it has been pointed out that the 
British had an interest in maintaining women's 
subordination to show that India was not yet ready for 
self-rule. At the same time, by claiming that they were 
liberating women in India, the British were demonstrating 
the superiority of Western culture in terms of relations 
between sexes.10 Perhaps the British colonialists believed 
in a hierarchy of races in human societies, with their own 
at the top.11
Liddle and Joshi also showed that Katherine Mayo's 
book was used by the British to maintain the oppression of 
colonialism rather than arguing for the removal of male
8 Das, F. Hauswirth: Purdah; The status of Indian women. 
London 1932, pp.1-2.
9 See in particular Liddle, Joanna and Rama Joshi; Gender 
and imperialism in British India'. In South Asia Research. 
Vol.5, No.2, Nov.1985, pp.147-165; Liddle, Joanna and Rama 
Joshi: Daughters of independence-gender. caste and class in 
India. London and New Delhi 1986, pp.24-3 0.
10 Liddle and Joshi (1985), p. 154.
11 Id.
89
dominance.12 The policy of the British can also be gathered 
from another work, similar to Katherine Mayo's, where the 
author states that one of the arguments constantly cropping 
up in England and America against India's fitness for self- 
government is that the women of India were treated by 
Indian men with little respect.13
In her controversial book, Katherine Mayo attributed 
Indian subjugation and slave-like mentality to the 
organisation of sexuality.14 Mayo suggested that India's 
plight was to be blamed on Indian men, whose hands were too 
weak to hold the reins of government. She reasoned that the 
cause of their weakness lay in the subordination and abuse 
they show to their women.15 But her work was refuted by 
many Indians as a scandalous libel on their civilisation 
and character.16 Mayo's critics have attacked her from 
different angles. Lajpat Rai emphasised her failure to 
provide any historical data and stated that up to the 
middle of the last century the position of Indian women was 
not worse than that of their European and American 
sisters.17 D.G. Mukerji criticised Mayo's work as
12 Liddle, Joanna and Rama Joshi: 'Gender and colonialism: 
women's organisation under the Raj'. In Women's Studies 
International Forum. Vol.8, No.5, 1985, pp.521-529.
13 Cousins (1941), p.78.
14 Mayo (1927) , p.22 .
15 Ibid. , p.32.
16 See for example Jha, Monoranjan: Katherine Mavo and India. 
New Delhi 1971, p.26.
17 Rai, Lajpat: Unhappy India: Being a reply to Miss
Katherine Mavo's Mother India. Calcutta 1928, p.183.
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inadequately documented and full of exaggeration.18 C.S. 
Ranga Iyer attacked Mayo on her tendency to generalise from 
specific cases to the whole of India and her failure to 
note regional differences.19 Ernest Wood criticised the 
ethnocentricity of her book and defended India, explaining 
that it is not true that Indian men do not feel fondness 
for their wives, they simply do not show their love and 
affection in public.20 He also wrote that the position of 
Indian women in the home is very honorable and prestigious. 
Thus:
There is no indignity in her not going out into 
the world and fighting in the welter of modern
competitive systems Must we see everything in
terms of money and commerce?21
The message of "Mother India" aroiised intense public 
feelings in India and abroad and instigated many others to 
write on women in India, putting the issue itself firmly on 
the agenda. It also had positive effects on administrators 
and legislators by making them more sympathetic to legal 
reforms.22 The problem of the feminist writers of that 
period, like Begum Rokeya Shakwat Hossain or Katherine Mayo
18 Mukerji, Dhan Gopal: A son of Mother India answers. New 
York 1928.
19 Iyer, C.S. Ranga: Father India. London 1927.
20 Wood, Ernest: An English man defends Mother India: A 
complete constructive reply to Mother India. Madras 1929, 
p . 31.
21 Ibid. , p.29.
22 Ramusack, N. Barbara: 'Women's organisations and social
change: The age of marriage issue in India'. In Black,
Naomi and Ann Baker Cottrell (eds.) : Women and world
chancre: Equity issues in development. Beverley Hills and 
London 1981, pp.198-216, at p.214.,
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was that they did not define the real needs of women in 
India. They were only focusing on the subordination of 
women and searching for solutions in general sexual 
equality and other Western notions of liberation and 
independence.
There were well-defined limits around the British 
government's attempts at improving the position of Indian 
women. Although it was outwardly claimed that the colonial 
rule has liberated women, a thorough examination of the 
facts would reveal that it damaged their interests. One 
particular issue that has received some attention is 
whether the British army, especially the British soldiers, 
posed a problem for women in India as a whole, or
specifically for prostitutes. This has excited several 
authors. It was reported that the British troops had done 
injury to Indian prostitutes by passing venereal diseases 
on to them.23 This allegation was followed by the Indian
Contagious Diseases Act of 1868, which tried to give a
solution to the spreading of venereal diseases by
controlling the prostitutes rather than limiting the access 
of British soldiers to them. Thus, the Indian Contagious 
Diseases Act of 1868 enabled people to carry on their evil 
trade in girls for the benefit of the British soldiers.24 
It appears that the British soldiers' increased demand for
23 See Ballhatchet, Kenneth: Race, sex and class under the 
Rai: Attitudes and policies and their critics. 1793-1905. 
London 1980, p.79.
24 Ramabai, Pandita: 'A pioneer of the women's rights
movement'. In Manushi. 198 0, Vol.5, pp.18-25.
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prostitution developed a fear and insecurity in the general 
population, so that they restricted their women to more
seclusion in the zenana. However, not only foreign
aggression, but also the social rigidity of child marriage 
with its necessary consequence of child-widows and the 
stigma of widow remarriage had created many prostitutes.25
Moreover, the intensification of traditional cultural 
norms during the 19th and 20th century in India may have 
been the result of political insecurity and the fear to 
lose one's tradition by interaction with other cultures.26 
The effort to emphasise cultural norms in the face of 
challenges of British colonialism has seldom been looked 
into. An interesting American study shows that during the 
period of British control, purdah was enforced most
severely in the Muslim princely states of India.27 
Moreover, the policy of the colonialist government, 
although based on formal proclamation of non-interference 
in socio-religious belief, was in fact coupled with
proselytisation by the Christian missionaries. This 
presented a direct challenge to the indigenous people's 
religious and social beliefs.28
25 Jayawardena, Kumari: Feminism and nationalism in the 
third world. London and New Delhi 1986, p.79.
26 See chapter 2.1.2 above where it has been shown that 
Bangladesh is an amalgamation of different cultures and 
traditions.
27 White, Elizabeth Herrick: Women's status in an Islamic 
society; The problem of purdah. Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Denver, Denver 1975, p.23.
28 Shridevi, S.: A century of Indian womanhood. Mysore 1965, 
p.23 .
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The imported educational system did not have many 
links to the culture and tradition of the indigenous 
population; it also did not do anything for the upliftment 
of rural women. The British education was encouraged by 
Christian missionaries and English women and spread only 
among the urban elites.29 It is perceived that generally 
the mass of women were illiterate, in the sense that they 
did not have any formal education.. In fact, there was a 
provision of formal education in religious schools or 
madrashas for Muslim girls up to puberty and also a system 
of private lessons, common for upper classes and castes of 
both Hindu and Muslim girls.30 Moreover, oral and non- 
formal instruction by learning about the ancient 
traditions, religion, history and folklore was prevalent.31 
Further on, the communities gave initiation to practice in 
traditional arts and crafts.32 By the Charter of 1913, the 
East India Company did accept responsibility to formally 
educate Indian women, but in reality they refused to take 
direct action on women's education.33
It has therefore been argued that one of the reasons
29 Shridevi (1965), pp.95-96.
30 Wies, Muriel: 'Education'. In Baig, Tara A. (ed.): Women 
of India. Delhi 1958, p.157.
31 Chattopadhaya, Kamaladevi: Indian women's battle for
freedom. New Delhi 1983, p.32.
32 Id.
33 Sinha, Niroj: 'Reinforcing second class status of women 
in India: A study of the impact of religion through
education on women's status'. In Swarup, Hemlata and 
Sarojini Bisaria (eds.): Women, politics and religion. New 
Delhi 1991, pp.91-112, at p.99.
94
for the decline in the status of women in the British 
period was the total disinterest displayed by the rulers of 
India with respect of educating women, coupled with the 
policy of discouraging handicrafts, so that many women 
ceased to be an economic asset of the family.34
One other major reason for reducing the economic 
status of women in this period came about as a result of 
industrialisation and changes in technology. For example, 
the introduction of rice mills had devastating effects on 
the major source of livelihood of women.35 There was a 
proverb, "Jar chore nai dhenki mushall, shav bou-ihir nai 
kushal", i.e. womenfolk are in a sorry plight in a house 
that has no husking instrument or dhenki.36 Thus a major 
mode of employment for women was taken away by modern 
technology.
The British colonialists' concept of emancipation of 
Indian women did not extend to allowing them voting rights. 
This shows that women were denied not only social and 
economic rights but also political rights. The right of 
vote for women was vehemently and explicitly rejected. The 
South Borough Franchise Report reasoned that it would 
conflict with the conservatism of the culture, that purdah
34 Singh, Indu Prakash: Women's oppression. men 
responsible. Delhi 1988, p.154; Singh, Indu Prakash: Indian 
women: The captured beings. New Delhi 1990, pp.78-79.
35 Mukherji, Mukul: 'Impact of modernisation in women's 
occupation-a case study of rice husking industry in 
Bengal'. In The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 
Vol.20, No.l, pp.27-46.
36 Krishnamurthy, J. (ed.): Women in colonial India. Delhi
1989.
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would make it difficult to implement and it would be 
premature when so many men were not sufficiently educated 
to use the vote responsibly.37 The question of 
enfranchising women was mooted in India in 1917, at a time 
when even in England women did not have that right. Adult 
franchise for women was granted in England only in 192 8 and 
as such the British colonialists were not in a hurry to 
enfranchise Indian women.38 Thus the active women of the 
Indian independence movement attributed their oppression 
not to men as a group, but generally to custom, resulting 
from wars, invasions and imperialism.39 The negative impact 
of tradition and custom has already been shown as a cause 
of women's subordination in chapter 2.1.2 above. As a 
result of women's sacrifice, courageous and organisational 
activities in the independence movement, the demand for 
universal adult franchise was instituted at independence.
By the movement of non-co-operation and civil 
disobedience under the leadership of M.K. Gandhi, a large 
number of women of all communities came out of purdah and 
participated in the struggle for freedom from foreign 
rule.40 In the late 1920s, women workers actively
37 See Everett, Jana Matson: Women and social change in
India. New Delhi 1981, p.106. .
38 Thomas, P.: Indian women through the ages. London 1964, 
p. 333 .
39 Forbes, Geraldine: 'Caged tigers: First wave feminist in 
India'. In Women's Studies International Forum. Vol.5, 
No.6, pp.525-536, at p.529.
40 Sharma, Radha Krishna: Nationalism, social reform and
Indian women. Patna and New Delhi 1979, p.61; Caplan, 
Patricia: 'The Indian women's movement-then and now'. In
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participated in the Calcutta and Howrah Municipal 
scavenger's strike of 1928 and the jute mills strike of 
1928-29.41 Women assisted by spreading the boycott of 
foreign goods, introducing khadi cloth and collected 
jewellery to use for national funds.42 Women also 
participated in selling and distributing prohibited 
literature.43 Women saw the movement for national 
independence and engagement in the women's movement as 
complementary.44 But it never occurred to them that they 
were recruited by the leaders of national Independence only 
to channel the energies of an emerging women's movement 
into the political movement. Women were used for 
demonstrating the untrustworthiness of the imperial rule by 
putting them in the forefront of processions, giving wide 
coverage of their arrest and maltreatment by the police to 
arouse the anger of the people against imperial rule.45 
This theme was projected in numerous articles, pamphlets 
and speeches. For example, a hand bill of 193 0 read:
Women Speaking. Vol.5, No.7, 1981, p.24.
41 Sarker, Tania: 'Politics and women in Bengal-the
conditions and meaning of participation'. In Krishnamurthi, 
J. (ed.): Women in colonial India. Delhi 1989, pp.231-241, 
at p.232.
42 Bondurant, V. Joan: Conquest of violence-the Gandhian 
philosophy of conflict. Bombay 1959, p.90.
43 Ibid. , pp .81-83.
44 Liddle (1986) , p.40.
45 Pearson, Gail: 'Nationalism, univers.alism and the extended 
female space in Bombay city'. In Minault, Gail (ed.): The 
extended family; Women and political participation in India 
and Pakistan. Delhi 1981, pp.174-192, at p.176.
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If you want to save your sisters from being
trampled under the hoofs of horses or save their 
skulls from being cracked by lathi, take oath 
from today not to use British goods.46
There was a wide difference between the goals of the
women's movement and the Indian national movement. The
women's movement did not only want the liberation from
foreign rule but also from male domination.47 According to
Gail Omvedt, the criteria for liberation of women are the
following:
Equal participation in the . productive and 
political affairs of society and freedom from 
sole responsibility for home and child care.48
This, however, would hardly be the agenda of most
Indian women at the time. It appears, from this
perspective, that the key to women's subordination can be
found in their identification with the domestic sphere.49
This feature of domestic subordination appears to be
derived from Engels who compared the marriage agreement to
an unequal contract of owner and labourer, with the owner
being more powerful and authoritative.50 This was
46 Ibid. , p.189.
47 Liddle (1986) , p.40.
48 Omvedt, Gail: 'Caste, class and women's liberation in
India' . In Bulletin of Concerned . Asian Scholars (BCAS) . 
Vol. vii, No.i, January-March 1975, pp.43-48, at p.43.
49 Rubin, Gayle.: 'The traffic in women: Notes on the
political economy of sex'. In Reiter, R.R. (ed.): Towards 
an anthropology of women. New York 1975, pp.157-210.
50 Engels, Frederick: The origin of family, private property 
and the state. Moscow 1977, p.228.
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supported, among others, by J. Sayers.51
Such views taken from foreign writers and concepts 
caused some confusion. The women's organisations in India 
perhaps could not perceive this and, influenced by foreign 
writers, aimed to achieve sexual equality. However, as we 
have argued, the real need of women in India is not 
liberation from the family but to have freedom from 
economic deprivation and violence within it. The Indian 
women's movement aimed first to remove those customs which 
were detrimental to women's "dignity and status" (child 
marriage, purdah, legal disabilities) within the family. 
They wanted to promote measures which would allow 
recognition of the distinctive features of womanhood within 
the family.52 Women's partial and unreflected involvement 
meant that they did not frontally attack the official 
ideology of women.53
Soon after independence, South Asian women acquired 
constitutional guarantees of gender equality in political 
and economic life and universal adult suffrage. However, it 
is obvious today that these rights are not fully realised 
in practice. The struggle for independence did not remain 
without effects, though. Some of the zenana women who came
51 Sayers, J. et al. (eds.): Engels revisited. London
1987.
52 Majumder, Vina: 'Social reforms movements in India-from 
Ranade to Nehru'. In Nanda, B.R. (ed.): Indian women: From 
purdah to modernity. New Delhi and London 1990, pp.41-66, 
at p .66.
53 Mies, Maria: 'Indian women and leadership'. In Bulletin
of Concerned Asian Scholars (BCAS). Vol.vii, No.l, January- 
March 1975, pp.56-61, at pp.58-59.
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out of purdah and volunteered for active service in the 
nationalist movement did not return to the seclusion of 
their homes. However, as we shall see, independence from 
the British colonialists could not automatically ensure an 
improvement of women's rights in society.
3.1.2 Interference with personal/family laws54 in 
British India
Before the British assumed political responsibility, Muslim 
law had been administered as the law of the land.55 The 
Farman of 1765 granted the Diwani, the right to collect 
revenue and civil jurisdiction, to the East India Company. 
In the original form of the Farman. the East India Company 
was bound to decide causes "agreeably to the rules of 
Mahomet and the laws of Empire" .56 But this clause 
disappeared from later versions of the treaty. The law of
54 Personal law has a wider scope than family law. Tahir 
Mahmood points out that Muslim personal law covers the 
following topics: 'Marriage and its dissolution, family 
rights and obligations, testamentary and intestate 
succession, personal property, religious and charitable 
endowments and pre-emption'. See Mahmood, Tahir: Family law 
reform in the Muslim world. Bombay 1972, p.167.
55 Gledhill, Alan: The republic of India. Westport 1970, 
p.220; O'Malley, L.S.S. (ed.): Modern India and the West-a 
study of the interaction of their civilization. London 
1968, p.110.
56 Wilson, Roland Knyvet: Analo-Muhammadan 1 aw. 6th ed. 
London 193 0, p.25.
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the Moghul Empire was founded on Sharia. Fatwa Alamgiri57 
and Hedava58; these sources were also identified by other 
authors.59 The non-Muslims had been governed in matters of 
their personal laws by their own ..personal and customary 
laws.60 In the early British administration, the imperial 
rulers more or less continued the Muslim pattern of 
judicial administration.61
It is important to note that there was no specific 
concern for women at this stage. The main agenda of 
consideration was protection of religious susceptibilities. 
It was promised by Warren Hastings in 1772 by Regulation II 
that the Muslims and Hindus will be allowed to be governed 
by their own laws in all suits regarding inheritance, 
succession, marriage, caste and other religious usages or
57 A collection of decisions or fatwas made in the reign 
of Aurengzeb.
58 Hedava was translated by Charles Hamilton and first 
published in 1791. There are complaints about the Hedava's 
accuracy see Ali, Syed Ameer: Mohammedan Law. Calcutta 
1912, Vol.i, pp.244-254.
59 Rankin, George Clause: Background to Indian law. Cambridge 
1946, p.4; Ali, Syed Ameer: 'Islamic jurisprudence and the 
necessity for reforms' . In Wasti, Syed Razi (ed.) : Sved 
Ameer Ali in Islamic history and culture. Lahore 196 8, 
pp.223-230, at p.224.
60 Ramadan, Said: Islamic law and its scope and eauitv.
1961, p.143; Fyzee, A.A. Asaf: 'Development of Islamic law 
in India'. In Singh, Attar (ed.): Socio-cultural impact of 
Islam on India. Chandigarh 1976, pp.107-115, at p.112.
61 Srivastava, D.K.: 'Personal laws and religious freedom'. 
In Journal of the Indian Law Institute. Vol.18, No.4, 1976, 
pp.551-586, at p.555; Fyzee, A.A. Asaf: Outlines of
Muhammadan law. 1st ed. Bombay 1949, pp.53-54.
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institutions.62 In the Act of Settlement 1781, the same
intention of non-interference of the 1772 Regulation was
reaffirmed. Section 17 of the Act of Settlement 1781,
directed that:
In inheritance and succession to land, rent and 
goods and all matters of contract and dealing 
between party and party should be determined in 
the case of Mohammedans and Hindus by their
respective laws and usages and where only one of 
the parties should be Mohammadan or Hindu by the 
laws and usages of the defendant.
The impact of the Warren Hastings scheme of 1772 was 
that for the first time the laws were divided into general 
and personal law. Thus the Act of 1781 was an extension of 
the 1772 Regulation. A large number of studies cover this 
issue of non-interference of British colonial rule.63 Non­
interference in religio-personal laws also aimed to protect 
the colonial political stability.64 It also appeased
certain vested interests of the Zamindars and Taluqdars in 
relation to customary laws depriving women of their rights 
of property.65 In fact, the colonial paradigm for
legislation was closely connected with the administration
62 Regulation II of Warren Hastings was adopted as the
Regulation of 17th April 1780.
63 See for example Jain (1952), 1st ed. pp.64-69; Rankin
(1946), pp.135-160; Derrett (1968), pp.232-269.
64 Shelat, J.M.: Secularism: Principles and application.
Bombay 1972, p.75.
65 Farroqi, Vimla: 'Muslim women's rights to equality and
the problems of today' . In Siddiqui, A. Zakia and Anwar 
Jahan Zuberi (eds.): Muslim women: Problems and prospects. 
New Delhi 1993, pp.26-31, at pp.27-28.
102
of land revenue.66 The reasons of non-interference did not 
allow the colonialists to injure the religious 
susceptibilities of the Indians.67 But this apparent non­
interference was only with regard to the two major 
religious communities, i.e. Muslims and Hindus.68 The 
personal laws of the Christians and P'arsis were codified by 
the British by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act. 1865, 
the Indian Divorce Act. 1869, the Indian Christian Marriage 
Act, 1872, the Indian Succession Act. 1925 and the Special 
Marriage Act, 1872. Tahir Mahmood states that the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act. 1857, has found itself reproduced 
into these Indian statutes.69 The argument that significant 
dissent was not raised when Muslim law was reduced to 
personal law70 has been strongly disputed by Indian Muslim 
scholars or alims. They reasoned that the British policies 
were forced on the Muslims without their consent as they 
were mere colonial subjects without ,any means to protect
66 Dhavan, Rajeev: 'Borrowed ideas: On the impact of American 
scholarship on Indian law'. In American Journal of 
Comparative Law. Vol.33, No.3, Summer 1985, pp.505-526.
67 Pearl, David: 'Modernising personal laws in India' . In 
South Asia Research. Vol.v, No.ii, Jan. 1972, p.148.
68 Jain, M.P.: Outlines of Indian legal history. 2nd ed.
Delhi 1966, p.697.
69 Mahmood, Tahir: Personal laws in crisis. New Delhi 1986, 
pp.98-99.
70 See Schacht, Joseph: An Introduction to Islamic law.
Oxford 1964, pp.94-95; Rashid, S. Khalid: 'Impact of
colonialism on the sharia in India'. In Islamic and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. 1983, Vol.iii, No.3, pp.161-176.
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their laws.71
The judges who were administering justice at this time 
were either British or Western-trained. There is no 
evidence in the literature on whether these judges were 
dedicated to the women's cause. English and other laws and 
concepts were often introduced by the judges when there was 
a lack of knowledge of traditional Arabic or Sanskrit 
texts. Moreover, there was a general difficulty for the 
judges in properly ascertaining the terms of Islamic law 
from the authoritative Arabic texts.72 This led to 
scholarship on translations and to the compilation of 
commissioned texts.73 However, up to 1856 the judges were 
assisted by law officers, i.e. Muftis or pandits, to 
declare the rule of law applicable to a case.74 Thus it was 
acknowledged that a great part of Islamic law has been 
modified deliberately or accidentally by the judiciary 
since 1772, when the East India Company first undertook to 
administer India directly.75
The laws observed in suits on personal laws were the
71 See for example Haq, Mushir-ul: Islam in secular India. 
Simla 1972, p.54.
72 Coulson (1964), p.155.
73 Baillie, Neil B.E.: A digest of Moohummudan law. 2nd
ed. London 1875; Hamilton, Charles: The Hedava. Lahore
1975; Macnaghten, W.H.: Principles and precedents of
Muhummuden law. Calcutta 1825; Wilson, Roland Knyvet: A
digest of Anglo-Muhammadan law. London 1895.
74 Rankin (1946), p.139; Jung, Ibn. S. Mohamedullah: A 
dissertation on the administration of justice of Muslim 
law. Allahabad 1926, p.91.
75 Derrett (1976), p.514.
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personal laws of the individual community. In the absence 
of any law or usage of the community, justice, equity and 
good conscience was developed as a major gap-f iller .76 
There has been a lively debate on the implications of this 
maxim.77
A significant example of the application of English 
notions to family law in British India affecting women was 
the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights. The concept 
itself is based on Christian ecclesiastical law. Recently, 
it has been argued that this concept was not properly 
applied in India.78 It also caused immense hardship to 
women. Before, women who refused to join their husbands 
could stay with their parents in their parental home and 
were not forced to continue their conjugal life. 
Restitution of conjugal rights was introduced under the 
Civil Procedure Code of 1859, but at first it was not clear 
how it should be enforced.79 In 1877 under the Civil
76 See for details Derrett, J. Duncan: 'Justice, equity 
and good conscience in India' . In Essavs in classical and 
modern Hindu law. Vol.4, Leiden 1978, pp.8-27, at p. 9; 
Derrett, J. Duncan: 'The role of Roman law and Continental 
laws in India' . In Essavs in classical and modern Hindu 
law. Vol.3, Leiden 1977, pp.166-196.
77 See for details Derrett (1978), pp.8-27; Derrett (1977), 
pp.166-196; Gledhill (1970), p.220; Setalvad, M.C.: The 
role of English law in India. Jerusalem 1966, p. 12; 
Coulson, N.J.: A history of Islamic law. Edinburgh 1964, 
p.155; Pearl, David: A Textbook on Muslim law. London 1979, 
pp.23-34 .
78 Sudhir, Chandra: 'Whose laws?: Notes on a legitimising 
myth of the colonial Indian state'. In Studies in History. 
New Series Vol.8, No.2, July-Dee. 1992, pp.187-212, at 
p.192.
79 Macpherson, W. : Procedure of the civil courts 1793 of 
the East India Company. Calcutta 1850, p.20.
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Procedure Code (Act XV), refusal of restitution of conjugal 
rights was made punishable with attachment of property and 
imprisonment and it was enforced under the civil law of the 
country.80 Subsequently in 1908 the British made the 
punishment of imprisonment discretionary and only in 1923 
did they take away the punishment of imprisonment.81
According to this law, both the Muslim husband and 
wife were entitled to the remedy of restitution of conjugal 
rights.82 But such a remedy is not actually useful for 
Muslim women as the husband could always unilaterally or 
extra-judicially divorce the wife.83
There are many valid grounds of defence on the 
principle of equity84 as well as in Muslim law. For 
example, the wife could refuse restitution of conjugal 
rights on grounds of cruelty, non-payment of prompt dower, 
or false charges of adultery.85 However, the assumption of 
equal rights of men and women to pay costs worked against
80 Abdul Kadir v Salima 1886 ILR 8 All 149 (FB) .
81 See for details Engels, Dagmar A.E.: The changing role 
of women in Bengal 1890-1930 with special reference to 
British and Bengali discourse on gender. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, SOAS, London 1987.
82 Mahmood, Tahir: The Muslim law of India. 3rd ed. Allahabad
1987, p.84; Tyabji, Faiz Badruddin: Muslim law. 4th ed.
Bombay 1968, p.103.
83 See Bai Jina v Kharva Jina (1907) 31 ILR Bom. 366.
84 See Moonshee Buzul-ul-Raheem v Shumsoonissa 1867 xi MIA 
551. Sofia v Zaheer AIR 1947 All 16.
85 Saksena, Kali Prasad: Muslim law as administered in India 
and Pakistan. 3rd ed. Lucknow 1949, pp.85-87; Shabbir, 
Mohammed: Muslim personal law and judiciary. Allahabad
1988, pp.80-81 and 101-110.
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women in practice, as failure to pay the costs would make 
a wife forfeit her right even when she was successful in a 
suit for restitution of conjugal rights.86 The costs of 
these suits became a control mechanism used by men against 
women.
By introducing English notions, practice and 
procedure the British also1 interfered in the sphere of the 
personal law of the Muslims and Hindus. This interference 
became gradually more evident in the case law. This led to 
the emergence of "Anglo Mohammedan law", which according to 
some scholars severely distorted the pure Muslim law.87
In derogation of the 1772 promise of respect for Hindu 
and Muslim personal laws, the British rulers gradually 
claimed that they should introduce laws to improve women's 
status in British India, especially with regard to family 
law. Fawcett stated that English law, and the strictness 
and certainty with which it was applied, was helping to 
form and reform the conscience of the native populations.88 
Not only the British but increasingly Indian reformers were 
pressing for legal reforms. The British administrators were 
supported by Indian social reformers, whose contribution is 
often overlooked when it is emphasised that reforms were
86 For details see Saksena (1949), p.88.
87 See Ali, (1912), p.1-4 and in detail Mahmood, Tahir: 
Personal laws in crisis. New Delhi 1986.
88 Fawcett, Millicent Garrett: 'Infant marriage in India'.
In Contemporary Review. Nov. 1890, pp.712-720.
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made because of the British impetus.89 In fact, British 
support for the emancipation of women was often ambiguous. 
This will be shown in more detail below when we consider 
particular Acts.
Most issues of women's rights, especially sati, female 
infanticide and widow remarriage, were not issues of 
concern for the Muslim communities, but of the Hindu 
community. The literature shows concentration of concern 
about the position of women in Hindu law and society.90 
There were hardly any social movements to bring the issue 
of oppression of Muslim women to the forefront of social 
agenda, except perhaps the writings of Begum Rokeya Shakwat 
Hossain (see above, p.87). Therefore, the British drive for 
the emancipation of Indian women was mainly directed at 
Hindu women due to the custom of widow immolation and the 
treatment of widows generally.91 The glaring social evils 
of sati and widow immolation were prohibited by 
codification.92 Thus codification in the personal laws was
89 See for details Rashid, Abdur: The Islamization of laws 
in Pakistan-with special reference to the status of women. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London 1987.
90 Mitter, Dwarkanath: The position of women in Hindu law. 
New Delhi 1984; Altekar, A.S.: The position of women in 
Hindu civilization. Benares 1938; Mitre, Trailokyanath: The 
law relating to Hindu widow. Calcutta 1881; Gupta, A.R. : 
Women in Hindu society. New Delhi 1982; Almenas-Lipowsky, 
Angeles J. : The position of Indian women in the light of 
legal reform. Wiesbaden 1975.
91 Lateef, Shahida: Muslim women in India. London and New 
Jersy 1990, p.10.
92 Sati was abolished in 1829 by the Prohibition of Sati Act. 
For details see for example, Upreti, H.C. and Nandini 
Upreti: The muth of sati. Bombay et al. 1991.
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started only with regard to those issues which appeared to 
the British administrators either outworn or not conducive 
to substantial justice.93 At the same time, the British 
administrators were only interested to prohibit the more 
extreme abuses affecting women and they were not concerned 
with other reforms to improve the condition of women.94
While codification was largely used with regard to 
Hindu personal law,95 there was also some codification of 
Muslim personal law. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act. 1937 is discussed in chapter 3.1.4 below. 
The only legal reform that explicitly helped Muslim women 
to safeguard their rights was the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act. 1939.96
Within the scope of this thesis, only the Acts 
concerning Muslim women will be analysed. But as discussed 
in chapter 2.1.2 above, Hindu customs and usages also 
influenced the customs within the Muslim communities, so 
many legal reforms affected them similarly. For example, 
although many Muslims opposed the Child Marriage Restraint 
Act, 1929 and argued that it should be amended to exempt 
Muslims statistics showed that child marriage was also a
93 Mahmood, Tahir: Muslim personal law: Role of the state 
in the Indian subcontinent. New Delhi 1977, p.50.
94 Ramusack (1981), p.199.
95 See the Caste Disabilities Removal Act. 1850, Hindu Widows 
Remarriage Act. 1856, Gains of Learning Act. 1930, Hindu
Women's Right to Property Act. 1937.
96 Latifi, Daniel: 'Muslim personal law and judiciary in
India'. In Sharma, Ram Avtar (ed.): Justice and social
order in India. New Delhi 1984, pp.281-295, at p.287.
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problem among Muslims.97
The purpose of British-legislative interference in the 
personal laws was apparently to enhance the rights of women 
by prohibiting customs and social evils which were 
affecting their lives. This led to more specific social 
reform. However, the following chapters show that religious 
politics, and not the furtherance of the women's cause, was 
the major issue behind this kind', of legislation.
3.1.3 The Child Marriage Restraint Act. 1929
In British India sexual intercourse was legitimate even at 
the age of ten under section 375 of the Penal Code, 1860. 
This was seen as a slur on the British name in India as it 
suggested that sex with any female was permissible in law 
from the age of ten.98 The central issue in the debate on 
the age of consent was not the sharp division between the 
Indian reformers and orthodox males.99 Rather, the debate 
was about British interference with the social customs,
97 Engels, Dagmar: 'The age of Consent Act of 1891: Colonial 
ideology in Bengal'. In South Asia Research. Vol.3, No.2, 
Nov. 1983, pp.107-131; Siddiqi, Dina M.: 'The articulation 
of gender ideology and nationalism among Muslims in 
nineteenth century India'. In Journal of Social Studies. 
No.57, 1992, pp.50-64, at p.55.
98 Engels (1983) .
99 Engels (1987), p.184.
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especially of the Hindu community.100 In fact, this was the 
first major intervention in the privacy of the family law 
of all religious communities.
Reform was attempted, first of all by an amendment to 
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However this was vigorously 
opposed. By the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act. 1891
(Act X) section 1, the age of cohabitation was increased to 
twelve years. The age of consent was raised as a result of 
the efforts of several Indian reformers especially in 
Bombay. There were also petitions from women's 
organisations for the enhancement of the age of consent.
The debate on child marriages became prominent after 
the age of consent debate and was given more importance 
after census reports for 1921 were published, showing the 
high rates of child widows. The census reported that 612 
Hindu widows were babies not even 12 months old, 4 98 
between 1 and 2 years, 1280 between 2 and 3 years and 6,758 
were between 4 and 5 years of age, making a total of 12,016 
widows under 5 years of . age.101 But the colonial 
administration declined (this time) to sponsor any 
legislation regarding the age of marriage, arguing that it 
might impede the ruling of the country.102 The initiative 
and impetus for change came from various Indian social 
reformers backed by those Indians who were elected to the
100 Ibid. . p.82; Sen, A: 'Hindu revivalism in action-the 
age of consent bill agitation in Bengal' . In The Indian 
Historical Review. No.7, 1980-81, pp.160-184.
101 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.iv, 1929, p.4400.
102 For details see Ramusack (1981), pp.198-216.
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central legislative assembly. Thus in 1927 Hari Singh Gour 
proposed a Bill raising the age of consent to 14 years 
within marriage and 16 outside marriage. The Indian 
government appointed an Age of Consent Committee in June 
1928, which observed that many girls below that age would 
automatically be saved from the terrible risk of early 
widowhood if marriage was deferred to a given age. During 
the age of consent debate, the opinion was gaining ground 
that more effective steps should be taken to eradicate 
early consummation. The Age of Consent Committee reported 
that growing numbers of women saw that the success of the 
movement for emancipation largely depended upon the advance 
in the marriage age.103 In fact, the Age of Consent 
Committee itself recommended that in order to deal most 
effectively with early marriage, and consummation, a law 
should be enacted fixing the age ,of. marriage of girls at 14 
years.104 The Child Marriage Bill was then introduced on 
1st February 1927 and after unnecessary delay and long 
debates, was finally passed on 23rd September 1929105, was 
extended to all communities, and came into force on 1st 
October 1929 as The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929.
The primary object of the Act, as the author of the 
Bill asserted, was to put a stop to child widowhood.106
103 Report of the Age of Consent Committee 1928-1929: Indian 
women: Marriage and social status. New Delhi 1984, p.158.
104 Ibid. , p. 196.
105 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.v, 1929, p.1240-1315.
106 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.iv, 1929, p.4405.
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Premature co-habitation occurred among Muslims as well.107 
Apart from the debate about the protection of girls, there 
was a parallel struggle over the position of Muslim law. 
There was some controversy in the Legislative Assembly 
about whether the Muslims or a big majority of them were 
against the Bill. There were petitions seeking to exclude 
Muslims from its ambit. A member of the Central Legislative 
Council, T.A.K. Shervani argued that the report of the
appointed committee showed that the majority of the Muslim 
witnesses who appeared before the committee were in favour 
of the Bill.108 Moreover, another Muslim member, Mian
Mohammed Shah Nawaz, stated that the Age of Consent 
Committee unanimously found that the evil of early marriage 
and early consummation prevailed among the Muslims of 
Bengal, who formed 42 per cent of the total Muslim
population of the province.109 Further petitions from the 
province of Bengal in favour of the Bill substantiated this 
claim.110
As regards the question, whether the Bill was un-
Islamic, T.A.R. Shervani argued that the Bill was not
against the principles of Islamic law as the Quran or the 
Hadith do not prohibit child marriage.111 He further argued 
that the marriage of minors, which is known in Islamic law,
107 For evidence see Engels (1983) .
108 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.iv, 1929, p. 659.
109 Ibid. , p.658.
110 Ibid. , p.423 .
111 Ibid. , pp. 659-660 .
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is not based on Islamic principles, but on pre-Islamic 
customs.112
The Act had the wholehearted support of the All 
Indian Women's Conference (AIWC) and was regarded as their 
achievement.113 c
The title of the Act itself indicates its lacunae, as 
it suggests restraint of child marriage and not its 
prevention or abolition. Penalties and punishments were 
provided for the male who is over 21114 years and marries 
a girl under 14 years, but they were lenient and 
discretionary.
The parents or guardians who promote, permit or fail 
to prevent such a marriage are also punished. But where the 
guardian or parent is a woman, she shall be exempted from 
punishment of imprisonment, but only a fine shall be 
imposed [section 6(1) and section 12]. This milder penalty 
is a concession to women by the legislature indicating 
paternalistic attitudes in a society which does not 
recognise equality of the sexes. As a tool in the hands of 
some male relations, women are not the principal offenders 
and so are not punished.115 This is a form of positive 
discrimination which shows that the law also recognises
112 Ibid. , p.660.
113 Annual Report of the AIWC 193 0, p. 24.
114 The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (under section 
12 and 13) later reduced the age limit of males to be 
penalised for contracting a child marriage from 21 years to 
18 years, see for details chapter 3.2.2.
115 Sastri, L.S.: The Child Marriage Restraint Act. 1929. 
Allahabad 1988, 4th ed. p.28.
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women as the weaker sex.
More important is the issue of validity of a child 
marriage. Although the parents or guardians or the 
bridegroom may be punished, there is nothing in the Act to 
invalidate a child marriage.116 The significance of the 
Act, however, was that it raised the minimum ages for 
marriage for girls to 14 years and for boys to 18 years and 
criminalised violations.
The objective of the legislators in passing this 
legislation was perhaps noble, but because of the 
procedural loopholes the objects of the Act could not be 
achieved. The Act could only be applied when a complaint of 
any child marriage was made by a private person, and 
enforcement depended upon the court's permission to make 
arrests. Moreover punishment was not adequate as the child 
marriage remained valid after performance, although certain 
penalties were prescribed. Further on, cognizance of the 
crime was limited to one year and to keep the marriage 
secret for a year, if necessary, was not a difficult 
problem.
The policy and attitude of the colonial government 
towards protecting child brides was ambiguous. They did not 
support the passage of the Act, but did not prevent it. On 
the one hand, the government claimed to have great respect 
for womanhood; on the other hand it declared its intention 
to oppose the Bill, which was an important legislation for
116 Mahmood, Tahir: The Muslim law of India. 3rd ed.
Allahabad 1987, p.52.
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children and girls. Mr.Ramananda Chatterjee stated:
The abolition of child marriage and child
mortality and the raising of the age of consent 
within and outside marital relations would tend 
to make Indians a physically, intellectually and 
morally fitter nation. But British bureaucrats 
have all along been very unwilling to help Indian 
social reformers in effecting these reforms by 
direct and indirect legislation.117
Thus, the British colonialist government pleaded that 
the Act was in advance of public opinion and the
responsibility to educate the people rested on the Indians 
themselves.118
The judiciary also' erred on the side of leniency in 
applying the penal provisions of the Act. The efforts of 
the women's organisations to implement the Act were not 
significant enough.119 Thus, the Act failed to fulfil its 
purpose not only because of the reluctance of the British 
administrators to enforce the Act, or the orthodoxy of the 
people to co-operate with it, but- also because the 
nationalist leaders and social reformers were more 
engrossed in gaining independence than the enforcement of 
social legislation that would help women. The Child 
Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 was only discouraging the 
practice. Since the threat of punishment has failed as an
effective deterrent, child marriages persist to this day.
As we shall see below in chapter 4, the question of age of
117 Chatterjee, Ramananda: 'Indian social reformers'. In
Modern Review. Sept. 1927, as cited In Legislative Assembly 
Debate. Vol.iv, 1929, p.4409.
118 Ramusack (1981), p.212.
119 Ibid. , p.213 .
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marriage is still an issue in Bangladeshi law today.
3.1.4 The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Application Act. 1937
In British India there was interference at various levels 
with shariat law, for example the Muslim criminal law and 
evidence law were abolished.120 Within the realm of 
personal law, different states and Muslim communities 
adopted and evolved their own system of law, with the 
effect that customary law or the local law was given 
preference over sharia law.
This issue affected Muslim women, in particular where 
they were denied some of the Quranic rights to property. 
Muslim women could seldom exercise their rights of divorce, 
inheritance or remarriage due to the prevailing customs. 
The status of Muslim women under the customary law was 
appalling.121 For example, with regard to inheritance, the 
Hindu law was applied, which deprived women of their rights 
granted under Muslim law. Muslim men connived in this, 
since it helped them to deprive women of rights. Moreover 
this situation was being confirmed by legislation. For 
example, section 5(b) of the Puni ab Laws Act of 1872 
indicated that in cases where the parties were Muslims, the
120 By the Penal Code of 186 0 and by the Evidence Act of 
1872 .
121 Saksena (1949), p.23.
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decision was governed by Muslim law, unless modified by any 
custom.122 The latter, however, was normally the case.
For this reason on 26th September 1935, H.M. Abdullah 
introduced a Bill in the Legislative Assembly to make 
provision for the application of the Muslim personal law 
(shariat) to the Muslims.123 The principal aim of this 
statutory legislation was to ensure that pure Muslim law 
should prevail over customary laws.124 Thus two issues 
arose for debate, one related to the protection of shariat 
and the other regarding improvement of the position of 
Muslim women.
After two years, on 1st April 1937, the Bill was 
referred to a Select Committee,125 which presented its 
report on 1st September 193 7 and suggested some 
amendments.126 The amendments were, first of all, related 
to agricultural land which could not come under the purview 
of the new law. As stated by Mujeeb, the amendments of the 
Bill made women's rights subservient to the rights of
122 For details see Gilani, Rizul Hasan: 'A note on Islamic 
family law and Islamization in Pakistan'. In Mallat, Chibli 
and Jane Connors (eds.): Islamic Family law. London 199 0, 
pp.339-346.
123 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.vi, 1935, pp.1968- 
1969.
124 Hodkinson, Keith: Muslim family law, a source book.
London and Canberra 1984, p.23.
125 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.iii, 1937, pp.2528- 
2544 .
126 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.iv, 1937, p. 944.
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men.127
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act came
into force on 16th September 1937.128 The Act was passed in
the Central Legislature stating the following reasons:
........ the status of Muslim women under the so
called customary law is disgraceful......... the
introduction of Muslim personal law will 
automatically raise them to the position to which 
they are entitled.129
Despite such rhetoric, the obvious aim of the Act was 
to strengthen sharia. The focus was now to ameliorate the 
condition of women within the framework of Islamisation. In 
the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Abdul Qaiyum stated that 
Muslim women have resented strongly the dead hand of 
customary law which has reduced them to the position of 
chattels.130 When a Muslim died, his daughter, sister and 
wife were thrown into the street and the reversioner in the 
tenth degree could come and collar all the property.131 Mr. 
M.A. Jinnah argued in the Legislative Assembly that the 
customs and usages had been precariously excluding the 
female heirs, making them entitled only to maintenance and 
marriage expenses.132 He further said that under the
127 Mujeeb, M. : Islamic influence of Indian society. New 
Delhi 1972, p.95.
128 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.v, 1937, pp.1819- 
1865.
129 Gazzette of India, Part v (1935) , as quoted by Mahmood 
(1977), p.30.
130 Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol.v, 1937, p.1427.
131 I d .
132 Ibid. , p.1832.
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Islamic law, the shares were defined and even if a woman 
got half, she obtained it in her own right and was the sole 
owner of that share .133
The Act refers to and seeks to abolish a custom 
whereby property received by a female by inheritance or 
gift or under contract or general law of the land was not 
her absolute property and would revert back to the heirs of 
the last male owner.134 The case-law suggests that the 
customary laws were abolished. The Privy Council held that 
the Shariat Law was given preference over the customs and 
usages.135
The subjects with regard to which the Muslims will be 
governed under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act include marriage (including all its forms), 
maintenance, dower, divorce (including talacr. ila, zihar. 
lian. khula, and mubarat), guardianship, maintenance, 
intestate succession, special property of females 
(including personal property inherited or obtained under 
contract of gift or any other provision of personal law), 
gift, waqfs and trust and trust properties.136 In cases of 
testate succession, adoption, wills and legacies, the Act 
does not ordinarily apply Muslim personal laws unless the
133 Ibid. , p. 1445 .
134 Saksena (1949), p.27; Muhammad v Aman (1889) P.R.31; 
Kaim Pin v Umar Baksh (1888) P.R.3.
135 For details see Bhattacharjee, A.M. : Muslim law and the 
Constitution. Calcutta 1985, p.30.
136 The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 
1937, Sec.2.
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person makes a declaration.137 Thus customs on these 
subjects which are not in consonance with the Muslim law 
are not invalidated; but any person so affected may abandon 
the custom and adopt the Muslim law.138
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. 
1937 could not change the deep-rooted custom of denying 
women their inheritance. It was rightly stated by Mumtaz 
Khawar and Farida Shaheed that the continued observance of 
traditional customs rendered the law quite ineffective.139 
Thus, in Pakistan the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law 
(Shariat) Application Act, 194 8 included agricultural land 
within the scope of Muslim law and an amendment of this Act 
in 1951 included testate and intestate succession within 
its scope. In 1951, the Acts were consolidated into the 
West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application 
Act. 1962.140 While in India the debate has continued,141
in Bangladesh the governing statute is the original Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 with all its
137 The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 
1937, Sec.3.
138 Fyzee, A.A. Asaf: Outlines of Mohammadan law. 4th ed. 
Delhi 1974, p.59; Saksena (1949), p.28.
139 Khawar, Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed: Women of Pakistan: 
Two steps forward and one step backward? London and New 
Jersey 1987, p.57.
140 Pearl, David: A textbook on Muslim personal law. 2nd 
ed. London 1987, p.38.
141 For details see Mahmood, Tahir: Muslim personal law- 
role of the state in the Indian subcontinent. 2nd ed. 
Nagpur 1983, p.100; Ahmad, Furqan: 'The Muslim Personal Law 
(Shariat) Application (Amendment) Bill 1986'. In Islamic 
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.vi, No.4, 1986, pp.271-273.
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limitations.142
3.1.5 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act,
1939
The Act provided women in British India, married under 
Muslim law, the right to apply to a court for a judicial 
divorce, which was not recognised before, although all 
schools of Islamic law recognise that a Muslim wife has a 
right to approach the cradi or court for faskh or judicial 
dissolution of her marriage.143
The basis of the law can be traced in the fourth 
chapter of the Quran, which deals with wives.144 Syed Ameer 
Ali reported that according to Shahih al Bukhari, the power 
of the kazi to pronounce a divorce is also founded in the 
express words of the Prophet that if a woman be prejudiced 
by a marriage, let it be broken off.145 The various schools 
of Islamic law accepted the basic principles of dissolution
142 See Mahmood, Tahir: 'Personal laws in Bangladesh-a
comparative perspective'. In Journal of Indian Law 
Institute. No.14, 1972, pp.583-589.
143 For details see Carroll, Lucy: 'Muslim women and judicial 
divorce: An apparently misunderstood aspect of Muslim law' . 
In Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.v, No.3-4, 
1985, pp.226-245, at p.230.
144 Holy Quran, iv: 34-35 as cited by Mahmood, Tahir: Muslim 
personal law-role of the state in the Indian subcontinent. 
2nd ed. Nagpur 1983, p.45; Fyzee (1974), p.168.
145 See Ali, Syed Ameer: Mahommedan law. Vol.ii, 5th ed.
New Delhi 1985, p.519.
of marriage but differed on the circumstances in which it 
should be applied.146 Syed Ameer Ali stated the differences 
among schools to dissolve the status of marriage by a cradi 
or judge.147 For example, under the Hanafi doctrine, 
inability to provide maintenance is not sufficient ground 
for asking for a divorce when, the.; husband does not have 
sufficient means. Whereas under the Shafi law, inability to 
provide maintenance, wilful or otherwise, is a cause for 
the cradi to dissolve the marriage.148 Thus to secure 
dissolution, a Hanafi woman, might be tried by a Shafi 
Kazi, whose pronouncement is also binding on her. This 
device to select and combine various elements of different 
schools of law is known as takhawur or an eclectic choice 
between parallel rules of the various schools of Islamic 
law.149 This selective process of overcoming divergences 
was hardly followed. Even though the courts in British 
India were given powers before 193 9 to apply the law of one 
of the schools of Muslim law in a case in which the parties 
were followers of different schools, on grounds of justice, 
equity and good conscience, the courts were reluctant to 
apply the more liberal rules of Maliki law to parties
146 Mahmood (1983), p.45.
147 See Ali (1985), pp.519-533.
148 Ibid. , pp.520-521.
149 Layish, Aharon: 'Shariah, custom and statute law in a
non-Muslim state'. In Cuomo, I.E. (ed.): Law in
multicultural societies. Jerusalem 1985, p.102; Coulson 
N.J.: A history of Islamic law. Edinburgh 1964, p.185.
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following other schools.150 This led to the passing of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939.
We began to see above that there are differences among 
the schools of Islamic law concerning the precise grounds 
which would entitle a Muslim wife to judicial dissolution 
of her marriage. The Shafi school allows the wife's right 
to judicial divorce on the grounds of her husband's 
inability to maintain her, as well as his imprisonment, 
insanity, or affliction with serious disease. The Malikis, 
in addition, would allow a wife a judicial divorce if her 
husband failed or refused to maintain her, had been missing 
for four years, had abandoned or deserted her, or ill- 
treated her.151 The Hanafi school only allowed a wife to 
apply for judicial dissolution of her marriage for the
husband's impotency, insanity and leprosy.152 However, she 
could also obtain dissolution of her marriage on the
grounds of putative widowhood if her husband had become a 
missing husband.153
Not only are there divergences between the schools 
with regard to the grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 
but also differences of opinion within any one ground. For
150 Hussain, Syed Jaffer: 'Legal modernism in Islam: Polygamy 
and repudiation'. In Journal of the Indian Law Institute. 
Vol.7, 1965, pp.384-398, at p.396. See chapter 3.1.2 for
details of the application of this maxim.
151 See for details Carroll (1985), p.230; Mahmood (1983),
p . 45.
152 Nasir, Jamal J. : The Islamic law of personal status.
London 1986, p.114; Carroll (1985), pp.230-231.
153 Coulson (1964), p.185. Later developments on this issue 
are found below, p.125.
example, the Maliki, Hanbali and Shia schools agree that a 
woman is entitled to re-marry after four years of her 
husband's absence, provided permission of the kazi or an 
order of a court has been obtained before the second 
marriage. The Shafi school requires that the woman should 
wait for her husband's return for seven years, after which 
she can re-marry with the prior permission of the kazi. 
Within the same school the jurists differ from each other. 
According to Abu Hanifa, a woman has to wait 120 years for 
the return of her husband before remarriage. But Muhammed 
reduced the period to 110 years and Abu Yusuf further 
reduced it to 100 years.154 According to Hedava and Fatwa- 
i-Alamairi under the Hanafi law, the wife of a missing 
husband had to wait for at least 90 years before 
contracting a second marriage.155 Thus the Hanafi wife had 
impossible grounds for the judicial dissolution of her 
marriage.156
In British India, as Hanafi law was dominant, this 
caused immense hardship to women as the courts denied 
Muslim women the rights of dissolution available to them
f /
under the sharia. The situation became so alarming that 
women only for the purpose of dissolution of their marriage
154 For details see Ahmad, K.N. : The Muslim law of divorce. 
New Delhi 1984, p.502; Ali (1917), p .118.
155 Ahmad (1984), p.502.
156 Anderson, Norman: Law reform in the Muslim world. London 
1976, p.39.
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renounced their faith.157 Thus there was a growing demand 
to reform the laws to ameliorate the status of women; the 
emerging debate was also influenced by-the reforms in other 
countries.158 The Muslim community ;repeatedly expressed 
dissatisfaction with the view held by the courts.159 The 
ulemas issued fatwas supporting non-dissolution of marriage 
by reasons of the wife's apostasy. The debate only reached 
its height when cases of apostasy by Muslim women to get 
rid of their husband began to be reported from different 
parts of the country.160 Thus the main reason for the 
support of the religious scholars and functionaries to the 
issue was to protect the Islamic ummah rather than to 
ameliorate the position of women.161 The ulema found that 
there was no way out but to secure legislation empowering 
judges in India to dissolve Muslim women's marriages in 
specified circumstances.162 This reasoning of the ulema was
157 Mullah, Farduji Dinshad: Principles of Mahomedan law.
10th ed. Calcutta 1933, p.209; Baillie, B.E. Neil: A right 
of Muhammadan law. 2nd ed. London 1887, p.29; Malik, Vijay: 
Muslim law of marriage, divorce and maintenance. 2nd ed. 
Lucknow 1988, p. 4; Mahmood (1983), p.48; Qadri, Anwar 
Ahmad: Commentaries on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act. 1939. Lucknow 1961, p.87.
158 Schacht (1964), p.104.
159 Mahmood (1983), p.46; Fyzee, A.A. Asaf: 'Muslim wife's 
right of dissolving her marriage'. In Bombay Law Journal. 
Vol.xxxviii, 1936, pp.113-123; Khambafta, K.J. : 
'Dissolution of Muslim marriage at the instance of the 
wife'. In Bombay Law Journal. Vol.xi, 1934, pp.290-291.
160 Mahmood, Tahir: 'Indian legislation on Muslim marriage
and divorce'. In Gangrade, K.D. (ed.): Social legislation 
in India. Delhi 1978, pp.16-29, at p.20.
161 Carroll (1985), p.233.
162 Mahmood (1983), p.46.
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based on a book163 which enumerated in detail the Maliki 
principles which can be applied to dissolve Muslim women's 
marriage under specified circumstances.164 It was also 
suggested in the book that some Muslim members of the 
Central Legislative Council should introduce a Bill based 
on these recommendations.165 Accordingly the leaders of 
Jamiat ul-ulema prepared a Bill.
On 17th April 1936 the Bill was introduced by Qazi Md. 
Ahmad Kazmi, a member of the working committee of the 
Jamiat ul-Ulema. While the main purpose of the legislation 
was to protect Islam, in the Legislative Assembly the 
women's cause was shown as the main issue. While 
considering the Bill, Mr. Abdul Qaiyum said that the 
enlightened sections of the community believe that the time 
has come when a serious attempt should be made to restore 
all rights which were granted by the Quran to Muslim 
women.166 He further said that owing to the attitude of 
Muslim males and the highhanded manner in which Muslim 
women are treated, they have been forced in innumerable 
instances to resort to conversions which were not genuine 
conversions, but only in order to escape the marital 
tie.167
163 Thanvi, Ashraf Ali: Al- Hilat Al-Naiiia Lil Halilal
Al-Aiiza. published in Arabic and Urdu in Delhi 1932.
164 Mahmood (1983), p.47.
165 Id.
166 Legislative Assembly Debate. Vol.i, 1939, p.621.
167 Ibid. , p. 622.
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On the merit of the Bill, the honourable Sir Md. 
Zafrullah Khan said that it puts down, in the space of one 
printed page, the various grounds on which divorce may be 
obtained by a woman married under Muslim law. The lack of 
such provision had caused a great deal of distress, misery 
and suffering in India.168 He stated further that khula or 
divorce obtained at the instance of the wife was 
practically unknown in British-India and, if granted, was 
confined to the narrowest possible limits. In other Muslim 
countries, however, the various grounds of khula were 
freely recognized.169
Mrs. K. Radhabai Subbrayan, the only female member of
the Assembly, expressed her support for the Bill and
ventured to say that this Act would be the beginning for
all progressive measures with regard to women.170
The statement of the reasons and objects of the Bill
indicates the circumstances for which the Bill was passed,
There is no provision in the Hanafi Code of 
Muslim law enabling married Muslim women to 
obtain a decree from the courts dissolving her 
marriage in case the husband neglects to maintain 
her, makes her life miserable by deserting or 
persistently maltreating her or certain other 
circumstances. The absence of such a provision 
has entailed unspeakable misery to innumerable 
Muslim women in British India. The Hanafi 
jurists, however, have clearly laid down that in 
cases in which the application .of Hanafi Law 
causes hardship, it is permissible to apply the 
provisions of the Maliki, Shafi or Hanbali Law. 
Acting on this principle the Ulemas have issued 
fatwas to the effect that in cases enumerated in
168 Ibid. , p.877.
169 Ibid. , p. 878 .
170 Ibid. , p.878.
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clause 3, Part A of this Bill, a married Muslim 
woman may obtain a decree dissolving her 
marriage. A lucid exposition of this principle 
can be found in the book called 'Heelat-un- 
Najeza' published by Maulana Ashraf Ali Sahib who 
has made an exhaustive study of the provisions of 
Maliki Law under the circumstances prevailing in 
India may be applied to such cases.. This has been 
approved by a large number of Ulemas who put 
their seals of approval on the book.
As the courts are sure to hesitate to apply the Maliki 
Law to the case of a Muslim woman, legislation 
recognizing and enforcing the above-mentioned 
principle is called for in order to relieve the 
sufferings of countless Muslim women.171
The Bill became law on 17th March 1939 as the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. 1939 (Act VIII of
1939).
The new Act was an attempt to reinstate liberal Muslim 
provisions which were not contrary to Muslim law. Under 
sec. 2 (ii) of the Act a wife is entitled to the 
dissolution of her marriage when her husband has failed to 
provide for her maintenance for a period of two years. The 
entitlement of the wife to maintenance depends on the 
principles of Muslim law. Under section 2 (iv) of the Act, 
a wife is entitled to the dissolution of her marriage when 
her husband has failed to perform, without reasonable 
cause, his marital obligations for a period of three years. 
Whether the husband is impotent or not has to be decided in 
accordance with Muslim law. Finally, under section 2 (ix) of 
the Act, a marriage can be dissolved by the wife on any 
ground recognised as valid under -Muslim law. This 
illustrates the application of Muslim law.
171 Gazette of India. Part v, 1938, p.36.
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However, there are provisions of the Act which effect 
substantive changes and in some ways, as claimed by some 
scholars, contravene the principles of Muslim law. Tahir 
Mahmood has explicitly described the circumstances in which 
the husband might have withheld maintenance.172 In 
particular, if the wife is nashizah (disobedient) or
refractory, under Muslim law she is not entitled to
maintenance and so her marriage cannot be dissolved on the 
ground of the husband's failure to provide maintenance for 
a period of two years.173 Further on, it has been held by 
the courts that a wife who refuses to return to her husband 
without sufficient cause is not entitled to maintenance.174
The rulings of the courts are mutually contradictory as
they are based on the "fault" theory and contrarily the 
modern "breakdown" theory.175 The view that judicial 
dissolution or faskh can be granted irrespective of the 
wife's faulty conduct has been criticised by some scholars 
as it is not in consonance with the principle of Nushuzah 
under Islamic law.176
As we saw under the Hanafi law inability to maintain
172 Mahmood (1980), pp.97-101; Mahmood (1987), pp.97-101.
173 Rahman, Tanzil-ur: A code of Muslim personal law. Vol.i, 
Karachi 1978, p.288.
174 Mai ida Khatoon v Pachalo Mohammad PLD 1963 Dhaka 583; 
Sardar Muhammad v Nasima Bibi PLD 1966 Lahore 7.
175 Mahmood (1980), p.101.
176 Fyzee (1974) , p.172 .
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was not by itself considered as a ground for divorce,177 
whereas under the Act failure to maintain, even on account 
of poverty, ill-health or imprisonment, is a good ground 
for the dissolution of the marriage.178
On the question whether the wife has a right of 
dissolution on the ground that the husband is missing, the 
right of dissolution arises after the expiry of the waiting 
period. As we saw (above, p.125) under Hanafi law, the wife 
of a missing husband had to wait for an impossibly long 
time before contracting
a second marriage. Under Maliki law, however, the period of 
waiting was only 4 years. The first change regarding this 
issue was made by the Evidence Act of 1872. Section 108 of 
the Act provides for a presumption that a person shall be 
considered to have died if he has not been heard of for a 
period of 7 years.179 The Act of 193 9 has further reduced 
the period to 4 years, adopting the Maliki law.
On the ground of cruelty of the husband, there was no 
dissolution of marriage under the traditional Hanafi 
law.180 On the ground that the husband had more wives than 
one and did not treat them equitably in accordance with the 
injunctions of the Quran, under section 2 (viii)(f) of the 
Act, it has been held that if the wife is herself at fault
177 Asmat Bibi v Samiuddin, 79 IC 1925 Cal 991; See also 
Manchanda, S.C: The law and practice of divorce. Allahabad, 
4th ed. 1973, p.727.
178 Zafar Hussain v Mst. Akhbari Begum AIR 1944 Lahore 336.
179 Mazhar Ali v Budh Singh 1884 ILR All 297 (FB) .
180 Ahmad (1984) , p. 11.
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so that the husband finds it impossible to maintain equal 
treatment between her and his other wives, she cannot be 
entitled to dissolve the marriage.181 But when the husband 
did not provide any money to one wife while maintaining his 
other wives, it was held that he had not treated the wives 
equally.182
With regard to the provisions of Muslim law concerning 
impotency it is for the wife to establish the allegation 
that her husband is suffering from incapability. But also 
that she was ignorant of it at the time of marriage.183 
Under section 2 (v)(c) of the Act the burden of proof has 
been shifted to the husband to prove that he has been cured 
of his defect.
The Act also made substantial changes to the Islamic 
doctrine of Khivar al-buluah or "option of puberty". Before 
the Act, a minor could repudiate her marriage, which was 
contracted by her guardian, when she attained puberty. 
After the 1939 Act, the age of puberty is fixed at the 
completion of 15 years, irrespective of the actual time of 
attainment of puberty.184 This clause eliminates the fight 
over proof of puberty.185 Moreover under the traditional 
Islamic law, a girl could not exercise this option against
181 Badrunnisa Bibi v Muhammad Yusuf AIR 1944 All 23 .
182 Mst. Zubaida Begum v Sardar Shah AIR 1943 Lah 310.
183 Ahmad (1984), p.421.
184 Mahmood (1980), p.103.
185 For an example see Mst. Daulon v Dosa PLD 1956 Lahore 
712 .
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the decision of marriage made by her father or paternal 
grandfather, but only against other guardians. This 
assumption of the jurists was based on the reasoning that 
as they were so closely related to the girl, it could be 
presumed that they must have acted in her best
interests.186 However, this reasoning is not based upon any 
Quranic prescription or sunnah of the prophet.187 Moreover 
the courts have held that the consummation of marriage 
before the girl attained the age of 15 years did not 
destroy the option of puberty.188 Tahir Mahmood points out 
that it is doubtful whether this is in conformity with 
Muslim law.189
The central question of apostacy has not been
elaborated on by the Act. It only states in the fourth 
section that a Muslim woman's apostacy of Islam shall not 
dissolve her marriage. The fact is that if the women
apostates to become a kitabia (who follow religious books),
the marriage remains valid, as Muslim men are entitled to 
marry a kitabia. But if she apostates to a religion which
does not follow a holy book, the marriage is considered
void ab initio. However, in the Act the position of a woman
186 Ahmad (1983), p.10; Hamilton, Charles (trans.) : The 
Hedava. 2nd ed. London 1957, p.37.
187 Siddique, Muhammed Mazheruddin: Women in Islam. Lahore 
1952, pp.83-84; Esposito, John L. : Muslim family law in 
Egypt and Pakistan: A critical analysis of legal reform, 
its sources and methodological problems. Ph.D. Thesis, 
Temple University, Ann Arbour, Michigan 1974, p.45.
188 For an example see Ghulam Sakina v Falak Sher Allah
Bakhsh AIR 1950 Lahore, p.45.
189 Mahmood (1983), p.49.
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who was originally a convert to Islam from some other faith 
remained intact in the sense that any later conversion 
dissolved her marriage automatically.190 Thus, the Act has 
abolished apostacy as a ground for dissolution of marriage 
by a Muslim woman, taking away a right she already had. Now 
she must obtain a decree of the court before she considers
her marriage dissolved.191 This shows the conflict of
Muslim interests and women's rights.
Thus the Act was passed with many modifications, which 
was against the wishes of the ulemas who drafted the
original Bill192 and made them disappointed. Their main 
grievance was that the jurisdiction under the Act was not 
reserved for Muslim judges to extend the application of the 
Act to a couple who later become Muslims, to adopt the 
provisions relating to "option of puberty" to the 
traditional Hanafi principles and to make the provisions of 
sec. 4, dealing with the effect of apostacy to confirm the 
classical Muslim law.193 In July 1942, Md. Ahmed Kazmi
pressed for amendments, but was not successful as the 
amendments were not acceptable to the Government. Moreover, 
necessary support for them could not be secured in the 
legislature. The Ulemas blamed the leaders of the Muslim 
League in the legislature for giving the Bill a progressive
190 Mannan, A.M.: 'The development of the Islamic law of 
divorce in Pakistan'. In Journal of Islamic and Comparative 
law. Vol.5, 1974, pp.89-98, at p.92.
191 Malik (1988) , p.72.
192 Mahmood (1983), p.49.
193 Mainul, Md. : Jamaiat-al-ulama kva Hav. Delhi 1946.
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outlook and for not keeping it within the Islamic 
framework.194 Perhaps the leaders of the Muslim League in 
the legislature were successful in their effort for the 
passage of the Act as it was a progressive law reform. In 
this tug of war of Islamisation and modernisation, women- 
almost by chance-gained some rights which could have been 
hard to achieve otherwise. :
The Act has a very limited scope in the sense that it 
did not restrict the arbitrary power of the Muslim husband 
to pronounce talaa or restrict polygamy.195 Moreover, it 
has to be asked whether transferring the power of 
dissolving marriages from the husband and to the judges 
(who are usually men) would improve the situation. Some 
scholars think that the delicate matters of family life 
will create a scandal if they come to open court.196
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 193 9 could 
not provide equal rights to the spouses with regard to the 
dissolution of marriage as the wife who could not fulfil 
the requirements of the specific grounds recognized in the 
Act did not have any redress.197 For example, 
incompatibility of temperament was not considered a valid
194 Id.
195 Singh, Sukhdev: 'Development of the concept of divorce
in Muslim law'. In Allahabad Law Review. Vol.5, 1973,
pp.117-127, at p.126; Hussain (1965), pp.384-398.
196 El Arousi, M. : 'Judicial dissolution of marriage'. In 
Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law. Vol.7, 1977, pp.13- 
20.
197 Esposito, John L. : Women in Muslim family law. New York 
1982, p.81.
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ground for the wife asking for khula divorce, although she 
foregoes her dower.198 However the situation changed in 
1959 when judicial khul was allowed if the wife was unable 
to keep the limits ordained by God as envisaged in the 
Quran, i.e. if in their relations to one another the 
spouses will not obey God and a harmonious married state as 
envisaged by Islam will not be possible.199 This judicial 
khul without the husband's consent was reaffirmed in 1967 
by the Supreme Court of Pakistan by granting a unilateral 
judicial khul to the wife for incompatibility of 
temperaments.200 Thus although the legislative enactments 
in Muslim law had limitations, the judiciary was trying to 
be the gapfiller for enhancing the rights of women.
198 For an example see Saveeda Khanam y Muhammad Sami PLD 
1952 (W.P.) Lahore 113 (F.B.).
199 See Balauis Fatimah v Nazm-ul-Oureshi PLD 1959 (W.P.) 
Lahore 566 (para 42).
200 Khurshid Bibi v Mohammed Amin PLD 1967 SC 97. For a 
discussion of judicial khul see, Hinchcliffe, Doreen: 
'Divorce in Pakistan: Judicial reform'. In Journal of
Islamic and Comparative Law. Vol.ii, 1968, pp.13-25; 
Carroll, Lucy: 'The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961:
Provisions and procedures'. A reference paper for current 
research'. In Contributions to Indian Sociology. (NS) , 
Vol.13, 1979, pp.117-143.
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3.2 Women and family law in the Pakistan era
The independence from colonialism certainly had a vibrant 
effect on the whole Indian subcontinent and Pakistan was 
not an exception to it. This part of the thesis 
concentrates on the progress of laws concerning women in 
the new nation. It does not review the changing trends 
affecting women in education, health, rural development, 
economic and political status, as done by other authors.201 
It focuses on the progress of women's rights and legal 
status with reference to legislation within the parameters 
of family law. It is in this era that some attempts were 
made to improve the position of Muslim women through law.
The creation of Pakistan as a country for Muslims led 
to a dilemma concerning policies of law-making. Age-old 
questions were re-opened. Can man legislate, given that the 
Quran is God's law? Even the most modernist reformers in 
Pakistan would find it inconceivable to abandon the Islamic 
framework and to create secular laws. Instead, the focus 
shifted to reforms within Islamic law.202 Thus the debate 
runs on the line whether the reforms conform with the
201 Chipp, Sylvia A. : 'The modern Pakistani women in a Muslim 
Society'. In Chipp, Sylvia A. and Justice J. Green (eds.): 
Asian women in transition. University Park and London 198 0, 
pp.2 04-220; Woodsmall, Ruth Frances: Women in the chancing 
Islamic system. Delhi 1983, (1st ed. Washington D.C. 1960). 
However the progress of women was rather limited to the 
urban women's life style. See for details Hafez, Sabiha: 
Metropolitan women of Pakistan. Karachi 1981.
202 See for details Coulson, N. J. : Conflicts and tensions
in Islamic jurisprudence. Chicago and London 1969.
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rights given by Islam. The rights of women under Islam have 
already been analysed in detail above. The present chapter 
considers the new legislation in family law produced in 
Pakistan in 1961 and subsequently inherited by Bangladesh.
3.2.1 Legislation relating to family law in the Pakistan era
We have already seen that the legislation of British India, 
inherited by the new state, did not significantly enhance 
the position and status of women. The three dimensionality 
of legislation consisting of restraining child marriage, 
enhancing women's rights to divorce and enlargement of 
women's rights by abrogation of customs was not translated 
into practice and the grievances of women with regard to 
family matters were not redressed. Apparently the new 
regime felt a need to redress the situation of women by 
reforming the family law. A fresh atbetfipt has been made, in 
the new state, to reemphasise women's rights by new 
legislation.
In Pakistan, women have consistently and daringly 
opposed archaic, anti-women laws which have been imposed on 
them in the name of religion. 203 In fact it was not 
religion per se but the distorted picture of it, reinforced 
by patriarchy and other factors, which was the real
203 Bhasin, Kamla and Said Nighat Khan: 'A note on the
relevance of feminism for South Asia'. In Finding our wav- 
readinas on women in Pakistan. Lahore 1991, pp.201-205, at 
p.205.
138
obstacle, as we already saw in chapter 2. Reformation and 
modification of family laws was an important agenda item on 
which women were actively campaigning. The All Pakistan 
Women's Association (APWA) felt that family law was biased 
to men, specially with regard to the issues of polygamy, 
talao and maintenance.204 It was thought that the 
unrestricted right of polygamy was being exercised by 
unscrupulous men; this usually makes the first wife 
dowerless and destitute. Thus polygamous marriages, 
according to APWA, severely hinder the progress towards 
emancipated womanhood.205 Moreover, APWA felt bitter about 
the unrestricted right of men to give talaa and also gave 
importance to the enforcement of maintenance orders.206
204 Kraushaar, Sylvia Chipp: 'The All Pakistan Women's
Association and the 1961 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance'. In 
Minault, Gail (ed.): The extended family. women and
political participation in India and Pakistan. Delhi 1981, 
pp.263-285.
205 Pearl, David: 'The legal rights of Muslim women in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh'. In New Community. Vol.5, No.1-2, 
Summer 1976, pp.68-74; Faridi, Tazeen Begum: The changing 
role of women in Pakistan. Lahore 1960.
206 Pearl, David: 'Family law in Pakistan'. In Journal of
Family Law. Vol.9, 1969-70, p.171.
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3.2.2 The Commission on Marriage and Family Laws
Due to immense pressure from the women's organisations and
their sympathisers, 207 the government established a
Commission on Marriage and Family Laws on 4th August 1955
to review the situation and suggest necessary changes. The
Commission was to decide whether,
The existing laws governing marriage, divorce, 
maintenance, and other ancillary matters among 
Muslims require modification in order to give 
women their proper place in society according to 
the fundamentals of Islam.208
The primary object of setting up the Commission was to 
examine whether the existing family law needed any
alterations and modifications to enhance the position of 
women. Professor Coulson has argued that to some degree the 
Commission was set up to ensure that the existing laws
• ;  - r
conformed with Islamic principles.209 But that was not the
sole purpose of its formation. According to the Marriage
Commission itself,
The primary object of the Commission was to 
revive in a slightly modified form the rights,
207 Carroll, Lucy: 'Nizam-i Islam: Processes and conflicts 
in Pakistan's programme of Islamisation, with special 
reference to the position of women'. In Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. Vol.xx, No.l, March 
1982, pp.55-95, at p.59.
208 The Marriage and Family Laws Commission Report was 
published in The Gazette of Pakistan. 20th June, 1956, 
pp.1197-1232, at p.1197 and is here after referred to as 
The Report.
209 Coulson, N.J.: 'Reform of family law in Pakistan'. In 
Studia Islamica. Vol.7, Sept. 1957, pp.135-155, at p.136.
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granted to women by Islam.210
The Commission was established with seven members,
headed by a former Chief Justice, one representative of the
Muslim ulema and included three women experts. The
Commission prepared its Report on the basis of a set of
questionnaires, which was circulated to the public. The
Report itself illustrates the Commission's approach to
reform of the law in the interest of the public,
What is not categorically and unconditionally 
prohibited by a clear and unambiguous injunction 
is permissible, if the welfare of the individual 
or of society in general demands it.211
Moreover the Report approached a modernist trend of
reform which aimed towards improving the status of women
within the family,
We are of firm conviction that the principles of 
the Holy Qur'an if rationally and liberally 
interpreted are capable of establishing absolute 
justice between human beings and are conducive to 
healthy and happy family life.212
On 3 0th July 1956, a dissenting note by Maulana 
Ehteshamul Huq was published in the Gazette of Pakistan.213 
He was a member of the Commission on Marriage and Family 
Laws, disagreed with most of the recommendations of the 
Commission and blamed it for distorting Islam.
If we consider the Report of the Marriage Commission
210 The Report, p. 12 03.
211 Ibid. , p.1204 .
212 Ibid. . pp.1203-1204.
213 This will be referred to here after as The Dissenting 
Note.
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and the Dissenting Note of the traditional ulema and other 
critics, the debate on the traditionalist and modernist 
approach to the reform of family laws in Pakistan becomes 
more focused. Below, we discuss the major legal issues 
concerning women's rights that were taken up by the 
Commission.
Registration of marriage:
No law or enactment required compulsory registration of 
Muslim marriages.214 This caused immense problems for women 
not only to legitimise their relationship within the 
family, but also to prove the existence of the marriage 
itself. Muslim law permits oral marriage and neither 
official or unofficial registration of marriage is 
required.215 The existence of Muslim marriages had to be 
proved by other factors and in the absence of those factors 
it had to be presumed.216 However, voluntary registration 
of Muslim marriages was recognised in Bengal since the 
passing of the Bengal Muhammedan Marriage and Divorce 
Registration Act of 1876.
The Commission recommended the introduction of 
compulsory registration of marriages, and the adoption of 
a standard marriage contract. It was argued that the 
absence of registration of marriage causes complex problems
214 Mahmood, Tahir: The Muslim law of India. Allahabad 1982, 
2nd ed. p.55.
215 Ibid. , p.56.
216 Id.
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relating to the validity and existence of nikah between
certain parties, which arise very frequently in civil and
criminal courts.217 The Commission traced the source of
their argument for registration of marriage from the Divine
Book itself, which contains an injunction to reduce
important transactions to writing.218 -The Commission only
extended those transactions in cases of marriage.
In his Dissenting Note, Maulana Ehteshamul Haq did not
deny the necessity of registration, as it guards against
the possibility of an error of forgetfulness. But he was
not in favour of punishments for its contravention. Other
traditional writers were more critical about registration
of marriage. Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi has taken a
theological view,
The first consequence will be that all those 
marriages which are not registered would be 
illegal and void and the children born because of 
them would be illegitimate. It is clear on the 
face of it that this conflicts with shariah.219
It is necessary to point out that this criticism is
inaccurate, as unregistered marriages would not be void
marriages and the children born from this wedlock would be
legitimate.220 The Report did not state that unregistered
marriage would be void and was thus clearly in conformity
217 The Report, p. 12 08.
218 Ibid. , p.1229.
219 Islahi, Amin Ahsan: 'Marriage Commission Report X'rayed' . 
In Ahmad, Khurshid (ed.): Marriage Commission report 
X 'raved. Karachi 1959, p.171, (2nd ed. Karachi 1961, under 
the title Studies in the family law of Islam).
220 Fyzee, A.A. Asaf: Outlines of Muhammedan law. 3rd ed. 
Bombay 1964, p.108; Pearl (1969-70), p.173.
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with Islamic law.
Age of Marriage:
The debate about minimum marriage ages has already been
referred to (see pp.110-116). The Commission was of the
opinion that no man under 18 and no woman under 16 shall
enter into a marriage contract, which is in conformity with
the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an and sunnah.221 This
means that the Commission suggested a higher minimum age
for girls; it stood at 14 years under the Child Marriage
Restraint Act. 1929.
Maulana Ehteshamul Haq vehemently opposed the fixation
of age limits for marriage through legislation. However, he
agreed that shariah has neither fixed any age limit nor
stipulated any age of puberty for the parties entering into
a marriage contract.222 He wrote:
Such a measure is not at all in conformity with 
the injunctions of shariat. It is a pity that 
persons who claim to be not only Muslims but also 
renowned scholars and experts in shariat are 
making a suggestion which is definitely repugnant 
to the fundamentals of our ' din' ,223
The critical comment of Maulana Islahi on the point is 
worth mentioning as he questions the validity of the 
Commission's reasoning of attainment of maturity. In his 
view one can not assess generally that on 16 years or 18 
years one will attain maturity of thought and intelligence.
221 The Report, p. 12 09.
222 The Dissenting Note, p. 1577.
223 Ibid. , p. 1580.
144
He argued:
If maturity of thought and intelligence be an 
essential condition of marriage then perhaps 
thirty and not eighteen would be the proper age- 
limit.224
Maulana Islahi also argued that the effect of this law 
would be to make a permissible act prohibited by 
legislation.225 Apart from Islamic rhetoric, this approach 
signifies unwillingness to accept a higher minimum age for 
women probably for concern about zina.
Divorce bv the husband:
In sharia law, the unilateral right of the husband to 
divorce his wife without the intervention of the court is 
often exercised arbitrarily and irrationally, making the 
lives of women miserable. Muslim law places the right in 
the husband in the expectation that he will take recourse 
to it rationally and with justice. 226 However, a Muslim 
husband of sound mind may divorce his wife without any 
cause whenever he desires.227 This right of the husband has 
been described by authors as unfettered and unilateral.228
In its extreme, this has led to the talacr-al-bidah 
pattern of divorce, where a husband pronounces triple 
divorce at one sitting. This has been regarded as a serious
224 Islahi (1959) , p. 173.
225 Ibid. , p. 176.
226 Mahmood (1982), p.113.
227 Fyzee (1974), p.150; Mullah (1972), p.293.
228 Coulson (1969), p 75; Esposito (1980), p.229.
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problem affecting women's lives as it is treated as
irrevocable and final.229
The Commission recommended the abolition of talaa-al-
bidah and in addition suggested that talacr-al-hasan230
should be made obligatory. They emphasised that this is not
against the divine revelation or the teachings and the
practice of the Prophet.231
Maulana Ehteshamul Haq in his dissenting note agreed
that the talacr-al-hasan form of divorce was favored by the
Prophet and therefore ought to be encouraged:
We do not propose to give any encouragement to 
the practice of indiscriminate talacrs either. For 
this we suggest that talaa, whether pronounced at 
one sitting or three sittings, should not be 
permitted without compelling reasons because to 
keep the way to unrestricted talaa open and to 
bar its enforcement and execution would be a 
premium on vice and adultery.232
The Maulana seemed to be in favour of talaa with 
compelling reasons, although he did not emphasise this. The 
ulema was advocating to check talaa-al-bidah by education 
and awareness of the law, not by legislation. However, he 
was not proposing to declare three pronouncement of talaa 
in one sitting to be ineffective or invalid.233
229 See, Fyzee (1974) ; Rahman (1978),.
230 This is the repudiation of marriage by the husband by 
three pronouncements made during three tuhrs or period of 
purity. This has been regarded as the most approved form of 
divorce by the husband. See, Ali (1917); Fyzee (1974).
231 The Report, pp. 1211-1213 .
232 The Dissenting Note, p. 1585.
233 Ibid.. pp.1581-1589.
146
Divorce sought bv the wife:
We have already seen (see above, p.122) that the right of 
dissolution of marriage at the instance of the Muslim wife 
was not recognised in South Asia and that this led to the 
reforms of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. 
This Act provided grounds under which Muslim women of South 
Asia could dissolve their marriage. Under this Act, the 
case of a wife seeking redress needs to be judicially 
scrutinised, which is a lengthy procedure, whereas for 
Muslim men there is no need to assign any reason for 
divorce. 234 Thus, divorce is easier for Muslim husbands 
than wives.235
On the matter of divorce at the instance of the wife, 
the Commission expressed the view that no modification of 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 was 
necessary. The Commission emphasised that talaa-e-tahweed 
and khula should be made more certain and precise.
On talaa-e-tahweed the Commission was of the opinion 
that it is lawful to provide in the marriage contract that 
the woman shall have the same right to pronounce divorce as 
the man, if the right to do so had been delegated to her in
234 Puri, Balraj : 'Muslim personal law: Questions of reform 
and uniformity be delinked'. In Economic and Political 
Weekly. 8th June 1985, pp.987-990, at p.989; Mahmood 
(1972), p.90; Carroll, Lucy: 'Talaq-i-Tafwid and
stipulation in a Muslim marriage contract: Important means 
of protecting the position of South-Asian Muslim wife'. In 
Modern Asian Studies. Vol.16, No.2, 1982, pp.277-309, at
p.278 .
235 Pearl (1987), p.100; Hodkinson (1984), p.246.
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the marriage contract by the man.236 It was pointed out by 
an author, while reporting on the Dissenting Note, that 
Maulana Ehtishamul Huq emphasised that the delegation of 
the right of divorce by the husband to the wife should not 
be considered as an absolute right of the wife as described 
by the Commission. 237 The traditional critics were of the 
view that when the husband transferred his right of 
repudiation of marriage, he was left with no power and 
authority to repudiate it.238
The correct exposition of the law has been given by 
Tanzil-ur-Rahman who noted that if the husband delegates to 
his wife the right to divorce, his own right of effecting 
divorce does not lapse, but subsists so long as the wife 
does not exercise the right.239
On khula the Commission, recommended that 
incompatibility of temperament should give the wife a right 
to demand a divorce.240 The member critic, however, was of 
the opinion that the declaration of incompatibility of 
temperament as a valid ground for dissolution of marriage 
by khula would throw open the floodgates of talaa and spell 
moral and social ruin for the society.241 What he meant to
236 The Report, p. 1210.
237 Feroze, Muhammad Rashid: 'The reforms in family laws in 
the Muslim world'. In Islamic Studies. Vol.i, No.l, 1962, 
pp.109-130, at p.114.
238 Islahi (1959) , p.187.
239 Rahman (1978), pp.341-343; Carroll (1982), pp.277-300.
240 The Report, p. 1215.
241 The Dissenting Note, p. 1590.
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say, presumably, was that women should not be given a say 
in decisions about divorce.
Polygamy:
Islamic law permits restricted polygamy with a view to 
meeting natural eventualities.242 However, this view has 
been opposed by some authors.243 Others have regarded it as 
an exception to the general rule.244 This qualified right 
is being abused in society, putting many women in great 
trouble. There has been substantial change to this 
traditional right of polygamy in many Muslim countries of 
the world. The Tunisian Code of Personal Status of 1956
242 Tyabji, Faiz Badruddin: Muslim Law. 4th ed. Bombay 1968, 
p. 46; Pearl, David: A text book of Muslim personal law. 
London 1987, pp.77-78.
243 On the controversy of polygamy see for the orthodox and 
traditional view Ahmad, Khurshid (ed.): Marriage Commission 
Report x 'raved. Karachi 1959; Khan, M. Mustafa Ali:
7 Islamic polygamy: A blessing in disguise'. In Kerala Law 
Times. Journal 1989(1), 47-58; Haq, Fazlul: 'Polygamy in
Islam-misinterpreted and ill-judged'. In Kerala Law Times. 
Journal 1990 (2), pp.14-18; for the modernist view see
Hussain, Syed Jaffer: 'Legal modernism in Islam: Polygamy
and repudiation'. In Journal of the Indian Law Institute. 
Vol.7, 1965, pp.384-398; Rahman, Fazlur: Islam. New York, 
Chicago and San Francisco 1966, p.221; Hinchcliffe, Doreen: 
Polygamy in traditional and contemporary Islamic law'. In 
Islam and Modern Age. Vol.I, No.3, Nov. 1970, pp.13-38; 
Esposito, John L. : Women in Muslim family law. New York 
1985, pp.92-93; Menski, W.F.: 'Comparative legal training
in action: A reluctant defence of polygamy'. In Kerala Law 
Times. Journal 1990 (1), 50-69; Menski, W.F.: 'Crocodile
tears and Muslim polygamy in India'. In Kerala Law Times. 
Journal 1991 (2), 20-24.
244 Mahmood, Tahir: 'Dissuasive precepts in Muslim family 
law'. In Aligarh Law Journal. Vol.2, 1965, p.123; Rahim, 
Abdur: The principles of Muhammedan jurisprudence. Madras 
1911, p.85.
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prohibited polygamy.245 There are also restrictions on this 
right in Egypt246 and the practice of polygamy in Syria and 
Iraq has been circumscribed.247
With respect to polygamy, the Commission considered it 
necessary for justice and equi;ty that a man intending to 
have a second marriage should seek permission from the 
Family Court, explaining the special circumstances leading 
to the necessity of such a marriage. He should satisfy the 
court that equitable treatment to the first wife and all 
children would be guaranteed.248 Thus, the Commission was 
of the opinion that in rare cases the taking of a second 
wife may be justifiable, but the man should satisfy the 
court,
That the first wife is insane or is suffering 
from some incurable disease or that there are 
other exceptional circumstances which makes his 
second marriage an inescapable necessity, and he 
is not taking a second wife ..merely because he 
wishes to marry a prettier or a younger woman 
than his first wife.249
The critics of the Commission did not accept this. 
Maulana Islahi has given many causes for polygamy from the 
causes of nature250 to moral health.251 The advocates of
245 For details see Esposito, John L. : 'Perspectives on
Islamic law reform: The case of Pakistan'. In Journal of 
International Law and Politics. Vol.13, No.2, pp.217-245, 
at p.220; Nasir (1986), p.115.
246 See for details, Nasir (1986), p.29.
247 See Hinchcliffe (1970), pp.20-23.
248 The Report, p. 123 0.
249 Ibid. , p. 1216.
250 Islahi (1959) , p.209.
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the unrestricted right to enter into a polygamous marriage 
argued that:
The shariah has made no difference between first, 
second, third and fourth marriages. It equally 
allows all of them. If the first marriage 
requires no order from a court of law, even the 
third and fourth, what to say of the second 
marriage, should not be conditioned with 
procurement of any court order.252
These arguments have been countered in the Report 
itself which states that it is already when a person wishes 
to marry for a second time that the injunction to do adl or 
justice between the wives arise. 253 However the problem of 
adl between wives has been categorised as technical adl.254
Mehr:
The reformers did not attempt to reform the system of 
dower in a thorough fashion to improve the position of 
women. 255 The Commission recommended that if no details 
about the mode of payment of mehr are given in the 
nikahnama. the entire mehr shall be presumed by the court 
to be payable on demand.256 It is worth mentioning that in 
this situation, where no dower is specified, the Ithna
251 Ibid. , p.208 .
252 Maududi, Syed Abul Ala: 'The family law of Islam (reply 
to the questionnaire)'. In Ahmad, Khurshid (ed.): Studies 
in the family law of Islam. Karachi 1961, p.25.
253 The Report, p. 1217.
254 The Dissenting Note, p. 1600.
255 Esposito (1980), p.227.
256 The Report, p. 1218.
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Ashari law presumes that the whole dower is prompt. 257 The 
case law suggests that in such a situation of unspecified 
dower the custom or usage of the wife's family should be 
taken into consideration.258
The dissenting member of the Commission did not 
comment on the recommendation on dower, but emphasised that 
it is essential to make laws ensuring payment of mehr.259 
The Commission also emphasised that a. husband will have to 
pay the mehr fixed in the marriage contract, however high 
it may be. They thought that the social custom of fixing an 
inordinately high sum as mehr without any real intention to 
pay it would gradually disappear.260 The critic of the 
Commission agreed that this high fixing of mehr is an "evil 
custom" but argued that this social evil cannot be undone 
by legislation.261 An author has contrarily pointed out 
that this excessive dower is a method to check divorces and 
discourage polygamy in South Asia.262 This excessive amount 
of dower is not only a check for unreasonable exercise of 
talaa but also the only financial security the woman might 
have after the dissolution of her marriage.
257 Ali (1912), p.442; Fyzee (1974), p.139.
258 Nasiruddin Shah v Amatul Muahni AIR 194 8 Lah. 13 5 F.B.
259 The Dissenting Note, p. 1601.
260 The Report, p. 1218.
261 Islahi (1959), p.218.
262 Khan, Md. Najibullah: 'Legislation of sharia' . In 
Legislation in conflict with fundamental law. Vol.l, 
Karachi 1971, pp.257-346, at p.318.
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Custody:
The Muslim law recognises that a mother is of all persons 
most desirable to have the custody of a small child, so 
that proper care and attention can be given to it.263 There 
is no Quranic verse fixing the:, age limit of custody of 
children and no evidence from the practice of the prophet 
is recorded. But in the moral sphere it is specified in the 
Quran that the mother should breast-feed her offspring for 
two whole years.264 This moral injunction implies in the 
ethical sense that the custody in the first instance 
belongs to the mother.265 The Hanafi school entrusts the 
mother to have custody of her daughter until she attains 
puberty and of her son till he is 7 years of age, while the 
Shafi and Maliki school entitle the mother to have custody 
of a female child until her marriage.266 The right of the 
mother to the custody of her children continues even when
• j
she is divorced by the father of her children, but she 
forfeits the right by marrying a stranger or by change of 
religion. 267 If the mother forfeits her right it devolves 
upon her nearest female relation until the father is
263 Rahman, A . F .M . Abdur: Institutes of Mussalman law: A
treatise on personal law according to the Hanafite school. 
Calcutta 1907, p.210.
264 The Quran. Sura 11:223.
265 Rahman (1907), p.719.
266 For details see Tyabji (1968), p.216; Rahman (1907), 
p.718; Fyzee (1974), p.33.
267 Rahman (1907), p.211.
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legally entitled.268
In the Indian subcontinent, after the minor attains
the specified age, the custody by the mother immediately
becomes illegal. The refusal of the mother to hand over the 
children to the father would amount to removal of the ward 
from the custody of their rightful guardian under section 
25 of the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890.269
The Commission argued that it is admissible to propose
changes and modifications in the matter of custody of minor 
children, as the divine origin or the practice of the 
Prophet did not fix any age limit and some of the Muslim 
jurists have expressed the view that the matter of age 
limit in this respect is an open question.270
The critic of the Commission cited a hadith on which 
the Hanafi law of custody is based. It orders children to 
observe prayers at the age of seven,, making it obligatory 
for the father to start religious education of his children 
when they attain the age of seven. Hence, he can take over 
custody of the children at that age.271 However, the mother 
is entitled to the custody of a female child, according to 
the dissenting note, not only up to the age of puberty but 
up to the time of her marriage.272
Other traditional writers did not take recourse to the
268 Rahman (1907), p.212; Tyabji (1968), p.217.
269 Mst. Zebu v Mirai Gul PLD 1952 Pesh 77.
270 The Report, p. 1219.
271 The Dissenting Note, p. 1601.
modification of the legal age but were in favour of the 
theory of the welfare of the child and cited illustrations 
where the mother was given custody when it was in the best 
interests of the child.273
Guardianship:
Under Hanafi law a mother can only be the legal guardian of 
a minor's property at the death of the father, the paternal 
grandfather or their executors, provided she is appointed 
by the court or the father or the paternal grandfather. By 
strictly following the principle of legal guardianship 
after the death of the father, the property is often not 
properly protected.274
The Commission suggested that in the absence of the 
father the Family Court should be able to appoint the 
mother for the protection and management of the minor's 
property. 275 The critic was emphasising that only if there 
is no trustworthy male guardian should the property of the 
minor be given to the mother.276
Maintenance of wives:
Maintenance or nafaaa is a fundamental right of Muslim 
women created not by any separate contract but by the
273 Islahi (1959) , p.220.
274 The Report, p. 1221.
275 I d .
276 The Dissenting Note, p. 1602.
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marriage contract or kabinnama itself.281 Economic support 
or maintenance of a wife during the subsistence of the 
marriage is a legal responsibility of the husband in 
Islam. 282 Thus, a Muslim wife has a right to be maintained 
by her husband under Islamic law, even if she can maintain 
herself. 283 If a husband refuses to maintain her, she has 
a right to sue him under section 488 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1898. The criminal court can grant an 
order of maintenance. But the procedure in the criminal 
court is very complicated and often requires a great length 
of time. This tends to cause great hardship to women.
The Commission recommended that if the husband 
neglects or refuses to maintain his wife without any lawful 
cause, the wife should be entitled to sue him for 
maintenance in a special Family Court.284 The Commission 
also proposed to increase the maximum monthly allowance as 
maintenance award under section 488 from Rs.100/- to 
Rs. 300/-.285 In addition the Commission recommended that a 
wife should be allowed to claim past maintenance for three 
years prior to the institution of the suit.286
The critic of the Commission voiced little opposition 
to those recommendations. Maulana Ehteshamul Haq said that
281 Ali (1912) , p.459.
282 The Quran. ii:29.
283 Fyzee (1974), p.212; Tyabji (1940), p.317.
284 The Report, p. 1219.
285 Ibid. , p. 1220 .
286 Id.
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a woman can claim the same maintenance which is fixed by 
the Oazi or a court, but can not claim her past 
maintenance.287
By analysing the important recommendations of the 
Commission on Marriage and Family Laws and the criticisms 
of the conservative ulemas it can be gathered that the real 
conflict was not so much about the substantive legal 
changes, but that this was an extended debate of 
traditionalists and modernists on the principles of Muslim 
law. 288 The reasoning on both sides followed their view of 
thinking and tried to justify their arguments. The major 
issue was supposed to be the emancipation of Muslim women, 
while the discussion was merely revolving round the 
religious politics of Islamisation and the ulema' s power. 
This highlighted the conflict of interests about women's 
rights and Muslim men's interests in the subordination of 
women. Thus the voices of the opponents were heard, 289 and 
not of the supporters of reforms. Perhaps for this reason, 
the government did not have the courage to give immediate 
effect to the report.290
The contradictions of the . reforms arose because 
Islamic family law is intimately, connected with religion, 
so perhaps a bold step could not be taken. N.J. Coulson has 
remarked that with reference to divorce:
287 The Dissenting Note, p. 1601.
288 Pearl (1969-70), p.181.
289 Ahmad (ed.) (1959); Khan (1971), pp.251-346.
290 Mahmood (1983), p.165.
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Basically the husband's right of repudiation, 
which undoubtly occasions the greatest prejudice 
to woman's status, remains, and the compromise at 
which the Ordinance aims between the modernist 
and the traditionalist viewpoints seems on 
balance to favour the latter.291
However, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 the 
only major family law reform in Pakistan, was a significant 
piece of reform as it sought to restrict the practice of 
talaa-al-bidah and required the registration of marriage, 
restricted polygamy, discouraged hasty divorces and settled 
maintenance claims by an Arbitration'Council.292 The Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 was also an attempt within 
family laws to protect individual women's civil rights; 
this caused dissatisfaction among the conservative 
ulema. 293 Although the enactment of the Ordinance was made 
with good intentions, to promote the interests of women, it 
also aroused tensions within the society.294 The 
discussions prior to the enactment of the Ordinance 
indicate the divergence of opinion not only among modern 
and orthodox Muslim scholars but also about the need for 
improvement of certain rights of Muslim women.
291 Coulson, N.J.: 'Islamic family law: Progress in
Pakistan'. In Anderson, J.N.D. (ed.): Changing law in
developing countries. London 1963, pp.240-257, at p.255.
292 Esposito (1974), pp.90-91.
293 Korson, J. Henry and Maskiell Michille: ' Islamization and 
social policy in Pakistan-the constitutional crisis and the 
status of woman'. In Asian Survey. Vol.xxv, No.6, June 
1985, pp.589-612, at p.604.
294 Rosenthal, I.J. Erwin: Islam in the modern national 
state. Cambridge 1965, p.336.
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3.2.3 The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961
After considerable delay, the martial law government under 
Ayub Khan was bold enough to adopt many recommendations of 
the Commission. In March 1961 it promulgated the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance, against strong opposition by the
ulema, who regarded it as totally un-Islamic.295 On the
other hand, the women activists welcomed the Ordinance and
launched a movement in support of it.296 Men who were 
modern in their thinking also defended the Ordinance as 
restoring to Muslim women the rights and protection given 
to them by the Divine Book itself. 297 The question of 
modernisation of the Muslim family law has been seen as a 
necessary condition for women's emancipation298 but reforms 
could be achieved within the Islamic framework by
counteracting orthodox views.
It is useful to compare and contrast the 
recommendations of the Marriage and Family Laws Commission 
and the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 
1961, not only to assess whether the Ordinance was a new
295 See for details Ahmad (ed.) (1959), pp.33-34; Mahmood 
(1983), pp.165-166.
296 Khawar and Shaheed (1987), pp.58-59; Chipp-Kraushaar, 
Sylvia: 'The All Pakistan Women's Association and the 1961 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance'. In Minault, Gail (ed.): The 
extended family. Delhi 1981, pp.263-285.
297 For example see Mirza, Anis: 'Family Law Ordinance not 
un-Islamic'. In Dawn. 15 July, 1962.
298 Rosenthal (1965), p.337.
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scheme299 of Ayub Khan, the then president of Pakistan, who 
encouraged governmental intervention in family law, 300 but 
also to determine whether it safeguarded women's interest.
Despite the opposition of a substantial body of 
critics, the Ordinance implemented the recommendation that 
the grand-children should represent the position of their 
demised parent in the property of the propositus under 
section 4. Some writers have emphasised that this would 
displace the guiding principle of Islamic law.301
The recommendation of the Commission to register all 
Muslim marriages was effected by section 5 of the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance. Contravention of this provision was 
made punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which 
may extend upto three months, or a fine upto one thousand 
rupees, or with both. Thus the penalties are relatively 
light and flexible. Notably, failure to comply with the 
provision did not affect the validity of one's marriage.
The Ordinance also provided for a standard kabinnama 
which contains certain clauses. These, if agreed upon at 
the time of marriage, protect the position of the woman by 
making it possible for the wife to seek enforcement by the
299 On this see Pearl (1969-70), p.183; Carroll (1982), p.58.
300 See in particular Pearl, David: 'Executive and
legislative amendments to Islamic family law in India and 
Pakistan'. In Heer, Nicholas (ed.): Islamic law and
jurisprudence. Washington 1990, pp.199-220, at p.205.
301 For details see Khan (1971), p.296; Mahmood, Tahir: 
Family law reform in the Muslim world. Bombay 1972, pp.288- 
289; Anderson, J.N.D.: 'Recent reforms in the Islamic law
of inheritance'. In International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly. Vol.14, 1965, p.358; Mahmood (1983), p.168.
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courts in case of contravention of any clauses in the 
kabinnama. Moreover it also protects women by facilitating 
recourse to divorce without the intervention of the court. 
The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 has given the 
option to the husband to delegate the right of divorce by 
clause 18 in the form of the kabinnama. The wife, if the 
power to divorce is delegated, has a right to divorce 
herself extra-judicially.302 Already before the statutory 
enactment, this right of delegated divorce was recognised. 
The Ordinance made this option more readily accessible and 
gave it official recognition.
Section 6 of the Ordinance deals with polygamy. It 
made it obligatory for a man desiring to marry a second or 
subsequent wife to seek in writing303 the approval of the 
Arbitration Council. 304 Under section 6(3) of the 
Ordinance, if the Arbitration Council is satisfied that the 
proposed marriage is just and necessary, 305 it may grant
302 Form II of the Muslim Family Law Rules. 1961 describes 
the form of the kabinnama as prescribed by rule 8 of these 
Rules.
303 Under section 6(2) of MFLO, The person is required to 
state the reasons for the proposed marriage. The consent of 
the existing wife or wives to the marriage is also 
required.
304 According to Section 2 (a) of the MFLO, Arbitration 
Council means a body consisting of the Chairman and a 
representative of each of the parties to a matter dealt 
with in this Ordinance.
305 According to Article 14 of the Muslim Family Laws Rules. 
1961: In considering whether another proposed marriage is 
just and necessary during the continuance of an existing 
marriage, the Arbitration Council may, without prejudice to 
its general powers to consider what is just and necessary, 
have regard to such circumstances, as the following amongst 
others:
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permission which may be subject to any condition which it 
deems fit to make. Under section 6(4) applications for 
revision may be made, by any party to the sub-divisional 
officer, 306 who is the final court of appeal. If a person 
contracts another marriage without the permission of the 
Arbitration Council, he shall be punished under section 
6(5) (b) with imprisonment or a fine or both. But the 
Ordinance, again, did not invalidate those marriages. Thus, 
if a person marries, in defiance of the Ordinance, the 
existing wife has a right to claim her dower under section 
6(5)(a) and if she wishes she can also make a petition for 
divorce under the new provision introduced by the Ordinance 
into the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939.307
Section 7 of the MFLO also requires the intervention 
of the Arbitration Council and seeks to curb unilateral 
divorces by Muslim men. It states in section 7 (1) that as 
soon as any man has given talaa. he should send the
Sterility, physical infirmity, physical unfitness for the 
conjugal relation, wilful avoidance of a decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights, or insanity, on the part of 
an existing wife.
306 Under section 6(4) of the MFLO. In West Pakistan, the 
appeal is made to the Collector. In Bangladesh this power 
of appeal was later transferred to' the Court of Munsif 
under an amendment of 1985 (see chapter 4 below).
307 Under section 2 (ii) (a) of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act 193 9, a woman married under Muslim law shall 
be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of the 
marriage on the ground that the husband has taken an 
additional wife in contravention of the permission of the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961.
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Chairman308 notice in writing of his so doing and send a 
copy to the wife. The stipulated effect of such notice is 
to freeze the talaa for 90 days, during which limit the 
Chairman together with representatives of both parties, 
tries to reconcile them under section 7(4) of the MFLO. 
Section 7(3) of the Ordinance seems to indicate that after 
90 days the talaa becomes effective unless the parties were 
reconciled. Any person who does not comply with these 
provisions is punishable by fine or imprisonment under
section 7(2) of the MFLO. Section 7(3) of the MFLO has only 
purported to convert talaa-al-bidah from an unrevocable and 
final divorce to a revocable one.309
The Arbitration Council was also given powers by the 
MFLO in another area of family law, i.e. a wife's claim of 
maintenance. It stated under section 9 (1) of the MFLO that 
if any husband fails to maintain his wife adequately, the 
wife may apply to the Arbitration Council, who shall 
specify the amount which shall be paid as maintenance by
the husband. Appeal may be made to the Sub-divisional
Officer under section 9(2) of MFLO within 30 days (under 
section 16 of the Muslim Family Law Rules. 1961) and his 
decision will be regarded as final.310 The amount payable
308 Chairman under section 2 (b) means the Chairman of the 
Union Council or a person appointed by the central or 
provincial government or by officer authorised by the
government. This provision has been changed in Bangladesh, 
see Appendix IV, p.454.
309 Coulson (1963), p.251.
310 In Bangladesh the right of the Subdivisional Officer 
for revision has been taken over by the Munsif's Court, 
projecting the encroachment of the judiciary in the local
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as maintenance will be recoverable as arrears of land 
revenue under Section 9(3) of MFLO.
The recommendation on dower was that when no details 
of the mode of payment of dower had been specified in the 
kabinnama. then the entire amount of the dower was 
considered payable on demand. This has been put into effect 
by section 10 of the Ordinance which provides that where no 
details about the mode of payment of dower are specified in 
the nikahnama, or the marriage contract, the entire amount 
of dower shall be presumed to be payable on demand.311 In 
addition the Ordinance also protects women by raising the 
minimum age of marriage for girls from 14 to 16 years by 
making amendments in the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 
1929 (Section 12(a)) . It has also enhanced women's right by 
enlarging the option of puberty. The MFLO, by Section 
13(b), has extended the limit to 16 years.
The sections of the Ordinance can be regarded as being 
in conformity to the recommendation of the Commission 
except sections 6, 7, and 8.
It could be argued that the head of the executive of 
that time, President Ayub Khan, by giving judicial 
functions on issues of family law to the Union Council or 
local administrative personnel, was undermining the role of 
the judiciary. An examination of sections 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Ordinance shows that the MFLO was a new scheme which 
projected the ex-president's philosophy and ideology of law
administrative sphere. See below, p.228.
311 See Appendix iv, p. 457.
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rather than the Report of the Marriage Commission.312 The 
Commission was suggesting the desirability of interference 
of the court in family matters, but the president was more 
interested to give power to the locally elected men who 
according to his view would understand the problems of 
their immediate community best.313
In summing up it can be critically commented that the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 fell short of the 
needs and expectations of women's organisations and other 
social reformers who aspired for the better legal 
protection of women. The Ordinance did ignore some of the 
important issues crucial to women, such as khul divorce, 
custody of children and past maintenance for women, as had 
been recommended by the All Pakistan Women's 
Association.314 Moreover, the procedures in the MFLO are 
basically concerned with extra-judicial divorce, especially 
imposing some restrictions over the husband's traditional 
power of talaa.315 The unilateral power of talag was, 
however, left substantially unimpaired, it was only 
required that the husband should notify the action to the 
Council.316
The Ordinance was within the ambit of modern versions
312 Pearl (1969) , p.183.
313 Ibid. , p.182 .
314 Recommendation of Family Laws Ordinance 1961. All 
Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), Lahore 1961.
315 Carroll (1978), p.280.
316 Ibid., p.251; Coulson (1963), p.251.
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of Islamic norms. But the Arbitration Councils could not 
ensure full justice to the aggrieved women in Pakistan. 
Matters referred to an Arbitration Council would usually be 
decided in accordance with social norms prevailing in the 
society.317 In the patriarchal setting of Pakistan, this 
form of local dispute settlement could not effectively 
rescue Muslim women from economic deprivation and violence.
3.2.4 Application of the legislation relating to 
family law by the courts in Pakistan
One of the aims of our inquiry is to focus on problems of 
implementation of legislation which purports to benefit 
women. We have already described the goal and procedures of 
the legislation relating to family law in Pakistan during 
the period from 1947 to 1971. This portion of the thesis 
will focus on the application of this legislation as 
reflected through the case-law.
There are two types of mechanism available for redress 
in the cases of personal law. First, a person may institute 
a criminal suit in a criminal court. For example, under 
section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1898 a case for 
maintenance may be filed. Secondly, a civil suit may be 
instituted in the civil courts. It is significant to
317 For details see Pearl, David: 'The impact of the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance in Quetta (Baluchistan) 1966-68'. In 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute. 1971, pp.561-569, at 
p.561; Carroll (1978), pp.279-286.
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emphasise again that only a small portion of disputes 
actually comes to the courts. The reasons behind this can 
not be discussed fully within the ambit of this thesis.
The courts are institutions which could enforce newly 
created statutory rights which are not recognised by the 
community. An examination of the- family law cases reported 
after 1961 illustrates this point. The majority of these 
cases involve the issues of talaa and polygamy under 
sections 7 and 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 
1961 respectively. These two sections had sought to 
introduce innovations in personal law and were incorporated 
to assist women against male egoism. Below, we now discuss 
the major areas of concern.
Registration of marriage
Section 5 of the Ordinance appeared to make it evident that
no marriage solemnised under Muslim law should be left
unregistered. Mr. Justice Abu Md. Abdullah, in the case of
Abdulla v Rokeva Khatoon.318 held:
This section makes it absolutely necessary that 
the marriage solemnised under the Muslim law 
shall be registered. The solemnisation of 
marriage if validly effected might not be 
effected for non-registration of the marriage.
But the non-registration of the marriage causes 
a doubt on the solemnisation of . the marriage 
itself.319
Thus, lack of registration does not make the marriage 
void, but in certain cases it would be difficult to prove
318 21 DLR 1969 213.
319 Ibid. , p.217 .
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the marriage itself. Thus registration of marriage is 
useful for women as it gives documentary proof that 
marriage was solemnised. Illiterate poor women are mostly 
affected if their marriages are not registered, as they are 
easily deserted by their husbands. The case-law here has 
not gone beyond general declarations.
Polygamy
We saw that section 6 of the MFLO only penalises the male 
in respect of a marriage contracted in contravention of 
this section by making him liable to imprisonment or fine 
or both but does not invalidate the marriage itself. 320 The 
criminal sanctions may not deter many persons from entering 
into a polygamous marriage.321 The courts have held that 
contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of the 
first marriage without permission as required under the 
Ordinance is liable to prosecution. 322■ Moreover, such a man 
is not allowed to register the second or subsequent 
marriage. It has been rightly stated by Justice Ahsanuddin 
Choudhury,
Section 6(1) of the Ordinance lays down that no 
marriage during the subsistence of the earlier 
marriage without the permission of the 
Arbitration Council shall be registered. It is
320 Ali Nawaz Gardezi v Mohammad Yusuf PLD 1963 SC 51, at 
p.74; Also in Muhammad Aslam v Ghulam Muhammad Tasleem PLD 
1971 Lah 139, at p.142-143.
321 However, in a later case in Pakistan, criminal sanction 
has been used even when the first marriage was solemnised 
in civil form in the United Kingdom,^. See Fauzia Hussain v 
Khadim Hussain PLD 1985 Lah 165.
322 Ahmad Mia v Kazi Abdul Motaleb 23 DLR 1971 118.
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therefore, obvious that a marriage under Muslim 
law must satisfy the provisions of the Ordinance 
for its registration. If the provisions are not 
satisfied, the marriage shall not be 
registered.323
Thus the legal consequence; of a subsequent marriage 
not following the procedure of the Ordinance is only that 
the subsequent marriage is not registered, the marriage 
itself remains valid.
Some cases have been on procedural points. Thus, 
regarding complaints of polygamy, it has been held that a 
complaint by a Chairman of the Union Council, forwarded by 
the Deputy Commissioner to the Magistrate amounted to a 
complaint under the Ordinance.324
In essence, however, section 6 MFLO does not 
effectively protect Muslim women against the whims of a 
polygamous husband.
Talaa
One of the first cases on divorce was the much noted
Supreme Court decision in Ali Nawaz Gardezi v Muhammad
Yusuf. 325 where the purpose of section 7 of the Ordinance
was re-stated,
The object of section 7 is to prevent hasty 
dissolution of marriages by talaa. pronounced by 
the husband, unilaterally, without an attempt 
being made to prevent disruption of the 
matrimonial status. If the husband himself thinks 
better of the pronouncement of talaa and abstains 
from giving a notice to the Chairman, he should
323 Ibid. , p. 120.
324 Muhammad Islam v State PLD 1967 Pesh 201.
325 PLD 1963 SC. 51.
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perhaps be deemed, in view of section 7, to have 
revoked the pronouncement and that should be to 
the advantage of the wife.326
The debate was, inter alia, on the issue whether 
notice to the Chairman of the Union Council was mandatory. 
While it has more recently been pointed out by an author 
that it is argued by some that the introduction of the 
notice requirement is contrary to the Quran and the sunnah, 327 
in the 196 0s the courts assumed that notice was mandatory.
On the question whether talaa given without complying 
with the provisions of the Ordinance is valid, there are 
now two contrary trends of cases. One trend suggests that 
the notice to the Chairman of the Union Council is 
mandatory. 328 A whole line of cases follows this leading 
case. 329 However, the opposite position is also reflected 
in the case-law and a number of cases have held that notice 
is not an essential criterion.330
The right of the wife to be notified under section
326 Ibid. , p. 75.
327 Pearl (1990) , p.207.
328 Ali Nawaz Gardezi v Muhammad Yusuf PLD 1963 SC 51.
329 State v Tauair Fatima. PLD 1964 Kar 306; Abdul Aziz v 
Rezia Khatun, 21 DLR (196 9) 733. Abdul Mannan v Sufuran
Nessa, 1970 SCMR 854; Muhammad Salahuddin Khan v Muhammed 
Nazir Siddiaue. 1984 SCMR 583. For .details of the issue 
see, Carroll, Lucy: 'Talaq in Pakistan: Notification,
revocation and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance'. In 
Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly. No.4, 1984, pp.238- 
24 7; Carroll, Lucy: 'Talaq in Pakistan: The question of
notification again'. In Islamic and Comparative Law 
Quarterly. No.5, 1985, pp.287-297.
330 Chuhar v Gulam Fatima PLD 1984 Lah 234; Noor Khan v Hag 
Nawaz PLD 1982 FSC 265; Md. Rafique v Ahmad Yar PLD 1982 
Lahore 825; Marina Jatoi v Nuruddin K. Jatoi PLD 1967 SC
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7(1) seems clearly enforceable by the penal sanctions 
contained in section 7 (2).331 The early cases in Pakistan 
made it mandatory to supply a copy of the notice of talaq 
to the wife. 332 However, several later cases arrived at a 
contrary decision.333 If the primary object of the 
Ordinance was to enhance the position of women priority has 
more recently been given to Islamisation rather than 
concerns of women. 334 We shall see in chapter 5.5 below 
that Bangladeshi law now differs significantly from the law 
of Pakistan in this area.
Other types of dissolution of marriage
Section 8 of the MFLO required the same procedure to be 
followed in other cases of dissolution of marriage than 
talaa. In the suit of Mst. Mumtaz Mai v Gulam Nabi. 335 the 
procedure required in the Ordinance could not be availed of 
as the suit was filed before promulgation of the Ordinance; 
the case implies that in khula cases also the same 
procedure as in section 7 should be followed. In the case 
of Muhammed Amin v Mst. Surrava Begum. 336 it was held that
331 For details see Carroll, Lucy: 'Wife's right to 
notification of talaq under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 
1961'. In PLD Journal 1985, pp.272-21 6.
332 Inamul Islam v Mst. Hussain Banu PLD 1976 Lah 1466.
333 See for example M. Zikria Khan v Aftab Ali Khan PLD 1985 
Lah 319.
334 Mahmood (1983), p.164.
335 PLD 1969 HC 5.
336 PLD 1969 Lah 512.
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the expression "wished to dissolve marriage otherwise than 
by talaa" includes dissolution sought on the ground of
khivar al-buluah or option of puberty, as it is in full
accord with the phraseology employed in section 2 of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939.337 Recently 
there has been a surge of cases under section 8, but these 
are not discussed here, as this part of our study is
concerned only with Pakistani law till 1971 .338
Maintenance
Section 9 of the MFLO provides that the Chairman of the 
Arbitration Council may issue a certificate specifying the 
amount which should be paid as maintenance by the husband, 
only if the husband fails to maintain his wife 
"adequately". In Sardar Muhammed v Mst. Nasima Bibi. 339 it 
was held that the word "adequately" includes cases of total 
neglect or refusal. The judges seem to have extended the 
provisions of the Ordinance as they gave the Arbitration 
Council power to grant allowances for a period prior to the 
time of making of application.340
337 Muhammad Amin v Mst. Surawa Begum PLD 1969 Lah 512, at 
p.518 .
338 See for details Carroll, Lucy: 'Consensual divorces
and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961' . In PLD Journal 
1987, pp.121-127.
339 1967 19 DLR (WP) 50.
340 Id.
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Dower
In Gul Newaz Khan v Maherunnessa Beaum,341 The High Court 
of Dhaka ruled that since wilful non-payment of maintenance 
constitutes a ground for divorce, wilful non-payment of 
dower due on demand entitles a wife to seek a judicial 
decree of divorce.
Overall, we can see that the;courts in Pakistan were 
implementing the provisions of the MFLO and in some cases 
extending the meaning of certain provisions. However, the 
effects of this legislation on the society as a whole seem 
to have been minimal, as the concern to protect religion 
was stronger than that of protecting women. The requirement 
of women in South Asia to have freedom from economic 
deprivation and violence were not focused on in the 
judicial decisions. Although some emphasis was given in the 
MFLO on giving maintenance and dower for wives, the courts 
were only alerted when there was total neglect and refusal. 
Moreover it has been argued that.the legislation could only 
affect the elites of the society.342 Thus, the patriarchal 
domination of Pakistani family law continued despite some 
well-sounding legislation and cases which paid lip-service 
to protecting the needs of women. The law as a whole would 
not come to the rescue of most women who found themselves 
confronted with violence and economic deprivation. As we
341 3 PLD 1965 Dacca 274-276.
342 See for details Carroll, Lucy: 'The reception of the 
Muslim family laws Ordinance, 1961, in a Bangladeshi 
village'. In Contributions to Indian sociology. Vol.12, 
No.2, 1978, pp.279-286; Pearl (1971), pp.561-569.
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shall see below, the movement for the independence of 
Bangladesh also offered women a glimpse of hope of a better 
future in this regard.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY LAW IN BANGLADESH
This part of the thesis gives an overview of the policy 
debates surrounding the development of family law in 
Bangladesh, concentrating on the establishment of the 
Family Courts and their effects on women. Before going into 
details on legal enactments and case-law, we first consider 
how women were treated by the legislature in the newly 
independent country and whether the stated aim to 
ameliorate women's rights was more than rhetoric. In this 
light, women's rights in Bangladesh have been analysed 
within the constitutional framework, indicating the 
disparity between the personal law and the constitutional 
rights, showing vividly the internal contradictions within 
the Constitution between granting legal equality and making 
special laws for women.
The personal law system is then analysed projecting 
how the Constitution ensures that the personal law system 
continues to survive although it is lagging behind some 
basic principles which have been accepted by the 
Constitution. The minority laws and their position vis-a- 
vis uniformity of laws are also given some consideration.
The chapter then concentrates on the recent 
establishment of Family Courts. Finally, the post­
independence reforms in family law are analysed generally
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to see whether the legal reforms have actually operated to 
the advantage of women.
4.1 Women and the legislature
The movement for liberation in Bangladesh accelerated the 
urge of women towards social and legal emancipation. Women 
played a significant role in the freedom movement. But the 
literature primarily portrays women's contribution in the 
movement as victims of rape by Pakistani soldiers and 
collaborators, or as women left alone by a freedom-fighter 
father, brother or husband.1 It has been reported that 
nearly 30,000 Bangladeshi women were raped by Pakistani 
soldiers in their supposed mission to populate this wing of 
the nation with pure Muslims.2 To them Bengalis were not 
Muslims. The amalgamation of Bengali culture and Islamic 
tradition has already been discussed above and we have seen 
the unique character of Muslim identity mixed with Bengali 
culture in Bangladesh (see above, p.43). Perhaps the 
Pakistanis could not understand this.
1 Ahmed, Rahnuma: 'Women's movement in Bangladesh and the 
left's understanding of the woman question'. In The Journal 
of Social Studies. No.30, 1985, pp.41-56, at p.48.
2 Kabeer, Naila: 'The quest for national identity: Women, 
Islam and the state in Bangladesh' . In Institute of 
Development Studies Discussion Paper No.268, Brighton 
1989, pp.1-33, at p.9. A modified version of the article is 
published in Kandiyoti, Deniz (ed.) Women. Islam and the 
state. London 1991, pp.77-143.
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After independence, the sovereign Democratic Republic
of Bangladesh gave new promises to women, acknowledging
their contribution in the liberation movement. Speaking to
a mass crowd in Dacca in March 1972, the father of the
nation, also regarded as the friend of the nation or
'Bangabondhu'. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stated:
In the past religion has been exploited in order 
to enslave our mothers and sisters; this will no 
more be permitted.3
He further regretted that, in the past, half of the 
population of the nation had been confined within the four 
walls of their houses owing to social prejudices.
Acclaiming the appreciable role played by women in the 
freedom movement, the leader declared that his government 
would secure that women may enjoy equal rights and
privileges with men in free Bangladesh.4 The stage was, 
thus, set for an improvement of the legal position of women 
in the new nation.
The raped women were declared by the leader of the 
nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as war heroines, 
'Birangona', to make them accepted in the society. But the 
majority of them were not accepted by the society and it 
was a problem for the Mujib government to rehabilitate 
them. Rahnuma Ahmed stated that the existence of the 30,000 
raped Bengali women was an embarrassment to Mujib and his
3 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur: 'Women will enjoy equal rights'. 
In Bangladesh Observer. Dacca 27th March 1972, p.l; See 
also Da'wat. an Urdu daily. Delhi 29th March 1972, p.3.
4 Rahman (1972), p.l.
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regime.5 It was reported that the 5% quota of government 
employment reserved for the rape victims identified them in 
society.6 The Mujib government also provided jobs for the 
wives of freedom fighters who died or were crippled, but 
could not improve the overall status of women.7
During 1975-1981 the regime of president Ziaur Rahman, 
starting with the United Nation's international women's 
year, integrated more women in the development process.
Under him a separate full-fledged Ministry of Women's
Affairs was set up and reserved seats for women in
Parliament were increased from 15 to 30.8 These reserved 
seats were not open to election but were filled by
nomination of the majority party, which was simply another 
means to increase the powers of the ruling party.9 There 
seems to be some agreement in the literature that the real 
cause for the mobilisation of women was not only to 
legitimise elite rule but to acquire more aid from the 
donor agencies by giving (some) attention to women.10 It
5 Ahmed (1985), p.48.
6 For details see Huda, Sigma: 'Women and law: Policy and
implementation'. Paper presented at a seminar on 'Women and 
law' organised by Women for Women, Sept. 13-15, 1987,
Dhaka.
7 Ahmed (1985), p.48; Kabeer (1991), p.125.
8 Kabeer (1991), p.127.
9 White, Sara C. : Arguing with the crocodile: Gender and 
class in Bangladesh. London, New Jersey and Dhaka 1992,
p. 15. .. .
10 Ahmed (1985), p.49; Kabeer (1991), p.127; White, Sara
C.: 'Women and development: A new imperialist discourse'. 
In The Journal of Social Studies. No.48, April 1990, pp.90- 
111, at p.103.
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has been argued more recently that the government and the 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) used women's issues 
as a potential source of funding.11 But the positive impact 
of this was that women's issues in Bangladesh were slowly 
coming to the limelight, paving a way for incorporating 
more women into the development process. The government 
under president Ziaur Rahman also wanted to improve the 
legal position of women and the Dowry Prohibition Act of 
1980, for example, was enacted for that purpose. The Act is 
discussed in detail in chapter 6.2.1 below.
The rule under president Hussain Muhammed Ershad, 
during 1982-90, continued the policy of president Zia to 
incorporate the women in development (popularly known as 
WID) program by making use of this hidden resource through 
employment.12 However, incentives of foreign aid were 
attached to it. Some legal measures were devised in this 
period, supposed to advance women's welfare and to deter 
crimes against women by more severe punishments, 
particularly the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance. 1983 and the Family Courts Ordinance, 1985.
Details of these enactments are discussed further below. 
The role of the government in islamising the state needs to 
be discussed in this context, particularly when the 
constitutional amendments are analysed. Because of this 
Islamic trend, the government did not ratify the UN
11 White (1992), pp.15-16.
12 Kabeer (1991), p.128.
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Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 
1979 in full and reserved certain clauses which conflicted 
with the sharia.
The present democratic government since 1991, under 
the country's first woman prime minister, Begum Khaleda 
Zia, is following the policy of /her predecessors to 
mobilise more women in the employment market. New forms of 
urban employment in the garment, plastic and pharmaceutical 
industry, in particular, have become available since the 
1980s; this gave women more opportunities to enter wage 
labour. In the professional sphere, too, women are more 
involved now, not only as teachers and nurses, which is 
typically supposed to be more fitted for them, but there 
were already 52 lady judges in the judiciary in 1992.13 
This shows that there is some pressure toward sexual equity 
and a re-evaluation of the stereotyped concepts about 
subjugating women. However, in family law this pressure is 
creating confusions and contradictions, as women do not 
enjoy absolute equality. Further, in social reality, women 
are not even given those rights which are granted under the 
Islamic and official family law. In this context, radical 
change outside the Islamic framework, as recently argued 
for by the outspoken feminist Taslima Nasreen, will only 
provoke the male-dominated society to turn towards more
13 This was stated by the Law Minister in a workshop on 
'Uniform Family Code and problems of enforcement of equal 
rights of women in Bangladesh: Legal policy and social
dimension'. The workshop was held on Sept. 22 and 23, 1992 
jointly organised by Bangladesh Institute of Law and 
International Affairs (BILIA) and the Mahila Parishad. Its 
proceedings are not published.
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conservatism. It is doubtful how much emancipation of women 
will be achieved by such provocative writing. However, 
Taslima Nasreen's brave efforts to criticise the whole 
system have given her much publicity and international 
attention.14 At the same time, her case offers a chance for 
the fundamentalists to take these issues up for their own 
campaigns to win power.15 Khaleda Zia's government denies 
her charges and has banned one of her books, entitled 
Loiia, for offending Muslim sentiments and fanning 
communalism, but it has not acted against the writer to the 
extent demanded by the extremists. This indicates that the 
government approves, in principle, of gradual changes of 
attitudes in society towards giving women their granted 
rights. But not many effects can so far be seen in 
practice. Thus, apart from some pro-women legislative 
activity, there has been little useful progress for the 
women in Bangladesh in this sphere. The attempts to improve 
the status of women which have been taken by the 
politicians have remained largely rhetoric and did not 
reduce the domination of males. It remains to be seen to 
what extent the various measures could protect women from 
economic deprivation and violence.
14 To show how wide circles this has drawn see, Rettie, 
John: 'Bangladesh's threatened writer wins police guard but 
no champions'. In The Guardian. Friday 10 Dec. 1993; 
'Fundamentalists call for feminist's hanging'. In Leicester 
Mercury. 19.11.93; McGirk: 'Life in a cage for feminists
who dared to tell the truth' . In The Independent. Wednesday 
2 March 1994.
15 The Guardian. 10 Dec. 1993.
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4.2 The constitutional framework of women’s rights 
in Bangladesh
In fulfilment of his promise to women, the father of the 
nation stipulated fuller participation of women in the 
national life by confirming it in the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, which came into effect on 16 December 1972, 
exactly one year after independence from Pakistan. Under 
article 10, one of the fundamental principles of state 
policy states:
Steps shall be taken to ensure participation of
women in all spheres of national life.
This shows that women's rights were not at par with 
those of men so far and that some efforts were made by the 
Constitution to tackle this disparity. Under article 8 of 
the Constitution, the fundamental principles of state 
policy are laws fundamental not only to the governance of 
Bangladesh but they are also to be applied by the state in 
the making of laws. However, according to article 8(2) of 
the Constitution of Bangladesh, the fundamental principles 
are not judicially enforceable or justiceable as 
fundamental rights.
The fundamental rights granted under part three of the 
Constitution specifically deal with women. Article 28 
states: .
28. (1) The state shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only'of religion, race,
16 This was substituted from socialism and freedom from 
exploitation by the Proclamations Order No.l of 1977.
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caste, sex or place of birth.
(2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all 
spheres of the State and public life.
(3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex or place of birth be 
subjected to any disability, liability, 
restriction or condition with regard to access 
to any place of public entertainment or 
resort, or admission to any educational 
institution.
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the 
state from making special provisions in favour 
of women or children or for the advancement of 
any backward section of citizens.
Thus while providing equal rights for women in several 
respects, although only in the public sphere and not in the 
private sphere, the legislature could not pull them out of 
the typical stereotyped image depicting women as the weaker 
sex in need of protection. They categorised women with 
children and the backward sections of the population, 
reserving the rights of the state to make any special 
provision for the advancement of such backward sections of 
the population. This paternalistic attitude of the 
legislature can also be found in other provisions of the 
Constitution. Article 29 states:
29. (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens in respect of employment or in the 
service of the Republic.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex or place of birth, be 
ineligible for, or .discriminated against, in 
respect of any employment or office in the 
service of the Republic.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the 
state from-
(a) making special provision in favour of any 
backward section of citizens for the 
purpose of securing their adequate
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representation in the service of the 
Republic;
(b) giving effect to any law which makes 
provision for reserving appointments 
relating to any religious or denominational 
institution to persons of that religion or 
denomination;
(c) reserving for members of one sex any class 
of employment or office on the ground that
it is considered by its nature to be
unsuited to members of the opposite sex.
While providing for equality of opportunity to women, 
the Constitution under article 29(3) (c) has explicitly 
given the right to the state to reserve certain employment 
and offices to men alone, if they are seen as unsuited to
women. This urge of the legislature can also be gathered in
other provisions of the Constitution. Thus, 15 seats were 
reserved for women under Article 65(3); this was increased 
to 30 seats in Zia's regime in 1990.17 Further, in exercise 
of these provisions the government reserved 10% of all new 
recruitment in the public sector for women.18
These articles of the Constitution perpetuated the 
conventional view that women are inferior and therefore 
need protection.19 Thus, although generally the
Constitution promises equality of the sexes, there are
17 This was done by the Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act 
xxxviii of 1990. The effect of this was not to give more 
power to women but to strengthen the authority of the 
ruling party, since these women were to be nominated (see 
above, p.178, footnote 8).
18 Chaudhury, Rafiqul Huda and Nilufar Raihan Ahmed: Female 
status in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1980, at p.20.
19 For India see Sarkar, Lotika: 'Status of women: Law as 
an instrument of social change'. In Journal of the Indian 
Law Institute. 1983, Vol.25, No.2, pp.262-269, at p.267.
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disparities of the sexes within it.20 This paternalistic
attitude towards protecting women as the weaker sex has
already been discussed (see above, p.65).
It is apparent from this that the legislature
recognises the unequal status of women in Bangladesh,
although they outwardly claim that the Constitution ensures
sexual equality. Salma Sobhan rightly observed that,
The tenor of all these provisions read as a whole 
makes it obvious that the drafters of the 
Constitution could not fail to acknowledge 
tacitly the fact of the inequality present in the 
status of women.21
However, the author has blamed the female section of 
the population for undermining their own potentialities. By 
blaming women, the author has victimised them more (see for 
the same reaction on the writing of other authors, above 
p.63) . We are arguing, on the contrary, that such 
statements reflect social attitudes and that women
themselves are not conscious of their hidden powers which 
are not recognised by the society.
One of the causes of the subordination for women was 
projected to be the attempt to use religion to police 
women's behaviour (see chapter 2, p.39). One can see how 
this affects women when the Constitution itself has a
20 See for details Sobhan, Salma: Legal status of women in 
Bangladesh. Dhaka 1978, pp.4-6; Bangladesh: Strategies for 
enhancing the role of women in economic development. 
Washington DC 1990, pp.18-2 0; Chaudhury, Rafiqul Huda and 
Nilufar Raihan Ahmed: 'Women and the law in Bangladesh:
Theory and practice'. In Islamic and Comparative Law 
Quarterly. Vol.viii, No.4, Dec. 1988, pp.275-287, at p.275; 
Chaudhury and Ahmed (1980) pp.18-33.
21 Sobhan (1978) , p. 5 .
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religious colour. Bangladesh, after independence, accepted 
secularism as one of the pillars of its socio-political 
structure. However, the secular Constitution did not have 
any direction for a Uniform Civil Code to bring at par all 
the personal laws as was done under article 44 of the 
Indian Constitution (see below, p.193).22
The Constitution of Bangladesh was amended in 1977 by 
president Ziaur Rahman, deleting the principle of 
secularism from the Constitution and replacing it by 
'absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah' under article 
8 of the Constitution. It has been claimed that this was 
done for financial considerations, basically to have more 
aid from Arab and Middle-East countries.23 But in 1988, 
President Ershad went so far as to islamise the state by a 
further constitutional amendment to make Islam the state 
religion by the famous eighth amendment. Under article 2A, 
it declares:
The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but 
other religions may be practised in peace and 
harmony in the Republic.
The part of the eighth amendment which amended article 
10 0 and gave power to the state to decentralise the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court was challenged by writ 
petitions and was declared void by the celebrated judgement
22 Pearl, David: 'Bangladesh: Islamic laws in a secular
state'. In South Asia Review. Vol.8, No.l, 1974, pp.33-41, 
at p .33.
23 Guhathakurta, Meghna: 'Gender violence in Bangladesh:
The role of the state'. In The Journal of Social Studies. 
No.30, 1985, pp.77-90, at p.85.
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of the eighth amendment case.24 However, the other part of 
the eighth amendment which declares Islam as the state 
religion, although contested by women's organisations as 
contravening the Constitution and United Nations 
Conventions, was not made void.25 Several women's 
organisations opposed it, as it would make women more 
vulnerable to discriminatory laws.26 To them it was also an 
attempt to amalgamate religion with politics to strengthen 
the authority of the orthodox people to police women's 
behaviour.27 It was also reported that the women's 
organisations were arguing that the Amendment is taking 
away the spirit of the liberation movement and the 
guarantees of freedom of speech, thought and women's rights 
of independent Bangladesh.28 The women's organisations were 
fearing that this amendment will strengthen the orthodoxy 
of religion, putting them back in seclusion.
Overrall, the constitutional framework of Bangladesh 
purports to protect the rights of women, but it does not go
24 See for details, Anwar Hossain Chowdhurv v Bangladesh and 
Others C.A. No.42 of 1988, Jalaluddin v Bangladesh and 
Others C.A. No.43 of 1988 and Ibrahim Shiekh v Bangladesh 
and Others C.P.S.C.A. No.30 of 1989 arising out of Writ 
petitions No.1252, 1176 and 1283 of 1988; 'Constitution 8th 
Amendment case judgement'. In Bangladesh Legal Decisions. 
Dhaka 1989 (special issue).
25 Kabeer (1989), p.32; White (1990), p.95.
26 An active women's organisation called 'Naripokho' 
challenged this part of the amendment in the court but was 
not successful. Other organisations, such as Mahila 
Parishad, Democratic Forum, Hindu Boidho Aiko Forum also 
argued against it.
27 Kabeer (1989), p.32.
28 Holiday. 19.4.88.
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far enough, nor do the constitutional guarantees mean much 
in the private sphere.
4.3 The personal law system and women’s rights
The legal system of Bangladesh consists of the general law 
and the personal or the family law of the religious 
communities. The diversity of this system was created by 
interference from the British colonial rulers and 
codification of the general law (for details see chapter 3 
above). Personal laws based on religion are the only laws 
which are different for different communities. All other 
laws are supposed to be common for all citizens under the 
Constitution. While as we saw, the Constitution ensures 
equality of the sexes only in a formal-Sense, the disparity 
of the sexes can be felt more in the religious family laws 
which are the main focus of this study. Why does the
constitutional protection of equality of sexes not extend 
to family law? This is a central controversy in all South 
Asian laws. However, it is not the main focus of the
present thesis. While, there is much literature on this 
issue in India.29 A brief attempt is made here to
understand the problem in the context of Bangladesh. First 
of all, the Constitution of Bangladesh states under article 
149 that all existing laws shall continue to have effect
29 See for details Mahmood, Tahir: Personal laws in
crisis. New Delhi 1986, pp.3-48, at p.21.
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but may be amended or repealed by laws made under the 
Constitution. Thus, the personal laws as existing laws 
continue to have effect and it is doubtful whether the 
Constitution can override the personal laws. Secondly, the 
constitutional clause of sexual equality [under article 
28(2)] only applies to the public sphere and is not 
applicable to the private sphere. Thirdly, personal laws 
can not be considered inconsistent with the Constitution 
when one of the fundamental rights [under article 28(1)] 
provided by the Constitution is that the state shall not 
discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion. 
This provision ensures freedom of religion and also 
safeguards the personal laws based on religion. Fourthly, 
the directive principles of state policy, fundamental for 
the governance of the country, although not judicially 
enforceable or justiceable, do give preference to the 
religion of the majority of the population. As we saw 
above, by the Proclamation Order No. I of 1977 under 
president Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh has emphasised the 
element of Islam. Article 8 states,
(1) The principles of absolute trust and faith in the 
Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and 
socialism meaning economic and social justice, 
together with the principles derived from them as 
set out in this part, shall constitute the 
fundamental principles of state policy.
(1A) Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah 
shall be the basis of all actions.
This shows that the Constitution itself is biased 
towards religion. Under article 7 it is stated that it is 
the supreme law of the land and any law which is
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inconsistent with it shall be void.30 The Constitution is 
the supreme law as it reflects the will of the people and 
all laws are to be tested on the touchstone of the 
Constitution.31 Finally, article 26 of the Constitution 
provides that all laws inconsistent with the fundamental 
rights shall be void. But there are discriminatory laws in 
the personal law system which . are inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights. Will the Constitution make those laws 
void? No attempt has as yet been made to examine whether 
this differential treatment offends against the provisions 
of the Constitution.32 However, it will be against the 
fundamental principles of state policy and fundamental 
rights to abrogate the personal laws of the different 
communities.
Gender equality in the Constitution of Bangladesh also 
has some adverse effects. Thus it became obvious, while 
analysing the family law cases, that the judiciary are 
upholding the Constitution, especially the equality clause, 
in restitution of conjugal rights cases. This can be used 
to refuse husbands to force wives to continue marital life 
without their desire, but vice versa it is acting against 
the women's interests, as wives also could not force their
30 For a discussion on the supremacy of the Constitution 
of Bangladesh see, Monsoor, Taslima: /Supremacy of the 
Constitution'. In The Dhaka University Studies-Part-F.
Vol.2, No.1, June 1991, pp.123-135.
31 Ibid. , p.135.
32 See in detail Ahmed, Sufia and Jahanara Choudhury: 
'Women's legal status in Bangladesh'. In Women for Women: 
Research and Study Group (ed.): Situation of women in 
Bangladesh. Dacca 1979, pp.185-331.
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husbands to continue marital life (see for details below, 
p.251).
The whole matrix of these problems lies in the complex 
system of laws in Bangladesh. While the minority laws have 
been marginalised, potential conflicts arise between the 
majority Muslim personal law and the general state law. The 
Muslim personal law in the new state also partly 
constituted a legacy inherited from the British Indian and 
Pakistani period, made applicable to Bangladesh by the 
Bangladesh (Adaptation of Existing Bangladesh Laws) Order. 
1972. Moreover, the personal law system of the Muslims with 
regard to marriage, divorce and succession is generated by 
Islamic law, whose application is regulated by the Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937 (see above, 
p.117). But in matters of wills, legacies and adoption 
under section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act 1937 the Muslims of Bangladesh are 
subjected to local custom and usage, unless a person 
declares that he or she should be subjected to Islamic law. 
There has been no amendment to the Act. The West Pakistan 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 which 
amended the 1937 Act, did not extend to erstwhile East 
Pakistan and present Bangladesh.33 It was never much 
publicised that in Bangladesh life estates may be created 
in favour of Muslim women under the customary law, or
33 See above, p.121. See also Mahmood, Tahir: Family law 
reform in the Muslim world. Bombay 1972, p.247; Mahmood, 
Tahir: 'Personal laws in Bangladesh-a comparative
perspective'. In Journal of the Indian Law Institute. 
Vol.14, No.4, pp.583-589, at p.586.
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testate succession may be opened in favour of women, as 
such settlements are still lawful in Bangladesh. This might 
reduce the disparity of traditional Muslim law with regard 
to intestate succession. Moreover, there are differences of 
the local law within Bangladesh; in particular the tribal 
matrilineal laws are more sympathetic to women than the 
local patrilineal law. There is much scope for further 
study on this. Thus, the personal law system of Bangladesh 
is not only based on Muslim law but also on customary or 
local law, which may be utilised to benefit women who have 
unequal rights in the traditional Muslim law. At the same 
time, generally, customs can be shown to disadvantage women 
(see above, p.44).
In the field of Muslim personal law there have been 
many reforms in Bangladesh (for details see below p.194). 
But for the minority laws, the British colonial enactments 
or even pre-British laws are retained in the personal laws 
of the Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, Parsis and Sikhs. 
Even for the Hindus who are the largest of the minority 
communities (nearly 13% of the whole population) the 
personal law is outmoded and in need of reform.34
There is a recent trend in Bangladesh to take steps 
for uniformity of all personal laws by introducing a 
Uniform Family Code. Women's organisations are very active 
in this regard. As we saw, there is no provision in the
34 Menski, Werner F. and Tahmina Rahman: 'Hindus and the
law in Bangladesh'. In South Asia Research. Vol.8, No.2, 
Nov. 1988, pp.111-113; Sobhan (1978), p.32; Choudhury and 
Ahmed (1980), p.33.
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Constitution of Bangladesh like article 44 in India to 
secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code. In Bangladesh 
the omission in the Constitution of a directive to 
introduce a Uniform Civil Code provides the constitutional 
authority for the continuation of the present system.35 It 
has been argued that the scope for uniformity of family 
laws in Bangladesh is more than in India because of its 
greater homogeneity and compactness.36 But the possibility 
for uniformity of family laws in Bangladesh is also 
doubtful. The reforms of family law in Bangladesh as 
analysed in this thesis suggest that the country is heading 
towards a new model of uniformity of procedural law and not 
uniformity of the substantive law of the different 
communities (see below, p.195).
The reforms made in Muslim family law in Bangladesh 
did not go outside the periphery of the Islamic framework. 
This keeps the equilibrium between society and law. The 
emphasis, therefore, must now be on the improvement and 
enforcement of the existing personal laws and, thus, on 
providing gender equity.
35 Pearl (1974) , p.34.
36 Menski, Werner F. : 'The reform of Islamic family law 
and a uniform civil code for India'. In Mallat, Chibli and 
Jane Connors (eds.) Islamic family law. London 1990, 
pp.253-293, at p.289.
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4.4 Reforms to family law in independent Bangladesh
This part of the chapter gives a general overview of all 
the family law reforms in independent Bangladesh which 
aimed to enhance the legal status of women in Bangladesh. 
In the next section of this chapter, we analyse in detail 
the reforms regarding the establishment of Family Courts in 
Bangladesh, exploring whether the aims or intentions of the 
law makers to ameliorate the status of women were achieved.
The development of family laws in South Asia shows 
generally that the aim of reforms was not so much to 
emancipate women but that concern with religious politics 
has been dominant. The personal law system of Bangladesh 
has seen hardly any substantial change in contrast to the 
changes in the general law regarding violence against 
women, dowry, cruelty and the establishment of Family 
Courts. Men as law makers have been blamed for not making 
substantial reforms in the discriminatory features of the 
religio-personal laws, as this would weaken their own 
interests.37 In fact the major portion of family law 
reforms made in Bangladesh was in the general law effecting 
all the communities. Legislative enactments in Bangladesh 
have been made on the issues of restraining dowry by the 
Dowry Prohibition Act. 1980, prohibition for cruelty to 
women by the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance, 1983 and establishment of Family Courts by the
37 Khan, Salma: The fifty percent: Women in development
and policy in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1988, p.17.
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Family Courts Ordinance 1985 which are general law 
affecting all communities. Only the issue of registration 
of marriage and divorce has been tackled for the majority 
of the population by the Muslim Marriages and Divorces 
(Registration) Act. 1974. However, there is a demand for 
registration of marriage and divorce in all communities as 
it is becoming more widely recognised that non-registration 
works against the interests of women. This might be 
regarded as a modified version of achieving uniformity of 
family laws in Bangladesh. We are regarding it as a better 
method of uniformity as it does not generate agitation, 
conflict and tension in the communities concerned because 
only procedural uniformity is effected, while substantive 
rights are not curtailed.
The legal reforms of family law in Bangladesh have 
also included many amendments to existing legislation. 
Prominent among them are the Child Marriage Restraint 
(Amendment) Ordinance. 1984, the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages (Amendment) Ordinance. 1986, the Dowry 
Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinances of 1982, 1984 and 1986, 
the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) (Amendment) 
Act, 1988, the Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinances of 
1982, 1985 and 1986, the Muslim Marriages and Divorces
(Registration) (Amendment) Ordinance. 1982 and the Family 
Courts (Amendment) Act 1989. If the purpose of some of 
these amendments was to give more protection to women, this 
was not achieved completely, but attempts have been made to 
make the Acts and Ordinances more effective. The amendments
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of these Acts will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6 below 
when the respective areas of the law will be analysed.
In Bangladesh the ambivalence of the government to 
enhance the rights of women under family law can be 
gathered by analysing the different Acts and Ordinances, 
which were enacted at different times. On the surface, the 
Acts show that they are ameliorating the status of women. 
But in fact, in social reality, the legislature could not 
put themselves out of the patriarchal interpretation of the 
laws. For example, there are still no laws which state that 
the minimum age of marriage of males and females are at 
par; girls have always an earlier age of marriage. However, 
laws enacted after independence to enhance the position of 
women signify that the legislature is now more sympathetic 
to women. On the other hand, there is a growing reluctance 
against the effective implementation of such laws. The main 
obstacle that lies in the way of the practical application 
of the legal rights of women in Bangladesh is primarily the 
inherent contradiction of attitudes, that persist in a male- 
dominated society.38 Thus, whatever legal rights women may 
have officially, they are not necessarily being recognised 
by the society.
The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 which forbids or 
prohibits anyone from demanding, giving or taking dowry is 
the most noteworthy of the reforms in family law in 
Bangladesh. But inspite of this legislative move dowry 
still remains a major cause of domestic violence against
38 Ahmed and Jahanara (1979), p.287.
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women in the country. Perhaps, if the Act had prohibited 
dowry by making it void its effectiveness could be 
enhanced. The scrutiny of the case law suggests that the 
law is not being properly implemented (see chapter 6, 
below).
The Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance, 1983 seeks to deter serious forms of cruelty to 
women with severe punishment. This Ordinance punishes a 
person with imprisonment for life or provides death penalty 
for kidnapping or abducting women, trafficking in women and 
attempting to cause death or for committing rape. Because 
of lack of data it seems that it cannot be analysed whether 
this deterrent punishment is of any help to reduce crimes 
against women. Moreover, the Acts did not always introduce 
completely new ideas. For example, the Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 merely repeated 
the prohibition of certain offences already prohibited in 
the Penal Code of 1860. However it enhanced the punishments 
and tied them to other offences committed against women. 
Similarly the Family Courts Ordinance of 1985 (discussed in 
detail below, pp.210) did create Family Courts with special 
procedures and lesser formalities but relied on the 
existing Assistant Judges Courts and did not create 
separate Family Courts. The Family Courts could not try all 
the issues of family law, which created confusions and 
inconsistencies (see below, p.218). Moreover, although the 
Family Courts introduced new procedures, it was not a 
summary procedure moving far away from the adversary system
(see below p.207).
It is not imputed here that the laws did not enhance 
the position of women in Bangladesh. Rather, the Acts had 
little direct impact on women in Bangladesh. However, these 
Acts also drew public attention to the growth of violence 
against women and put women's issues more firmly on the 
national agenda. It also reminded the male section of the 
population of the rights of women, which acts as a 
deterrent to treat them as chattel. Thus, the reforms are 
appropriate to the patriarchally dominated legal framework 
of Bangladesh. The real problem is lack of enforcement of 
the legal reforms. This shows that the time has come to 
understand the real needs of women in Bangladesh, which is 
not to acquire gender equality in family law but to claim 
their granted rights by achieving gender equity.
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4.4.1 The Family Courts Ordinance. 1985
The establishment of Family Courts by the Family Courts 
Ordinance. 198539 was a significant step in legal reforms
with reference to the legal status of women in Bangladesh. 
The concept of family courts was first introduced in 
America.40 The idea of Family Courts soon spread and can be 
found in most American states and also in other countries.
For convenience of understanding, a chart of the
hierarchy of the civil and criminal courts in Bangladesh is
given below, not only to show the position of the Family
Courts in the hierarchy of the court system in Bangladesh, 
but also to provide an overview of the whole judicial
system.
39 Published in the Bangladesh Gazette on 30.3.1985.
40 For details see Schaffer, I.D.: 'Family Courts-
reconsideration invited' . In Family Law -in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century. Cape Town 1983, pp.191- 
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HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The Court of District & 
Additional District Judge
[Assistant Judges 
Court/Family Court
Metropolitan 
Magistrate Court
Civil Criminl
Sessions Court
Appellate
Division
Special 
& Statutory
High Court 
Division
The Court of Munsif Magistrates Court
Constitutional
Writ
The Court of 
Subordinate Judge Additional Sessions Judge
Court of Third 
Class Magistrate
Court of First 
Class Magistrate
Court of Second 
Class Magistrate
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh
The Court of Assistant 
Session Judge
2 0 0
At the apex of the hierarchy of courts in Bangladesh 
is the Supreme Court, which is comprised of the Appellate 
Division and the High Court Division. The Appellate 
Division hears and determines appeals from the judgements 
of the High Court Division. The High Court Division decides 
appeals from the courts subordinate to it. The civil courts 
under the High Court Division, according to hierarchy, are 
the Court of District and Additional District Judge, then 
the Court of Subordinate Judge; the lowest tier in the 
civil jurisdiction is the Court of Munsif. The criminal 
courts under the High Court Division are the Sessions Court 
and the Magistrates Courts, with different tiers within 
themselves.41
In the chart shown above we have emphasised the civil 
and criminal jurisdiction and have given their hierarchy as 
we are concerned only with their jurisdiction. But there 
are also a number of other courts and tribunals of special 
jurisdiction.48
In Bangladesh, the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 came 
into effect from 15.6.1985. Under section 4(1) of the 
Ordinance there were to be as many Family Courts as there 
were Courts of Munsifs. Thus, under section 4(2) all Courts 
of Munsifs became Family Courts for the purpose of the 
Ordinance. This provision has been amended by section 2 of 
the Family Courts (Amendment) Act. 1989 by which Family
41 For the functions of the courts in Bangladesh see
Hoque, Azizul: The legal system of Bangladesh. Dhaka 1980,
pp.41-57.
48 For details see ibid., pp. 57-64.
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Courts are upgraded to 'Assistant Judges Courts' .49 Thus, 
all Courts of Assistant Judges shall be Family Courts after 
the 198 9 amendment.
Under section 5 of the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 
the Family Courts will have exclusive .jurisdiction to try 
and dispose of suits relating to dissolution of marriage, 
restitution of conjugal rights, dower, maintenance, 
guardianship and custody. Thus, the Family Courts have no 
jurisdiction to entertain other issues of family law as for 
instance inheritance, partition, gift or wakf.50 Further, 
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts includes only the 
civil jurisdiction regarding these issues. If any criminal 
offence arises, it necessarily falls under the Criminal 
Courts or the Magistrate Courts.
The Family Courts Ordinance under section 5 gave 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Courts to try and 
determine maintenance cases. But the Magistrates Courts are 
still entertaining those suits. Thus, at present, there is 
a controversy whether Magistrate courts still have the 
jurisdiction to entertain applications claiming maintenance 
under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1898 as 
the government or the judiciary has not taken any step to 
resolve it.51 This needs a detailed analysis of section 5
49 Choudhury, Obaidul Huq: Hand book of Muslim family
laws. Dhaka 1993, p.2.
50 Choudhury, Alimuzzaman: The Family Courts Ordinance 1985 
and other personal laws. Dhaka 1987,.p.2.
51 Rahman, Md. Mojibur: Muslim o' paribarik ain porichiti. 
Netrokona 1989, p.65.
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of the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985. The section states:
Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance. 1961 a family court shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, try and 
dispose of any suit relating to, or arising out 
of, all or any of the following matters, namely:
(a) a dissolution of marriage
(b) restitution of conjugal rights
(c) dower
(d) maintenance
(e) guardianship and custody of children.
From the language of the section it seems that the
Magistrates Courts have lost their jurisdiction to try
cases for maintenance. We could justify our argument by
comparing this section with section 5 of the West Pakistan
Family Courts Act. 1964. The Bangladesh Ordinance of 1985
is actually an almost identical copy of the Pakistani Act.
Section 5 of the Pakistani Act runs as follows:
Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance, 1961 and the Conciliation Courts 
Ordinance, 1961 the Family Courts shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and
adjudicate upon matters specified in the
schedule.
The Schedule comprises:
1. Dissolution of marriage
2. Dower
3. Maintenance
4. Restitution of conjugal rights
5. Custody of children
6. Guardianship.
The only literal difference between the sections is 
that in the Pakistani Act the Family Courts are allowed to
entertain, hear and adjudicate any matter which is
described in the schedule. Whereas, by the Bangladeshi 
Ordinance, the Family Courts are allowed to adjudicate any 
suit which is described in the section. The term 'suit'
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generally and usually means matters of a civil nature and 
not criminal cases. But the term 'matter' obviously
includes civil and criminal cases. From the above argument, 
as discussed in the judgement of Adnan Afzal v Sher
Af zal.52 it can be gathered that the Pakistani Act has 
ousted the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Courts to 
entertain maintenance cases. The'Pakistani Act, by a state 
amendment, has also clarified that the government may 
invest any judge of a Family Court with powers of a
Magistrates Court to make an order for maintenance under 
section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1898.53 Later
on, probably to avoid confusion, section 488 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. 1898 has been omitted from the 
Code itself.54
In India also the Family Courts Act. 1984 specifically 
provided that a Family Court has jurisdiction under section 
7(2) of the Act over new maintenance cases.55 Section 7(2) 
of the 1984 Indian Act states that,
........ a Family Court shall also have and
exercise-
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate 
of the first class under Chapter IX (relating 
to order for maintenance of wife, children 
and parents) of the Code of Criminal
52 PLD 1969 SC 187.
53 Punjab Act xiv of 1973.
54 By the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) 
Ordinance, xxvii of 1981.
55 For details of new cases on maintenance see now Menski, 
W.F.: 'Maintenance for divorced Muslim wives'. In Kerala
Law Times. Journal 1994(1), pp.45-52.
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Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) ... .56
The Bangladeshi Ordinance has been silent with regard
to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court to entertain
maintenance cases under section 488 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. 1898. It is not clear why in Bangladesh the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts has not been clarified in
the statute itself.
The issue at hand in the context of Bangladesh has not
been resolved by the courts of the country either. It could
not be argued that Adnan Afzal v Sher Afzal57 applies in
Bangladesh, since Pakistan's West Pakistan Family Courts
Act of 1964 only extended to West Pakistan. But in Abdul
Khalecrue v Selina Begum.58 the High Court Division of the
Supreme Court held that the provisions made in the Family
Courts Ordinance. 1985 have ousted the jurisdiction of the
Magistrates Court to entertain an application for
maintenance as it was a matter to be dealt with by the
Family Courts. The underlying reasoning for this, as
Justice Abdul Bari Sarkar stated, is:
The purpose of the Family Courts Ordinance was to 
provide a speedy forum for disposal of all family 
matters in the same forum, instead of in 
different forums both in the civil and the 
criminal courts as it was,before. There will be 
anomaly and multiplicity "of" proceedings and 
practical difficulties will arise, if, in spite 
of the establishment of the Family Courts by 
Ordinance No.XVIII of 1985, the Magistrates 
continued to entertain cases for maintenance u\s
56 For details see Sugathan, N. : The Family Courts Act.
1984. Cochin 1992, p.9.
57 PLD 1969 SC 187.
58 42 DLR (1990) 450.
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488 CrPC.59
It is indisputable that the civil issues falling under 
section 5 of the Ordinance come under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Family Courts. In Abdur Rahman v 
Shahanara Begum.60 it was . held that pending cases in any 
civil court other than the Family Court in matters within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court may continue 
in that court if filed before the Family Courts Ordinance 
came into force. It was also decided that there is no bar 
under that Ordinance to withdraw or discontinue a pending 
case from any other court and filing a fresh suit for the 
same relief in the Family Court.61 The plaintiff-opposite 
party had found it convenient to file the case in the 
Family Court. This projects that Family Courts may be more 
accessible to women, as the Ordinance provided for speedy 
disposal of cases filed in a Family Court. The object of 
the establishment of Family Courts for the summary disposal 
of cases was also made apparent in this case, as the male 
petitioner was required to pay compensatory cost of 2500 
taka to the opposite party for abusing the process of the 
court by delay and it was also directed that the trial 
court, i.e. the Family Court, should dispose of the suit 
within three months and should not grant unnecessary 
adjournments, as the Ordinance provides for speedy and
59 Ibid. , p.452 .
60 43 DLR (1991) 599.
61 Ibid. , p.600.
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summary disposal of the cases.62
With this objective for speedy disposal of cases, a 
further Amendment was made to the Ordinance. The Family 
Courts (Amendment) Act. 1989 made explicit provision for 
expeditious judgements, emphasising the intention and aim 
of passing the original Ordinance. Under section 8 (i) of 
the Family Courts (Amendment) Act. 1989 a new provision was 
added by which the Family Court may, on the prayer of the 
defendant and for good cause shown, fix another date not 
beyond 21 days for the presentation of his defence. Under 
section 9(ii) of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act. 1989, 
where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not 
appear when the suit is called for hearing, only if it is 
proved that the summons or notice was served on the 
defendant without sufficient time to:enable him to appear 
and answer on the day fixed for his appearance, the Family 
Court shall postpone the hearing of the suit to a future 
date not exceeding 21 days. Further on, section 13 (ii) 
provides that on conclusion of trial, if compromise or 
reconciliation is not possible, the Family Court shall 
pronounce judgement either at once or on some future date 
not beyond 7 days, of which notice shall be given to the 
parties or their agents or advocates. Thus, it cannot be 
denied that the amendment was necessary so that family 
disputes are tried without delay. Whether the cases are 
disposed of in accordance with the new law remains to be 
further analysed.
62 Ibid. , p.601.
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The Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 is the only law 
relating to family matters which offers an opportunity for 
the conciliatory settlement of disputes. The role of the 
Family Court judges is of vital importance for attempting 
such reconciliation between the parties. Similar provisions 
for reconciliation can be found in India, where the Family 
Courts Act. 1984 provides under sections 9, 10(3) and
21(2)(c) the procedure to be followed .by the Family Court 
judges for the settlement of disputes.63 In fact, the 
Family Court system was rooted in a social welfare 
philosophy to establish a link between the legal and social 
sciences.64 But the Family Courts are courts of law 
applying legal principles and not a social service bureau 
which utilises the authority of the law.65 However, it is 
compatible for a Family Court to function as a court while 
at the same time carrying out social objectives so long as 
those objectives recognize the importance of adherence to 
legal principles.66 In the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 
there are clear provisions for the reconciliation of the 
parties.
Emphasis on the settlement of disputes, if there is 
any reasonable possibility, is found under section 10 of
63 See for details Bakshi, P.M.: 'Family courts judge's 
role in trial and settlement'. In The Lawyers. Vol.6, 
No.16, Oct. 1991, pp.16-19, at p.16.
64 Schaffer (1983), p.194.
65 Gordon, William C. : 'The family court: When properly
defined, it is both desirable and attainable.' In Journal 
of Family Law. Vol.14, No.l, 1975, pp.1-30, at p.5.
66 Ibid. , p.7.
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the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985. According to section 10, 
after the written statement is filed, the Family Court will 
fix a date not more than 3 0 days later for a pre-trial 
hearing of the suit. In that pre-trial hearing, the Family 
Court will attempt to effect a compromise or reconciliation 
between the parties after examining the plaint, written 
statement, summary evidence and documents under section 
10(3). On conclusion of the trial, another attempt is made 
to effect a compromise or reconciliation between the 
parties before the pronouncement of the judgement (section 
13). Thus, the actual intention of the legislature seems to 
be that the Family Courts should act as conciliators and 
mediators for the reconciliation between the parties so 
that the couple may have a happy conjugal life.
It must be noted here, however, that no evidence of 
such attempts could be found in the large number of 
unpublished Family Court judgements which was collected and 
analysed. Perhaps a more detailed study of the Family 
Courts procedure could clarify whether the judges are 
actually trying to reconcile the parties. However, one 
commentator found that this compromise procedure of the 
Family Courts is only extending the life of the suit and is 
an extra burden to the Family Courts where a large number 
of cases are awaiting disposal.67
It was thought that the establishment of Family Courts 
was a significant step for women's emancipation. It seems
67 Rahman, Md. Motiur: 'Legal aspects and social problems 
of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and. Family Courts 
Ordinance'. In 41 DLR (198 9) Journal, pp.21-22, at p.22.
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that this is not completely true. As there are really no 
separate Family Courts and the Assistant Judges Courts 
which are to act also as Family Courts are already 
overburdened with cases, they could not take utmost care to 
handle family issues. In India the Family Courts Act. 1984 
established special Family Courts for every area in the 
state comprising a city or town where the population 
exceeds one million [section 3 (a) ] ,68 The Family courts of 
Bangladesh could have been much more effective if they were 
totally separate courts.
There were provisions in the Family Courts Ordinance, 
1985 which were especially helpful to women in Bangladesh, 
although they may be applicable to both sexes. Under 
section 11(1) of the Ordinance, a Family Court may, if it 
deems fit, hold the whole or any part of the proceedings in 
camera. The Family Court will also hold the proceedings in 
camera at the request of both parties under section 11(2) . 
This will assist women to maintain their parda or seclusion 
and will also avoid their fear of social stigma, preventing 
that their private affairs be open to the public.
Under section 22 of the Ordinance, the court-fees to 
be paid on any plaint presented to a Family Court were to 
be a nominal 25 takas for any kind of suit. This certainly 
has a positive impact on the women of Bangladesh, as less 
financial burden will give them more accessibility to the
68 Sugathan (1992), p.4. This has led to calls for more 
such courts. See Narayan, R. Lakshmi: 'The Family Courts
Act, 1984-a critical appreciation'. In Kerala Law Times. 
Journal 1992 (2), pp.21-24, at p.24.
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courts. But the incidental costs of the lawyers' fees, 
typing etc. are very high and beyond the reach of the 
general public, let alone most -women.
The Family Courts Ordinance, 1985 is a self-contained 
law, as clear provisions have been made for the institution 
of suits, issuance of summons, filing of written statement, 
pre-trial hearing, hearing and execution of decree. The 
Ordinance does not depend on any other law for its 
procedure. Under section 20 of the Ordinance, the Evidence 
Act, 1872 or the Civil Procedure Code. 1908, except for its 
sections 10 and 11 (stay of suits and res judicata) do not 
apply to proceedings before the Family Court.
In Md. Macrbul Ahmed v Sufia Khatun and Others.69 it 
was held that the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 is a 
special law which also provides the procedures to be 
followed by the Family Courts. The provisions of Order 39 
Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. 1908 granting a 
temporary injunction will not be applicable to such cases. 
The facts of the above case show that the petitioner (the 
husband) filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights in 
the Family Court at Ramgonj against the wife and others 
under the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985. The petitioner 
also filed an application for temporary injunction under 
Order 39 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, 
restraining his wife from marrying any other person during 
the pendency of the suit. The . wife contended that the 
husband used to torture her and was a man of loose morals,
69 40 DLR (1988) 305.
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so that she had no alternative but to sever the marital tie 
on 2 9.7.85, notice of which had been served to the husband 
and the local Chairman of Ramgonj. The Family Court, by its 
order dated 26.12.85, rejected the petitioner's prayer for 
an injunction. The petitioner then appealed to the court of 
the District Judge, who also dismissed the appeal. The 
petitioner's application to the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court was also rejected.
Although the Family Courts could not grant temporary 
injunctions, they surely could give temporary or ad-interim 
orders. In Captain Shamsul Alam Chowdhurv v Shirin Alam 
Choudhury,70 it was decided that since the word 'order' has 
not been defined in the Ordinance, it cannot be read to 
mean only a final order. This imputes that the Family Court 
can also make interim orders.
The Ordinance did not provide in detail how a court 
will entertain the issues before it. This causes anomalies, 
as for instance in maintenance it qould be said that there 
is no limit to the amount or quantum of maintenance, as 
provided under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
1898. It is shown further below, when the substantive 
issues are dealt with in detail (see pp.307-309), that this 
is causing confusion, as the Family Courts can now allow 
any amount of maintenance. However, this is parallel to 
Islamic law and advantageous to women as it gives an 
opportunity to secure an enhanced amount of maintenance, 
depending on circumstances.
70 43 DLR (1991) 297.
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Under section 9(4) of the Ordinance, where on the day- 
fixed for the hearing the defendant appears and the 
plaintiff does not, the court shall dismiss the suit. An 
author looked at this provision from the perspective of 
social reality and argued that, if the plaintiff is the 
wife who alleges something against her husband, she can 
easily be threatened in many ways to prevent her from 
appearing in the court and it is then not justified that 
her case should be dismissed.71 It is indisputable that 
such situation might arise, but Guhathakurta was not aware 
that under section 9(5) the plaintiff may, within thirty 
days of the making of the order of dismissal, apply to the 
court to set aside the order on satisfying the court that 
there was sufficient cause for her non-appearance and the 
court shall then appoint another date for proceeding with 
the suit.
Under section 17 of the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985, 
an appeal could only be preferred from a judgement, decree 
or order of a Family Court to the District Judge's Court 
for specific issues. In Moinuddin v Amina Khan Mailish.72 
it was held that the District Judge's Court being a civil 
court, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. 1908 
would apply to the proceedings before it. It was further 
clarified by the High Court Division of the Supreme Court 
that there is no scope for thinking that the District 
Judge's Court referred to in the Family Courts Ordinance is
71 Guhathakurta (1985), p.84.
72 42 DLR (1990) 483.
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a persona designata of a Family Court.73
The court of appeal under the Ordinance is not 
competent to remand a suit to the trial court, i.e. Family 
Court. It was held in Hosne Ara Begum v Md. Rezaul Karim.74 
that the scheme of the Family Court is quick disposal of a 
case between husband and wife and for such purpose, under 
section 20 of the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985, provisions 
of the Evidence Act. 1872 and the Civil Procedure Code. 
1908 have been excluded. The court of appeal can only 
decide the appeal and has no power to send the case on 
remand to the Family Court.75
Appeal as provided under section 17 of the Ordinance 
is only allowed in cases of dower which exceed 5000 taka 
and for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty 
under section 2 (viii) (d) of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act. 193 9 and not on any other grounds of 
dissolution of marriage under the Act. This is a limitation 
which should be altered. It is discouraging women to bring 
suits for the dissolution of marriage on all other grounds, 
as the verdicts of the Family Courts are final and cannot 
be challenged in higher courts, whereas on other issues of 
family law which are not dealt within Family Courts, women 
have the opportunity to appeal. This also projects the 
hidden agenda that issues concerning women are finally 
decided, with certain exceptions on questions of dower and
73 Ibid. , pp.484-485 .
74 43 DLR (1991) 543 .
75 Ibid. , p.546.
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cruelty, at the lower end of the judiciary. This shows that 
these vital issues of women and family are not given
adequate importance as the higher courts are only concerned 
about those cases which could be challenged. It should be 
mentioned that there is no provision of second appeal or 
revision to the High Court, so that conflicting decisions 
on the same issue do not have any platform to be resolved. 
Because of this limited scope for appeal some conflicting 
decisions are already remaining unresolved. The most
affected areas are, significantly, maintenance and dower
(see in detail chapter 5 below, pp.286-289 and 307-310). 
Thus, in one sense the decisions of the Family Courts
(except where there is scope for appeal) can be regarded as 
the law. But what happens when different Family Courts have 
different decisions on the same point, depending on the 
facts and circumstances of the case? Then what is the law? 
Thus, there must be some scope for appellate jurisdiction 
erecting precedents for the Family Courts to be followed.
It is interesting to unravel the fact that Bangladesh 
actually has got some kind of uniformity of laws in family 
law, as the whole spectrum of the family issues of all the 
communities falls under the same Family Courts under the 
Family Courts Ordinance, 1985. Although the Ordinance does 
protect, under sections 5 and 23, the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance. 1961, it is not necessarily an Ordinance for
only the majority of the community, i.e. the Muslims. The 
Ordinance is concerned with the family law issues of all 
the communities. But by protecting the law of the majority
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of the community only and overriding all other laws under 
section 3 of the Ordinance it has caused not only 
unfairness but many anomalies.76 Thus, in the Divorce Act. 
1869, a divorce decree requires under section 17 
confirmation of the decree by the High Court. But the 
Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 gave exclusive jurisdiction 
to the Family Courts under section 5 to try and entertain 
these issues without any confirmation from the higher 
courts. This seems to be an interference with the minority 
law, but not the majority law.
It has been provided under section 23(2) of the 1985 
Ordinance that a divorce decree passed for a Muslim 
marriage can not escape the formalities and procedures 
under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. This makes 
the procedure more elaborate for Muslims, although it seems 
that they have two options. For example, after one obtains 
a decree for the dissolution of marriage from the Family 
Court it is sent to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council 
under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 to complete 
the necessary procedure.77 But controversies arise when 
there is a conflict between the two official laws. For 
instance, a marriage which could not be dissolved in the 
Family Court may be validly broken, under the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance of 1961 or vice versa. However, there are
76 Chaklader, A.H.: 'Is the Family Courts Ordinance, 1985 
another name for statutory quixotism?'. In 3 8 DLR (1986) 
Journal, pp.19-21, at p.19.
77 Ibid., p.20; See also Haq, Md. Nurul: Paribarik Adalot 
ain o' alochona. Dhaka 1990, p.118.
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situations where a man just follows talaa-al bida. i.e. 
pronounces three talacrs in one sitting and does not follow 
the official law (see for details below, p.259).
A real problem arises when the decree of the 
dissolution of the marriage has been sent to the Chairman 
of the Arbitration Council within seven days of the passing 
of the decree under section 23(2) of the Ordinance to 
proceed as an intimation of talacr. the wife appeals to the 
District Judges Court and the decree is set aside by the 
Appellate Court. Will the marriage be dissolved under the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961? Or will the parties 
continue to lead a marital life according to the Appellate 
Court's decision? Such controversies arise as there is no 
provision in the Ordinance requiring the Chairman of the 
Arbitration Council to wait for the judgement of the 
Appellate Court. Moreover, by providing for an appeal under 
section 17 only for the ground of cruelty [under section 2 
(viii)(d)] of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. 1939 
and dower the minority communities do not have any relief 
of appeal under the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 for 
dissolution of marriages for cruelty, which is unfair to 
the members of other religions. For this reason some argue 
that the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 is intended for the 
Muslims only.78
From the above discussion it is sufficient to 
understand that the Family Courts Ordinance of 1985 is a 
beneficial enactment, but its effectiveness must be made
78 Rahman (1989), p.22.
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viable by enlarging its scope to allow other reliefs 
concerning women, with a right of appeal on all issues to 
the higher courts. The analysis of the provisions as a 
whole suggests that the Ordinance brought only procedural 
changes and did not effect any substantive rights. It is, 
however, opening a new avenue for creating uniformity of 
the family laws in Bangladesh (see for details above, 
p.195) .
The Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction of the 
issues described in the Ordinance and can entertain no 
other issues. It is suggested that a separate and 
independent Family Court should be established which should 
deal with all family and personal matters. The Family Court 
should have two jurisdictions, one civil and the other 
criminal, so that all the issues could be handled by it, 
expanding the limitations of issues given under the present 
section 5 of the Family Courts Ordinance of 1985. At 
present, dowry or cruelty to women still fall under the 
jurisdiction of Magistrates Courts.
The consolidation of jurisdiction over all family- 
related issues into one court would benefit the litigants, 
legal practitioners and the court system itself.79 It was 
recommended in a workshop on the Uniform Family Code that 
the power given to the Magistrates Courts under section 488 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1898 to entertain 
maintenance cases should be transferred to the Family
79 Gordon (1975) , p. 10.
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Courts.80 This could solve the issue whether the Family 
Courts are entitled to try and entertain maintenance cases. 
Giving also criminal jurisdiction to the Family Courts will 
make the process more expeditious.
Where more than one court has jurisdiction over family 
issues, it often results in inconsistent approaches, delays 
and discrimination.81 While in . criminal courts the 
litigants can not claim more than 400 taka for maintenance, 
in the Family Court there is no limit of maintenance and 
they can achieve more. Moreover, the Magistrates Courts 
have the power to issue warrants of arrest to a husband who 
evades summons or fails to pay maintenance instalment or 
dower money.82 But the Family Courts does not have this 
coercive jurisdiction. Thus, Family Courts should have 
criminal jurisdiction also to make the whole process more 
expeditious and easy. This enlargement of the jurisdiction 
of the Family Courts would certainly enhance the 
effectiveness of the Ordinance and would help women in 
Bangladesh to bring out their grievances and to seek 
protection against violence and economic deprivation by 
men.
80 See Footnote 13 above for details of the workshop.
81 Gordon (1975) , p. 11.
82 Rahman, Shiekh Shamsur: 'Family Court and Muslim family
law'. In 40 DLR (1988) Journal, pp.24-26, at p.26.
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4.4.2 Overview of the reforms to pre-independence 
family laws in Bangladesh
We have already discussed the reforms with regard to 
marriage, divorce and intestate succession and related 
issues in British India and the Pakistani period (see 
above, chapter 3); these are applicable in Bangladesh but 
have been amended after independence in Bangladesh. As 
such, there are areas of the law in which Pakistani law and 
Bangladeshi law now differ. The present section gives a 
brief overview of the reforms made to pre-independence 
family laws in Bangladesh. This covers some minor 
amendments about which is not necessary to write in detail 
in chapters 5 or 6.
In the field of child marriage, the Child Marriage 
Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 has increased the 
legal minimum ages of marriage. The Child Marriage 
Restraint Act. 192 9 had sought to restrain the 
solemnisation of marriages of children below the age of 18 
for the boy and 14 years for the girl. The MFLO 1961, 
section 12 had raised the girl's age to 16 years. The 
Amendment of 1984 raised the legal marriage ages for both 
sexes, for the male to 21 years and for the female to 18 
years and prescribed punishments to anyone marrying below 
that age.83 Under section 4, substituted by the Child 
Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance 1984, the
83 It is to be noted that this is the same in India since 
the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act of 1978.
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following is provided:
Punishment for male adult above twenty-one years 
of age or female adult above eighteen years of 
age marrying a child- Whoever, being a male above
twenty-one years of age, or being.a female above
eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage 
shall be punishable with simple imprisonment 
which may extend to one month or with fine which 
may extend to one thousand taka,- -or with both.
Under the Child Marriage Restraint Act. 1929 there was
a difference between a "child" (female below the age of 14;
male below the age of 18) and a "minor" (person of either
sex below the age of 18). Under the Act as now amended in
Bangladesh, the definitions of "child" and "minor" are
identical. A girl below 18 is both a child and a minor, as
under section 3 of the Majority Act of 1875 every person
domiciled in Bangladesh shall be deemed to have attained
majority when he shall have completed the age of eighteen
years. But a boy below 21 is a child under the Child
Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance of 1984 and a
major from 18 years under the Majority Act of 1875. But the
punishment given in the 192 9 Act is identical to that in
the amended version of the Act of 1984. The difference is
that until the 1984 Bangladeshi amendments, the female
spouse was not liable to punishment. Now a female spouse
over 18 is made liable for punishment if she is married to
a man under 21. Thus a girl who has just turned 18 and who
is married to a boy a few months short of being 21, commits
an offence for which the girl may be jailed and fined,
while her husband is not amenable to any punishment,
although her parents or guardians, would be. This is
discrimination against the female section of the population
2 2 1
as they are subject to punishment from an earlier age than 
the men. Moreover, under section 6(1) of the 1929 Act, 
which prescribed punishment to the parents or guardians of 
a minor who contracted a child marriage, it was also 
specifically provided that no parent who is a woman shall 
be punishable with imprisonment. This provison is not 
deleted by the amendment. Thus now the bride over the legal 
age of 18 years is liable to punishment for marrying a 
bridegroom under 21 but her mother or mother-in-law are not 
to be punished by imprisonment.84 Actually there was no 
punishment either by imprisonment or fine for the females 
in the original statute.85 But now the bride can be 
imprisoned and fined for marrying a man below the legal 
age. This penalty on the bride was introduced perhaps as an 
oversight, or to avoid zina or problems with runaway 
couples. It looks like a misfired attempt to introduce 
sexual equality.
Whether a bride should bear such punishment at all in 
the social context of Bangladesh is an interesting issue. 
In rural Bangladesh girls are disadvantaged, secluded and 
are not allowed to have their own independent opinion about 
whom they will marry, as marriage is often arranged by 
their parents.
In a village study in Bangladesh it was reported that 
in the case of a son's marriage his consent is regarded as
84 See Caroll, Lucy: 'Recent Bangladesh legislation effecting 
women'. In Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.V, 
No.3-4, Sept.-Dec. 1985, pp.255-264 at p.257.
85 Zafar Khan v Mohd. Ashraf PLD 1975 Lahore 234, at p.235.
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necessary but in the case of a daughter's marriage, she is 
invariably expected to obey her father's decision.86 
However, it is doubtful whether field studies by male 
researchers talking to men could actually avoid male 
bias.87 Moreover, they may have simply failed to reveal the 
extent to which women have always been able to exercise a 
certain amount of control, both. within and beyond the 
domestic unit.88 It appears correct to re-state generally 
that women of all classes in Bangladesh are subjected to 
patriarchy; for the rural women the effects will be more 
oppressive.89 Thus, it is not reasonable that rural women 
should bear criminal liability in such cases.
Practically, the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 
has never been truly effective, particularly in the rural 
areas where even today such marriages are quite common, 
retaining the parda and the honour of the patriarchal 
family. This shows the schism or dichotomy between law and 
life.90 Does this not also reveal that the state by its law
86 Taniguchi, Sinkichi: 'Society and economy of a rice 
producing village in northern Bangladesh'. In Studies in 
socio-cultural change in rural Bangladesh. No.3, Tokyo 
1985, pp.1-78, at p.23.
87 On this see Donnan, Hastings: 'Marriage, migration and
minorities: South Asian ethnography in Ireland-the case of 
Pakistan. In South Asia Newsletter. No.3, August 1989, 
pp.5-7.
88 See Donnan, Hastings: Marriage among Muslims: Preference 
and choice in Northern Pakistan. Delhi .1988, pp.81-83.
89 Cain, Mead et al.: 'Class, patriarchy and women's work 
in Bangladesh'. In Population and Development Review. 
Vol.5, No.3, Sept. 1979, pp.405-438, at p.432.
90 Singh, Indu Prakash: Women, law and social change in
India. New Delhi and London 1989, p.65.
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is unable to change the folkway?91 However, the raising of 
ages of marriage in the statutory legislation appears to 
have had some impact in the upper or middle strata of 
society, where the indirect effect of giving more education 
to the girl child has led to higher marriage ages.
A serious obstacle for the effective implementation of 
the legislation is that a marriage ..actually solemnised 
between children is treated as valid by the Child Marriage 
Restraint Act. 1929 itself as well as under Islamic law.92 
All that is to be feared then is getting caught violating 
the Act. There is no proper enforcement agency to catch 
defaulters, nor are people's ages easy to prove where 
births are normally not registered.93
It was held in Mst. Bakshi v Bashir Ahmed.94 that if 
a girl below the age of 16 years is married in violation of 
the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, such marriage 
does not become void although the adult husband contracting 
the marriage or the persons who have solemnised the 
marriage may be held criminally liable. Another lacuna of 
the legislation is the non-cognizable character of the
91 See also Schur, Edwin M.: Law and societv-a sociological 
view. New York 1968, p.127.
92 See Anderson, Norman: Law reform in the Muslim world.
London 1976, pp.103-104; Mahmood, Tahir: Muslim personal 
law. New Delhi 1977, pp.51-53.
93 Sobhan, Salma: 'Women's issues in Bangladesh'. In Law 
Asia. Vol.2, 1982-83, pp. 254-258, at p.257.
94 22 DLR (1970) SC 289.
224
offence, which has been amended in India.95 Attempts should 
be made in Bangladesh to amend the law in tune with India 
to make the Act more rigorously effective. Moreover, it 
would be highly applauded if special provisions were made 
for appointing child marriage prevention officers to 
enforce the legislation, as was done in the Child Marriage 
(Gujarat Amendment) Act of 1963.
As the legal age for marriage has been raised to 18 
years for females in Bangladesh there has been a 
corresponding change in section 2 (vii) of the Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 regarding the 'option of 
puberty' to the effect that a girl .having been given in 
marriage by her father or other guardian before she
attained the age of 18 years, can repudiate the marriage
before the age of 19 years. This was done by the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages (Amendment) Ordinance 1986 
whose only purpose was to increase the age for the option 
of puberty [under section 2 (vii)]. What about the cases, 
however, where a child marriage was contracted by the
guardians between 1984 and 1986? Will such a child have the 
option of puberty? Even though the amendment does not 
disclose whether it acts retrospectively, there is a case 
under the original Act, holding that section 2 of the Act 
applies with retrospective effect.96
Finally, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 has
95 By section 3 of the Child Marriage Restraint 
(Amendment) Act 1978.
96 Manak Khana v Mst. Mulkham Banu AIR 1941 Lah. 167.
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been amended in Bangladesh in 1982, 1985 and in 1986 but
these were really administrative reforms to bridge 
procedural gaps. By Section 2 of the Muslim Family Laws 
(Amendment) Ordinance of 1982 the jurisdiction of the 
Ordinance was extended to Bangladesh. It is curious that 
this jurisdiction was only clarified after eleven years of 
independence. Cases in this period already applied the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 when it was formally not 
applicable to Bangladesh.
By section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) 
Ordinance of 1982, the penalty for polygamy without the 
permission of the Arbitration Council under section 6(5) (b) 
was changed from 5,000 Rupees to 10,000 taka, which is its 
equivalent amount in Bangladeshi currency.
Section 3 (a) of the amending Ordinance of 1982 gave
a new definition of the Chairman of the Arbitration Council 
as:
'Chairman' means Chairman of the Union Parishad 
or Paurashava or a person appointed by the 
Government in the Cantonment areas to discharge 
the functions of Chairman under this Ordinance.
The necessity for this change had arisen because of
the Bangladesh Local Councils and Municipal Committees
(Dissolution and Administration) Ordinance (P.O.7 of 1972),
by which the existing local Councils and Municipal
Committees of the former East Pakistan were dissolved. This
created a procedural gap and certain anomalies arose.
Persons were even not punished for entering a polygamous
marriage without taking permission from the Arbitration
Council, as there was no legal authority from which such
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consent might be taken.
In the case of Tahera Begum v Farukh Miah.97 the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court upheld the decision
of the High Court that, as at the time of the second
marriage, i.e. in 1975, there was no person or legislative
authority to constitute the Arbitration Council from whom
the accused was required to take permission for contracting
another marriage, he could not be convicted for an offence
under section 6(5) of the Ordinance.98
Meanwhile, after the judgement of the High Court
division in the case of Farukh Miah v Tahera Begum.99 the
Ordinance was amended hurriedly to correct this perceived
procedural gap and the Chairman of the Arbitration Council
was defined.100 This Amendment to the Ordinance was
actually superfluous, as the Government had in fact, by an
Extra-Ordinary Gazette notification on 18th November 1972,
appointed the Administrators of Union Panchavat. Shahar
Committees and Paurashavas to perform all the functions as
provided under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961
within their respective areas. The Notification of the
Government No. S-l/4R-l/72/532-18th November, 1972 states:
"In exercise of the power conferred by article 6 
of the Bangladesh Local Councils and Municipal 
Committee (Dissolution and Administration) Order,
1972, the Government is pleased to appoint the
97 35 DLR (1983) AD 170.
98 Ibid. , p.173.
99 BLD 1981 165.
100 In Section 3 of the Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) 
Ordinance of 1982, as cited on the previous page.
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Administrators of Union Panchayat, Sahr 
Committees and Pourashavas to perform all the 
functions as provided under the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance 1961 and the Rules made thereunder 
within their respective areas."
The existence of this Notification was only revealed 
in the case of Avesha Sultana v Shahiahan Ali,101 where the 
Court found that the Government had in fact appointed 
persons as Chairmen of the Arbitration Council and the 
husband ought to have taken their permission before 
contracting the subsequent marriage.
To clear the ambiguity of terms, the Muslim Family 
Laws (Amendment) Ordinance of 1985 substituted the whole 
section of definition (under section 2) of 'Arbitration 
Council', 'Chairman' 'Municipal Corporation', 'Paurashava' 
and 'Union Parishad. Under section 3 of the Muslim Family 
Laws (Amendment) Ordinance of 1985, which amends section 
6(4) of the original Ordinance/., application for the 
revision of the order of an Arbitration Council would be 
made to the Munsif and not to the Sub-Divisional Officer. 
His decision shall be final and shall not be questioned in 
any court. This projects that the power to settle family 
disputes is being taken over by the judiciary; it may also 
reflect failure of the original plan of the Ordinance to 
settle family disputes at the local level of administration 
(see above, p.164-165).
By the Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance of 
1986 a new section was inserted (section 11A) to specify 
the place of trial. Section 11A states:
101 38 DLR (1986) HCD 140.
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Notwithstanding anything contained in any other 
law for the time being in force, an offence under 
this Ordinance shall be tried by a court within 
the local limits of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the offence was committed, or
(b) the complainant or the accused resides or last 
resided.
The amendments show that there is a policy of 
encouraging disputes to come up to the court. The idea to 
resolve them though the local administration, regarding the 
courts as the last resort, is fading. This shows that the 
judiciary are increasingly taking over the local, informal 
sphere. This indicates that the legal system of Bangladesh 
is giving more preference to the judicial system than the 
informal methods. Whether the courts are actually better 
for the women's cause than the local arbitration remains to 
be seen when various issues of family law are discussed in 
detail in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5 
FAMILY LAW AND WOMEN IN BANGLADESH
The aim of this chapter is to assess comprehensively to 
what extent the legislative enactments in family law, 
especially on marriage laws and marriage-related issues, 
have contributed to giving women in Bangladesh better 
protection from economic deprivation and violence. The laws 
concerning registration of marriage and divorce, 
restitution of conjugal rights, polygamy, dissolution of 
marriage, dower, maintenance, custody and guardianship are 
analysed in this chapter. The laws concerning dowry and 
cruelty to women are discussed in detail in chapter 6.
This chapter also focuses on the question whether 
women in Bangladesh stand to benefit from judicial 
activism. Along with the trend for more modern legislation 
in Bangladesh, this indicates a clear manifestation of a 
new sensitivity in issues involving the welfare of women, 
particularly protecting them from abuse.1 One example of 
such recent judicial activism would certainly be the 
provocative judgement delivered by Justice S.M. Hussain in
1 Malik, Shahdeen: 'Saga of divorce women: Once again Shah 
Banu, maintenance and scope for marriage contracts'. In 42 
DLR (1990) Journal, pp.34-40, at p.39.
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Nelly Zaman v Giasuddin Khan.2 where he held that the 
concept of forceful restitution of conjugal rights by the 
husband against an unwilling wife has become outmoded and 
does not fit in with the public principle and policy of 
equality of all men and women. This might be a consequence 
of social changes in Bangladeshi society, as women's 
contribution to the national economy is now being better 
valued and recognised. However, this outlook of the 
judiciary is only indicated in a few family law cases and 
is not a general tendency.
This chapter also seeks to examine, through the 
analysis of cases, the attitude of the Judges in the Courts 
of Bangladesh to the question of family law reform. Have 
the Courts been influenced in their interpretation of the 
statutory provisions by the patriarchal sentiments of 
society? How far are the judges achieving an extension of 
the sphere of sharia to influence the condition of women? 
It is, therefore, also discussed in this thesis whether the 
lower courts, specially the Family Courts, are applying the 
traditional rules or deviating from them to give women more 
rights.
The fieldwork for this thesis involved collection of 
unreported decisions of the Family Courts of Dhaka (for 
details see above, p.23). Before discussing cases on a 
particular issue, it is useful to demarcate its salient 
features in Islamic law and its reworking by the modern 
reforms to know the correct position of the legal matrix
2 34 DLR (1982) 225.
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within which such family issues are adjudicated and 
determined in Bangladesh today. It seems accepted that law 
as an instrument of social change can be analysed by 
examining the legislation and the judgements of the 
judiciary to bring about social justice.3 This will also 
allow us to consider whether the modern legal apparatus of 
reforms is finding expression in social reality and how 
beneficial the modern reforms have been to women in 
practice.
We have already given a chart of the judicial system 
of Bangladesh to clarify the hierarchy of the different 
courts (see above, p.200), with its two jurisdictions, 
civil and criminal, depending on the nature of the case. 
The family issues which are of a criminal nature are under 
the jurisdiction of criminal courts but the civil cases 
come to the Family Courts. The Family Courts are the 
Additional Judges Courts under section 4 of the Family 
Courts Ordinance. 1985 (for details see above, p.202).
The officially reported cases are only cases of the 
High Court Division or the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court; thus, unless a case goes to the appellate 
stage, it is not reported. However, the unreported cases 
are significantly important in family issues as in Family 
Courts appeals are only allowed in cases of dower over 5000 
taka and on the ground of cruelty under section 17 of the 
Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 (see above, p. 213) . The
3 Sarkar, Lotika: 'Status of women: Law as an instrument 
of social change'. In Journal of the Indian Law Institute. 
Vol.25, No.2, 1983, pp.262-269, at p. 265.
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decisions of the Family Courts conclusively determine all 
issues except those where there is a scope for appeal (see 
chapter 4, p.214). Thus, unless unreported cases are 
examined, the effect of the legislation and of judicial 
interpretation at local level cannot be determined.
5.1. Registration of marriage
Although in Islam marriage is a civil contract and not a 
sacrament, it is a religious and a sacred covenant.4 
Marriage in South Asia requires many rituals and involves 
not only the parties or their families but also the 
community.5 In Bengali Muslim communities, apart from the 
legal significance of marriage, the ceremonial requirements 
involving the community are also indispensable.6 In this 
context, marriage can be regarded as a social contract.
The rituals of Muslim marriage in Bangladesh are
4 Nasir, Jamal J.: The status of women under Islamic law and 
under modern Islamic legislation. London 1990, p . 3 ; 
Esposito, John L. : Women in Muslim family law. New York 
1982, p.16; Jung, Mahomed Ullah Ibn S.: A dissertation on 
the Muslim law of marriage. Allahabad 1926, p.l; Mahmood, 
Tahir: The Muslim law of India. 1st ed. Allahabad 1980, 
p.47.
5 The same effect of customary norm or adl can be found in 
marriage in Malaysia, see for details, Mat, Ismail Bin: 
Adat and Islam in Malaysia: A study in legal conflict and 
resolution. Ph.D. Thesis, Temple University, Ann Arbour 
1985, pp.210-216.
6 The case law on dissolution of marriage in Bangladesh 
indicates that the main reason for the break-up of marriage 
is not usually because of the parties themselves, but due 
to the disagreements between the families.
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indisputably influenced by Hindu models. This reflects the 
impact of tradition on the Muslim community in Bangladesh 
and illustrates the continuity of local traditions (see 
above p.44) . The rituals of marriage are regarded as an 
important part of the community's culture and traditions. 
The comparison of the rituals of Hindu marriage and Bengali 
Muslim marriage at once show that there are many 
similarities; especially the gave holud or the rite of 
smearing turmeric on the body of the bride and groom seems 
to be alike.7 Although the rituals may not have the same 
significance of religious auspiciousness as in Hindu 
marriage, they are performed with great respect. In fact, 
the rituals as performed in public involve the community to 
recognise the marriage and can be regarded as the social 
registration of marriage.
This begs the question that when Muslim marriages in 
South Asia already have religious and social approval, what 
is the necessity of registration? Is it merely bureaucracy? 
It is important for a modern state to have accurate 
information or statistics of its members; to know which 
members of the population are married and to whom, is one 
of them. This bureaucratic aim can only be fulfilled by 
some form of registration of marriage. There is a section 
of people who reject registration on the ground that it is
7 For details of Bengali Hindu marriage rituals see 
Fruzetti, Lina M. : The gift of a virgin: Women, marriage 
and ritual in a Bengali society. New Jersey 1982, pp.75-79; 
On modern developments generally see Menski, Werner F. : 
'Change and continuity in Hindu marriage rituals'. In 
Killingley, S.Y. (ed.) Hindu ritual and society. Newcastle 
1991, pp.32-51.
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only a bureaucratic set-up for the denial of rights to 
persons who are co-habiting without marriage.8 From this 
perspective, proof of co-habitation should be enough to 
establish the status of marriage. Indeed, the well-known 
concept of presumption of marriage comes into play.
Sharia does not prescribe any particular form of 
marriage ceremony except the essential elements of iiab and 
gabul. the presence of two witnesses, the promise to pay 
mahr and the marriage contract or the kabinnama. The 
contractual agreement between the parties may be made 
orally, although the Quran recommends important 
transactions to be in writing. Marriage was also regarded 
important in the sense of involvement of two individuals 
for life.9 There is no need for registration in a Muslim 
marriage as it is not made obligatory in the Quran or the 
sunnah.10 On the other hand, there are no prohibitive 
sanctions against registration of marriage also.11 Thus, 
registration is not a constituent condition to be fulfilled 
for the validity of the marriage under Islamic law. The 
requirements of registration are considered to be legal 
restrictions for various kinds of protection, including 
prevention of denial of the marriage and establishment of
8 Gandhi, Nandita and Nandita Shah: The issues at stake- 
theorv and practice in the contemporary women's movement in 
India. New Delhi 1992, p.230.
9 Esposito (1982), p.16.
10 Mahmood, Tahir: The Muslim law of India. 2nd ed. 
Allahabad 1982, p.56.
11 Rahman, Tanzil-ur: A code of Muslim personal law. 
Vol.i, Karachi 1978, p.88.
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paternity.12 Compulsory registration of marriages appears 
to be an attempt to check not only child marriages and 
polygamy but also to confirm whether the parties have 
capacity to marry and have given proper consent to the 
marriage. This may prevent the chance of fraud and abuse of 
the relationship. In a study on divorce in the Rangpur and 
Dinajpur areas of rural Bangladesh, it was shown that 75% 
of divorced women thought that as their marriage was not 
registered, they had been divorced very easily, without any 
scope for challenging their husbands in the court for 
payment of dower and maintenance for the iddat period.13 
Registration of marriage is a documentary proof, in the 
light of which the husband can not avoid paying dower and 
maintenance, which could in turn prevent divorce by the 
husband. But the above study reveals that women in rural 
areas of Bangladesh are simply not aware of the fact that 
marriage without registration is also enforceable in the 
court of law. However, the study also found that 25% of the 
registered marriages also ended in divorce.14 Thus, 
registration of marriage is indeed a legal duty but its 
omission does not affect the validity of the marriage, nor 
does registration protect women from divorce. There are 
cases in the Family Courts where the parties may not have
12 El Alami, Dawoud Sudqi: The marriage contract in Islamic 
law-in the shariah and personal status laws of Egypt and 
Morocco. London 1992, p.83.
13 Why marriages break u p : A study on divorce in rural 
Bangladesh. (Rangpur and Dinajpur Rural Sevices-RDRS, World 
Service and USAID) Dhaka 1990, p.15.
14 Id.
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their marriage registered but are married under the sharia. 
We could not find any cases challenging the validity of
marriage where there was no registration. Perhaps the issue 
did not arise as the people are not aware of registration 
or they are aware that registration alone cannot give
validity to their marriage.
The need and urgency of registration of marriage
arises, perhaps, in view of the demoralisation of a society 
in which religion is no longer sufficient to provide
effective sanctions. Society also turns a blind eye to the 
problem of proof of marriage, especially the need to 
protect women from being deprived of their rights. 
Registration of marriage other than being reliable proof of 
marriages (see case law on Pakistan, above, p.167) ensures 
legitimacy and strengthens inheritance rights for women and 
children. A man has less option to deny a marital 
relationship where there is proof of registration. Further, 
the frequency of desertion of women could be checked.
In South Asia, registration of marriage is merely 
prima facie evidence of a Muslim marriage, which may be 
rebutted by other evidence.15 Voluntary registration of
marriages and divorces was recognised in Bengal as early as 
1876 by the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Act of 
1876 (Bengal Act 1 of 1876) (see above, p.142). In the case 
of Imamuddin v Sukkor Ali Mollah and others.16 it was held
15 Rahman (1978) , p. 87.
16 26 DLR (1974) 56.
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that a very old kabinnama registered under the 1876 Act 
established the legitimacy of the daughter and such a 
document could be relied on for such purposes.
In 1961, by section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance of 1961, registration of marriages appeared to 
have been made compulsory and penalties were provided for 
its contravention (see for details, above, p.160). In Ahmed 
Mia v Kazi Abdul Motaleb. it was held that it is evident 
that no marriage solemnised under section 5 can be left 
unregistered, as this is required by the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance. 1961.17 But in fact, an early study showed 3 0%
of marriages remained unregistered.18 The study was based 
on 577 respondents, consisting of Chairmen, members and 
secretaries of Union Councils, Marriage Registrars and 
villagers. The sample was drawn from 32 unions of 8 
culturally distinct areas of East Pakistan. A more recent 
study in two districts of Bangladesh found that only 25% of 
rural marriages are registered.19 The unreported cases on 
issues of family law also showed that in most instances the 
marriage is held in accordance with sharia and not under a 
registered deed (see below, pp.290,303 and 304). There is
17 23 DLR (1971) 118.
18 See Qader, S.A.: 'Modernization of an agrarian society: 
A sociological study of operation of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance in East 
Pakistan'. In Rural Sociology Research Report. No.l, 
(Bureau of Agricultural, Statistical and Sociological 
Research, Agriculture University), Mymensing 1968.
19 Why marriages break u p : A study on divorce in rural
Bangladesh (Rangpur and Dinajpur Rural Service-RDRS and 
USAID), Dhaka 1990, p.15.
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a need to know better how many marriages are registered in 
Bangladesh to reflect to what extent the official law, i.e. 
the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act 1974 
is being implemented. This can only be done by detailed 
fieldwork, which was unrealistic for this study. However, 
an inquiry of the particulars of the Act and the case-law 
is attempted below.
In independent Bangladesh, the_, Muslim Marriages and 
Divorces (Registration) Act 1974 has superseded the 
provisions of registration of marriage under the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance 1961 and the Muslim Marriage and 
Divorce Registration Act (Bengal Act 1 of 1876).
Section 3 of the Muslim Marriages and Divorces 
(Registration) Act of 1974 made, it compulsory to register 
Muslim marriages in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act. Contravention of the provision of registration was 
made punishable under section 5(2) with simple imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to three months or with fine 
which may extend to 500 taka or with both.
The Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) 
(Amendment) Ordinance. 1982 gave a second proviso to 
section 4 of the Muslim Marriages and Divorces 
(Registration) Act. 1974 empowering the court to extend, 
curtail or otherwise alter the limits of any area for which 
a Nikah Registrar had been licensed. This amendment of the 
Act is merely bureaucratic as it only defines the 
jurisdiction of the Nikah Registrar.
The necessity of registration of marriage can be felt
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if we examine the relevant cases. In the unreported case of 
Beauty Begum v Md. Sekander Ali,20 the defendant had 
married the plaintiff according to Islamic sharia but he 
did not register the marriage under section 5(2) of the 
Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act 1974. The 
Family Court reasoned that the defendant had intentionally 
avoided to register the marriage. The reasoning behind 
this, as the court ascertained, was that the defendant had 
a first wife and did not want to give certainty and rights 
to the second wife. However, the defendant had given a 
promise to register the second marriage, which he had not 
fulfilled for the last fourteen years. Thus, it was held 
that the defendant was liable to the penalties provided 
under section 5(2) of the 1974 Act. This shows that men are 
marrying without any registration to avoid giving rights to 
women. But there is not enough evidence to ascertain how 
frequently men are marrying without registration or whether 
only bigamists are doing it to maintain a dual 
relationship.
Registration of marriages can also protect other 
rights of women. The right of divorce by the wife may be 
strengthened if marriage is confirmed by a registered deed. 
In the celebrated case of Nelly Zaman v Giasuddin Khan.21 
the right of a wife to exercise a delegated divorce if the 
power is vested in the registered kabinnama was considered. 
The terms of the registered kabinnama had two conditions,
20 Petition Suit No.564 A-6 of 1988 (unreported).
21 34 DLR (1982) 223.
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one of mutual recrimination and the other of the husband's 
inability to maintain her. The court held that as there was 
sufficient recrimination between the parties, it 
legitimised the registered right of the wife to divorce. 
Thus registration of the marriage makes the realisation of 
the right to divorce much easier.
The right to dower can also be-protected from abuse 
and fraud when it has been expressed in a registered deed. 
In the case of Aniuman Ara v Md. Abdur Rashid.22 it was 
held by the Family Court that when kabinnamas are not 
registered, the parties can change the amount of dower 
money. Moreover, it puts an extra burden on the court to 
ascertain the correct amount. In the above case, the dower 
money was changed by the husband from 5001 taka to 501 
taka. Such abuse may be prevented by registration of the 
kabinnama. Thus, registration should be the norm of every 
marriage in Bangladesh, not only for the sake of certainty 
of the marriage but also to enhance the position of the 
wife. If unregistered marriages were to be denied judicial 
relief in the courts, only then would this law be seriously 
implemented.23 This was apparently the case in Egypt and 
Tunisia.24 But it would be outside the framework of the 
sharia principles and against the attitudes of Bangladeshi 
society to make registration of marriage the only proof of
22 Family Suit No. 9 of 1981 (unreported) .
23 See to this effect, Esposito (1982), p. 84; Anderson, 
Norman: Law reform in the Muslim world. London 1976, 
pp.103-104.
24 Esposito (1982), p.90.
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marriage.
As the law stands at the moment, registration of 
marriage is compulsory but is not an essential ingredient 
without which the marriage can be impaired. While, the 
state has its own agenda for registration, for women it 
gives scope for protection and security of documentary 
evidence, but in practice the current law does not protect 
women well enough.
5.2 Registration of divorce
The purpose of registration of divorce has not been 
emphasised in the literature as much as registration of 
marriage. This does not imply that registration of divorce 
is not important. In fact, the demand for compulsory 
registration of marriages of all communities in India has 
been made together with the demand for registration of non­
judicial divorce.25 The reasoning behind the non­
significance for the registration of divorce is not probed 
into. Perhaps the male law makers are not in favour of 
making concessions in this area.
In Bangladesh, the provisions under section 6 of the 
Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act of 1974 
did not make registration of divorce compulsory. This means 
that this Act simply re-enacted the provisions of the
25 Diwan, Paras: Law of marriage and divorce. 2nd ed.
Allahabad 1991, p.133.
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Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Act of 1876 for
voluntary registration of divorce. There is no provision in 
the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 or the Muslim 
Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act of 1974 for the 
maintenance of registers of divorces.
Under section 6(1) of the Muslim Marriages and 
Divorces (Registration) Act of 1974 a Nikah Registrar may 
register any divorce effected under Muslim law after 
satisfying himself of the happening of the event, if 
application is made for such purpose. The Nikah Registrar 
may refuse to register a divorce and the person or persons 
who applied for such registration may make an appeal to the 
Registrar under section 6(4) . The order passed by the 
Registrar is final.
The Nikah Registrar shall not register a delegated 
divorce or talag-e-tahweed unless under section 6(3) of the 
1974 Act proper documentation is provided that the 
delegated right has been registered under the Registration 
Act, 1908 (xvi of 1908) or by production of the attested 
copy of an entry in the register of marriages showing that 
such delegation has been made. Men giving talag do not have 
to prove any document, whereas women have to go through the 
procedure of proving the document of delegation. This seems 
to be an extra burden on women. It is not certain why women 
are not given the right to effect registration of delegated 
divorce unless the delegation is registered when the 
marriage itself is valid without registration under Islamic 
law. What if this right was given in a kabinnama which is
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not registered? If the wife is entitled to her delegated 
right even when the kabinnama is not registered, then it is 
not justified that she should bear this extra burden. This 
elaboration of the procedure goes against women. However, 
where the Nikah Registrar refuses to register such divorce, 
the remedy of appeal to the Registrar, provided under 
section 6(4), also applies.
If the law had provided that a divorce will not be 
effective unless it is registered, perhaps only then its 
importance would be felt. But this cannot be possible where 
there is continuing scope for talag, and statutory 
enactment only requires to give notification of talaa to 
the local Chairman which is an issue under the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 (see in detail above, p.162). 
But legislation may be made by which the Registrars may 
refuse registration of divorce unless efforts for 
reconciliation between the husband and wife have been 
completed.26 This might mitigate the sufferings of women 
from the unilateral talaa (see below, p.259) and polygamy 
(see below, p.252). It has been suggested that the 
registration of divorce, if made compulsory, with the 
consent of both parties, will take away the arbitrary and 
capricious impulses of unilateral divorce by the husband.27
26 Mahmood, Tahir: 'Progressive codification of Muslim
personal law'. In Islamic law in modern India. Delhi 1972, 
pp.80-98, at p. 86;
27 Minattur, Joseph: 'On the magic of monogamy and similar
illusions.' In Mahmood, Tahir (ed.): Islamic law in modern 
India. Delhi 1972, pp.157-166, at p.164.
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Thus, registration of marriage or divorce is not under 
sharia but is a civil obligation which is regarded by the 
judges as a requirement of good order which should be 
fulfilled in the interest of the’public.28 The registration 
of marriage is seen as compulsory but the registration of 
divorce remains voluntary. Since the compulsory obligation 
extends only to registration of marriages and not divorces, 
failure for registration of divorce does not make the 
person liable to penalty under the provisions of the Muslim 
Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act of 1974.
We could not find any reported or unreported cases on 
the registration of divorces. The issue of divorce itself 
is discussed in chapter 5.5 below.
5.3 Restitution of conjugal rights
The early law on restitution of conjugal rights has already 
been discussed (see above, p.105). It was argued that 
although this remedy is allowed to both husband and wife, 
its Anglo-Indian development has strengthened the already 
strong position of a Muslim husband. However, there are 
grounds of defence which can be used by the wife to refuse 
the forced restoration of her conjugal life. Payment of 
prompt dower is one such defence, which acts as a condition
28 Layish, Aharon: Women and Islamic law in a non-Muslim 
state-a study based on decisions of the sharia courts in 
Israel. Jerusalem 1975, p.191.
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precedent to the husband's claim for restitution of
conjugal rights.29 The courts, before the independence of
Bangladesh, seemed to be not very appreciative of these
defences (see above, p.106). The shift'in the attitude of
the judiciary can be gathered if we consider the cases
reported after the emergence of Bangladesh. After
independence, in cases on restitution of conjugal rights,
judges have forcefully advanced social welfare arguments
against orthodox canonical precepts. The leading example
here is Justice S.M. Hussain's potent pronouncement in
Nelly Zaman v Giasuddin Khan.30 He commented:
A reference to article 28 (ii) of the constitution 
of Bangladesh guaranteeing equal rights of women 
and men in all spheres of the state and public 
life would clearly indicate that any unilateral 
plea of a husband for forcible restitution of 
conjugal rights as against a wife unwilling to 
live with her husband is violative of the 
accepted state and public principle and policy.31
This shows that the judges are beginning to use the
constitutional provisions of equality to give women more
rights in the arena of personal law. In his unprecedented
judgement, Justice S.M. Hussain has elucidated dicta of
restitution of conjugal rights as not being physically
enforceable and executable through any process of law. He
stated:
29 Shabbir, Mohammad: Muslim personal law and judiciary.
Allahabad 1988, pp.104-110; Haq, Mohammed Nurul: 'The 
effects of legislation and judicial decision on the 
Muslim law of dower'. In Dhaka University Studies-Part A . 
Vol.45, No.l, June 1988, pp.93-111.
30 34 DLR (1982) 221.
31 Ibid. , p . 225 .
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It may be specially mentioned that by lapse of 
time and social development the very concept of 
husband's unilateral plea for forcible 
restitution of conjugal rights as against a wife 
unwilling to live with her husband has become 
outmoded and does not fit in with the accepted 
state and public principle and policy of equality 
of all men and women being citizens equal before 
law entitled to equal protection of law and to be 
treated only in accordance with law as guaranteed 
in Article 27 and 31 of the , Constitution of 
Bangladesh.32
This appeared to be the first . step to burying the
stereotyped conceptions of the wife as property of the
husband, beginning to look upon women as human beings
having their own rights in marital relationships. This was
in consonance with the equality clauses of the Constitution
(see above, p.182). However, bringing sexual equality into
family law has been creating some'confusion (see already
above, p.l). Moreover, the constitutional clause of sexual
equality under article 28(2) only applies to the public
sphere and is not applicable to the private sphere (see
already above, p.183). However, the judges of the Family
Courts are only applying Article 27 and 31, i.e. that all
citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal
protection of law. The judge further stated, while
comparing the equality of men and women, that:
In the husband's unilateral plea for forcible 
restitution of conjugal rights as against a wife 
unwilling to live with her husband, there is no 
mutuality and reciprocity between the respective 
rights of the husband and wife, since such plea 
for restitution of conjugal rights is not 
available to a wife as against her husband apart 
from claiming maintenance and alimony.33
32 Ibid. , p. 224-225 .
33 Ibid. , p.225.
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The prayer for the restitution of conjugal rights was 
not allowed by the court, in the above case, on the ground 
that the marriage had already been dissolved by the 
exercise of the right of delegated divorce by the wife.
In a recent decision by the High Court division of the 
Supreme Court in Hosne Ara Begum v Rezaul Karim.34 it was 
rightly observed that the wife has under Islamic law a 
right to refuse the conjugal rights of the husband if she 
is treated by him with cruelty or if there is failure to 
pay prompt dower.35 Thus, physical and mental torture of 
the wife was not only held to be an offence punishable with 
imprisonment and fine but it also gave a valid ground to 
the woman to refuse restitution of conjugal rights to the 
husband.
Our analysis of the unreported cases from the Family 
Courts of the capital city of Dhaka confirms this position. 
An examination of the unpublished cases clearly reveals 
that Nelly Zaman' s case is being used as a precedent in 
these lower court cases.
In Alahi Baksh v Rafeza Khatun.36 a lady judge 
(Jasmine Anowar) did not allow the plaintiff to restore his 
conjugal life on the basis of the reasoning given in the 
judgement of Nellv Zaman v Giasuddin Khan.37 The Family 
Court reasoned that the decree will be infructuous if the
34 43 DLR (1991) 543.
35 Ibid. , p.545.
36 Family Suit No. 34 of 1988 (unreported) .
37 34 DLR (1982) 221.
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Court directed restitution of conjugal rights on an ex- 
parte hearing and will be in contravention of Articles 27 
and 31 of the Constitution of Bangladesh.
In Khondakar Shaficrul Hua Masud v Farida Beaum and 
others.38 the same lady judge did not Jgrant the plaintiff 
the claim for restitution of conjugal rights on the same 
constitutional reasoning. The Family Court held that it is 
out of question to allow the plea if the wife fears death. 
Further on, the court ascertained that the marriage itself 
had been legally dissolved by the exercise of delegated 
divorce by the wife.
In Md. Abdus Samad Khan v Nasima Bilauis.39 Justice 
Md. Abdul Momen also directed that the husband was not
entitled to get any decree for restitution of conjugal
rights as the marriage had already been dissolved by the 
wife's exercise of delegated divorce.
In Mst. Fatima Begum v Mohammed Golam Hossain,40
Justice Monjurul Basith did not allow the plaintiff to
restore the conjugal rights on the ground that one can not 
be forced to continue conjugal life. The court, however, 
ascertained that the marriage between the parties 
subsisted. The talaa purported to have been given by the 
husband was not in accordance with the provisions of
section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The 
notice of talaa was given, in the above case, to an
38 Family Suit No. 18 of 1990 (unreported).
39 Family Suit No. 13 of 1992 (unreported) .
40 Family Suit No. 61 of 1991 (unreported) .
249
unauthorised person and not to the persona desianata, i.e. 
the Chairman of the Union.41
In Md. Abdul Karim v Muhsina Tabassum.42 Justice 
Monjurul Basith did not grant the husband's prayer for the 
restitution of conjugal rights. The reasoning behind this 
judgement was also based on the judgement of Nellv Zaman's 
case that the husband cannot restore conjugal rights 
against an unwilling wife.
Finally, in Ani uman Ara v Md. Abdur Rashid.43 the 
argument of Nellv Zaman's case was upheld by the Family 
Court when the lady judge, Jasmine Anowar, did not allow 
the plaintiff to restore her conjugal life. It was also 
held in this case that the marriage between the parties 
subsisted as the talaa had not been given in accordance 
with section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. 
The court granted the claim of prompt dower and maintenance 
to the plaintiff.
Thus, the unpublished judgements of the Family Court 
of the Dhaka district with regard to the issue of 
restitution of conjugal rights indicate that the recent 
progressive judgements of the higher judiciary have had 
effects on the lower tier of the judiciary. Our examination 
of the cases on restitution of conjugal rights shows that 
there is no gender discrimination to apply the principle 
that no force can be used to continue one's conjugal life
41 For details, see also below, p. 255.
42 Family Suit No. 142 of 1990 (unreported) .
43 Family Suit No. 97 of 1990 (unreported) .
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as held in the case of Nellv Zaman. This seems to indicate 
that these courts are encouraging a modernist approach in 
the legal culture of Bangladesh. In referring here to 
whether the judges are male or female, we are not imputing 
that only the lady judges of the Family Court are 
pronouncing enlightened judgements. In fact, irrespective 
of gender, the Family Court judged, at least in cases of 
restitution of conjugal rights, are bringing modern 
insights into family law. Thus, restitution of conjugal 
rights can be used by the wife when the husband denies the 
wife a divorce which she wants. However, the plea of 
equality in restitution of conjugal rights cases may also 
work against women's interests, as wives could also not 
force their husbands to continue marital life with all its 
obligations. Thus, deserted and abandoned wives have been 
losing their remedy to reconcile with their husbands and to 
continue with their marital life. One could almost go as 
far as saying that this law underwrites desertion, but this 
might be an unintended result.
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5.4 Polygamy
Polygamy in Islamic law is a qualified right by which a 
Muslim man is permitted to marry up to four wives.44 
Recently there has been a lively debate about whether the 
right was allowed as a general rule or as an exception for 
natural calamities.45 It has been argued already that the 
permission to have polygamous marriages abuses women and 
their rights (see for details, p.149). In the Pakistani 
period, by the promulgation of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance 1961, the right of polygamy has been curtailed by 
providing some form of administrative assent before a 
second or subsequent marriage (see for details above,
p.161) .
In Bangladesh, too, in accordance with the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance 1961, before a man marries for a 
second or subsequent time, he must obtain the permission of 
the Chairman of the local administrative body, i.e. 
Chairman of the Union Parishad, Pourashava or administrator 
of the Municipal Corporation. The Arbitration Council, 
comprising such Chairman of the local administrative body 
and representatives of both parties, can only allow the 
husband to remarry if the members are satisfied that the
44 Faiz, Badruddin: Muslim law. Bombay 1968, p.46; Pearl, 
David: A textbook on Muslim personal law. London 1987, 2nd 
ed. pp.77-78.
45 See above p.14 9, footnote 243 for the relevant details.
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marriage is just and necessary as required under section 
6(3) of the Ordinance. In considering whether a second or 
subsequent marriage is just and necessary, the Arbitration 
Council is bound by the rules of the Ordinance and the 
provisions of the Muslim Family Law Rules. 1961 .46 The 
courts of Bangladesh are also permitting a second or 
subsequent marriage only on the general ground that it is 
just and necessary. In Makbul Ali v Munwara Begum.47 it was 
noted by the court that the Ordinance did not prohibit 
polygamy but allowed it under certain circumstances.48 The 
court enumerated the grounds as referred to in the Rules of 
the Ordinance. Among these grounds, physical and mental 
infirmity of the existing wife or wives are the primary 
ones which allow a Muslim husband to remarry. It remains a 
fact that the husband has to justify his claim through the 
permission of the Arbitration Council. However, sometimes 
the procedural impediment of taking permission from the 
Arbitration Council itself is becoming the principal 
obstacle in reducing polygamy. In Tahera Begum v Farukh 
Mi ah,49 the Supreme Court did not punish the accused for 
contracting a second marriage without the permission of the 
legislative authority in the misconception that there was 
no authority from which he could have obtained such
46 For details see above, p. 161. For the full text of the 
Rules see Appendix V.
47 39 DLR (1987) 181.
48 Ibid. , p.183.
49 35 DLR (1983) Ad 170.
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permission. This shows the lack of link between legislature
and judiciary (see for details, above, p.226). In Avesha
Sultana v Shaiahan Ali.50 the Court held,
The accused respondent having taken the second 
wife without the permission of the Arbitration 
Council the offence under section 6(5)(b) of the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was committed 
by him.51
The cases on polygamy indicate that Muslim husbands in 
Bangladesh may be punished if they do not follow the
procedure of the Ordinance regarding the required
permission from the Arbitration Council under section 6(5). 
In the case of Ahmad Mia v Kazi Abdul Motaleb.52 one of the
first cases on this issue, it was decided by the court that
the contracting of a second marriage during subsistence of 
the first marriage without permission, as required under 
section 6(5) of the Ordinance, is liable to be
prosecuted.53
In the case of Abul Basher v Nurun Nabi.54 the High
Court division of the Supreme Court described the intention
of the law-makers to insert the section on polygamy in the
Ordinance when it stated:
It seems that the legislative intent of section
6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 is to
restrict the practice of polygamy and to permit 
it only in cases where it appears reasonable to 
the Arbitration Council.
50 38 DLR (1986) HCD 140.
51 Ibid. , p. 143 .
52 23 DLR (1971) 118.
53 Ibid. , p. 120 .
54 39 DLR (1987) HCD 333.
254
In the above case the High Court referred the case 
back to the trial judge for determining whether the husband 
had obtained the requisite permission from the Arbitration 
Council before contracting the second marriage. This 
indicates that the judges are emphasising that the
permission of the Arbitration Council is mandatory.
The unreported cases of the Family Courts of Dhaka 
reveal that the root cause of nearly all the cases for
restitution of conjugal rights and realisation of dower and 
maintenance lies in polygamy. In Mst. Fatima Begum v 
Mohammad Golam Hossain,55 the plaintiff wife prayed for the 
restoration of her conjugal life as her husband had married 
again and neglected her. The Family Court did not allow the 
plaintiff to have her conjugal rights restored as no one 
can force anybody to lead a conjugal life, but ascertained 
that the marriage subsisted. Thus, the new law, as we saw, 
can also work against women and protect men. Moreover, 
suits for restitution of conjugal rights usually arise to 
control women. Whenever the wife gives divorce to her 
husband, he challenges it by filing a suit for restitution 
of conjugal rights.56
In Mst. Ancrari Begum v Md. Iqbal Rashid.57 the
plaintiff wife prayed for the realisation of prompt and
deferred dower on the ground that her husband had married
55 Family Suit No. 61 of 1991 (unreported).
56 An example would be Khondakar Shaficrul Haa Masud v Farida 
Begum and others. Family Suit No.18 of 1990 (unreported).
57 Family Suit No.61 of 1991 (unreported).
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for the second time without the requisite permission from 
the Arbitration Council. The court granted the plea.
Scrutiny of the cases reveals that the Islamic 
prerogative right of the husband to marry for a subsequent 
time has been curtailed by applying the provisions of the 
Ordinance. The Ordinance did not directly effect the 
substantive rights of the husband but circumscribed that 
right by imposing technical and procedural impediments. 
Earlier, the provisions of the Ordinance failed usually to 
provide any real results, perhaps because the Arbitration 
Councils, composed usually by males, were very often not 
unwilling to give permission to remarry although it was 
merely a formality.58 Thus, a man marrying for a second 
time only needed to apply to the Arbitration Council for 
consent. But now, if the Arbitration Council does not give 
consent and a man marries for a second or subsequent time, 
he is liable to be prosecuted and punished. Moreover, the 
wife can claim her full dower and can also dissolve the 
marriage, under section ii (a) of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act of 193 9, if the husband has taken an 
additional wife without permission.
There is no evidence that violations of such procedure 
can make the second marriage void.59 From the cases on 
polygamy it is evident that even though the husband does 
not seek permission from the Arbitration Council, the 
polygamous marriage is valid. Thus, the statutory
58 Ahmed and Jahanara (1979), p.304.
59 Sobhan (1978) , p. 24 .
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impediments are not enough to safeguard wives from the 
husband's unlimited polygamous marriages. In the Hindu 
community in Bangladesh too, the practice of polygamy is 
not uncommon; moreover, there is no statutory barrier in 
such cases.
5.5 Dissolution of Marriage
There are, generally speaking, three types of dissolution 
under Muslim law, dissolution by the death of either party, 
dissolution by act of the parties and dissolution by 
judicial process or faskh.60
The dissolution of marriage by judicial process or 
faskh has been discussed when we analysed the Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 (see above, p. 122) . The 
dissolution of marriage by an act of the parties has also 
been discussed before, including later developments in the 
Pakistani period under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 
1961 (see above, p.162).
The judicial developments in Bangladesh regarding 
dissolution by act of the parties, for example talaq by the 
husband, show that there are some instances where the 
statutory enactments, by strictly adhering to the 
procedural technicalities, are favouring women to continue 
their marriage. On the other hand, this is putting women in
60 Fyzee (1974) , p. 154 .
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a dilemma, as in the eyes of the official law their 
marriage subsists but according to Islamic law and the 
society they are divorced when the husband has pronounced 
talaa three times in one sitting. The problem arises 
because of the continuation of the irregular form of talaa 
known as talaa al-bida, which has been referred to as a 
deviation from the divine principles.61 The concern of the 
Commission of Marriage and Family Laws and later the 
enactment of section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 
1961 was to change this instantly effective form of talaa 
(see above, p.162), but this was not entirely successful.
Cases of talaa, khula and talaa-e-tahweed are all 
dissolution by the act of the parties. While the former is 
the unilateral right of the husband, the latter is the 
complementary right of the wife where she has to make some 
sacrifice or depends on the desire of the husband to 
delegate. The cases of talaa, khula and talaa-e-tahweed in 
Bangladesh are important to consider whether women are 
actually deprived of rights granted under Islamic law.
61 Mir-Hosseini, Ziba: Marriage on trial-a study of
Islamic family law, Iran and Morocco compared. London and 
New York 1993, p.37.
258
5.5.1 Talaq
In the talaa cases, by rigorously following the procedural 
technicalities and the precedent of Ali Nawaz Gardezi v 
Mohammad Yusuf,62 non-judicial dissolution of marriage by 
talaa-al-bidah was being disregarded. Without notice to the 
Union Council or Upazila Chairman, a divorce would not be 
effective. This remains the official law of Bangladesh.63 
It has also been argued by Western authors that the 
requirement of notice is mandatory as without it the talaa 
itself is invalidated.64 The Family Court decisions in 
Bangladesh confirm the position that without notice to the 
Arbitration Council, the talaa will not be effective. As we 
saw (above p.170) in Pakistan, more recently the Supreme 
Court has ruled that notice of divorce to a Union Council 
Chairman under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961 is against the shariah and the Constitution 
of Pakistan.65 Still more recently, further cases have 
supported this position (see above, p.170). This seems not
62 PLD 1963 SC 51.
63 Choudhury, Obaidul Huq: Hand book of Muslim family 
laws. Dhaka 1993, p.63; Haq, Md. Nurul: Paribarik Adalot 
ain o alochona. Dhaka 1990, p.136.
64 Pearl, David: A text book of Muslim personal law. 2nd 
ed. London 1987, p.Ill; Anderson, J.N.D.: 'Reforms in the 
law of divorce in the Muslim world'. In Studia Islamica. 
Vol.xxxi, 1970, pp.41-52, at p.51; Hodkinson, Keith: Muslim 
family law-a source book. London and Canberre 1984, p.223.
65 Carroll, Lucy: 'Talaq and polygamy: Some recent
decisions from England and Pakistan'. In Islamic and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.v«_ No.3-4, 1985, pp.226-245.
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to be the position in Bangladesh possibly because there is 
no express trend of islamisation in family law. It appears 
to protect women better by following the reforms enunciated 
by the statutory enactments.
In Mst. Fatima Beaum v Muhammad Golam Hossain.66 the 
Family Court ascertained that the marriage between the 
parties subsisted as the talaa given by the husband was not 
in accordance with section 7(1) of the MFLO.
In Aniuman Ara v Md. Abdur Rashid,67 the Family Court 
also held that the talaa of the husband did not affect the 
marriage as it was not given as required under section 7(1) 
of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961. Thus, the strict 
interpretation of section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance. 1961 protects women officially. But it is not
taken into consideration what will happen to such women if 
in society they are regarded as divorced but in accordance 
with official law their marriage persists.
In Mst. Roksana Begum v Md. Abdul Khair,68 the 
defendant could not prove that he had given talaa to the 
wife and was liable to pay maintenance. The court did not 
accept the social fact that he had given talaa in the 
traditional way, gave more preference to the statutory
enactment and regarded it as an incomplete talaa. This has
protected the woman, as otherwise she would have been worse 
off financially. On the other hand, there are a large
66 Family Suit No. 61 of 1991 (unreported) .
67 Family Suit No. 97 of 1990 (unreported) .
68 Family Suit No. 96 of 1991 (unreported).
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number of occasions where the women are simply deserted or 
thrown out of their homes. How is the judiciary or the 
society protecting them? Even when the courts are arguing 
that these talaas are incomplete And invalid, the Muslim 
women in Bangladesh are in a difficult situation as remain 
unsure about their marital status. In the eyes of the 
society they are divorced by talaa. but in the official 
legal system they are not divorced.69 Thus, the statutory 
impediment of giving notice to the Arbitration Council 
sometimes works against women as they may be legally 
married under the official law but the society does not 
accept that and considers them as divorced by talaa.
In Md. Kutubuddin Jaiairdar v Nuriahan Begum,70 as 
notice had not been served to the relevant Chairman, the 
talag was held invalid. The plaintiff-respondent Nurjahan 
Begum brought this suit against her husband for a 
declaration that the marriage between her and her husband 
had been dissolved as a result of the exercise of the 
delegated power of divorce by her. She also used an 
alternative prayer that if the court found that the 
marriage tie between them had not been legally dissolved, 
then the court should grant a decree for dissolution of 
their marriage. This is a heavily contested suit which 
shows the trouble women have to face to free themselves 
from the marital bond. The facts of the case were that the
69 Ahmad, Husna: Divorced vet married: The position of
Bangladeshi women between English and Bangladeshi law. 
LL.M. Essay (unpublished) London SOAS 1991, p.5.
70 25 DLR (1973) 21.
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plaintiff Nurjahan Begum was married to the defendant 
Kutubuddin Jaigirdar on 27th July 1965 according to Muslim 
law. The defendant executed a kabinnama in which the dower 
amount was fixed at Rs.10,000,00 of which Rs.5,000 was 
prompt dower; the delegated power of divorce was given to 
the plaintiff. The defendant's father was against this 
marriage and drove the couple out of his house and they 
stayed for some time in the plaintiff's father's house. 
During this period it was found that the husband was ill- 
tempered, arrogant and cruel by nature and the life of the 
wife became miserable due to his assaults and cruel 
conduct. Their relationship became very strained and 
finally the husband agreed to divorce her by writing. The 
talaanama was registered on 17.6.66. Subsequently, the 
husband instituted a suit for restitution of conjugal 
rights and for a permanent injunction purporting to 
restrain the wife from taking another husband. The court 
decreed that although the marriage had been dissolved by 
talaa by the husband, as no notice had been given under 
sections 7 or 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, 
the marriage bond was still subsisting and the talaa was 
invalid. An appeal was made by the wife to the Court of 
District Judge who dismissed the appeal with the 
modification that the wife should be restrained from 
marrying for the second time till a valid divorce was 
obtained. On 21.7.67 the wife exercised her delegated power 
of divorce and instituted a suit with the prayer to declare 
that by the exercise of the delegated divorce their
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marriage had been dissolved. But the trial court dismissed
the suit on the ground that there was no excercise of
delegated divorce by the plaintiff and no notice. On
appeal, three years later the appellate court terminated
the marriage on a new ground, that of khula (see below,
p.269) . On second appeal by the husband, the court
dismissed the appeal with the modification that the decree
for dissolution of marriage was substituted by a decree
declaring the marriage dissolved by the exercise of the
delegated power of divorce by the wife.
This case not only projects the long procedure a woman
may have to go through to have her.marriage terminated and
the confusions existing because of the various forms of
divorce in Islamic law, but also the problem of the
official law not being accepted by the society. Justice
D.C. Bhattacharya himself stated:
Whatever might have been the circumstances under 
which the defendant pronounced talaa, it does not 
appear, on an examination of the said 
circumstances, that either the plaintiff or her 
father had ever any doubt as to the effectiveness 
of the said divorce, as will appear from the fact 
that the father admittedly arranged a second 
marriage for his daughter to be solemnised on 
30.4.67 and also from the fact that the plaintiff 
made a statement before the Subdivisional 
Magistrate of Sadar, Sylhet in a proceeding under 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, on 25.9.67 that 
she was unwilling to go with her former husband 
as she had already been divorced by him. In this 
context, it is most improbable that a Muslim girl 
would desire to live with a person who was no 
longer her husband because of the talaa given by 
him 71
This part of the judgement proves that whatever are
71 Ibid. , pp.36-37.
the procedural technicalities of the enactments, the 
attitude of the people still centers on the talaa al-bidah 
concept, i.e. whenever a talaa has been pronounced, it is 
valid per se and is considered final.
The same situation arose in Abdus Sobhan Sarkar v Md. 
Abdul Ghani,72 where the absence of notice invalidated the 
delegated divorce but the decision explained the role of 
the Arbitration Council in talaa cases. The case was filed 
under sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Muslim Family Laws
Ordinance 1961. The facts of the case were that an 
application was brought by Abdus Sobhan Sarkar under 
section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1898 for the 
quashing of proceedings in a case pending in the Court of 
Magistrate at Shirajgonj brought by Md. Abdul Ghani against 
him and a woman named Shakitannessa. In that case Md. Abdul 
Ghani complained that Shakitannessa is his legally wedded 
wife and claimed that Abdus Sobhan Sarkar had married her 
during the subsistence of their marriage. Abdus Sobhan 
Sarkar and Shakitannessa filed a petition before the 
learned Magistrate for dropping the case alleging that 
Shakitunnessa had married Abdus Sobhan Sarkar after she had 
divorced herself in exercise of the delegated power of 
divorce in the kabinnama. They alleged that the delegated 
divorce was approved by the Arbitration Council which also 
gave permission to Shakitannessa to marry again. But the 
Magistrate Court rejected the petition and hence reference 
was made to the Appellate Court. In appeal the petition was
72 25 DLR (1973) 227.
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dismissed on the ground that the Arbitration Council had no
power to approve the divorce or to permit her to marry
again. Justice Sayem stated:
It will also appear that although sub-section (4) 
of section 7 provides that within thirty days of 
the receipt of written notice of, pronouncement of 
a talaq the Chairman is required to constitute an 
Arbitration Council which is to take all steps 
necessary for reconciliation, nothing has been 
said in the section or anywhere else in the Act 
providing as to what will happen if under receipt 
of such a written notice of the talaq the 
Chairman does not constitute an Arbitration 
Council or if the Arbitration Council so 
constituted does not take any steps to bring 
about reconciliation between parties. Failure of 
the Chairman to constitute an Arbitration Council 
or that of a duly constituted Arbitration Council 
to take necessary steps to bring about 
reconciliation is thus inconsequential.
The court thus, held that as far as talaas were
concerned the Arbitration Council had no function except to
take steps to bring about reconciliation between the
parties and nothing more. The functions of the Arbitration
Council in talaq cases have already been discussed (see
above, p.163) . It appears that the only required criterion
is to give notice of talaq to the Arbitration Council. This
procedural impediment is generally working to protect women
when they do not desire to have their marriage dissolved.
But sometimes it acts negatively, prolonging an unwanted
marriage and preventing the woman from marrying again,
which has become the cause of untold misery, the
consequence of which might be alarming with accusations of
zina against the wife.
It appears that there is a brighter side of talaq than
73 Ibid. , p.229.
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other forms of divorce, as the wife is entitled to her 
dower and sometimes the liability to pay dower may restrain 
the husband to give divorce. However, the husband may 
persuade the wife to a khula divorce to evade the payment 
of dower (see below, p.272). Moreover, usually, even if a 
husband gives notice to the Chairman, he does not pay the 
dower or maintenance for the iddat. It was suggested by a
lawyer in Bangladesh that the notice of talaq under section
7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 should 
compulsorily accompany a bankdraft payable to the wife for 
the dower and the maintenance for the iddat.74 Thus,
Chairmen would not accept notices of divorce without dower 
and iddat money. The suggestion, if achieved, would solve 
many problems of Muslim women in Bangladesh. On the other 
hand, men would simply avoid to give notice of the divorce 
to the Chairman and rely on sharia. or even simple 
desertion. At present, this area of the law is quite 
confused and women are not offered the best possible
protection.
74 Rahman, Sheikh Shamsur: "Family Court and Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance". In 40 DLR Journal (1988) pp.24-26.
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5.5.2 Khula
Dissolution of marriage by khula is defined as an agreement 
between the parties to dissolve the marriage by the wife's 
foregoing of dower.75 The "judicial khul" has abolished the 
husband's consent criteria (see above, p.136). But the 
compensation paid by the wife, usually by restoration of 
her dower, has remained intact.
In khula cases in Bangladesh, the courts are only 
reiterating the position in Pakistan that the consent of 
the husband is not a required criterion, as has been done 
in the celebrated case of Khurshid Bibi v Mohammad Amin.76 
But the judges are using a social argument rather than 
saying that Khurshid Bibi is a precedent. Perhaps on the 
basis of Khurshid Bibi. the judges wanted to create a new 
principle.
In Hasina Ahmed v Sved Abul Fazal.77 a potent
pronouncement has been made by Justice S.M. Hussain that by
this khula form of divorce, women now enjoy higher social
rights with the change of time. The court stated:
This divorce by way of khula if not obtained with 
the consent and agreement between the parties, 
can, by analogy, be obtained from a Court of law 
before whom the case of dissolution of marriage 
is pending.78
75 Jung (1926), p.52; Rahman (1978), p.513.
76 PLD 1967 SC 97.
77 32 DLR (1980) 294.
78 Ibid. , p. 2 97.
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The above case clearly indicates the trend of the
judiciary to initiate new egalitarian principles in Muslim
family law on the ground of changing situations of the
society. The court stated,
It must be observed that the courts while 
adjucating on family dispute and administering 
personal law shall take into account not only the 
factual and the legal position and questions 
involved in a particular case but also consider 
the social dynamics when the concept of law is 
changing in a changing society. Previously 
decades before where a wife's claim for a divorce 
could be resisted for well-established reasons it 
cannot be resisted for the self-same reason 
because of the very basic fact that with the 
changing society women are coming of their own 
and their independence of mind and will must be 
respected while considering the legal and 
contractual obligation in marriage between man 
and woman as such.79
This decision shows that the judge is accepting the 
new social environment which has brought a change in the 
attitudes of women in Bangladesh. He wants to see this 
applied in family law cases. The court held that as the 
husband had falsely charged the wife with adultery, the 
wife was entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage. 
Moreover, the court held that as the wife had explicitly 
expressed her willingness to part with her dower in 
consideration of a divorce, this should be accepted.
The type of attitude the courts should have to decide 
cases was also commented on by the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it would be 
beneficial in a changing society if the courts concerned 
took a modernist and egalitarian vie.w as has been done in
79 Id.
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the celebrated case of Khurshid Bibi v Mohammad Amin.80 
This projects that Bangladeshi jurisprudence is building on 
Khurshid Bibi's case and reflecting a new outlook of the 
judiciary through it. However, by blindly following 
Khurshid Bibi's case, courts are sometimes abandoning the 
plaintiff's case and making out a new case instead.
In Md. Kutubuddin Jaiqirdar v Nuriahan Begum,81 the 
facts of the case, in a nutshell, were that first the 
husband gave talaa to the wife but because of the 
procedural difficulties the court of first instance did not 
accept that (see above, p.262). Then the wife exercised the 
right of delegated divorce and instituted a suit for a 
declaration that the marriage was dissolved, with an 
alternative prayer of dissolution on the ground of cruelty, 
which was also rejected (see above, p.262). On appeal, the 
appeal court abandoned the plaintiff's own case of cruelty 
[under section 2(viii)] of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act of 1939) and made out a new case of khula, 
being carried away by the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan in Khurshid Bibi's case. On second appeal in the 
Supreme Court Appellate Division, the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court did not grant khula, as the evidence on 
record did not support the claim, and the wife did not 
forego her dower. The plaintiff wife herself had asserted 
in the course of her testimony, 'I retain my right of 
dower' ('amar moharanar dabi akhono ache'). This statement
80 PLD 1967 SC 97.
81 25 DLR (1973) 21. See already above, p. 2 61.
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is completely inconsistent with the right of khula obtained
by the decree. The Supreme Court held that the suit as
framed and the evidence as led did not entitle the
plaintiff to have a decree dissolving the marriage in khula
form. Moreover, in the plaint, the wife was claiming the
right of divorce in her alternative prayer on the ground of
cruelty of conduct under section 2 (viii) of the Dissolution
of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. No case of khula divorce
was made out in the pleading of the wife. Justice D.C.
Bhattacharya of the Supreme Court stated:
In the said circumstances it was the clear duty 
of the said court not to abandon the plaintiff's 
own case and make out a new case for her in its 
stead.82
This questions the attitude of the judges. Why are 
they interested to deviate in a clear case of cruelty and 
turn it into a case of khula? Is it for the benefit of 
women or to deprive women of their rights of dower? The
determined position of the plaintiff that she would not
forego her right of dower should have denied the judiciary 
the mandate to turn her case into a case of khula.
In Muhammad Siddia v Mst. Ghafuran Bibi.83 a prayer 
for converting the suit for dissolution of marriage, 
originally based on habitual cruelty, into a suit for
divorce by way of khula at an appellate stage before the
Supreme Court was not permitted. The facts of the case were 
that the wife's suit for dissolution of marriage on the
82 Ibid. , p.28.
83 25 DLR (1973) SC 1.
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ground of habitual cruelty and non-maintenance had been 
dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the dismissal 
order was confirmed by the Appellate Court. On second 
appeal, the High Court took the view that even if the 
wife's appeal failed, the husband would not be in a 
position to take back the wife forcibly since the 
relationship between the spouses was very strained. In 
these circumstances the High Court felt justified in 
allowing the appeal and granting a dissolution of marriage 
by way of khula. Against this the husband appealed before 
the Supreme Court. It was decided that as there was no 
prayer made in the plaint for dissolution of marriage by 
way of khula, the High Court had acted illegally, as the 
husband was not given any opportunity to rebut the 
evidence. This shows that the High Court was transforming 
a case of cruelty into a case of khula. It is not clear 
whether this attitude is to sympathise with the women's 
cause, to give women their rights or to take away their 
rights. However, the Supreme Court sent the case back on 
remand to amend the plaint and to decide whether the wife 
was entitled to such form of dissolution.
A khula divorce, perhaps, as the court reflects, is 
the key to freedom for many Muslim women. But the case law 
reveals that the higher courts are turning other cases of 
dissolution into a case of khula to deprive women of their 
right to dower and to protect the financial interest of 
men. Moreover, from the practical point of view, a woman 
may be pressurised by her husband to give khula to avoid
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the payment of dower which he has to give when using 
talaq.84 Some Muslim men are now refusing to give talaq to 
their wives contemplating that their wives will give khula 
when they can not bear any more and will thus free them of 
their liability to pay dower. There is no attempt made to 
mitigate this unfairness. Thus, judicial khul could 
actually be taking away an important right of the Muslim 
women. It is yet to be clarified why the courts are 
encouraging 'judicial khul' more than any other grounds of 
dissolution. Is it another game to deprive women of their 
rights, or giving freedom to men from their duty to pay 
dower? However, the judicial device of khula is also hard 
to achieve and proceedings could drag on for 6 to 10 years, 
as was indicated by a court of Pakistan in Tahera Begum v 
Saleem Ahmed Siddiaui .85
The situation in Bangladesh has changed after the 
enactment of the Family Courts Ordinance of 1985, as the 
special proceedings of the Family Courts are supposed to 
lead to an expeditious judgement. Still it usually takes a 
year or more to get a decree, as was evident in the case of 
Mst. Roksana Begum v Md. Abul . Khair.86 where the 
maintenance case needed nearly one year and ten months to 
come to a decision (filed in May 1991, judgement in March
84 Carroll, Lucy: 'Mahr and Muslim divorcees right to 
maintenance'. In Journal of the Indian Law Institute. 
Vol.27, No.3, July-September 1985, pp.487-495, at p.494; 
Carroll (1982), p.277.
85 PLD 1970 Karachi 619, at p. 620.
86 Family Suit No. 96 of 1991 (unreported) .
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1993). Execution of the decree is yet another matter.
Thus, the dissolution of marriage by khula potentially 
operates against women as it deprives them of their right 
of dower for their freedom from an undesirable marriage. 
Why women should always make concessions and compensations 
for their freedom, and not their partners, is yet to be 
understood.
5.5.3 Talaq-e-tahweed
One of the most potent legal weapons in Muslim women's 
possession is the right of delegated divorce or talaa-e 
tahweed.87 This is a conscious effort of the female spouse 
or her guardian to balance the male matrimonial power.88 
This right has been regarded by the judges of British India 
as conditional and not an absolute option, depending on 
being reasonable and not opposed to public policy.89 
However, conditional delegation was always recognised to be 
perfectly valid if the condition or contingency specified 
in the kabinnama was fulfilled.90 The Muslim Family Laws
87 On the new study of the subject see Shaham, Ron: 'Judicial 
divorce at the wife's initiative: The Sharia Courts of 
Egypt, 1920-1955'. In Islamic Law and Society. Vol.l, No.2, 
August 1994, pp.217-257.
88 Carroll (1982), p.278.
89 Ibid. , p. 2 79.
90 Ali, Syed Ameer: Mahommedan law. Vol.ii, 4th ed. 
Calcutta 1917, p. 556.
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Ordinance of 1961 has provided the option to delegate the 
right of divorce in the form of the kabinnama itself (see 
in detail, above, p.161) . But it would have been beneficial 
to the women of Bangladesh if the stipulations of the 
delegated divorce had been expressly written into the 
kabinnama. giving women a broader choice at the time of 
need. However, sometimes the stipulations are handwritten 
in the kabinnama by the guardians of the parties.
The case law in Bangladesh suggests that women are 
benefitting from this device of delegated divorce. In 
Nasima Bilkis v Md. Abdus Samad Khan.91 the plaintiff 
alleged that on the ground of cruelty, negligence to 
observe marital obligation and demand of dowry she had 
given divorce to the defendant by the delegated power of 
talaa-e-tahweed on 2.6.91 and the talacrnama had been 
registered. The Family Court held . that the right was 
exercised in accordance with strict compliance of the terms 
and conditions of the delegation. Examining the conditions 
of this delegated power, which stated that it could be 
exercised 'if there is maladjustment at any time' ('moner 
omil hoile iokhon ichcha'), the court arrived at the 
conclusion that there existed maladjustment between the 
parties.
In Monowara Begum v Md. Hannan Hawlader.92 the facts 
of the case state that the wife divorced the husband by 
talaa-e-tahweed and registered the divorce to make the
91 Family Suit No. 12 of 1992 (unreported).
92 Family Suit No. 15 of 1989 (unreported).
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dissolution more confirmed.
In Khondakar Shafiaul Hua Masud v Farida Begum and 
others,93 the Family Court did not allow the husband to 
restore his conjugal rights as the marriage itself had been 
effectively dissolved by the exercise of talaa-e-tahweed by 
the wife.
In Md. Kutubuddin Jaiairdar v Nuriahan Begum.94 the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held that although 
the lower Appellate Court had found that the marriage tie 
between the plaintiff and the defendant had been dissolved 
as a result of the exercise of the delegated power of 
divorce by the wife, it did not make the necessary 
declaration that the marital tie had already been 
dissolved. The Supreme Court not only rectified the decree 
of the lower appellate court but substituted the decree for 
dissolution of the marriage on other grounds by a decree 
declaring that the marriage had been dissolved by the 
exercise of the delegated power of divorce by the wife.
In the renowned case of Nelly Zaman v Giasuddin 
Khan.95 too, the court ascertained that the wife had 
exercised her delegated right of divorce or talaa-e-tahweed 
legally. The court held that it had been stipulated in the 
kabinnama that the wife could exercise this right if there 
was mutual recrimination between the parties. As there was 
sufficient recrimination between the parties it granted the
93 Family Suit No. 18 of 1990 (unreported) . See above, p. 249.
94 25 DLR (1973) 21.
95 34 DLR (1982) 223. See above p.246.
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right to the wife.
The device of talaa-e-tahweed is more beneficial to 
women as it does not come into effect immediately if the 
contingency arises, as a talaq would, but allows the wife 
to consider her options. When she has the situation under 
control and then decides to effect a divorce, she may 
exercise the right at her discretion. Thus, she is not 
automatically divorced without her will as is done by 
talaq.96 Moreover, by this method of inserting stipulations 
in the marriage contract, the wife could be provided 
separate maintenance and residence if the contingencies of 
polygamy or cruelty arise.97 This would resolve many of the 
problems for deserted women when the husband marries again 
or she is to suffer the agony or difficulties of living 
with a co-wife.
The case law indicates that progress has been made 
especially in the cases of delegated divorce where by the 
device of talaa-e-tahweed women are entitled to dissolve 
their marriage easily. As we saw, in khula cases women are 
sacrificing their right of dower in exchange for a divorce. 
In talaq cases, although men are legally obliged to give 
women dower and iddat money, this is rarely observed. Thus, 
Bangladeshi divorce law, overall, does not protect women 
well from economic deprivation and violence and the way 
forward, it appears, is more widespread and creative use of 
stipulations in the marriage contract.
96 For details see Carroll (1982), pp.284-285.
97 For details see Malik (1990), pp.35-40.
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5.6 Custody and guardianship
The Muslim law and statutory evolution regarding custody 
and guardianship have already been discussed (see above, 
pp.153 and 155). Traditionally, the right of guardianship 
of children is always vested in the father.98 The judiciary 
in Bangladesh is not giving enlightened judgements in cases 
of guardianship. They are mainly following the conservative 
line of interpretation of not recognising a woman as a 
natural guardian of her children. But the cases on custody 
in Bangladesh protect women more, as they exhibit mothers' 
rights of custody of young children as almost an absolute 
right. Enlightened pronouncements in the cases of custody 
of young children have encouraged mothers to claim custody 
beyond the conventional limitations relying on arguments 
about the welfare of the child. The modern trend of 
judgements started, in fact, from the Pakistani period.
In the case of Mst. Fahmida Begum v Habib Ahmed." it 
had been held that the courts in Pakistan can ignore the 
rules in textbooks on Muslim law, since there was no 
Quranic or traditional text on the point. Further on, the 
court concluded that it would be permissible to depart from 
the rules stated in those textbooks if on the facts of a 
given case its application was against the welfare of the
98 Anderson, J.N.D.: 'The eclipse of the patriarchal 
family in contemporary Islamic law'. In Family law in Asia 
and Africa. London 1968, pp.221-234, at p.222.
99 20 DLR (1968) WP 254.
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minor.100 There are many judgements supporting this claim 
of departing from traditional Muslim law as stated in the 
textbooks, as the rules propounded in different textbooks 
on the issue are not uniform.101
The cases of custody shows that the judiciary in 
Bangladesh is deciding the issue on the paramount 
consideration of the welfare of the minor. In Md. Abu Baker 
Siddiaue v S.M.A. Bakar and others.102 on the strength of 
precedents in the Pakistani period, the Appellate Division 
ruled,
It is true that, according to Hanafi school, 
father is entitled to the hizanat or custody of 
the son over 7 years of age. Indisputably, this 
rule is the recognition of the prima facie claim 
of the father to the custody of the son who has 
reached 7 years of age, but this rule which is 
found neither in the Quran nor Sunnah would not 
seem to have any claim to immutability so that it 
cannot be departed from, even if circumstances 
justified such departure.103
It was further held in the above case that the welfare 
of the minor was assumed to be the determining factor which 
the court regards as 'paramount consideration', even though 
the opinion of well-known jurists may not be followed. 
Thus, the rules of custody propounded in Hanafi law may be 
departed from in permissible circumstances, in
consideration of the minor's welfare. In the above case, 
the mother was preferred to be the guardian of the minor.
100 Ibid. , p. 257.
101 See for example Zohra Begum v Latif Ahmed Monawar 17 DLR 
(1965) WP 134.
102 38 DLR (1986) AD 106.
103 Ibid. , p. 114.
The facts of the case were that the mother, being a doctor,
was considered better suited to look after the minor than
the father, especially in view of the illness of the minor.
The Appellate Division conclusively determined that,
Facts as mentioned above clearly point out that 
the welfare of the boy requires that his custody 
should be given to the mother or that she should 
be appointed as his guardian.104
But this is only a - rare case where a woman as a
specific individual was recognised as having the right to
custody when her own ability and interest to help the child 
was greater than that of her husband. This was probably, 
not a plan of the father to get rid of a handicapped child, 
using the convenient fact that the mother was a doctor; 
actually, the mother wanted to have custody of the child.
Generally, the socio-economic conditions of women have 
the effect of not favouring their cases and the 
preconceived idea remains that women are unable to maintain 
their children. It is a fact, that the primary legal 
responsibility to maintain the child remains with the 
father and the issue is only the care and control of the 
person and property of the child. The image that a mother 
is unable to maintain the child is sustained perhaps to 
protect men's own patriarchal interest,
Sometimes the traditional rule has been restated and 
given a patriarchal interpretation to deprive women of 
their rights. In the custody case of Gulfam v Gazala Parvin
104 Ibid. , p.115.
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and others.105 the Family Court decided that although the 
minor son had not arrived at the predetermined age of 7 
years, the custody of the boy should go to the father 
because the mother had remarried. The court, on the other 
hand, emphasised that the father's remarriage did not 
affect the issue of appointing him as the custodian of the 
minor boy even at this tender age. The court relied on the 
book of Muslim law by Gazi Shamsur Rahman,106 which 
reflects orthodox concepts. This judgement seems to reflect 
an inclination towards orthodox Muslim law. But, in fact 
the judgement does not follow Muslim law, as otherwise it 
would have given custody of the small child to the nearest 
female relation of the mother. Thus, the classical 
orthodoxy is being reinterpreted sometimes to take away the 
already granted rights of women.
It is an established fact that a mother is normally 
seen as better qualified to care for the child in his or 
her tender years and that committing the custody to her is 
of advantage to the child.107 But, in Dr. Rashiduddin Ahmed 
v Dr. Ouamarunnahar Ahmed.108 the High Court considered it 
to be in the best interests of the. children to place them 
in the interim custody of their father while the issue was
105 Family Suit No.45 of 1992 (unreported) .
106 Rahman, Gazi Shamsur: Paribarik Adalot Adhadesh. Dhaka 
1978, p.62.
107 Rahimullah Choudhurv v Mrs. Saveda Helali Begum 20 DLR 
(1968) 1. See Ali, Syed Ameer: Mahommedan law. Vol. II,
Calcutta 1917, p.293.
108 30 DLR (1978) 208-211.
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finally settled in the lower court. The High Court decided 
on the ground that the father had been taking care of the 
children for nearly a year while their mother was in 
England. To put the children in the custody of the mother 
now would upset their settled lives.109 But the question 
remains whether it is for the paramount consideration of 
the welfare of the children to deprive them of the care of 
their mother or whether the courts are actually taking 
advantage of the modern doctrine of the child's welfare to 
deprive women of the already very limited rights granted to 
them. Thus, it is very easy for the judiciary to deprive 
women of their rights by the doctrine of 'best interests of 
the child' where there are no firm criteria to evaluate 
what are those interests.
The situation seems, however, favourable in the lower 
courts as reflected in the four unreported custody cases 
collected from the Family Courts of Dhaka city. A mother is 
usually given custody of the child during his or her 
infancy or tender age in accordance with Muslim law.110 
Moreover, in the lower court, i.e. Family Court, there is 
a case where a mother is also given custody of minors even 
above their tender years.111 This seems to reflect 
sensitisation of the judiciary to give more rights to 
women. There is also an unreported case in which the mere
109 Ibid. , p.210.
110 Mst. Nooriahan Khanam v A.T.M. Mamoonur Rashid. Family
Suit No.96 of 1992 (unreported).
111 Sved Nurul Hag v Aniuman Ara Begum. Family Suit No. 106 of
1989 (unreported).
281
application of the traditional law is described as a 
breakthrough. In Abul Bashar v M d . Ufazuddin.112 the facts 
and circumstances of the case were that the father of the 
minor boy was staying abroad and the minor had been born 
and brought up in his maternal grandfather's house in the 
care of the maternal grandmother, even while his mother was 
alive. Considering these facts and circumstances, the court 
granted the maternal grandmother custody of the boy up to 
the predetermined age of 7 years. The court reasoned that 
the welfare of the boy was of paramount importance. But the 
court did not indicate that they were in fact only 
following Muslim law, where the maternal grandmother 
substitutes the position of the mother in the tender years 
of the child.
In other cases of guardianship, the courts are 
deciding the issue on the predetermined norms of Islamic 
law, i.e. giving paramount importance to the right of the 
father. In the case of Akhtar Jahan Taniva v The State.113 
the Court decided that the mother's guardianship was lost 
by operation of law as soon as she remarried another person 
who was not related to the minor girl within the prohibited 
degree or who was a stranger.114 In the absence of the 
father, the guardianship of the child devolves to the 
grandfather and the mother is not entitled to be the
112 Family Suit No. 15 of 1991 (unreported) .
113 BLD (1986) 281.
114 Ibid. , p.283 .
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guardian.115 Thus, even when there are some cases of
custody where mothers are given custody of the children
above the pre-determined age, the guardianship of the
property of the minor is retained according to the
traditional conception of Muslim law.116
In Rehanuddin v Azizun Nahar,117 the High Court
Division of the Supreme Court agreed with the decision of
the District Judge in this case:
The learned District Judge has found that 
although the appellant was the natural guardian 
under the Muslim law, the mother in facts and 
circumstances of the case was entitled to be 
appointed as the guardian.118
The District Judge had ascertained at the first
instance that the facts and circumstances of the case
reveal that the mother was not treated well by her in-laws
and apprehended that the minor boy would also be treated in 
the same manner. On appeal the High Court agreed that the 
mother should be entitled to be appointed guardian but did 
not allow her to be guardian on the gound that she, being 
young (26 years), might remarry and sent the case back to 
decide the issue afresh.
The cases, except a few unusual ones, suggest that the 
father's guardianship of the property of the minor is
dominant. Patriarchal attitudes towards women are clearly
115 Sved Nurul Hag v Aniuman Ara Begum. Family Suit No. 106 of 
1989 (unreported).
116 Id.
117 33 DLR (1981) 139.
118 Ibid. , p. 14 0 .
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evident here, in particular the belief that the interests 
of the minor will suffer at the hands of the mother, or the 
common notion that mothers cannot maintain the property of 
the minor prevails. This is another way to subjugate women 
by undermining their credibility. However, as we saw, in 
some rare cases mothers were appointed guardian of their 
children with reference to their best interests. These 
mothers, as specific individuals, were given recognised 
rights in guardianship cases when their own ability to help 
the child was greater than that of the father.119 The 
financial position of the mother is considered by the 
court, whereas the primary responsibility of maintenance 
under the Islamic law lies with the father. Thus, the 
patriarchal ideal generally survives in cases of 
guardianship and males are, in particular, regarded as the 
natural guardian of the property of the minor.
5.7 Mehr or Dower
The legal position as regards the issue of dower remains 
the same in Bangladesh as it was after independence from 
Pakistan. It has been argued before that the division of 
dower into prompt and deferred creates anomalies and 
sometimes reduces the amount of dower if the husband can 
falsely prove that the prompt dower has been paid (see
119 A reported example is Md. Abu Baker Siddiaue v S .M. A. 
Bakar and others, 38 DLR (1986) AD 106.
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chapter 3 above, p.151). In the Pakistani period, the 
dowers which were not specified were regarded as to be 
realised in full on demand under the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance of 1961 (see above, p.164). This is still the law 
in Bangladesh.
Islamic law does not fix any maximum amount of dower, 
but makes it obligatory for the husband to pay whatever 
amount has been specified and whatever amount is assessed 
if not specified.120 Fixing of excessive amounts of dower 
is being used in South Asia as a means to control and check 
the husband's unilateral and unlimited power of divorce, as 
he has to pay the full amount of dower at the time of 
divorce. But it also acts as a status.matter, in which case 
there is no intention to pay the stipulated amount in 
full.121 Attempts have been made to curb the fixation of 
excessive amounts of dower in India which go against the 
interests of Muslim women, but no similar provision has 
been made in Pakistan or later, in Bangladesh. There has 
been some confusion over dower and dowry after the Dowry 
and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act of 1976 in Pakistan, but 
this has now been clarified.122
We saw earlier that it was found in a study of the 
metropolitan city of Dhaka that 88% of Muslim wives did not
120 Mahmood, Tahir: Muslim personal law-Role of the state 
in the Indian subcontinent. 2nd ed. Nagpur 1983, p. 62; 
Diwan, Paras: Dowry and protection to married women. New 
Delhi 1988, p.42.
121 Esposito (1982), p.24; Pearl, David: A textbook on Muslim 
law. 1st ed. London 1979, p.59.
122 Ibid., p.57; Pearl (1987), pp. 62-63.
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receive any dower at all (see above, p. 5) . If this is the 
situation in the capital city, one can anticipate an 
alarming situation in the rural remote areas. Why are women 
not receiving their legal right of dower? To inquire into 
this one has to probe into the causes for not giving dower. 
Here the same causes for which the women in Bangladesh are 
being subordinated come in, as women are dominated in the 
patriarchal family and in the wider socio-religious arena. 
What needs to be ascertained here, in particular, seems to
be whether the women's right to dower is being enlarged or
reduced by local customary conventions.
The examination of Bangladeshi cases clearly shows 
that the right has been curtailed by reducing the amount to 
be paid by the customary concept of usool (paid), i.e. by 
jewellery or other items given to the women in the ceremony 
of marriage. It is significant to point out that this 
concept of usool in Bangladesh is different from the
concept of usul or customary practice under Islamic law.123 
The indigenous concept of usool in Bangladesh means that at 
the time of marriage the bridegroom's party asserts that a 
portion of dower has been paid by jewellery or other
valuable goods. This might be noted down in the kabinnama. 
However, the bride's party usually does not ascertain at 
the time of marriage whether the claim is genuine because 
they want the ceremony to go on uninterrupted. But the 
claim might later prove to be false, taking away a 
potential right of dower of the woman..Moreover, presents
123 On usul under Islamic law see Rahman (1978), p.10.
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given at the time of marriage in the form of jewellery or 
otherwise, when included as a part of the dower, are 
reducing it. When the presents are made in public at the 
time of marriage, there is clearly an element of show of 
status, rather than concern for the financial protection of 
the women.
The cases reveal that whether any portion of dower is 
actually paid or not, if it is mentioned in the registered 
kabinnama, the courts tend to reduce the amount of dower by 
the alleged usool. Thus, in Mst. Razia Akhter v Abul Kalam 
Azad,124 the Family Court gave preference to documentary 
evidence. In the registered kabinnama it was mentioned that 
a part of the dower had been paid as usool at the time of 
marriage. The court did not further inquire whether it had 
actually been paid. The same situation arose also in Mst. 
Hafeza Bibi v Md. Shafiaul Alam.125 where the Family Court 
only allowed the claim for dower after reducing the total 
amount by the usool as specified in the registered 
kabinnama.
The concept of usool can also be found in cases where
the registered kabinnama did not specify that a part of
dower has been paid by the husband at the marriage
ceremony. In a recent case the Family Court presumed,
The plaintiff comes from a middle class family, 
her father is a lecturer in a college and the 
defendant is a teacher in a school. Considering 
the social economic structure" of our society it 
is very unlikely that a wedding in this
124 Family Suit No. 193 of 1989 (unreported) .
125 Family Suit No. 28 of 1992 (unreported) .
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background would take place without any jewellery 
or ornament from the bridegroom. In these 
circumstances I consider that there is some truth 
behind the claim of the defendant in this 
respect. Therefore, I would allow only half the 
dower money to the plaintiff.126
In Monawara Begum v Hannan Hawladar.127 the court 
orthodoxly decided that the wife was no longer entitled to 
dower as the jewellery given by.the husband constituted her 
dower. This concept of usool as substituting dower with 
jewellery and other valuables is actually reducing the 
right of dower of women. However, it is admitted that the 
Quran does not stipulate that dower should be in cash. The 
problem in Bangladesh is that outwardly it is shown that 
the dower is paid in kind, whereas actually it may not have 
been paid. It is rarely inquired whether the valuables are
actually paid or whether it tallies with the amount reduced
from the dower.
When usool is registered in the kabinnama. it is 
easier for the courts to reduce the dower, as found in many 
other cases. In Mst. Roksana Begum v Md. Abul Khair.128 the 
facts of the case show that the defendant claimed he had 
given talaq to the plaintiff, which he could not prove in 
the Family Court. The Family Court decided that the 
marriage subsisted. The Family Court also held that when in 
the registered deed it is expressed that a part of the 
dower money has been paid in the form, of jewellery at the
126 Mst. Mahsina Tabassum Shirin v Abdul Karim. Family Suit 
No.9 of 1992 (unreported).
127 Family Suit No. 15 of 1989 (unreported).
128 Family Suit No. 96 of 1991 (unreported) .
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marriage ceremony, there is no ground not to reduce the 
amount of dower. The court allowed only the prompt dower.
Sometimes the courts are not only regarding jewellery 
but also household ware and apparels as substitutes of 
dower. But, how do such items give security to women as to 
be a part of dower? In Nasima Bilkis v M d . Abdus Samad 
Khan,129 the Family Court regarded ware and apparels as the 
usool and further reduced the amount of dower after 
deducting the jewellery. Moreover, the defendant contended 
that the plaintiff waived the dower in the wedding night. 
The court, however, held that the defendant's contention 
did not bear any truth.
It is significant to point out that this imposed 
tradition to waive dower in the wedding night is another 
customary practice forced on women to deprive them of their 
right of dower. Under Islamic law, a wife can forego or 
gift her dower which is known as hiba al-mahr and the 
husband can increase the dower after marriage.130 The 
customary tradition suggests that if the wife foregoes her 
dower in the wedding night it is good for the couple. It is 
significant to point out that there is no customary 
tradition putting pressure on the husband to increase the 
dower. This confirms what we know, namely that the 
customary traditions have a patriarchal interpretation and 
restrictive effects on women. However, under Islamic law 
the wife making the remission must act freely and must not
129 Family Suit No. 12 of 1992 (unreported) .
130 Ali (1917), Vol.ii, p.462; Tyabji (1968), p.99.
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be influenced. In an earlier case in Pakistan, it was held 
that if the wife remits her dower just to retain the 
affection of the husband she is not allowed to forego her 
dower.131 We could not find any reported or unreported case 
of this kind in Bangladesh.
In Mst. Shahida Begum v Md. Mahbub Hossain.132 the 
plaintiff asked for the full amount of dower, i.e. prompt 
and deferred dower. The facts of the case were that the 
parties were married by a registered kabinnama on 3.2.90 
and the dower was fixed at 75,001 taka, out of which 5,000 
taka were mentioned as having been paid under usool. The 
Family Court granted the plaintiff's prayer for full prompt 
and deferred dower after deducting the amount paid as 
usool, on the reasoning that the defendant had effectively 
given talaa to the plaintiff on 21.10.91.
In Margubater Rouf v A.T.M. Zahurul Hag Khan,133 the 
plaintiff prayed for the realisation of dower and 
maintenance. The facts of the case show that the parties 
were married in accordance with sharia on 20.10.88. The 
dower money was fixed in the registered kabinnama at
300,000 taka. The plaintiff stated that her marriage was 
duly consummated but the defendant denied it. The Family 
Court held that the contention of the defendant that the 
marriage had not been consummated did not hold good as
131 Shah Banu v Iftekhar Md. . PLD 1956 Kar 363.
132 Family Suit No. 112 of 1991 (unreported) .
133 Family Suit No.l of 1992 and Family Suit No. 3 of 1992 
(analogous hearing) (unreported).
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there was no obstacle in the way of the defendant from 
being intimate with the plaintiff. She was, therefore, 
entitled to dower. Although there was no medical evidence, 
the court reduced the amount of dower to 100,000 taka and 
did not go into details on how the major portion of the 
dower had been paid by the defendant. Perhaps the same 
customary concept of paying up or usool by jewellery and 
other ware and apparels curtailed the amount.
This case also seems to contain evidence of another 
recent custom of taking dower as a status-enhancing device, 
which is to stipulate huge amounts of dower without any 
intention to pay this (the same situation is found in the 
context of dowry, see chapter 6 below, p.319).134 Under 
Islamic law there is a concept of assummat. where a large 
amount of dower may be announced in public, whereas 
privately the parties agree to a smaller amount.135 The 
effect of this can be felt in another case.
In Mst. Meherunnahar v Rahman Khondakar,136 the 
plaintiff asked for the realisation of her dower which was 
fixed at 90,111 taka by a registered kabinnama. The Family 
Court ascertained that no portion of the dower money had 
been paid as usool and that the plaintiff was entitled to 
the full amount. The facts of the case reveal that the 
plaintiff herself stated that the marriage had not been
134 Mahmood, Tahir: The Muslim law of India. Allahabad 
1982, p.77.
135 Hodkinson (1984), p.137.
136 Family Suit No. 24 of 1987 (unreported).
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consummated. The Family Court, while deciding whether the 
plaintiff was entitled to the full amount of dower, 
attempted a theological discussion that in the Quran it is 
expressly written that the amount of dower should be that 
amount which the husband is able to give whenever the wife 
demands it. The court deduced that .according to religion 
and the theologians, the amount should not be more than the 
ability of the husband warranted. It was held that it 
should not be more than the annual income of the husband. 
The court, thus, reduced the specified amount of dower 
granted by the registered kabinnama to 50,000 taka on the 
ground that the defendant, being a lawyer who is completely 
dependent on his senior, would not be able to pay a higher 
amount. It is significant to note that the reduction of the 
dower money to 50,000. taka was first suggested by a few 
lawyers in a conciliation or shalish and the parties agreed 
to it. But as the defendant failed to pay anything, the 
suit arose. The Family Court, thus accepted the compromise 
amount arrived at by the shalish and attempts to give it 
religious legitimacy.
There are cases where the courts are enterprising and 
go into detail whether the husband actually paid the dower. 
Ambia Khatoon v Md. Yasin Bepari137 is a suit for the 
realisation of dower and maintenance. The facts of the case 
in a nutshell are that the parties were married on 7.7.87 
and the dower was fixed at 50,000 taka, of which half was 
prompt and the other half deferred. The defendant, to evade
137 Family Suit No. 98 of 1990 (unreported).
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the payment of dower, was relying on out-of-court 
settlement and agreements. He contended that he had paid 
the full amount of dower (50,000 taka) fixed in the 
registered kabinnama by a compromise in a non-judicial 
stamp paper. The defendant also stated that he had paid a 
large part of the dower (30,000 taka) as usool at the time 
of the marriage. The Family Court rejected these claims of 
the defendant as being contradictory in itself and held 
that this showed he was attempting to evade payment. The 
court ascertained that as the marriage between the parties 
subsisted, the plaintiff was entitled only to her prompt 
dower, i.e. 25,000 taka.
Sometimes the courts allow the full amount of deferred 
dower, even when the marriage subsists.138 Similarly, in 
Mst. Ancrari Begum v Md. Igbal Rashid,139 the Family Court 
granted the wife the full amount of deferred dower from the 
husband when the marriage subsisted. In this case, while 
marrying for the second time, he did not marry in 
accordance with section 6(5) of the MFLO of 1961. The Court 
seemed to take its reasoning from section 6(5) (a) of the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 (see below, Appendix 
IV, p.456) .
This shows that this statutory enactment can be 
applied by the judges as a protection for wives in a
138 Mst. Khadeza Begum v Md. Nurul Islam. Family Suit No. 9 of 
1987 (unreported).
139 Family Suit No. 61 of 1991 (unreported) .
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polygamous marriage.140
The cases in Bangladesh on the issue of dower indicate 
that, on the one hand, there is evidence of growing support 
and protection of women by allowing the wives to have their 
right of dower. On the other hand, there are attempts to 
reduce the amount of dower by different customary 
conventions. However, dower does act as a bar for the 
husbands to refrain from divorcing their wives; evidence 
shows less cases of talaa than khula. This seems to 
indicate also that not many talaa cases go to court because 
men just talaa their wives and the wives do not see any 
point in challenging this unfettered and unilateral right 
of their husbands. On the other hand, it might be that 
there are not more talaa cases as the husbands refrain from 
giving divorce, thus forcing wives to go for judicial khul. 
In that case the husband will not only be freed from the 
payment of deferred dower but also gets in return what he 
might have given to the wife during the marriage.141 Even 
though this financial side of the husband's willingness for 
judicial khul was clearly pointed out, it was never 
emphasised in Bangladesh. Moreover, dower also contributes 
to desertion, as husbands who cannot divorce their wives 
and pay for it just desert them. It must be emphasised in 
this context that desertion has become an acute problem in 
Bangladeshi society.
140 See also above, p. 252.
141 Hinchcliffe (1968), p.24.
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The cases on dower in Bangladesh highlight the 
contrast between theory and practice. In dower cases, the 
payment is a legal obligation, whereas in social practice 
the question of payment arises only at the instance of 
divorce. For example, in khula cases the right of dower is 
relinquished to end an undesired marriage. The fact remains 
that in social reality women rarely get any portion of 
their dower unless the husband is adamant to give talaa. 
Sometimes the social position of female litigants who are 
economically dependent influences the claim for dower as 
the last financial support. Thus, the theoretical right of 
women's potential power of demanding dower does not exist 
in practice. It was already mentioned earlier (see above, 
p.5) that in Dhaka itself 88% of the Muslim wives did not 
receive any dower. This is proof of the patriarchal 
arbitrariness of Bangladeshi society which regard women's 
claims to dower as challenging the existence of the 
patriarchal system itself, despite the fact that it is an 
Islamic obligation.
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5.8 Maintenance or nafaqa
Maintenance of a wife during the subsistence of the 
marriage is a legal obligation of the husband in Islam.142 
Islamic law grants a Muslim wife a right to maintenance 
from her husband not only during the subsistence of the 
marriage but also reasonably after dissolution of the 
marriage.143 There is no controversy that the husband is 
liable to maintain the wife during the three months of 
iddat period, but there is a considerable controversy 
whether the maintenance extends beyond the iddat period. It 
has been specifically provided in the Quran that the 
divorced women shall wait for remarriage for three monthly 
periods and that for divorced women maintenance should be 
provided on a reasonable scale.144 Muslim juristic opinion 
is to the effect that the injunction of the Quran does not 
go beyond the iddat period.145
In South Asia the jurists have also argued that the 
husband should provide maintenance during subsistence of 
marriage and during the iddat period.146. This was, perhaps, 
because in Islam after dissolution of marriage the parties
The Ouran, ii : 29 •
The Ouran, 2:228 and 2:241.
The Ouran, 2:228 and 2:241.
145 Rahman, Fayyaz-ur: Muslim women's right to post divorce 
maintenance. Ongoing Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, London 1994.
146 Fyzee (1974), p.186; Diwan (1985), p.130.
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are entitled to remarriage and the woman returns to her 
natal family.147 Moreover, according to Islamic law, the 
deferred dower is seen as the safeguard for divorced women. 
However, we have seen that women in Bangladesh are usually 
deprived of their deferred dower. But what happens to those 
women whose natal family can not provide for them? There is 
no state welfare system in South Asian countries as in the 
West. In India it has been argued that maintenance after 
divorce is an obligation of the ex-husband on the basis of 
the argument provided in the original sources.148 From the 
women's viewpoint it is seen that the wife who has spend 
her whole life and labour for her husband's household, 
which was not rewarded, should not just be turned out of 
her house without any subsistence. In Bangladesh these 
problems are not articulated yet, as even maintenance 
during marriage and iddat money is sometimes not given.
The circumstances where a wife is not entitled to 
maintenance have already been described when the effects of 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 on Muslim 
law were analysed (for details see above, pp.122).
The law of maintenance in Bangladesh is an amalgam of 
codified law, local traditions and the traditional Muslim
147 Mahmood, Tahir: Personal laws in crisis. New Delhi
1986, p.87.
148 In the celebrated case of Shah Bano (Mohd. Ahmed Khan AIR 
1985 SC 945) in India the court allowed post divorce 
maintenance. See for details, Naseem, Mohammad Farogh: The 
Shah Bano case: X-raved. Karachi 1988; Ali, Asghar (ed.): 
The Shah Bano controversy. Bombay 1989. For the current 
developments under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act of 1986 see Menski (1994), pp.45-52.
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law. The quantum of maintenance is regulated under the 
schools of Muslim law by considering different 
circumstances. The Hanafi law determines the scale of 
maintenance by referring to the social position of both 
husband and wife, whereas the Shafi law only considers the 
position of the husband and the Shia law focuses on the 
requirements of the wife.149 Bangladesh mainly follows 
Hanafi law but the cases do not reveal that the courts are 
taking into consideration the social position of both 
husband and wife while ascertaining the amount of 
maintenance.
The statutory law regarding the issue is found under 
section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 (see 
already above, p. 163) . Thus, the Arbitration Council could 
issue a certificate specifying the amount which the husband 
has to pay as maintenance. There are no specified rules by 
which the quantum of maintenance could be determined. The 
amount of maintenance to be paid as determined by the 
Arbitration Council. If not paid in due time, it could be 
recovered under section 9(3) of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance as arrears of land revenue (see above, p.164).
The only development that has been made in Bangladesh 
relating to the law of maintenance is that revision against 
the certificate of the Arbitration Council is done by the 
Munsif Courts, i.e. the lowest tier of the judiciary under 
the Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance of 1985
149 Tyabji (1968), pp.265-266; Ali (1917), p.462; Anderson
(1976), pp.132-133.
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(Ordinance xiv of 1985) (see for details above, p.228).
This brief discussion shows that the issue of 
maintenance is an amalgam of substantive Muslim law and 
procedural statutory legislation. The case law in 
Bangladesh shows whether the courts are deviating from the 
traditional Muslim law or are giving more preference to the 
statutory legislation. The two are not different but in 
statutory law, emphasis has been given to the procedures 
for strict compliance with the Muslim law. However, 
sometimes more importance is given to the procedures than 
the substantive law.
In a fairly recent reported case on maintenance, the 
High Court shows itself to be static and does not deviate 
from the traditional concept of providing past maintenance 
unless the claim is based on specific agreement or a decree 
of a court. In Rustom Ali v Jamila Khatun,150 the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court did not grant the past 
maintenance allowed by the lower Court as the wife was not 
staying with her husband. Thus the husband, with his sexual 
rights over the wife, controls residence in his marital 
home. Where the wife refuses to cohabit, she becomes a 
disobedient wife or nashuzah, which was in this case 
regarded as a prima facie cause for not allowing 
maintenance.151 Muslim law only allows the wife maintenance 
if she is staying in her father's house, when the husband
150 43 DLR (1991) HCD 301.
151 On the traditional law see Mahmood (1982), pp.76-79; 
Tyabji (1968), pp.263-267.
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did not request her to come to his house, or it would 
involve danger or risk of her life or health to remove her 
from her father's house.152 The court did not consider the 
conditions which compelled the wife in Rustom Ali v Jamila 
Khatun,153 to stay separate. This conveys an impression of 
unsympathetic attitude towards women and also exhibits a 
strong desire to control women's movement. The court only 
allowed maintenance from the date of institution of the 
suit till three months after the decree for dissolution of 
marriage, i.e. during the period of her iddat.
However, in Hosne Ara Begum v Md. Rezaul Karim.154 the 
High Court Division of the Supreme Court ordered the 
husband to pay maintenance even when the wife left the 
husband's residence. The wife was living away from the 
matrimonial home on the ground of cruelty. Perhaps, the 
evidence of cruelty of the husband made the court
considerate towards the wife.
Eleven unreported judgements on realisation of
maintenance in the Family Courts of the capital city of 
Dhaka were gathered. The cases are usually brought for the 
realisation of dower and maintenance together. Because the 
rift between the parties had already started, a maintenance 
claim is the only weapon women have to restore their 
position or at best to have some .relief from economic 
constraints. The cases on the issue of dower as a
152 Ali (1917) , p.461.
153 43 DLR (1991) HCD 301.
154 43 DLR (1991) 543 .
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fundamental right of Muslim women have already been 
discussed. The cases on maintenance show that the Family 
Courts are strictly applying the traditional Muslim law and 
are not considering the socio-economic condition of women 
in a sympathetic light.
In Ambia Khatoon v Md. Yasin Bebari.155 the facts of 
the case were that the plaintiff and the defendant were 
married on 7.7.87 and their marriage was registered under 
a registered kabinnama which also mentioned dower of 50,000 
taka and stipulated that the wife was entitled to 
maintenance in a respectable manner. The Family Court 
ascertained that the marriage subsisted and rejected the 
claim of the defendant that he had paid maintenance. The 
court decided that, as it was stipulated in the registered 
kabinnama, the plaintiff was also entitled to past 
maintenance when she was co-habiting with the defendant, 
i.e. from 7.7.87 to 6.4.88. However, the court did not 
allow maintenance for the time when the plaintiff was not 
living with the defendant. This implies that the courts are 
interpreting the fact that a plaintiff is not living with 
the husband as tantamount to refusal to perform marital 
obligations.
Other judgements are revolving in a similar trend and 
do not differ both within the metropolitan area and outside 
it. Thus it cannot be claimed that the cases in the 
metropolitan area of the Dhaka district are depicting a 
modernist approach on this issue.
155 Family Suit No. 98 of 1990 (unreported) .
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In Monawara Beaum v Md. Hannan Hawladar.156 the Family 
Court of the village Madhurchar in the Dohar upazila of the 
Dhaka district did not allow the wife maintenance on the 
ground that she was not present in her in-law's house while 
her husband was working abroad. This means that the judges 
are concerned for the presence of the wife in the 
matrimonial home, not only for the performance of the 
marital obligations. This is further evidence that judicial 
attitudes are influenced by stereotyped concerns about 
controlling women's movement. In the above case, what was 
the wife expected to do in the in-laws' house? The parties 
were married under a registered kabinnama on 18.2.83 with 
a dower of 30,000 taka and the delegation of the right of 
divorce to the wife. The plaintiff pleaded that the husband 
left the country in 1987 for a job in the Middle-East and 
she was treated cruelly by her mother-in law and was 
compelled to leave the matrimonial home. It had been held 
in a very old case157 that the wife is not entitled to 
maintenance in such a situation, as quarrels and 
disagreement with her mother-in-law did not constitute a 
legal reason for her to leave her husband's house. The 
court may have based the judgement on this case, although 
there is no reference to any case law. On the other hand, 
the court was relying on the wrong or fault of the 
plaintiff and not the defendant's staying abroad. This 
might itself be the effect of the patriarchal notions
156 Family Suit No. 15 of 1989 (unreported) .
157 Mohammad Ali Akbar v Fatima Begum, AIR 1929 Lahore 660.
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influencing the attitude of the judge. The court 
ascertained that the wife had left her husband's residence 
without his permission, as she could not produce any letter 
showing that her husband had given approval for her to 
leave the residence. Thus, absence of documents in such 
situations could deprive the wife of her rights. The court 
decided that she was not entitled to maintenance during the 
subsistence of the marriage. Perhaps the traditional 
concept of disobedience or nashuzah was a basis of this 
judgement also, although it was not explicitly mentioned in 
the judgement. The court held that as the wife had divorced 
her husband by the power of delegated right of talacr-e- 
tahweed, she was only entitled to her maintenance for the 
iddat period (1,200 taka for three months, i.e. 400 taka 
per month). This situation could be tackled if the right of 
separate residence and maintenance for such illtreatment or 
differences had been stipulated in the kabinnama. as in a 
much older case.158
In Mst. Roksana Begum v Md. Abul Khair.159 the basic 
facts of the case were that the plaintiff and defendant 
were married under Islamic sharia on 10.2.88 with the dower 
money mentioned as 50,000 taka in the kabinnama. The 
defendant claimed that he had given talaa to the wife but 
he could not prove it in the court,.., The court therefore 
held that the talaa was not effective (see above, p.260). 
The court decided that the defendant must pay maintenance
158 Sabed Khan v Bilatunnissa Bibi, AIR 1919 Calcutta 825.
159 Family Suit No. 96 of 1991 (unrepbrted) .
303
of 1,000 taka per month to the plaintiff for the time when 
the proceedings were conducted, i.e. from the date when the 
suit was filed to the date of judgement (May 1991 to March 
1993), and within thirty days of the judgement. The court 
also directed the husband to pay the monthly maintenance to 
the wife within the first 10 days of the month.
In Mst. Razia Akhter v Abul Kalam Azad.160 a suit for 
the realisation of dower and maintenance, the parties were 
married under Islamic sharia on 11.6.87 and a son had been 
born from the wedlock. The court ascertained that the 
defendant gave talaa on 5.1.89 when the plaintiff was not 
residing in the defendant's house. The son was born on 
2.6.89. The court granted the woman maintenance for the 
iddat period, i.e. until the son was born five months after 
the talaa. This extension of the period of maintenance is 
in line with traditional Islamic law, and the statutory 
enactment. Islamic law provides for this extension of iddat 
period of maintenance to ascertain the legitimacy of the 
child. Under section 7(5) of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance of 1961, if the wife, is pregnant at the time of 
talaa. it is not effective unless the pregnancy ends. Thus, 
the judgement only gave minimal protection to the woman 
till the baby was born but follows the letter of the law.
In Mst. Hafeza Bibi v Md. Shafiaul Alam.161 the 
plaintiff and defendant were married under a registered 
kabinnama on 9.7.86 with the dower money fixed at 50,001
160 Family Suit No. 193 of 1989 (unreported) .
161 Family Suit No. 28 of 1992 (unreported).
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taka. The defendant gave talaa to the plaintiff on 
18.11.91. The court did not grant maintenance to the wife 
during the subsistence of the marriage, as she was not 
obedient to her husband. One of the main criteria of her 
disobedience was that she was staying away from her 
husband. However, the court allowed maintenance for the 
iddat period.
In Mst. Meherunnahar v Rahman Khondakar.162 the Family 
Court squarely applied the classical Muslim law that when 
the marriage is not consummated, the wife is not entitled 
to any maintenance.163 The facts of the case were that the 
parties were married under the Islamic sharia on 7.3.85 but 
after a few months, in September 1985, she was sent back to 
her father's house and on 25.5.87 the marriage was
dissolved by talaa. The court rejected the allegation of 
the defendant that the wife had venereal disease but 
decided that talaa was effectively given. The court
ascertained that the defendant had failed to provide 
maintenance to the plaintiff but did not allow maintenance 
to the wife as she herself had stated that there was no 
consummation of the marriage. Although the facts and
circumstances showed the opposite, the court ruled that
admitted facts need not be proved. It was evident that the 
plaintiff (wife) lied in the cqurt about not having 
intercourse with her husband. But why did she lie? Was the
162 Family Suit No. 24 of 1987 (unreported).
163 See Ali, Ameer Syed: Mohammedan law. Vol. II, Calcutta 
1917, p.463.
305
force of female seclusion (loiia or sharam) even stronger 
than her claim for maintenance? There is a strong sentiment 
of female seclusion of loi ia and sharam working within 
women of Bangladesh, so that they do not like their private 
affairs to be opened in public. However, such attitudes of 
women are never analysed in a couirt of law (on the notion 
of sharam as parda see above, p.62).
In Mst. Shahida Beaum v Md. Mahbub Hossain.164 the
plaintiff prayed for the realisation of maintenance only 
for the iddat period. The facts of the case state that the
parties were married on 3.2.90 and the kabinnama was
registered. After leading a conjugal life for eight months, 
the defendant gave the plaintiff talaa on 21.10.90. The 
defendant alleged that the plaintiff had married him while 
her marriage was already subsisting with another man and 
she did not have a good moral character. The court rejected 
these defences as the defendant could not prove any of them 
sufficiently. The court held that as the defendant had
given talaa to the plaintiff, she was entitled to 
maintenance for the period of iddat.
In Mst. Fatima Beaum v Mohammed Golam Hossain.165 the 
court held that the wife was entitled not only to 
maintenance for the present time but also past maintenance 
for the last seven months, as there was an agreement to pay 
maintenance in the negotiation or shalish in the 
Commissioner's office. This shows that the courts are also
164 Family Suit No. 112 of 1991 (unreported) .
165 Family Suit No. 61 of 1991 (unreported).
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considering other contracts than the kabinnama to ascertain 
the maintenance and, in particular, that they are willing 
to build negotiated settlements into., their decisions.
In Mst. Angari Beaum v Md. Iabal Rashid.166 the 
parties were married on 6.11.89, fixing the dower money at
20,000 taka. The court found that the marriage subsisted 
and granted the wife maintenance not only for the time when 
the proceeding was going on (the suit was instituted on 
6.4.91 and ended on 5.1.92) but long before that (from 
1.8.90 to 5.1.92) and also ordered the defendant to pay 
•further maintenance to the plaintiff within the first week 
of each month. The court fixed the monthly amount of
maintenance at 800 taka.
It is important to point out that it can not be 
gathered from the judgements whether the courts are
following the traditional doctrine of taking into 
consideration the social position of the parties for 
ascertaining the quantum of maintenance or what principle 
they are following to ascertain the precise amount of
maintenance. In the kabinnama, maintenance is usually 
regarded as to be given in a respectable manner 
(bhodrochito hare) . But it is not expressed how much 
maintenance can be regarded as respectable.
In some cases, where the husband is residing abroad, 
the Family Courts are granting a higher scale of
166 Family Suit No. 52 of 1991 (unreported).
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maintenance. In Maraubater Rouf v A.T.M. Zahurul Haa 
Khan,167 a suit for the realisation of dower and 
maintenance, the facts of the case disclose that the 
parties were married on 20.10.88 and the marriage was 
registered. In the kabinnama the dower was fixed to the 
extent of 300,000 taka, which might be for show of status 
or security for the wife. The plaintiff pleaded that the 
defendant left for abroad and did not provide any 
maintenance for her. The defendant alleged that the 
plaintiff was having an affair with another man and was 
unwilling to lead a conjugal life with him. The reasons 
behind this might be the migration dilemmas arising when 
husbands work abroad, as well as the social disapproval of 
the wife living without her husband. The husband gave talaa 
to the wife on 25.2.90. The court decided that, as talaa 
had been given effectively, in accordance with the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance 1961, no marriage subsisted and the 
wife was entitled to maintenance during the iddat period. 
The court reasoned that the wife was not entitled to any 
maintenance during the subsistence of the marriage as she 
was not willing to have conjugal relations with the 
husband. But it is interesting to note that the court 
ascertained 40,000 taka (nearly 650 pounds) as the 
maintenance of the wife for three months, i.e. 13,000 taka 
per month, whereas in similar cases only 600 to 1,000 taka 
per month were given. It may be assumed that the court was
167 Family Suit No.l of 1992 and Family Suit No. 3 of 1992 
(analogous hearing) (unreported). See also above, p.290.
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here taking into account the financial ability of the 
husband, who was working abroad. Alternatively, it was 
compensating the wife for the fact that matrimonial 
cohabitation ceased not due to her fault, but the husband's 
absence abroad.
However, in Nasima Bilkis v - Md. Abdus Samad,168 the 
maintenance for the iddat period was ascertained as 2,500 
taka per month when the husband was not working abroad. It 
cannot be gathered from the judgement why the court awarded 
such an high amount. The facts of the case are that the 
parties were married on 23.3.90 by a registered kabinnama. 
The plaintiff, alleging her husband's cruel behaviour, was 
living in her father's house from 19.7.90. The defendant 
persuaded the plaintiff to stay with him and the plaintiff 
stayed for seven days and then came back to her father's 
house again on 17.3.91 with the same allegation. The 
plaintiff divorced the defendant on the basis of her 
delegated power of divorce on 2.6.91 and registered the 
talaanama. The Family Court decided on the evidence of a 
letter of the plaintiff's father that the relationship of 
the parties was not harmonious and so the plaintiff was not 
entitled to maintenance during the subsistence of the 
marriage not even for the seven days when she was staying 
with the defendant. But the Family Court decided that the 
plaintiff was entitled to maintenance for the iddat period.
In cases on maintenance, the courts do not provide for 
past maintenance unless stipulated in the kabinnama. nor
168 Family Suit No. 12 of 1992 (unreported) .
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post-iddat period maintenance to divorced Muslim wives. In 
Bangladesh, women have to rely on other techniques to 
secure some post-divorce maintenance. One writer has 
suggested a hopeful trend towards adoption and enforcement 
of clauses in the marriage contract or kabinnama which 
would clearly and in unambiguous terms provide for mainte­
nance, as this offers protection against arbitrary and 
capricious subjugation.169 However, in practice the 
execution of maintenance decrees is very difficult as the 
husbands evade to pay maintenance, hide and cannot be 
located. Even when they are traced, they might not have any 
possessions or may falsely conceal them. It is recommended 
that the sanctions of the Family Courts could be 
strengthened by providing them with a criminal court's 
power to attach the property of husbands to pay maintenance 
to the wife. It has already been suggested that the powers 
of the Family Courts should be enhanced in this regard (see 
above, p .218).
There are three problems which continually crop up in 
all maintenance cases. Firstly, there is the question of 
quantum of maintenance, i.e. how do the law and the Family 
Court arrive at an adequate sum? It has been shown in the 
discussion of the cases that there is no firm policy, 
although sometimes the husband's income is taken into 
consideration. Secondly, the problem is more acute, as 
husbands evade to pay maintenance in the majority of cases. 
The only sanction left to the wife is to execute the decree
169 Malik (1990) , p.39.
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as arrears of land revenue, which is also not difficult for 
the husband to escape. Moreover, men in the patriarchal 
society of Bangladesh have the advantage to use social 
harassment, family slander and, in the extreme, physical 
threat so as not to implement the law. This is another 
element of the patriarchal arbitrariness which is the 
result of male authority in society. .Finally, husbands have 
the potential to disclaim the •- legal marriage or 
unilaterally repudiate it by talaa or, more easily, to 
simply desert the wife.
Thus, the present chapter has shown in various ways 
that women in Bangladesh do not enjoy full freedom from 
economic deprivation in the sphere of family laws. The next 
chapter will analyse in more detail how women fare with 
particular reference to freedom from violence.
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CHAPTER 6 
DOWRY AND CRUELTY TO WOMEN
This chapter extends the examination of the issues of 
family law and women in Bangladesh by focusing mainly on 
disputes concerning dowry and cruelty to women. As we noted 
before, violence against women has reached the stage of a 
national problem in Bangladesh. In the sphere of domestic 
violence, cruelty to women for dowry and other causes has 
become a grave issue.1 In fact, dowry deaths have become an 
everyday happening in South Asia.2
We have argued throughout that the real need of women 
in Bangladesh is to be protected from violence and economic 
deprivation. While dowry problems involve both aspects of 
the need, i.e. freedom from economic deprivation and 
violence, cruelty against women may only involve the aspect
1. Islam, Mahmuda: 'Women studies in Bangladesh: An
overview' . In South Asia News Letter. Center for Asian 
Studies Amsterdam and Documentation Center on South Asia, 
Leiden, No.4, Dec. 1989, pp.1-4, at p.l.
2 The Guardian. 28th July 1980, p. 5; Choudhury, Neerja: 
'Burning of the bride'. In New Internationalist. No.81, 
p.27; Vyas, Neena: 'A mother's crusade'. In Kishwar, Madhu 
and Ruth Vanita (eds.): In search of answers: Indian
women's voices from Manushi. London 1984, pp.206-207; 
Singh, Indu Prakash and Renuka: 'Dowry: How many more
deaths to its end?'. In Sood, Sushma (ed.): Violence
against women. Jaipur 1990, pp.311-319; Grover, Kanta: 
Burning flesh. New Delhi 1990, pp.20-23; Kumari, Ranjana: 
Brides are not for burning-dowrv victims in India. New 
Delhi 1989; Ekelaar, John: 'Scream silently, or the
neighbour will hear'. In The Lawyers. Vol.6, No.4, April 
1991, pp.4-11.
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of protection from violence. Demands for reforms to control 
these problems were already made earlier and the Dowry 
Prohibition Act. 1980 and the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent 
Punishment) Ordinance. 1983 were enacted in response to
growing evidence of cruelty against women. We try to assess 
here whether this legislation has been beneficial to women 
and seek to find out whether women are actually able to use 
the legal remedies available under these new statutes.
The issues studied in chapter 5 above fell under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts but dowry 
murders and cruelty to women are criminal offences under 
the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. We have already 
suggested that this family-related criminal jurisdiction 
should be transferred to the domain of the Family Courts so 
that every aspect of family law would be under one 
jurisdiction (see above, p.218).
The chapter has three major aims. First, to identify 
the problem of dowry and cruelty to women in law and in 
society; then to discuss whether the new legislation 
introduced to curb these social evils was successful or not 
and finally to examine, through reported and unreported 
cases, to what extent the legislation has effected actual 
practice in Bangladesh.
While this chapter also explores the relationship 
between the statutory enactments and social practice, as 
reflected in reported and unreported cases, it must be 
emphasised again that by far not all dowry and cruelty 
cases come up to the courts. Some tables of crimes against
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women in Bangladesh are given to ascertain the immensity of 
the problem. These tables show generally that cruelty and 
violence against women have tremendously increased in 
Bangladesh.
6.1 Confusions about the dowry problem
There is considerable debate about what constitutes dowry 
in its various forms. The confusion is more acute as in the 
societal context dowry is differently defined than in anti- 
dowry law. In a patriarchally-dominated social context 
dowry refers to property given to the bridegroom and his 
family but the anti-dowry law regards it as the exclusive 
property of the bride. The modern phenomenon of dowry, 
property given or agreed to be given to the bridegroom or 
his relatives, does not tally with the earlier concepts of 
brideprice and with the customary concepts of giving 
property to the bride herself.
Dowry and brideprice have received substantial 
attention in the anthropological literature. In fact, there 
is now a large volume of ethnographic and theoretical 
literature on dowry and bride-price.3 Much of this
3 See for example Srinivas, M.N.: Some reflections on dowry. 
Delhi 1984; Rajaraman, Indira: 'Economics of bride-price
and dowry'. In Economic and Political Weekly. No.18, 1983, 
pp.275-279; Goody, Jack: 'Bridewealth and dowry in Africa
and Eurasia'. In Goody, Jack and S.J. Tambiah (eds.) : 
Bridewealth and dowry. Cambridge 1973, pp.1-58; Tambiah, 
S.J.: 'Dowry and bridewealth and the property right of
women in South Asia' . In Goody, Jack and S.J. Tambiah
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literature concerns the problems of the wide-spread switch 
from bride-price to dowry as marriage prestations.
The relationship of dowry with female inheritance 
concerns especially the Hindu law of stridhanam, which is 
outside the scope of this thesis.4 However, dowry in its 
modern perception in the context of Bangladesh is discussed 
here. The dowry system is not recognised in the religion or 
the law of the Muslim societies but has spread into it.5 
Conversely, Islamic law provides dower to enhance the 
position of women. Why should Muslim women, who are 
supposed to be protected by dower, become victims of dowry? 
While recent scholars have admitted the fact that dowry has 
spread to the Muslim communities, they have largely ignored 
the position of Muslim women within this discourse.
It is important to note that until now authors confuse 
dower with dowry.6 Perhaps the aspect of women's property
(eds.): Bridewealth and dowry. Cambridge 1973, pp.59-169; 
Ahmed, Rahnuma and Shamsunnahar Milu: 'Changing marriage
transactions and the rise of the demand system in 
Bangladesh'. In Journal of Social Studies. No.33, 1987,
pp.71-107; Upadhya, Carol Bayack: 'Dowry and women's
property in coastal Andhra Pradesh'. In Contributions to 
Indian Sociology. Vol.24, No.l, 1990, pp.29-59; Kumari 
(1989), pp.1-87; Grover (1990).
4 On stridhanam see Pathak, J.K. and B.K. Sharma: Law of 
stridhanam. Allahabad 1992.
5 Sivaramayya, B. : Inequalities and the law. New Delhi 1984, 
p. 66; Latifi, Danial: 'Muslim personal law and Indian
judiciary'. In Sharma, Ram Avtar (ed.) Justice and social 
order in India. New Delhi 1984, ja pp. 282-325, at p.283; 
Diwan, Paras: 'The dowry prohibition law'. In Journal of
the Indian Law Institute. Vol.27, No.4, 1985, pp.564-571.
6 El Alami, Dawoud Sudqi: The marriage contract in Islamic 
law: In the Shariah and the personal status laws of Egypt 
and Morocco. London, Dordrecht and Boston 1992, p.107; 
Awasthi, S.K. and U.S. Lai: The law relating to dowry
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or stridhanam in Hindu law and dower as the exclusive 
property of the wife are seen as synonymous. When dowry is 
regarded as stridhanam or pre-mortem inheritance for women, 
contradictions arise and the equation of dowry with 
stridhanam has been disputed by several authors.7 They 
argue that the situation is absolutely reverse, as dowry is 
not a gift to the wife or her ' exclusive property but the 
property of her in-laws. But the anti-dowry law states that 
property given as dowry belongs to the wife. Why is dowry 
seen differently by the society and the law? It seems that 
the law-makers have not taken full account of the modern 
phenomenon of dowry and did not include its broader 
aspects.
The modern phenomenon of dowry in South Asia is its 
abuse as an inducement for a man to marry a woman or, with 
the same effect, demands of dowry payments by a man or his 
family. The result is a tendency to regard it as a groom- 
price, which is distinguished from the traditional kanvadan 
(gift of the virgin) or bride-wealth.8 This modern feature 
of dowry means the transmission of large sums of money, 
jewellery, cash, and other goods from the bride's family to
prohibition. Allahabad 1992, p.13.
7 For example Herseman, Paul: Punjabi kinship and marriage. 
Delhi 1981, pp.242-247; Madan, T.N.: 'Structural 
implications of marriages in North India: Wife givers and 
wife takers among pandits of Kashmir'. In Contributions to 
Indian Sociology. Vol.9, No.2, pp.218-243.
8 On this see Tambiah (1973), p.62.
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the groom's family.9 The emergence of dowry and the switch 
from brideprice have been explained by some authors as the 
cause of the decline of the earning capabilities and 
productivity of women.10 According to this view the system 
of dowry is closely linked with women's role in productive 
activities. Where women are regarded as an unproductive 
burden, a dowry is given to the bridegroom's side to 
compensate them. However, the present spread of dowry 
cannot be explained only with variables like non­
participation of women in economic activity. There are 
authors who refute this claim altogether, viewing the 
spread of dowry as parallel to developments elsewhere in 
the world identifying it with class formation under 
capitalist development.11 Moreover, it is evident that 
women in Bangladesh are becoming more active and 
economically independent (see above, p. 6) and it is quite 
clear that dowry demands and payments are primarily linked 
to status acquisition. While the issue of dowry in an 
economic framework has instigated a lively debate, it is 
outside the periphery of this thesis.12
The institution of dowry has been seen by Jamila 
Verghese in relation to the social attitudes in South Asia
9 Srinivas (1982), pp.10-11.
10 For example Rajaraman (1983) ; Srinivas (1984) .
11 Upadhya (1990), p.34.
12 See for details, Sambrani, Rita Bhandari and Sreekant 
Sambrani: 'Economics of brideprice and dowry-i'. In
Economic and Political Weekly. 9th April 1983, pp.601-603; 
Aziz, Abdul: 'Economics of brideprice and dowry-ii'. In
Economic and Political Weekly. 9th April 1983, pp.603-604.
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which give preferential treatment to sons, enhanced by 
statutory regulations.13 It is true that patriarchal 
society reserves special treatment for sons as they are 
expected to provide for their indigent parents (see above, 
p.47) . But according to more recent case-law in India under 
section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973
daughters are equally liable for the maintenance of their 
aged parents.14
Dowry is a new phenomenon for the Muslim communities 
in Bangladesh, with enlarged effects after independence. 
For the Hindu community also, its impact was not so 
widespread before liberation. It is significant to note 
that after independence a nouveau riche class who formerly 
belonged to the lower strata came into power.15 This
spectrum of people willingly gave dowry to the prospective 
grooms from higher classes of the society to become a part 
of that class. Nevertheless, hypergamy was only one
variable for the causation of the dowry system.16 This
13 Verghese, Jamila: Her gold and her body. New Delhi 1980, 
pp.157-158.
14 See for details Carroll, Lucy: 'Anti-dowry legislation in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh'. In Islamic and Comparative Law 
Quarterly. Vol.iii, No.4, Dec. 1983, pp.249-260, at p.259. 
The leading case on this in India is Dr. Mrs. Viiava 
Manohar Arbat v Kashirao Raiaram Sawai and another AIR 1987 
SC 1100.
15 Kirkpatrick, Joanna: 'Themes of consciousness among
educated working women of Bangladesh'. In Park, L. Richard 
(ed.): Patterns of change in modern Bengal. Michigan 1979, 
pp.127-147, at p.127.
16 For details of hypergamy and dowry in an Indian context 
see Van der Veen, Klaas W. : I give thee mv daughter: A
study of marriage and hierarchy among the Anavil Brahmins 
of South Guiarat. Assen 1972; Blunt, E.A.H: The caste
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seems to be more prominent in the caste system of Hindu 
society as there is a tendency towards hypergamy.17 
However, the tendency of hypergamy by dowry has also spread 
to the Muslim community in Bangladesh.18 Although there is 
supposed to be no class system in the Muslim society of 
Bangladesh, even in the supposedly homogenous peasant 
community significant distinctions of wealth, status and 
power exist.19
Some authors in Bangladesh are claiming that dowry has 
become an essential criterion for marriage in every 
community and is near universal in Bangladeshi society.20 
The simple gesture of iamai ador or special affection shown 
to the bridegroom has been transformed to the shape of 
daabi or demand by the bridegrooms. Even poor men are 
taking this chance of exploiting the bride's family to 
improve their fate from poverty and unemployment.21 This is 
making marriage a commercial transaction, giving more value 
to property and money than the bride herself.
Thus, the recent emergence of dowry among Bangladeshi
system of Northern India with special reference to the 
united province of Agra and Audh. Delhi 1934.
17 Blunt (1934) , p.70.
18 Rahman, Muhammed Motiur: 'Joutuk ain prosonghe'. In 41 
DLR (1989) Journal 51-53.
19 See for details Bertocci, Peter J.: 'Community structure 
and social rank in two villages in Bangladesh'. In 
Contributions to Indian Sociology. No.vi, Dec. 1972, pp.28- 
51.
20 Ahmed (1987) , p. 71.
21 Ibid. , p. 101.
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Muslims is more due to simple greed and commercialisation 
of marriage than the impact of traditional culture, the 
urge of hypergamy and the undermining of the women's 
productive role. To one author, the present dimensions of 
the dowry evil are the result of increasing industrial 
culture and the fascination for material prosperity, i.e. 
to get rich overnight, to possess the latest gadgets of 
comfort and luxury and the display of wealth.22 The impact 
of men coming into contact with a wider cash economy by 
going abroad has also been shown to be a significant 
variable for their raised expectations in marriage.23 The 
effect of dowry is so strong that even in England, where 
many of the immigrants are from South Asia, the same dowry 
problems occur.24 Very recently, it was reported in a 
Bengali weekly in London that there was a warrant issued 
from Bangladesh against the First Secretary of the 
Bangladesh High Commission for physical and mental cruelty 
to his wife as dowry demands were not met by his father-in- 
law.25
22 Raijada, K.K. : 'Dowry deaths, suicides and bride burning' . 
In Indian Socio-Legal Journal. Vol.xv, No.l and 2, 1989, 
pp.8 7-9 8.
23 For details see Ahmed, Rafiuddin: 'Migrations from 
Bangladesh to the Middle East: Social and economic costs to 
the rural people'. In Israel, Milton and N.K. Wagle (ed.): 
Ethnicity, identity, migration: The South Asian context. 
Toronto 1993, pp.105-122; Kabeer, Naila: 'Subordination and 
struggle: Women in Bangladesh'. In New Left Review. No.168, 
1988, pp.95-121, at p.104.
24 Menski, W.F.: ' English family law and ethnic laws in
Britain'. In Kerala Law Times. Journal 1988 (1), pp.556-
566, at p .566.
25 Notun Din. London llth-17th February 1994, p. 24.
320
Dowry deaths are a common phenomenon in South Asia. 
These deaths of women are usually caused by the same 
persons who are legally and socially enjoined to protect 
them, i.e. their husband or in-laws. It has been rightly 
pointed out that dowry deaths are a gruesome reminder of 
the authoritativeness of patriarchy.26 In one study, dowry 
demands have been identified as one of the major causes of 
murder of women in Bangladesh.22 The authors have 
established their finding by a table gathered from 
different media sources, showing that almost 50% of all 
murders of women in Bangladesh in the years 1983-84 were 
for dowry causes. This table is given on the next page.
26 Singh and Singh (1990), pp.311-312.
27 Akanda, Latifa and Ishrat Shamim: Women and violence.
Dhaka 1984, p.5.
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Table - 128
Percentage of motive bv cause of murder of women in 
Bangladesh in the year 1983-1984
Cause of 
Murder
Motive of murder
Theft Property
rights
Family
Quarrel
Dowry
Demand
Gratifi 
cation 
of sex
Total
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Beating 7 39 14 54 21 36
Physical
torture
2 67 1 50 4 22 9 34 16 27
Use of
sharp
weapon
1 33 5 27 2 18 8 14
Hanging 4 36 4 7
Use of
fire
arms
1 50 X 6 2 3
Use of 
acids
2 8 2 3
Rape 5 46 5 8
Administ
ration
of
poison
1 6 1 4 2 3
Total 3 2 18 26 11 60
The table shows that there are different motives of 
murder, theft, property rights, family quarrels, dowry 
demands and gratification of sex and and also identifies 
the causes of murder, a gruesome list of violence against 
women. The table also projects that the largest number of
28 This table is taken from ibid., p.4.
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murders, 26 out of 60 in the year 1983-84 were for the 
cause of dowry demands. It does not disclose those dowry 
murders which are dressed up as accidents or suicide or 
which are hidden under 'family quarrel'; this might have 
increased the percentage of murder for dowry even more. The 
task also depicts that dowry deaths by fire are not as 
common in Bangladesh as in other South Asian countries.
As to the methods of killing women for dowry, 54% 
given for beating and 34% for physical torture add up to a 
gruesome 88% of deaths by direct physical violence, while 
the remaining 12% of deaths were caused by use of acids and 
poison. It is remarkable that particularly the use of acids 
is reserved for dowry victims. Clearly, the table exhibits 
that dowry murders are now a serious problem in Bangladeshi 
society; necessary steps should be taken to curtail this 
social evil.
As the roots of the problem of dowry appear to be 
socio-economic, remedies can only be achieved by changes of 
attitude in society; this can be attempted by legislation, 
but will need to be supported by education and legal 
awareness. The parents of a bride should understand that by 
giving dowry they may not be giving their daughter any 
happiness; it has been claimed that it is only increasing 
her misfortune.29 The parents of the bride are not in fact 
giving the dowry to their daughter but to their son-in-law 
and his family; this increases greed for more dowry.
29 Kishwar, M. : 'Dowry: To ensure her happiness, or to 
disinherit her?' In Manushi. No.34, 1986, p.9.
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Parents should rather safeguard their daughters from 
economic deprivation and violence by educating them about 
their rights within marriage.
6.2 Dowry and the law
India was first in South Asia to make an attempt to control 
the dowry problem by passing the Dowry Prohibition Act of 
1961. Subsequently, Pakistan made relevant legislative 
enactments, which significantly were only applicable for 
the Western wing of the country.30 After independence in 
Bangladesh the problems of dowry became so horrendous that 
activist women and some enlightened males were demanding 
legislation to stamp out this social evil. It was not 
considered right to treat women as a commodity to be 
transferred in marriage for consideration of property and 
money when the religious and official family laws did not 
regard women as chattels. Moreover, the Constitution of 
Bangladesh apparently provides sexual equality. The 
commodisation of women was seen as neo-patriarchy, which 
should not be tolerated any longer (for the system of 
patriarchy in Bangladesh see already above, p.46). Under 
such pressure, the government passed the Dowry Prohibition
3 0 The relevant Acts of West Pakistan are, The West 
Pakistan Dowry (Prohibition Display) Act of 1967, The 
North-West Frontier Province Dowry Act of 1972 and the 
Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act of 1976.
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Act of 1980.31
6.2.1 The Dowry Prohibition Act. 1980
There are no published Parliamentary debates or report of 
a Commission to evaluate why the Dowry Prohibition Act. 
1980 was introduced. However, this is the case for all Acts 
and Ordinances passed in Bangladesh. Perhaps that is why 
such legislation is regarded as 'cost free legislation'.32 
The author reports that legislation was not difficult to 
make as in the four years from 1980-84 there were about 273 
Acts and Ordinances promulgated by the executive.33 
Nevertheless, the question of Parliamentary debates or 
appointing a Commission does not arise, as the Act in 
question is almost identical with the Dowry Prohibition 
Act. 1961 of India. One small difference between these two 
Acts is that in the Indian Act the punishment of 
imprisonment for the offence is for a maximum period of 6 
months, whereas in the Bangladeshi Dowry Prohibition Act. 
198 0 there is a maximum of 1 year.34 However, subsequently
31 Published in the Bangladesh Extraordinary Gazette, dated 
26th Dec. 1980. The text of the Act is found in Appendix 
VII, below, p.472.
32 Sobhan, Salma: 'Cost-free legislation? An evaluation of
recent legislative trends in Bangladesh relating to women'. 
In Lawasia. Vol.4, 1985, pp.153-161.
33 Ibid. , pp.158-159.
34 Carroll (1983), p.256.
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in India the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance. 1984 
has increased the penalty for dowry to a maximum of 2 years 
and in the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 
the penalty has been increased to a maximum of 5 years and 
a fine which shall not be less than 1500 rupees or the 
amount of the value of dowry whichever is more.35 In 
Bangladesh the penalty has also been increased and now 
extends up to a maximum of 5 years and not less than 1 year 
under the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance. 1986 
(see below, p.330).
The other difference is with regard to the limitation 
of the value of gifts given by any person other than a 
party to the marriage to either party to the marriage not 
in consideration of the marriage. The Bangladesh Act limits 
the value of such gifts to five hundred taka, while the 
Indian Act does not give any limit except prescribing that 
such gifts should not be given in consideration of the 
marriage.36 Originally the Indian Bill, before passing 
through Parliament, had a restriction of 250 rupees as a 
limit on the value of gifts; this was not adopted in the
35 See for details Jain, Kiran B.: 'The Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, 1984: A brief historical and comparative 
study'. In Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.vi, 
No.2-3, 1986, pp.181-189; Jain, Kiran B.: 'The Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986'v In Islamic and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.vi, No.4, 1986, pp.263-270; 
Jaswal, P.S. and Nishtha Jaswal: 'Anti-dowry legislation in 
India: An appraisal'. In Journal of the Indian Law
Institute. Vol.30, No.l, January-March 1988, pp.78-87, at
p p .8 0-81.
36 Under explanation I of section 2 of both Acts.
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Act.37 But now, in India, there are rules regulating the 
presents.38
Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 of 
Bangladesh prohibits the giving or taking or demanding of 
dowry at or before or after the marriage as consideration 
of the marriage.39 Any contravention of these provisions 
under section 3 and 4 will be an offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a maximum term of one year, or a fine of 
a maximum of 500 taka or both.40 Section 4 also provides 
that no court shall take cognizance of any offence except 
with the previous sanction of an officer authorised by the 
government. The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 
1982 allowed a person to proceed with a complaint without 
the prior sanction of a government officer (see below, 
p.329) .
Dowry as defined under section 2 of the Act includes 
any property which is given, or which is agreed to be 
given, whether directly or indirectly, by one party to the 
marriage to the other party, or by the parents of one of 
the parties, or by any other person, to the other party to
37 Achar, M.R. and T. Venkanna: Dowry Prohibition Act. 2nd 
ed. Allahabad 1986, p.23.
38 See the Maintenance of List of Presents to the Bride and 
Bridegroom Rules. 1985.
39 This has been amended to 'at the time of marriage or at 
any time' by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 
1984 (see below, p.329).
40 The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 1986 
extended the penalty to imprisonment from a maximum of one 
year to a maximum of five years, and not less than one year 
(see below, p.330).
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the marriage. This clearly shows an attempt to create a 
tight definition of 'dowry'. The explanation to section 2 
declares that the presents made at the time of marriage to 
either party to the marriage in the form of any articles 
whose value does not exceed 500 taka shall not be regarded 
as dowry unless they are made in consideration for the 
marriage. This presumes that gifts whose value does not 
exceed 500 taka are not deemed to be dowry unless made in 
consideration for the marriage.41 This also contemplates 
that if the value of the gift exceeds 500 taka, it must 
have been given as consideration for the marriage.
The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, under section 6, 
provided for the transfer to the bride of any dowry 
received. If the dowry was not transferred to the bride 
within the stipulated period as provided under section 
6(1), the person who had appropriated it was to be punished 
with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year or 
penalised by fine for a maximum of 5000 taka or by both 
[under section 6(2)] . It was also specifically provided by 
section 6(2) that such punishment should not relieve the 
person from the obligation to transfer the property taken 
as dowry to the bride. This expressly indicated that if any 
property was given as dowry it was the exclusive property 
of the bride. Under section 6(3) of the Act if the woman 
entitled to the property of the dowry died before receiving 
it, the heirs of such woman were entitled to claim it from 
the person holding it. This anti-dowry law regards dowry as
41 Carroll (1983), p.256-257.
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women's property but, as we indicated above society counts 
it as the property of the bridegroom and his family (for 
details on the confusions over dowry see above, p.314).
Bangladesh has recently seen many amendments in the 
dowry law. These were initiated for filling certain gaps in 
the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 and to make it more 
effective. However, the amendments in 1984 have also taken 
away an important right of property of the women in 
Bangladesh, so it is doubtful whether the legislative 
amendments actually operate towards the protection of 
women.
By the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 1982 
the proviso of section 4 was omitted, thus allowing a 
person to proceed with a complaint for offence of dowry 
without the prior sanction of a government officer. This 
measure helped to gain access to the protective legal 
mechanisms.
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 1984 
extended the definition of dowry to 'any property or 
valuable security given at the time of marriage or at any 
time', which substituted the earlier 'at, before or after 
marriage' for the purpose of ensuring that loopholes were 
closed.
But the amendment of 1984 deleted section 6 of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act 1980 which had. provided that any 
dowry given for the benefit of the wife or her heirs and 
received by any person, was to be transferred by such 
person to the woman within a specified period of time.
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Although this section was rarely invoked, it did confer an 
important right on a woman whose family had provided a 
dowry. As a result of the deletion of section 6, there is 
now not only a lacuna in Bangladeshi law on the issue of 
dowry, but the amendment has also taken away an important 
right of women to acquire property.42 This looks like 
another step to subjugate women. What happens now to any 
dowry which is in fact given? After 1984 the law appears to 
be completely silent about this question. The Dowry 
Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 1986 did not fill the 
gap created by deletion of section 6 of the Act. However, 
it made the penalty for giving or taking dowry tougher by 
extending the punishment of imprisonment from a maximum of 
one year to a maximum of five years, with a minimum of one 
year imprisonment. The offence of dowry had been 
cognizable, bailable and non-compoundable under section 8 
of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980. By the Dowry 
Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 1986 the offence has 
been made non-cognizable, non-bailable and compoundable by 
substituting the previous section 8, which enlarges the 
effectiveness of the Act.
These Amendments as analysed aind commented upon above 
show the attempt of the legislature to enhance the 
effective implementation of the Act. However, the 
amendments have also taken away an important right of the
42 Carroll, Lucy: 'Recent Bangladeshi.; legislation affecting 
women: Child marriage, dowry, cruelty to women'. In Islamic 
and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol.v, No.3-4, Sept.- 
Dec.1985, pp.255-264, at p.260.
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women to own property, thus depriving women economically. 
We have argued that the primary need of women in Bangladesh 
is to be protected from economic deprivation and violence. 
Thus, section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 should 
be re-introduced to protect women from economic 
deprivation. The effects and application of the Act are 
analysed below through cases to consider how far the Act is 
effective.
6.2.2 Cases on Dowry
Some years ago, it was reported by a weekly Bengali 
magazine that there were nearly 22,000 dowry cases pending 
in Bangladeshi courts.43 It has also been reported that 
many women in Bangladesh are filing divorce petitions to 
escape torture at the hands of in-laws for failing to meet 
the expectations of dowry.44 The validity of these reports 
is not beyond doubt; there are a huge number of cases of 
dowry. It is difficult to give a full survey of cases on 
dowry from the whole of Bangladesh, as there are not many 
reported cases from the higher courts. The unreported cases 
contain a large volume of cases of different Magistrates 
Courts, as each administrative area has such a court. 
However, it is possible to give an overview of the problem
43 Khaborer Khagai . March, Dhaka 1990, p. 18.
44 Ghosh, K.S.: Indian women through the ages. New Delhi 
1989, pp.46-47.
331
through reported and some unreported cases to reflect the 
application of the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act 
of 1980. Cruelty and murder for dowry under the Cruelty to 
Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 are 
discussed in a separate section below.
The reported cases concerning the issue of dowry have 
primarily struggled with the definition of dowry, whether 
what is claimed as dowry constitutes dowry under the Dowry 
Prohibition Act of 1980 or whether such demands were made 
as a consideration for the marriage to fulfil the condition 
of the Act. This shows that the cases were more concerned 
with technicalities in the application of the Act rather 
than the protection of women.
The first published case in Bangladesh is that of 
Mihirlal Poddar v Zhunu Rani Shah.45 where the High Court 
in Dhaka held that the demand for dowry was not a 
consideration for the marriage and hence it was not a 
demand for dowry. However, the High Court in Barisal, on 
almost identical facts, preferred the opposite conclusion 
three years later in the case of Rezaul Karim v Mosammat 
Taslima Begum.46 It has been suggested that these 
conflicting decisions on dowry need to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court of the country.47 In Rezaul Karim v Mosammat 
Taslima Begum, the court defined the meaning of dowry and
45 37 DLR (1985) 227.
46 40 DLR (1988) 360; BLD 1989 35.
47 See for details Malik, Shahdeen: 'Conflict of decisions
need resolution'. 42 DLR (1990) Journal 55-57.
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interpreted that dowry as it appears under section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act. 1980 is defined to mean any property
or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or
before or after the marriage as consideration for the
marriage.48 Thus dowry contemplates transfer of property or
valuable security at the time of marriage or even before
the marriage was solemnised.49
The court also reasoned in Rezaul Karim v Mossammat
Taslima Begum that the expression "in consideration for the
marriage" should be given an extended meaning, since
otherwise the whole scheme of the Act prohibiting demand
of dowry by the husband would be frustrated and will become
redundant.50 Thus as the court reasoned,
Demanding money or other valuable security from 
the wife or her relations by the husband after 
she is married for giving her the status of a 
wife namely, maintaining her as a wife, 
protecting her as a wife and giving her a shelter 
would amount to demanding money in consideration 
of the marriage.51
The court also gave an extended meaning of "marriage"
as defined in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 1980.
Marriage, as the court elucidates, means and includes,
not only the ceremony of marriage but also the 
newly created legal status for both husband and 
the wife, to be continued, asserted and 
recognised to be available always in everyday 
life, till death separates one from the other or
48 40 DLR (1988) 360, at p.362; BLD 1989 35, at p.36.
49 Id.
50 40 DLR (1988) 360, at pp.362-363; BIJD 1989 35.
51 Ibid. , p . 362 .
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till the marriage subsists.52
Marriage is not only a ceremony, as the court opines 
but the creator of a status which continues during the 
marriage and does not create any consideration in terms of 
money or property except that which is expressed in the 
kabinnama.
Thus, the popular interpretation of the definition of 
dowry has been obtained in a judicial decision. It is 
argued here that the wording under section 2 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act. 1980 "in consideration of the marriage" 
should be amended to "in connection with the marriage" as 
amended in India in 1984. This will help to resolve the 
confusion over whether a particular dowry is demanded in 
consideration for the marriage and conclusively determine 
it to be dowry if it is in connection with the marriage, 
thus covering the present loopholes of the Act. It has been 
mentioned earlier that the Amendment of the Act in 
Bangladesh in 1984 has already made a significant
improvement by extending the meaning of dowry demanded or
given or agreed to be given at any time before or after the 
marriage (see above, p. 329),
We could not find any cases challenging the deletion 
of section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 by the 
Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance in 1984. This has 
deprived women of the possibility of acquiring property by
dowry. Perhaps there are no cases as it is well-known to
women that dowry is not a right under Islamic law. However,
anti-dowy law is effective otherwise, as there is some 
evidence of punishment for demanding and taking dowry.53
6.3 Cruelty and violence against women: An overview
Crime against women is not a novel issue but in the early 
1980's, in the wake of dowry and related problems, violence 
against women has increased enormously in South Asia and is 
now regarded as an important social problem.54 The same 
effect can also be felt in Bangladesh after independence. 
It was reported that cruelty towards women in recent years 
has increased threefold compared to the overall incidence 
of violence and is now a great social problem.55 However, 
violence against women is a trend which is deeply related 
with the oppressive structures of the patriarchal values in 
society as discussed. It has been argued that popular 
support against gender violence should be generated based 
on the fact that women are human beings or citizens of the 
country and not on conventional lines of equating women
53 See for details Rezaul Karim v Mosammat Taslima Begum 40 
DLR (1988) 360; BLD 1989 35.
54 Prasad, B. Devi: 'Dowry related violence towards women: 
A sociological perspectives.' In Sood, Sushma (ed.): 
Violence against women. Jaipur 1990, pp.293-309, at p.294.
55 Sobhan, Salma et al. : The status of legal aid services to 
women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992, p.5.
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with reproduction or as dependents to be protected.56 It 
seems that the concern is more about whether public support 
for women's concern is initiated in conventional or modern 
ways than the protection of women against violence itself. 
Clearly, the need of the hour is to protect women from 
violence. If traditional or conventional frameworks of 
reference have the potential to protect women, there should 
not be any controversy about their use.57
Offences against women have taken modern aggravated 
forms, which were more or less absent in the past, as for 
example acid throwing or murder for dowry (see the table at 
p.322). Crimes against women have risen after independence, 
as morality has diminished after the nine months of 
liberation war.58 The causes for the increase are similar 
to the increase of dowry; in many cases, dowry itself is 
the cause. Women in Bangladesh are facing not only 
aggravated forms of conventional crimes but also new types 
of crimes.
Official statistics from the reports of the Police 
Headquarters in Bangladesh were collected by a renowned 
lady lawyer, Rabeya Bhuiyan. Her material exhibits a 
horrifying picture of the quantum of violence and cruelty
56 Guhathakurta, Meghna: 'Gender violence in Bangladesh: The 
role of the state' . In The Journal of Social Studies. 
Vol.30, 1985, pp.77-90, at p.77.
57 Kiswar, Madhu: 'Women's organisations: The pressure of
unrealistic expectations'. In Manushi. No.59, 1990, pp.11- 
14 .
58 Akanda and Ishrat (1984), p.2.
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against women in Bangladesh.59 The tables are shown below:
TABLE - 2
.1 i . -v '
A Statement of violence and cruelties against women in
Bangladesh from 1986-198860
Year 1986 1987 1988
Rape 433 380 344
Trafficking 
against women 
and children
10 16 85
Acid burn 22 13 16
Assault and 
hurt 97 52 44
Dowry offences 
with murder 16 24 46
Total
578 4 85 535
The table shows that in the year 1986 there were 433 
rape cases but in 1987 there were 3 80 and in the next year 
it was further reduced to 344 cases; in trafficking against 
women and children in 1986 there were 10 cases, in 1987 
there were 16 cases but in 1988 this increased to 85 cases. 
The cases of acid burn decreased from 22 in 1986 to 13 in 
1987 but increased again to 16 in 1988; the cases of 
assault and hurt were reduced from 97 cases in 1986 to 52 
in 1987 and 44 in 1988. Most significantly, dowry cases
....... ...i.
j
59 Bhuiyan, Rabia: Aspects ~of violence against women. Dhaka 
1991.
60 Ibid. , p.51
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with murder increased from 16 in 1986 to 24 in 1987 and 
further increased to 46 in 1988. This table does not 
necessarily reflect that crimes,: except dowry and
trafficking, are increasing but indicates generally that 
the amount of different crimes against women is so high 
that the time has come to introduce measures to eradicate 
them.
TABLE - 3
A statement of crimes against women of Bangladesh in the
year 198961
Types
of
violence
No. of 
cases
Charge
sheet
Final
Report
Under
invasti
gation
Punish
ment
Acq
uit
tal
Under
Trial
Acid-
burning
39 36 3 . - 1 2 33
Hurt 51 46 5 - 1 3 42
Dowry 112 89 22 1 1 6 82
Rape 361 284 62 5 10 11 263
Other
types
of
cruelty 537 420 100
17 5 20 395
Total 1090 875 192 23 18 42 815
The above table, for the year ‘ 1989 alone, shows a 
significant overall increase in crimes against women. Under 
the various entries, which are not quite the same as in 
previous years, the numbers of cases are much higher,
61 Ibid. , p.52 .
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especially for dowry, acid burning and rape. In this one 
year, there were 1090 cases of crimes against women, of 
which 815 are under trial, 42 accused were acquitted and 
only 18 accused were punished. However, this is not a 
complete picture; as we have indicated, the majority of 
cases are not reported at all. Moreover, these official 
figures are claimed to be under-reported.62
A report published in a daily newspaper in Bangladesh 
stated that only in the months of April and May 1989, 72 
women became victims of different kinds of violence. Out of 
these 72 women, 18 were killed, 14 died due to torture by 
their husbands, 4 were killed for dowry, 3 were raped, 3 
were kidnapped, 7 suffered acid burn, 5 committed suicide 
and 9 were rescued from the clutches of traffickers.63 
These alarming figures of increase of crime against women 
are also evidence that the new legislation with deterrent 
punishment alone is not enough to eradicate such crimes 
from society.
The lack of proper reporting is not only because of 
the inadequacy of government officials but also because 
women themselves are reluctant,, to, report crimes against 
them for fear of repeated violence, honour or loss of face 
of their families and for the fear that they will be turned 
out of their matrimonial home. However, when a wife decides 
to seek a divorce, she often reports such violence. There 
is not much scholarly literature on domestic violence in
62 Ibid. , p.50.
63 The Daily Incruilab. Dhaka 14.6.1989.
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Bangladesh and the official statistics do not give us a 
full picture of the incidence of violence against women. 
This vacuum can only be filled by further research on the 
issue.
6.4 Cruelty to women and the law
There is growing concern that a large number of women are 
subjected to inhuman torture, physical and mental cruelty. 
In fact crime against women in Bangladesh has increased to 
an alarming point and every day stories of torture and 
cruelty against women are reported in the dailies.
The Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance 
of 1983, a very important law concerning women, was 
promulgated to act as a deterrent to cruelty towards women. 
This legislation brought tougher provisions to deter crimes 
against women. However, it appears that the Ordinance could 
not minimise crimes against women; if it did, this is not 
projected in any of the literature. There are no government 
surveys detecting that crime against women has declined. 
But the cases certainly show that many women are coming to 
the courts to seek relief under the Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983.
In the present sub-section, we first consider the 
provisions of the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance of 1983 and then analyse the case-law under it. 
However, some cases under the Penal Code of 1860 are also 
discussed as we must see the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent
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Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 as an extension of the Penal 
Code. 1860.
6.4.1 The Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance. 
1983
This Ordinance seeks to deter serious forms of cruelty to 
women with severe punishment. The Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance. 1983 punishes a person 
with imprisonment for life or provides death penalty for 
kidnapping or abducting women, trafficking in women and 
attempting to cause death or for committing rape. It seems 
that it cannot be analysed for lack of data whether this 
deterrent punishment has been of any help to reduce crimes 
against women. However, the case-law reveals that 
complainants are keen to apply the Ordinance to give more 
severe punishment to the accused.
It needs to be asked why the urgency arose to enact a 
new Ordinance when the Penal Code. 1860 was supposed to
provide penalties for crimes against women. In essence, it 
seems offences in aggravated form were not adequately 
covered under the Penal Code. 1860. For example, rape was 
already there as an offence in the Penal Code, but rape 
added with murder was not included. Under section 7 of the 
Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance. 1983 
when the person committing rape murders the woman or, while 
committing rape, causes death to the woman, he is punished
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with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to 14 years and shall also be 
liable to fine. Under section 8 of the Ordinance, in the 
same situation, for attempting the offence, the offender is 
punished with imprisonment for life or with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 years and 
also with fine. Thus, the new Ordinance did extend the 
circumstances of the Penal Code, 1860 as before it rape 
with murder was not included.
Some cases compare the provisions of the Penal Code. 
186 0 and the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance, 1983. For example, in State v Khalilur Rahman,64 
it was held by the criminal court that it is devilish 
cruelty to kill a woman for dowry but it was beyond the 
court's jurisdiction to try this case as it could not be 
tried in an ordinary criminal court but in a special 
tribunal (see below, p.348) . But why should different types 
of crime against women have to be instituted in different 
courts? Is this to show more justice towards women? In fact 
this is creating more confusion in the minds not only of 
the women but also their pleaders and even the judges.
If the 1983 Ordinance creates such confusion, would 
not simple amendments of the Penal Code. 1860 have achieved 
the same results? Or was the legislature more concerned to 
make a new law to give more emphasis on women's protection 
from violence? We have seen that it is impossible to give 
a clear answer. Still, the need of women in Bangladesh to
64 41 DLR (1989) 1; BLD 1989 43.
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be safeguarded from violence is reflected in the enactment 
of the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance. 
1983.
The 1983 Ordinance was further amended by the Cruelty 
to Women (Deterrent Punishment Amendment) Act 1988, which 
made the penalty for trafficking in women under section 5 
tougher by stating that the punishment will not be less 
than 7 years. Moreover a new section,8 (a) was added giving 
the same punishment for attempting to kidnap or abduct or 
trafficking in women as for the actual kidnapping or 
abduction.
The legislature also made amendments to the Penal 
Code, 1860 to deter the growth of crimes against women. The 
offence of acid throwing in women's faces became so common 
that the legislature had to take immediate action; a new
section was inserted by the Penal Code (Second Amendment)
Ordinance. 1984. The new section 326A, provides punishment 
of death, transportation for life and fine for voluntarily 
causing grievous hurt in respect of both eyes, head or face 
by means of a corrosive substance.65
To reiterate, the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent
Punishment) Ordinance. 1983 may be regarded as an extension 
of the Penal Code, 1860 to accommodate grave offences which 
are not covered by it. It may have an impact on the
sentiments of the male population to know that they will be 
punished if they disobey the law and be cruel to women, but 
there is no evidence of it. However, it was found while
65 Bangladesh Statutes 37 DLR (1985) 144.
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analysing the cases that even legal practitioners are still 
confused about the application of the new law. Thus, there 
should be more research on the effects of the Cruelty to 
Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance. 1983 and it seems 
correct to assert that men should be made more aware of 
this law to protect women from violence.
6.4.2 Cases on cruelty and violence against women
Cruelty to women takes different forms and manifestations. 
It may be grave and gruesome as murder, rape, trafficking, 
acid throwing or take milder forms in mental cruelty and 
mental torture. Some of the forms of cruelty to women are 
briefly discussed through examples from recent cases to 
expose the gravity and enormity of these offences in 
Bangladeshi society. Detailed exposition of the issues 
could form the subject of a separate thesis.
There are recent cases of cruel murders of women. Two 
out of an enormous amount of cases are discussed here in 
which the accused were actually punished, which is a rare 
occasion.
In the highly publicised murder case of Kh. 
Ehteshamuddin Ahmed @ Iabal v Bangladesh and Others.66 the 
material facts found by the trial court on evidence led by 
the prosecution were that the victim Saleha Begum was
66 BSCR 1980 239.
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married to the accused Kh. Ehtashamuddin Ahmed alias Iqbal 
on 7th December, 1975. The accused lived with his family 
and had got a large amount of dowry from the parents of the 
victim. He received nearly 1.5 lakh taka from his mother- 
in-law for construction of a house. Monwara Begum was a 
maid servant of the family and the only eye witness in the 
case. Illicit connection grew between the accused and 
Monwara Begum and they had occasional sexual contact. On 
April 11, 1978 at about 11 A.M. when the victim went out of 
the house, the accused took Monwara to the bedroom and 
after shutting the door from inside, was having sexual 
intercourse with her when the victim suddenly returned and, 
finding the bedroom closed from inside, knocked at the 
door. After the door was opened by the accused, the victim 
entered the bedroom and, finding Monwara in the room, 
accused her husband of having an illicit connection with 
her. Monwara tried to go out of the room but the victim 
caught hold of her. Then the accused hit the victim on the 
head with a heavy wooden piece and the victim fell on the 
carpet. Monwara rushed to the second floor and informed the 
accused's mother Syeda Begum. The mother of the accused 
immediately came to the room, found the victim lying on the 
ground and tried to revive her but did not succeed. The 
accused, who was a medical student, examined the pulse of 
the victim and declared that she was dead. The mother of 
the accused went upstairs and the accused then took a blade 
from the dressing table and attempted to cut the victim's 
throat. Monwara tried to stop him but the accused slapped
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her and threatened her with the same consequence if she 
tried to stop him. The accused then cut the throat of the 
victim to show that it was a case of suicide. The accused 
was sentenced to death and was executed. He was only- 
punished for killing his wife and was not punished for 
zina. The case also shows that dowry was an issue, but this 
was not highlighted by the court.
In another recent case, State v Munir Hussain ® Surui 
and Others.67 the court found that the accused husband had 
dragged his wife-victim's body and thrown it in a deserted 
drain after injuring her severely with a sharp weapon while 
they were on a journey on the Dhaka-Chittagong highway. The 
court gave the accused the death penalty for this
horrendous murder. On appeal, the order was maintained. 
Following the murder there was much public agitation and 
the media also took a big role in reflecting the ideas of 
the people about justice for violence against women 
Finally, the execution has recently been carried out.
Apart from murders or attempts to murder, other
serious offences against women have also increased. The
issue of torture and murder of women for dowry falls under 
section 6 of the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance of 1983 (for details see above, p.342). Murder, 
attempt to murder and causing grievous hurt are also
criminal offences under the Penal Code of 1860. The 
difficulty in detecting dowry murders is that they can
67 Title Suit No. 121 of 1985 in the Court of Second 
Subordinate Judge, Dhaka (unreported).
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easily be fabricated as accidents and suicides.68 Some 
cases of grievous hurt or murder for dowry are analysed 
below to illustrate the impact of this alarming situation.
In State v Abdul Jabbar and others.69 the victim 
Sufia, a girl of 15 years, was married to the accused. 
After she came to her in-laws' house they demanded money 
from her father. The poor father was unable to fulfil their 
demand. During the month of Ramadan on 19.6.84, at night 
when Sufia's husband was not at home (his absence was 
apparently intentional) , she went to bed with her sister- 
in-law after she had taken the late night meal (shehrv) to 
fast but she could not sleep as she could guess some evil 
plan to attack her. She tried to escape from the house but 
was caught by her in-laws; with the help of a sharp cutting 
object (boti) they cut her throat. Luckily for her, the 
throat was not fully cut but considering her dead they 
threw her at a near-by pond. In such condition she was 
discovered by a woman who came to take water from the pond. 
For months the victim fought fpr her life in the hospital 
and even though she was saved she could not eat or talk 
properly. Both the accused brother-in-law and her mother- 
in-law could not be sentenced to adequate punishment due to 
lack of evidence. However, they were both sentenced to ten 
years' imprisonment after review by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator.
68 Carroll (1985), p.263.
69 D.M. Case No. 793 of 1983 (unreported) .
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In State v Khalilur Rahman,70 at about 3 P.M. on 
12.9.84 the accused Khalilur Rahman assaulted his wife 
Peara Begum severely with a balikucha (an instrument for 
sharpening knives) for non-payment of the balance of 60 0 
taka out of the dowry of taka 4,000 agreed to be given at 
the time of marriage. Peara Begum died on the spot as a 
result of the injuries. In view of the case made in the 
First Information Report and the evidence, the Sessions 
Judge observed that it is a 'devilish cruelty' to kill a 
woman for dowry and it was beyond his jurisdiction to try 
it as an ordinary criminal case.71 It should be noted that 
under the Ordinance of 1983 the offences under it should be 
tried under a Special Tribunal under the Special Powers 
Act, 1974. The case was sent back to be registered as a 
special tribunal case and the death reference was rejected. 
This shows that some cases of cruelty to women may not be 
tried in the ordinary criminal courts but under special 
tribunals. But it is yet to be understood whether by 
transferring those cases from the original criminal courts 
women will be benefitted more, or whether this is another 
way to corner women.
In the case of Salema Khatoon v The State.72 it was 
held that the offence of dowry under the Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 is a demand for 
property or valuable security from the victim wife or her
70 BLD 1989 43; 41 DLR (1981) 1.
71 BLD 1989 43, at pp.44-45; 41 DLR (1989) 1, at p.3.
72 38 DLR (1986) 348; BLD 1989 73.
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guardian or any other relation as consideration for the 
marriage at any time after the marriage by causing or 
attempting to cause death or grievous hurt to the victim 
wife. The word used in section 6 of the Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 (see Appendix 
VIII, p.476) is "husband" and a person does not become the 
husband of a woman until the marriage has taken place.
Thus the husband of the victim woman or the husband's 
parents or guardian or any relations are liable for the 
offence within the ambit of the above section. In the 
explanation to section 6 dowry as under the Cruelty to 
Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance.1983 must be in 
consideration for the marriage at any time after marriage. 
This is different from the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) 
Ordinance. 1984 where the definition of dowry is extended 
to any demand made before or after the marriage. This 
loophole in the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance, 1983 gives a chance to the husband or his 
guardians to escape liability. Thus, the offence of dowry 
violence under the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance, 1983 should be subject to the same definition as 
under the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance, 1984. 
This could be achieved by amending the word 'husband' in 
section 6 of the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance. 1983 to 'would-be husband'.
In Firoza Begum v Hormuz Ali.73 it was held that mere 
allegation made by the wife that her husband (the accused)
73 40 DLR (1988) 161.
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had beaten her while demanding dowry and ousted her from 
the house, in the absence of any allegation that the 
accused had caused or attempted to cause death or grievous 
injury to her, meant that the case did..not come within the 
mischief of section 6 of the Ordinance. This shows that the 
judges are not regarding beating for demanding dowry as 
sufficient evidence of cruelty under the Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance. 1983 unless the beating 
is grievous. The significant observation of this case is 
that even if it does not fall under the Cruelty to Women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983, it eventually 
comes under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 and is 
punishable. But it is doubtful whether the victims or their 
pleaders are aware of this. Otherwise,, why did they claim 
under the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance. 1983? Was the party or their pleader aspiring
for more severe punishment? This shows that the application 
of the Acts and the Ordinances are not yet realised in full 
in Bangladesh even by lawyers.
Apart from dowry murders there are other crimes 
against women which need to be highlighted. Maraina v The 
State, 74is a case under sections 4, 5 and 9 of the Cruelty 
to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983. The 
victim Margina, a girl of ten years of age, was kidnapped 
by women traffickers and raped by a gang of miscreants. The 
Police recovered Margina and sent her to judicial custody 
but did not investigate the case properly. This came out in
74 P. S. Case No. 10 of 1988 Khalispur (unreported) .
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the dailies and there was public pressure for re­
investigation. Margina gave a statement that the case was 
not at all investigated and the case was then sent for re­
investigation .
In Rani Dhar @ Babita v The State.75 the victim Gita 
Rani, a girl of thirteen years and a student of class nine, 
was kidnapped by the accused armed: miscreants from her 
home. The miscreants then entered India in order to sell 
the victim and send her to Pakistan, • but they were caught 
by the Indian Police. The Indian Border Police then handed 
her to the Bangladesh Rifles. Two accused were caught by 
the Bangladesh Police and are now under trial.
In Ananda and others v The State.76 the prosecution 
failed to prove the charge of abetment punishable under 
section 366 of the Penal Code and section 4 (b)(c) of the 
Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance of 1983 
against the accused Ananda. The court held that in the 
instant case there was nothing on the record to show that 
Ananda was a partner in any conspiracy which resulted in 
the abduction of the victim girl by another man.77
In Manindra Kumar Malakar v The State.78 it was held 
that the kidnapping of a women for unlawful purpose when 
she is above 16 and below 18 and no force has been used to 
go with the accused will not be,an offence under section
75 P.S. Case No.3 of 1987 Fulgazi (unreported).
76 41 DLR (1989) 533.
77 Ibid. , p.537.
78 BLD 1990 HCD 120.
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4 (b) of the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance of 1983. This is one of the loopholes of the 
Ordinance, as unlawful purpose was present and the victim 
was a child (under the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) 
Ordinance. 1984) and a minor. The age of consent for
marriage under the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) 
Ordinance of 1984 is 18 years, whereas the consent for 
unlawful purpose is considered to be 16 years and above. 
The same situation arises with the age of rape of the wife, 
which is 13 years and below under section 376 of the Penal 
Code, I860.79 Thus, if a husband rapes his wife above that 
age limit it does not fall under the category of rape. Such 
inconsistencies of the legislation should be amended to 
make this legislation more effective.
The most common domestic violence against women in 
Bangladesh is wife battering. The general notion in the 
rural areas is that the husband has a right to a certain 
level of force to be used against the wife. However, the 
situation is not the same in the urban population. Even the 
rural women are now not prepared to tolerate any violence. 
In fact, some cases of wife battering end up in divorce 
initiated by women.
In Mst. Ameena Begum v Ali Hassan.80 the plaintiff was 
married to the defendant on 9.8..85 by a registered 
kabinnama. The plaintiff alleged that her husband was of 
ill temperament and was habituated to alcohol (neshakhor).
79 Bhuiyan (1991), p.44.
80 Family Suit No.41 of 1990 (unreported).
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The plaintiff also alleged that on 20.2.90, the defendant 
came home drunk and battered her and turned her out of the 
matrimonial home. A further allegation against the 
defendant was that he was impotent, as they did not have 
any children during their marital life, which was confirmed 
by a doctor. The plaintiff divorced the defendant by her 
delegated power of divorce on 6.5.90 and sent notice of it 
to the defendant. The plaintiff, thus, was praying for a 
declaration that their marriage was dissolved. The Family 
Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration 
that the marriage is dissolved as her own allegations 
showed that she was not inclined to continue marital life 
with the defendant and one can not force her to do that 
against her wishes. This case, without saying so, follows 
the principle and precedent of Khurshid Bibi (see above, 
p. 136) .
Cruelty to women has different aspects. An allegation 
or false charge of adultery of the wife by the husband is 
also cruelty under the state law. It is to be noted that 
lian or a false charge of adultery is also a ground for 
dissolution of marriage under the Islamic law.81
In Hasina Begum v Sved Abul Fazal.82 the Court held 
that consistent and repeated allegations about the wife's 
involvement with another person are definitely 'cruelty' 
within the meaning of section 2 viii(a) of the Dissolution
81 For details see Ali, Syeed Ameer: Mohammedan law. Vol.ii, 
New Delhi 1985 (reprint), pp.525-528.
82 32 DLR (1980) 294.
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of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. It was further held in the 
above case that if the husband treats his wife with cruelty 
of conduct, even if such conduct does not amount to 
physical ill-treatment but only mental torture, it is 
tantamount to 'cruelty'.
In Runa Lai la v Javed Kaiser,83 the complainant, a 
famous singer of the country, filed a suit for divorce on 
the grounds of mental cruelty. The court allowed her plea. 
In Firoza Khatun v Nazrul Islam.84 the plaintiff was the 
daughter of a well-to-do person and the defendant exacted 
money from her father on various pleas. The plaintiff 
continued her studies despite all mental and physical 
cruelties caused to her by the defendant and won the 
Presidential honour for her performance as a head teacher. 
The defendant joined his wife in the same school as 
assistant head teacher but became jealous of the 
plaintiff's position and started giving false allegations
against her. He also tortured her physically, so that she
became ill. Finally she could bear no. more and divorced the 
defendant and filed a suit for the declaration of divorce. 
In the trial the defendant brought their young daughter to 
depose against the immoral character of her own mother and 
the daughter was weeping all along the trial. The court 
allowed the divorce. It is interesting to note that in
nearly all cases of domestic violence leading to divorce
83 Title Suit No. 121 of 1985, in the Court of the Second 
Subordinate Judge, Dhaka (unreported).
84 Title Suit No. 26 of 1988, in the Court of Second
Assistant Judge, Dhaka (unreported).
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the common allegation of the husband is that the wife is of 
bad character, unfaithful and a thief who has eloped with 
the saris and ornaments belonging to the husband.85 It is 
indeed true that the phenomenon of cruelty and violence 
against women is seen as a necessary concomitant of the 
patriarchal order.86
In a recent decision by the High Court division of the 
Supreme Court in Hosne Ara Begum v Rezaul Karim,87 it was 
rightly observed that the appellate court below was guided 
by the archaic concept of absolute dominion of the husband 
over the wife treating her as chattel, forgetting that 
under the Muslim law several rights were granted to the 
wife, including the right to refuse the conjugal domain of 
the husband if treated by him with cruelty or failure to 
pay prompt dower.88 The Supreme Court also extended the 
meaning of cruelty as defined under sec. 2 (viii) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 not only to 
include physical assault and cruelty of conduct but conduct 
which does not amount to physical assault or cruelty in the 
literal meaning. As the Supreme Court held, in a well-to-do 
family compelling the wife to do domestic work can be seen 
as physical and mental torture. However, the Supreme Court 
ascertained, on considering the evidence found by the trial
85 Bhuiyan (1991), p.27.
86 Parihar, Lalita: 'Battered wife syndrome: Some socio-
legal aspects' . In Sood, Sushma (ed) : Violence against
women. Jaipur 1990, pp.35-44, at p.36.
87 43 DLR (1991) 543.
88 Ibid. , p.545.
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court (Family Court) , that the wife was also subject to 
physical and mental torture and was under apprehension that 
she might be killed if she returned to her husband's house. 
Thus, physical and mental torture of the wife was not only 
held to be an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine 
but it also gave a valid ground to the woman to refuse 
restitution of conjugal rights to the husband (see above, 
p.248) .
It is widely acknowledged that only a fraction of all 
cases of cruelty and violence against women come up to the 
courts. But when such cases have come under judicial 
scrutiny, judges of the criminal courts have appeared 
sympathetic towards women's causes and are trying to give 
proper redress to women. The main problem of crimes against 
women is that it is very difficult to detect them, 
especially in the sphere of domestic violence. The 
detection of domestic violence is made more difficult by 
the fact that it happens within the four walls of the 
domestic arena. The reasons for the apathy in adjudication 
on domestic violence depend on several factors: the
reluctance of the police to become involved in marital 
disputes; traditional values and culture and the fear of 
the wife herself to complain against her husband.89 
Moreover, the women who are braving the consequences to 
come to the court cannot be sure that they are getting 
adequate relief. Is the punishment to their husbands worth 
their grievances and efforts? A recent study has shown it
89 Bhuiyan (1991), p.31.
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is not useful to complain in dowry cases.90 The suppressed 
problems which arise in the aftermath of the decree of the 
court are never taken into consideration. What happens to 
a wife who leaves her husband and does not have a place to 
live or money to buy food? The legal system of Bangladesh 
does not take into account such social problems.91 Thus, 
the demand of women in Bangladesh to be protected from 
violence also involves concern for freedom from economic 
deprivation. The two issues are intricately linked.
90 Akanda and Ishrat (1990), p.37.
91 Parihar (1990), p.37.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
The first principal purpose of this chapter is to summarise 
the issues involving the different paradigms of family law 
in this dissertation. The prospects for further, more 
detailed and fieldwork-based research are examined in the 
second sub-section. Finally, the concluding part of this 
chapter considers what recommendations may be made to 
protect women in Bangladesh better against violence and 
economic deprivation.
7.1 Dialogue of the issues
This thesis has argued that the actual need of women in 
Bangladesh concerns protection from economic deprivation 
and violence. Our analysis of the recent legal developments 
in Bangladeshi family law stresses that the real needs of 
women have not been given enough priority in the family 
law.
Bangladeshi women constantly face restrictions in a 
male-dominated patriarchal society. The needs and demands 
of women in this society, we have argued, are not focused 
on gender equality but on sexual equity. Thus, the concept 
of gender equality in the public sphere is distracting from 
the discourse about the real needs of women in family law
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and in society. The general law and the Constitution are 
premised on sexual equality, while the family law provides 
only equitable rights. The limited literature on women and 
law in Bangladesh confuses this, missing significant points 
of the realities of women's lives in a patriarchally- 
dominated society. We are suggesting that sexual equity can 
be meaningfully developed by better enforcement of the 
existing legal rights. . ; >
The main theme of this thesis is that women in 
Bangladesh need to be protected from economic deprivation 
and violence. These needs of women have not been adequately 
reflected in the legislation or judicial decisions. At the 
same time, first in British India, then in Pakistan and now 
in Bangladesh, the respective . legislatures have been 
claiming that they wanted to ameliorate the position of 
women, particularly of Muslim women. In British India, 
legal reforms regarding the restraint of child marriages, 
women's right to divorce and the restriction of customary 
laws had some positive impact on the status of Muslim 
women. In the Pakistani period (1947-71), mainly by the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, procedural 
impediments were introduced to disentangle the law from 
customary patriarchal influences. For example, the 
husband's right of unilateral, talaa was supposed to be 
restricted by procedural requirements. The judiciary 
appeared to assist women and famous cases like Khurshid 
Bibi v Mohammad Amin1 and Ali Nawaz Gardezi v Muhammed
1 PLD 1967 SC 97.
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Yusuf2 were taken as precedents also . by the Bangladeshi 
judiciary. But there are doubts now whether this worked 
entirely to the advantage of women or was even taking away 
important rights of women by not considering the 
implications of the new law within the established
patriarchal setting.
In contemporary Bangladesh, too, steps have been taken 
to give women more rights within the Islamic framework by 
introducing new legislation. Family law reforms were 
portrayed as attempts to find a solution for several
definite social problems, prominently violence against 
women in relation to dowry demands. Important legislation 
like the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, The Cruelty to 
Women (Deterrent Punishment) Act of 1983, the Muslim 
Marriage and Divorces (Registration) Act of 1974 and the 
Family Courts Ordinance of 1985 was enacted. But in each
case, it was not sufficiently well analysed how the new
laws would actually fit into the socio-cultural system of 
Bangladesh. A case in point was the new rule, introduced by 
the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance of 1984, that 
any dowry paid should not be the property of the bride. 
Surely, anybody who knows about,. the realities of 
Bangladeshi society would immediately understand that this 
would inevitably work against the interest of women and 
would strengthen patriarchal mechanisms of suppression. 
Families would continue to give presents to their daughters 
on marriage and as long as the distinctions between dowry
2 PLD 1963 SC 74.
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and other marriage prestations are not clearly drawn, the 
new law could not have any beneficial effect.
Legal reforms continue to have little or no impact on 
the remote poor rural communities in Bangladesh. Where 
legal reforms do not reach the people;, the question of its 
efficacy does not even arise. Within the constitutional 
framework of Bangladesh, it should be argued that ways need 
to be found to make legal reforms in family law available 
to all sections of the population and to strengthen their 
use to give all women of Bangladesh the chance to benefit 
from better rights than the patriarchal society would seem 
to offer.
In our analysis of reported and unreported family law 
cases from Bangladesh we found that the judicial decisions 
in this sphere do not expressly discuss the need to protect 
women from economic deprivation and violence. However, some 
decisions signify concern of the higher courts not only 
about giving general emphasis on women's rights but also 
about the need to protect women from cruel treatment and 
deliberate economic deprivation. Vie found a significant 
difference here between the reported judicial decisions of 
the higher courts and the unreported judicial decisions of 
the lower courts or the Family Courts, in which patriarchal 
notions seem to remain a dominant force. In addition, 
recent legal developments in Bangladesh continue the trend 
of undermining women's legal position by judicial 
interpretations which appear to be technically correct but 
are in fact working against women. Thus in Nellv Zaman v
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Giasuddin Khan.3 reliance on equality before the law 
clearly disadvantages female petitioners seeking 
restitution of conjugal rights.
Interestingly, however, the judgements of the lower 
criminal courts in cases involving violence against women 
disclose more intense judicial concern about the need to 
protect women from cruelty and murder. This reflects that 
safeguarding women's physical existence is a matter of 
concern for the judiciary and gives rise to the hope that 
not only cases of aggravated violence will motivate the 
judiciary to protect the interests of women.
The Family Courts of Bangladesh have now become the 
main repository of family law issues, as very few cases 
actually come up to the higher courts. To make a full 
assessment of how the law is developing today, a detailed 
study of unreported cases from various parts of the country 
would be necessary (see section 7.2 below). In the present 
thesis, this could not be done. However, the prevailing 
impression from the reported case-law that modern 
Bangladeshi family law has benefitted from judicial 
activism, protecting the interests of women, may need to be 
revised in the light of more detailed research focusing on 
local litigation patterns. Our own limited research of 
unreported case studies provided many examples of 
insufficient protection of women and shows that there is a 
need for more systematic activisation of the judiciary and 
better sensitisation of all judicial personnel for the
3 34 DLR (1982) 225.
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needs of women.
For example, several of the maintenance cases (see 
above, pp.3 07-310) showed that the judiciary is not 
following the sharia law nor any definite pro-women policy 
to determine the amount of maintenance for deserted wives. 
Further, as indicated above, application of the concept of 
'judicial khul' in Bangladesh i-s in effect also working 
against the interests of women, taking away the right of 
dower for Muslim women. Most of the analysed dower cases 
reflected the attitudes of the patriarchal society and lack 
of judicial alertness in preventing deliberate economic 
deprivation of women, especially through uncritical 
application of the local customary concept of usool (see 
above, pp.286-289).
The case-law of Bangladesh also suggests that, through 
delegated divorce by the method of talacr-e-tahweed. more 
women are now able to dissolve their marriages with 
relative ease. However, this does not mean that women, even 
from liberal urban backgrounds, face no social stigmas 
attached to dissolving their marriages. Their friends and 
family will try to persuade them to go back to their 
husbands.4 This shows that liberal legal reforms by 
themselves do not solve social problems. While the effect 
of the law may be to make divorce at the instance of the
4 For further details on this see Bhuiyan, Rabia: 'Divorce 
is difficult'. In Akanda, Latifa and Roushan Jahan (eds.): 
Collected Articles. (Women for Women), Dhaka 1983, pp.54- 
58; Jahan, Roushan: 'Hidden wounds and visible scars'. In
Agarwal, Bina (ed.): Structures of patriarchy. New Delhi 
1988, pp.216-226, at p.219.
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wife easier, the nub of the problem arises after 
dissolution. What is the position and status of the 
divorced wife? Can she survive alone in a conservative 
patriarchal society? What about financial constraints?
It is a fact that dissolution of marriage gives rise 
to many practical issues which are neither considered by 
the legislature nor the judiciary. One could, in a sense, 
say that life after divorce is not a matter for the law. 
But it is apparent that the socio-economic consequences of 
marital breakdown have an important impact on the legal 
position of spouses and the options available to them. In 
India, some detailed studies have shown the economic 
dependency of women on matrimony. In particular, women 
often have nowhere to go after divorce if support from the 
parental home is not forthcoming.5 Lower middle class 
women, in particular, had to depend on their natal family.6 
Such studies also reveal that women feel a strong sense of 
helplessness after divorce, as neither their parental home 
nor their husband's home seems to belong to them as of 
right.7 However, legally this should not be the position of 
Muslim women of Bangladesh, as they have a right under the 
sharia to a share of the parental property, although not to 
the same extent as their brothers. Clearly, the influence 
of local patriarchal customs and traditions is helping to
5 Dhagamwar, Vasudha: Women and divorce. Bombay and New
Delhi 1987, p.99; Mehta, Rama: Divorced Hindu women. Delhi 
1975, p.119.
6 Id.
7 Dhagamwar (1987), p.101.
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deprive Bangladeshi women of their rights.
Much controversy surrounds the question whether there 
is judicial bias towards men. It may be expected that the 
effects of a male-dominated patriarchal society have an 
impact on the courts. But some judicial decisions are 
remarkably enlightened and can be seen as a departure from 
the patriarchal mould. There are also many judgements, 
however, in which the courts are interpreting the 
legislation only on the basis of orthodox concepts and fail 
to give effect to the underlying social purpose of the 
legislation.
In family matters, courts are often used as the last 
resort when other attempts of conciliation and mediation 
have failed. This is not only because litigation involves 
financial liabilities but is certainly also due to the fact 
that stigma is attached to bringing private issues into the 
public sphere. Sometimes there is no backing from the natal 
family to assist a woman, as litigation would impair the 
family's honour and dignity. Moreover, because of the known 
fact that court procedures are dilatory, few women feel 
inclined to bring family disputes to the court. It seems 
that the Family Courts have made some difference to this 
but are still not expeditious enough.
It is very difficult to ascertain the social class of 
the litigants from judgements which only contain the name 
and place of residence of the parties. However, sometimes 
the facts themselves disclose the social and economic 
status of the parties by stating their occupation and
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education. From such information it can be gathered that 
the women in Bangladesh who come to court can be divided 
basically into two categories. The first group belongs to 
the higher or middle classes who are economically
independent. Such women can afford to have the courage to 
face the stigma attached to litigation. The second category 
of women come from the lower classes and tend to utilise 
the courts in desperation and generally with the
expectation of financial benefit. To them the slim hope of 
financial gain is probably more important than protecting 
the social taboos of honour or izzat of the patriarchal 
family and the limitations of parda.
The social reality reflected in the case-law shows
that more women, in both categories, are now coming up to
the Family Courts with their grievances after passing 
through all the obstacles of social bindings, seclusion and 
financial constraints, with the aspiration that they will 
get justice at last. They know they cannot get justice in 
the panchavat or the village court or the local 
administrative body, as these institutions are usually 
dominated by orthodox males.
If we ask how effective the judgements of the Family 
Courts are in practical life and whether the rights given 
to women in the decisions are actually achieved in social 
reality, we must admit that there is a dearth of 
information and that further research is needed. A related 
pertinent question is whether the enlightened judgements of 
the courts are actually accepted by the society. Even when
366
liberal or pro-women judgements are pronounced in 
matrimonial law, it is important to recognise that the 
patriarchal society will not accept them unless there is a 
substantial change in the traditional attitudes of the 
people, especially among males. This can be felt mostly in 
relation to child marriage and dowry, as few people observe 
the official law in the rural areas and it is freely 
violated without anyone ever challenging this in a court of 
law.
Overall, the judicial decisions on family law in 
Bangladesh, both in the higher courts and in the Family 
Courts and lower criminal courts reveal that the judges 
are, to some extent and in certain areas, giving 
enlightened decisions. Where these come from a higher 
court, they have generally been taken as precedents by the 
lower courts. It could be argued that this trend, if 
generally applied, will gradually bring about a better 
understanding of sexual equity and the needs of women to be 
protected from economic deprivation and violence. In 
countries like Bangladesh, it seems that no useful purpose 
for constructive law reform is served by radical judgements 
which treat people as independent individuals beyond the 
context of family life.
While the potential impact of enlightened judgements 
on society should not be underestimated, it is too simple 
to assume that court decisions by themselves can change the 
social realities for most women. Court activity and the 
involvement of sensitised judges may help to establish that
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institutions like the Family Courts are the right platform 
to protect women from economic deprivation and violence. 
For the meaningful realisation of sexual equity in 
patriarchal societies like Bangladesh, law and society have 
to interlink at all levels in a complex process of working 
out what this equity should mean in any particular 
situation. So far, the evidence of continuing and in fact 
growing atrocities against women seems to suggest that the 
law may be ready to tackle grave abuses of women's rights, 
but society lacks at times the moral strength to protect 
women from economic deprivation and violence.
In a legal thesis, it seems appropriate to conclude 
that a better sensitised judiciary could lead the 
development of Bangladeshi family law into the right 
direction. Clearly, as we have shown, the existing law does 
not require major reforms to provide an effective support 
mechanism for enlightened judicial pronouncements. The onus 
remains on society to reconsider the impact of traditional 
patriarchal notions and to examine whether the treatment of 
women in Bangladesh today passes the test of fulfilling the 
needs of women to be protected from violence and economic 
deprivation.
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7.2 Prospects for future studies
The present thesis has taken an overall view of the family 
law in Bangladesh and it has not been possible to 
incorporate detailed fieldwork to research the impact of 
family law reforms at the local level. It is quite obvious 
that future studies on specific issues in family law are 
desirable and necessary to arrive at more detailed 
assessments. The following themes, in particular, offer 
themselves for further research:
1. The dilatory procedure in the Family Courts. It 
would be useful to assess what changes have been made 
in practice by the Family Courts Ordinance. 1985 with 
regard to the actual time needed to produce decrees, 
to what extent lawyers continue to be involved in 
litigation before the Family Courts and whether the 
public impression of the futility of legal action has 
been affected by the Ordinance.
2. A detailed case study may be made on the effects of 
judicial decisions, inquiring whether the decrees are 
actually executed in practice. This will explore the 
social reality of women in Bangladesh and enable us to 
assess the impact of judicial pronouncements in 
society.
3. There could be a study on the patterns of out-of- 
court settlement and on the effects of local 
arbitration or shalish on women, particularly as such 
informal settlements are now recognised by the Family
Courts in Bangladesh. It could be analysed in detail 
to what extent such informal settlements are working 
against women and how they could be made more useful 
in the protection of the interests of women.
4. The property ownership structure and its impact on 
women in Bangladesh could be the focus of a detailed 
study. It should show how women are actually being 
disinherited from property by securing the ties with 
their natal family. In particular, the local custom of 
naior, and its implications in this respect, deserve 
to be researched.
5. There should be further study on the effects of 
economic independence on women's lives. It should be 
investigated whether working outside the home has 
improved the position of women within the home, as 
tentatively suggested by this thesis, or whether this 
is an illusion. This kind of work could also focus on 
whether extreme poverty curtails the social 
constraints on women's participation in paid work. 
Some implications of .this are shown in this thesis.
6. There could also be a useful work linking the 
discussion about maintenance rights of women and 
succession, suggesting that women should not be 
deprived of their property rights just because they 
are maintained by their husbands. Linked to this, 
research on ways to enforce the right of maintenance, 
so that women are not so easily deserted and 
economically deprived, would be desirable.
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7. Further studies should be conducted about the 
extent of legal awareness of women in Bangladesh. This 
will establish the extent to which women in Bangladesh 
have knowledge of the legal provisions and the methods 
of enforcement of their rights. Recommendations should 
be made about how better awareness could be created. 
Specific studies could be devised also to ascertain 
whether women in Bangladesh know the legal provisions 
which concern them most, such as validity of their 
marriage, grounds of divorce and ownership of 
property.
7.3 Recommendations
It follows from section 7.1 above that the existing
legislation on family law in Bangladesh does not lack the 
potential to protect women from economic deprivation and 
violence. We have also seen that the judiciary has been 
able to pronounce enlightened judgements in some instances.
Since we have argued that a major onus for improving
the position of Bangladeshi women lies on society,
recommendations could be made about how social reforms
could work towards better protection of women against 
violence and economic deprivation. Clearly, the main 
impediment in the way of freedom for women from violence 
and economic deprivation in Bangladesh is the discrepancy
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of liberal legal concepts tending towards equitable rights 
and of traditional attitudes persisting in a male-dominated 
society.8 Thus, it is suggested here that new law is not 
the answer, but there need to be changes within the social 
sphere. Men, in particular, should be conscious of their 
duties to protect women from violence and economic 
deprivation. Everybody in society should be aware that it 
is morally unacceptable to treat any woman with cruelty or 
to deprive her of economic assets or entitlements by 
illegal and illicit means.
In the present thesis, we need to concentrate on the 
legal sphere. It is reiterated here that the existing 
family law of Bangladesh could, after some amendments, 
fulfil the requirements for better protection of women.
In particular, there must be proper enforcement of 
the family law reforms and of judicial decisions. The 
reluctance of the law enforcing agencies to assist women 
should be eliminated as far as possible. This can be felt 
most obviously in cases of domestic violence, where despite 
the threat of deterrent punishments offences against women 
have increased, the police are not inclined to interfere in 
household affairs and many women faced with violence are 
left unprotected.
The operation of the judicial process in Bangladesh, 
with few exceptions, works against the interests of women.
8 Ahmed, Sufia and Jahanara Choudhury: 'Women's legal
status in Bangladesh'. In Women for women: Research and
Study Group (ed.): The situation of women in Bangladesh. 
Dhaka 1979, pp.285-331, at p.287.
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To benefit the concerns of women within the judicial 
process, they should be involved more directly or 
indirectly as police officers, judges, prison officers and 
lawyers. Women should not be in fear of custodial rape in 
police stations. In reaction to evidence from Pakistan that 
72% of women in custody had been physically or sexually 
abused,9 women police stations have been introduced there. 
This model of women police stations should be adopted in 
Bangladesh, as custodial rape is -also a problem there. 
Moreover, custodial rape should be included in the 
definition of the offence of rape under the Penal Code. 
I860.10
It is interesting to note that there are already 52 
lady judges in the judiciary, some lady police officers and 
prison officers and significant numbers of women lawyers. 
The large participation of women in universities and law 
colleges allows for hope that in the near future the 
judicial system of Bangladesh will be more sympathetic 
towards protecting women from economic deprivation and 
violence. However, it could not. be substantiated in this 
study that lady judges have been making significant 
contributions towards the protection of women. Lady judges, 
too, are appointed from the elites of the society who may 
be unable to understand the real needs of poor litigants.
As indicated above, to protect women from economic
9 Goodwin, Jan: 'Jailed for being raped'. In Marie Claire. 
No.70, June 1994, pp.54-62.
10 See already Bhuiyan, Rabia: Aspects of violence against 
women. Dhaka 1991, p.44.
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deprivation and violence, a few amendments to the family 
law of Bangladesh can be suggested; An attempt is made here 
to identify those aspects which may help to give better 
protection to women in Bangladesh. While this list does not 
claim to be comprehensive, it relates to the major points 
of possible action identified in the main body of the 
thesis.
1. Prevention officers should be employed to detect
;'t :
i.*
defaulters of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929. The 
necessary amendments to the Act could be introduced very 
simply and there are Indian precedents for this. Moreover, 
since it continues to be difficult to ascertain 
individuals' age at marriage because of the absence of any 
reliable registration procedure for births, more emphasis 
should be given to proper registration at birth.
2. It should be publicised that every marriage 
solemnised under Muslim law should be compulsorily 
registered under the Muslim Marriages and Divorces 
(Registration) Act of 1974. There should be amendments to 
the Act to make also Muslim divorces compulsorily 
registered, thus giving more security of status to women. 
At the same time, the law must continue to take account of 
the existence of unregistered divorces.
3. It could be suggested that the marriage certificate or 
kabinnama should automatically provide for delegated 
divorce. Our case studies revealed that judicial khul is 
taking away an important right of women. Such divorces, if 
made extra-judicial by law, will have the same practical
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importance as talaa. Also, the hustle-and expenses of going 
through the judicial process will not be there and cannot, 
therefore, operate to the disadvantage of women. Further 
on, if incompatibility of temperament is made a ground for 
dissolution of marriage with other grounds under the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 193 9, the pressure 
on women to give khula would disappear and they would no 
longer need to return their dower.
4. Suggestions were made in India that the control of 
the person and property of a minor should be placed in one 
person, either male or female, with the prime consideration 
of the welfare of the child.11 A parallel suggestion is 
made here in the context of Bangladesh to give the mother, 
along with the father, the right to guardianship, thus 
changing the paramount right of the father as the natural 
guardian.
5. In the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the old section
6. which provided women rights to possess dowry property 
given by their parents, should be re-introduced.
6. The Family Courts should be separated from the 
Assistant Judges Courts and should bear an independent 
identity. Also, Family Courts should be a higher court of 
the judiciary and should not be left at the lower end of 
the judiciary. To protect women better against violence and 
economic deprivation, the Family Courts should also have 
powers of the criminal courts and the necessary amendments
11 Towards Equality: Report of the committee on the
status of women in India. New Delhi 1974, p.128.
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for this purpose should be made to the Family Courts 
Ordinance of 1985.
7. Better access to law should be provided for women. 
While the Family Courts themselves have been a way forward 
to facilitate access to the law for women, as it only takes 
25 takas to file a suit in such courts, this is not the end 
of litigants' worries. Incidental expenses and lawyers' 
fees are far too expensive for an ordinary individual of 
Bangladesh, let alone poor women. Women are, thus, often 
denied their right at law due to. financial constraints, 
even when they have a good claim.
8. The law faculties of the universities could initiate 
legal aid clinics to give on-the-spot advice to women and 
to provide legal literacy programs. Such initiative was 
effectively taken by the Faculty of Law, University of 
Delhi.12
9. Shelter should be provided for women who are victims 
of violence and have no natal family to support them. It is 
suggested that those refuges should be anonymous so that 
husbands or in-laws will not know the whereabouts of the 
women and will not get a chance to harass them. It should 
be mentioned that Mahila Parishad, a major women's 
organisation in Bangladesh, has opened up shelters for 
women to spearhead their campaign against dowry and
12 Singh, S.P.: 'Report of the legal aid clinic, faculty
of law, University of Delhi.' In Delhi Law Review. Vol.12, 
1990, pp.163-164.
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violence against women.13
10. Other than provisions for proceedings in forma 
pauperis under the Civil Procedure Code. 1908 and for 
court-appointed counsel in capital cases, no official legal 
aid facilities are known to be available in civil and 
criminal cases in Bangladesh.14 As proper legal aid is not 
provided officially, it is suggested here that Family 
Courts should allow the litigants to plead their own cases. 
It appears that in India, Family Courts are not a legal 
battle ground for the interests of the privileged but a 
court where the litigants themselves plead for their 
redress.15 If the same strategy was adopted in Bangladesh, 
it might give more women easier access to law.
11. There are many voluntary legal aid centers in 
Bangladesh, giving women opportunities not only to have 
judicial redress, but also legal literacy, shalish or 
mediation.16 As we saw, a major limitation of shalish is 
that it does not have the same sanction or authority as the 
Family Courts and the parties may simply avoid to appear.17
13 Kabeer, Naila: 'The quest for national identity: Women,
Islam and the state in Bangladesh' . In Institute of 
Development Studies Discussion Paper. No.268, Brighton Oct. 
1989, pp.1-42, at p.30.
14 Committee on legal services to the poor in the 
developing countries: Legal aid and world poverty. New 
York, Washington and London 1974, p.189.
15 Diwan, Paras: 'The family courts.' In Journal of the
Indian Law Institute. Vol.27, No.l, 1985, pp.101-109, at
p.102.
16 Sobhan Salma et al. : The status of legal aid services 
to women in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1992.
17 Ibid. , p. 27.
377
However, as an out-of-court settlement, local arbitration 
or shalish on women's issues is increasingly recognised by 
the Family Courts in Bangladesh. But, as we pointed out, 
sometimes legal aid services like the shalish are providing 
women a considerably lesser remedy than would be granted to 
them by the Family Courts, even allowing accused men to 
escape punishment.18
12. One of the underlying reasons to enact the Family 
Courts Ordinance of 1985 in Bangladesh was to reconcile the 
parties and to go away from the adversarial model. Our 
analysis of cases could not uncover whether such attempts 
at reconciliation were actually made by the Family Courts. 
A more detailed study may clarify this point. But the 
Family Courts Ordinance of 1985 is the only law relating to 
family matters where there is an opportunity for the 
settlement of disputes.
13. In the legal system of Bangladesh today, family 
matters are entrusted to the Additional District Judge's 
Courts, with judicial personnel well-versed in ordinary 
civil matters but not necessarily in family law. The Family 
Courts should be separate courts with special expertise to 
facilitate the solution of family problems, rather than 
being a legal battleground in which the parties and their 
pleaders are more engaged in winning and defeating a legal 
action than in working towards the protection of women from 
economic deprivation and violence.
18 Ibid. , p. 30.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX - I
THE CHILD MARRIAGE RESTRAINT ACT 1929
(Act No.xix of 1929)
An Act to restrain the solemnisation of child 
marriages.
Whereas it is expedient to restrain the solemnisation 
of child marriages; it is hereby enacted as follows:
1. SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT -(1) This Act may
be called the Child Marriage Restraint Act, [1929] .
(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh and applies
to all citizens of Bangladesh wherever they may be.
(3) It shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 
1930.
2. DEFINITION -In this Act, unless there is anything 
repugnant in the subject or context -
(a) "child" means a person who, if a male, is under 
[twenty one]1 years of age, and if a female, is under 
[eighteen]2 years of age;
(b) "child marriage" means a marriage to which either 
of the parties is a child;
(c) "contracting party" to a marriage means either of 
the parties whose marriage is or is about to be 
thereby solemnised;
(d) "minor" means person who [if a male]3 is under 
[twenty-one]4 years of age, [and if a female is under 
eighteen years of age]5
1 Substituted vide S.2 (a) of Ordinance 38 of 1984.
2 Id.
3 Vide S.2(b) of Ordinance 38 of 1984.
(e) 6||Municipal corporation" means the Municipal 
corporation constituted under the Chittagong Municipal 
Corporation Ordinance, 1982 (XXXV of 1982), or the 
Dhaka Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 1983 (XL of 
1983), or the Khulna Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 
1984 (LXXII of 1984), within whose jurisdiction a
child marriage is or is about to be solemnised;
(f) "Paurashava" means the Paurashava constituted 
under the Paurashava Ordinance, 1977 (XXVI of 1977), 
within whose jurisdiction a child marriage is or is 
about to be solemnised; and
(g) "Union Parishad" means the Union Parishad
constituted under the Local Government (Union 
Parishad) Ordinance 1983 (LI of 1983); within whose 
jurisdiction a child marriage is or is about to be 
solemnised.
3 (Omitted)7
4.8 Punishment for male adult above twenty-one years of age 
or female adult above eighteen years of age marrying a
child -
Whoever, being a male above twenty-one years of age, or 
being a female above eighteen years of age, contracts a 
child marriage shall be punishable with simple imprisonment 
which may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand taka, or with both.
5. PUNISHMENT FOR SOLEMNISING A CHILD MARRIAGE -Whoever
performs, conducts or directs any child marriage shall be
punishable with simple imprisonment which may extend to one 
month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand taka 
or with both, unless he proves that he had reason to 
believe that the marriage was not a child marriage.
6. PUNISHMENT FOR PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONCERNED IN A CHILD 
MARRIAGE -(1) Where a minor contracts a child marriage, any 
person having charge of the minor, whether as a parent or 
guardian or in any other capacity, lawful or unlawful, who 
does any act to promote the marriage or permits it to be 
solemnised, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment
which may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand taka, or with.both:
Provided that no woman shall be punishable with
6 Clauses (e) (f) and (g) were added by S. 12 (I) (c) of 
Ordinance viii of 1961 read with S.5 (a) of Ordinance xiv of 
1985.
7 Section 3 has been omitted by section 3 of Ordinance 
No.38 of 1984.
8 Section 4 substituted vide section 4 of Ordinance No. 38 
of 1984.
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imprisonment.
(2) For the purpose of this section, it shall be 
presumed, unless and until the contrary is proved, that 
where a minor has contracted a child marriage, the person 
having charge of such minor has negligently failed to 
prevent the marriage from being solemnised.
7. IMPRISONMENT NOT TO BE AWARDED FOR OFFENCES UNDER 
SECTION 3 -Notwithstanding anything contained in section 25 
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or section 64 of the 
Bangladesh Penal Code, a court sentencing an offender under 
section 3 shall not be competent to direct that, in default 
of payment of the fine imposed, he shall undergo any term 
of imprisonment.
8. JURISDICTION UNDER THIS ACT -Notwithstanding anything 
contained in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898, no court other than that of a Magistrate of the First 
Class shall take cognizance of, or try, any offence under 
this Act.
9. MODE OF TAKING COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCE -No court shall 
take cognizance of any offence under this Act [except on a
complaint made by the Union Council, or if there is no
Union Council or if there is no Union Parishad or
Paurashava or Municipal Corporation9 in the area, by such 
authority as the Government may in this behalf prescribe, 
and such cognizance shall in no case be taken] after the 
expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is 
alleged to have been committed.
10. PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES INTO OFFENCE UNDER THIS ACT -The 
court taking cognizance of an offence under this Act shall 
unless it dismisses the complaint under section 203 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, either itself make an 
inquiry under section 202 of that Code, or direct a
Magistrate of the first class subordinate to it to make 
such inquiry.
11. (Omitted)10
9 Added by section 12(1) (c) vide Ordinance VIII of 1961.
10 Section 11 has been omitted by section 12 (5) , of 
Ordinance VIII of 1961. The omitted section ran as follows: 
"Power to take security from complainant - (1) When the court 
takes cognizance of any offence under this Act upon a 
complaint made to it, it may for reasons to be recorded in 
writing, at any time after examining the complainant and 
before issuing process for compelling the attendance of the 
accused, require the complainant to execute a bond, with or 
without sureties, for a sum not exceeding one hundred 
rupees as security for the payment of any compensation 
which the complainant may be directed to pay under section
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12. POWER TO ISSUE INJUNCTION PROHIBITING MARRIAGE IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THIS ACT -(1) Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the court 
may, if satisfied from information laid before it through 
a complaint or otherwise that a child marriage in 
contravention of this Act has been arranged or is about to 
be solemnised, issue an injunction against any of the 
persons mentioned in sections 3,4,5 and 6 of this Act 
prohibiting such marriage.
(2) No injunction under sub-section (1) shall be 
issued against any person unless the court has previously 
given notice to such person, and has afforded him an 
opportunity to show cause against ; the issue of the 
injunction.
(3) The court may either on its own motion or on the 
application of any person aggrieved rescind or alter any 
order made under sub-section (1) .
(4) Where such an application is received, the court 
shall afford the applicant an early opportunity of 
appearing before it either in person or by pleader; and if 
the court rejects the application wholly or in part, it 
shall record in writing its reasons for so doing.
(5) Whoever knowing that an injunction has been issued 
against him under sub-section (1) of this section disobeys 
such injunction shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to three 
months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand taka 
or with both.
Provided that no woman shall, be punishable with 
imprisonment.
250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and if such 
security is not furnished within such reasonable time as 
the court may fix, the complaint shall be dismissed.
(2) a bond taken under this section shall be deemed to be 
a bond taken under the code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 
and Chapter XLII of that Code shall apply accordingly."
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APPENDIX - II
THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW (Shariat) APPLICATION
ACT1937
(Act No.XXVI of 1937)1
An Act to make provision for the application of the 
Muslim Personal law (Shariat) to Muslim in [Bangladesh].2
Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the 
application of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) to Muslim 
in [Bangladesh]3; it is hereby enacted as follows:-
1. SHORT TITLE AND EXTENT -(1) This Act may be called the 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.
[(2) It extends to the whole of (Bangladesh)4]
2. APPLICATION OF PERSONAL LAW TO MUSLIMS -Notwithstanding 
any custom or usage to the contrary, in all question (save 
questions relating to agricultural land) regarding inter 
state succession, special property of females, including 
personal property inherited or obtained under contract or 
gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, 
dissolution of marriage, including talacr. ila. zihar. lian. 
khula, and mubaraat. maintenance, dower, guardianship, 
gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs (other than 
charities and charitable institution and charitable and 
religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where 
the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law 
(Shariat).
3. POWER TO MAKE A DECLARATION -(1) Any person who 
satisfies the prescribed authority-
(a) that he is a Muslim, and
1 For Statements of Objects and Reasons, see Gazette of 
India, 1935, Part.V, p.136, and for Report of Select 
Committee, see ibid., 1937, Part.V, p.235.
This Act has been applied to the partially excluded areas 
of the Mymensingh district from the 20th January, 1944, see 
Bengal Government Notification No.l31-F, dated the 15th 
January 1944.
2 Subs, by Act VIII of 1973, as amended by Act LIII of 
1974 (with effect from the 26th March 1971) for "Pakistan".
3 Ibid., sub section (2).
4 Id.
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(b) that he is competent to contract within the 
meaning of section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872, and
(c) that he is a resident of [Bangladesh],5
may by declaration in the prescribed form and filed 
before the prescribed authority declare that he 
desires to obtain the benefit of [the provision of 
this section],6 and thereafter the provisions of 
section 2 shall apply to the declarant and all his 
minor children and their descendants as if in addition 
to the matters enumerated therein adoption, wills and 
legacies were also specified.
(2) Where the prescribed authority refuses to accept 
a declaration under sub-section ,(1) , the person desiring to 
make the same may appeal to such officer as the
[Government]7 may, by general or special order, appoint in 
this behalf, and such officer may, if he is satisfied that 
the appellant is entitled to make the declaration, order 
the prescribed authority to accept the same.
4. RULE-MAKING POWER -(1) The [Government]8 may make rules 
to carry into effect the purpose of this Act;
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may provide 
for all or any of the following matters, namely:-
(a) for prescribing the authority before whom and the 
form in which declarations under this Act shall be 
made ;
(b) for describing the fees to be paid for the filing 
of declarations and for the attendance at private
residences of any person in the discharge of his
duties under this Act; and for prescribing the times 
at which such fees shall be payable and the manner in 
which they shall be levied.
(3) Rules made under the provisions of this section 
shall be published in the official Gazette and shall 
thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act.
5 Subs, by Act VIII of 1973, as amended by Act LIII of 
1974 (with effect from the 26th March 1971) , for 
"Pakistan".
6 Subs, by Act XVI of 1943, section 2, for "this Act".
7 Subs, by Act VIII of 1973, as amended by Act LIII of 
1974 (with effect from the 26th March 1971) for "Provincial 
Government".
8 Id.
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5. [Dissolution of marriage by court in certain 
circumstances.]9
6 . [Section 6 . ] 10
9 Repealed by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 193 9 
(VIII of 1939) .
10 Sec. 6 was ommitted by Act viii of 1973, as amended by Act 
LIII of 1974 (with effect from 26th March 1971).
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APPENDIX - III
THE DISSOLUTION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES ACT 1939 
(Act No.VIII of 1939)
Received the assent of the Governor-General on the 
17th March 1939 (Published in the Gazette of India dated 
the 25th March 1939)
[An Act to consolidate and clarify the provisions of 
Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of marriage by 
women married under Muslim law and to remove doubts as to 
the effect of the renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim 
woman on her marriage tie.]
Whereas it is expected to consolidate and clarify the 
provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution 
of marriage by the women married under Muslim law and to 
remove doubts as to the effect of renunciation of Islam by 
a married Muslim woman on her marriage tie, it is hereby 
enacted as follows:
1. (1) SHORT TITLE AND EXTENT -This Act may be called the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh.
2 . GROUNDS FOR DECREE FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE -A woman 
married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a 
decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or 
more of the following grounds, namely-
(i) That the whereabouts of the husband have not been 
known for a period of four years;
(ii) that the husband neglected or has failed to 
provide for her maintenance for a period of two years;
(iia) that the husband has taken an additional wife in 
contravention of the provisions of the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance. 1961;
(iii) that the husband has been sentenced to 
imprisonment for a period of seven years or upwards;
(iv) that the husband has failed to perform, without 
reasonable cause, his marital obligations for a period 
of three years;
1 Inserted by section 13 (a) of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance (VIII of 1961).
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(v) that the husband was impotent at the time of the 
marriage and continues to be so;
(vi) that the husband has been insane for a period of 
two years or is suffering from leprosy or a virulent 
venereal disease;
(vii) that she, having been given in marriage by her 
father or other guardian before she attained the age 
of [eighteen]2 years, repudiated the marriage before 
attaining the age of 19 years;3
Provided that the marriage has not been consummated;
(viii) that the husband treats her with cruelty, that 
is to say,-
(a) habitually assaults her or makes her life 
miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct 
does not amount to physical ill-treatment, or
(b) associates with women of evil repute or leads an 
infamous life, or
(c) attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or
(d) disposes of her property or prevents her 
exercising her legal rights over it, or
(e) obstruct her in the observance of her religious 
profession or practice, or
(f) if he has more wives than one, does not treat her 
equitably in accordance with the injunction of Quran;
(ix) on any other ground which is recognised as valid 
for the dissolution of marriage under Muslim law;
Provided that-
(a) no decree shall be passed on ground (iii) until 
the sentence has become final;
(b) a decree passed on ground (i) shall not take 
effect for a period of six months from the date of 
such decree, and if the husband appears either in 
person or through an authorised agent within that 
period and satisfies the court that he is prepared to 
perform his conjugal duties, the court shall set aside 
the said decree; and
2 Substituted for the word 'fifteen' by sec. 13(b) of the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961).
3 Substituted by Ordinance XXV of 1986-vide sec. 2.
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(c) before passing a decree on ground (v) the court 
shall, on application by the husband, make an order 
requiring the husband to satisfy the court within a 
period of one year from the date of such order that he 
has ceased to be impotent, and if the husband so 
satisfies the court within such period, no decree 
shall be passed on the said ground.
3. NOTICE TO BE SERVED ON HEIRS OF THE HUSBAND WHEN THE
HUSBAND'S WHEREABOUTS ARE NOT KNOWN -In a suit to 
which clause (i) section 2 applies -
(a) the names and the addresses of the persons who 
would have been the heirs of the husband under Muslim 
law if he died on the date of the filing of the plaint 
shall be stated in the plaint;
(b) notice of the suit shall be served on such 
persons; and
(c) such persons shall have the right to be heard in 
the suit;
Provided that paternal uncle and brother of the 
husband, if any, shall be cited as a party even if he or 
they are not heirs.
4. EFFECT OF CONVERSION TO ANOTHER FAITH -The renunciation 
of Islam by a married Muslim woman on her conversion to a 
faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to 
dissolve her marriage:
Provided that after such renunciation, or conversion 
the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the 
dissolution of her marriage on any of the grounds mentioned 
in section 2:
Provided further that the provisions of this section 
shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some 
other faith who re-embraces her former faith.
5. RIGHTS TO DOWER NOT TO BE AFFECTED -Nothing contained in 
this Act shall affect any right which a married woman may 
have under Muslim law to her dower or any part thereof on 
the dissolution of marriage.
6. REPEAL OF SECTION 5 OF ACT XXVI OF 1937 -This section 
repeals section 5 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act (XXVI of 1937) .4 Section 5 of the Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 -runs as 
follows:.
Dissolution of marriage by courts in certain
4 Repealed by Act XXV of 1942.
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circumstances -
The District Judge may, on petition made by a Muslim 
married woman, dissolve a marriage on any ground recognised 
by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
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APPENDIX - IV
THE MUSLIM FAMILY LAWS ORDINANCE 1961
(Ordinance No. VIII of 1961)
[An Ordinance to give effect to certain 
recommendations of the Commission on Marriage and Family 
Laws]
Whereas it is expedient to give effect to certain 
recommendations of the Commission on Marriage and Family 
Laws;
Now, therefore, in pursuance of the Proclamation of 
the seventh day of October 1958, and in exercise of all 
powers enabling him in that behalf, the President is 
pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance;
1. SHORT TITLE, EXTENT, APPLICATION AND COMMENCEMENT -(1)
This Ordinance may be called the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961.
(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh1 and applies 
to all Muslim citizens of Bangladesh wherever they may be.
(3) It shall come into force on such date as the 
Government,2 may, by notification in the official Gazette, 
appoint in this behalf.3
2. "DEFINITIONS"4 -In this Ordinance, unless there is 
anything repugnant in the subject or context -
(a) "Arbitration Council" means.a, body consisting of 
the Chairman and a representative of each of the 
parties to a matter dealt within this Ordinance;
Provided that where any party fails to nominate a 
representative within the prescribed time, the body
1 Substituted by Ordinance 21 of■•■19-62.
2 Id.
3 15th July 1961 (Gazette of Pakistan, 1961 Extraordinary
p.1128).
4 Substituted by Ordinance XIV of 1985 vide sec. 2 under 
heading definitions (a) to (f).
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formed without such representative shall be the 
Arbitration Council;
(b) "Chairman" means -
(i) the Chairman of the Union Parishad;
(ii) the Chairman of the Paurashava;
(iii) the Mayor or Administrator of the Municipal 
Corporation;
(iv) the person appointed by the Government in the 
Cantonment areas to discharge the functions of 
Chairman under this Ordinance;
(v) where the Union Parishad, Paurashava or Municipal 
Corporation is superseded, the person discharging the 
functions of such Parishad, Paurashava or Corporation 
or, as the case may be, appointed by the Government to 
discharge the functions of Chairman under this 
Ordinance;
Provided that where the Chairman of the Union Parishad 
or Paurashava or the Mayor of the Municipal 
Corporation is a non-Muslim, or he himself wishes to 
make an application to the Arbitration Council, or is, 
owing to illness or any other reason, unable to 
discharge the functions of Chairman, the Union 
Parishad, Paurashava or Municipal Corporation shall 
elect one of its Muslim members or Commissioners as 
Chairman for the purposes of this Ordinance;
(c) "Municipal Corporation" means the Municipal 
Corporation constituted under the Chittagong Municipal 
Corporation Ordinance, 1982 (XXXV of 1982), or the 
Dhaka Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 1983 (XL 
of1983), or the Khulna Municipal Corporation 
Ordinance, 1984 (LXXII of 1984), and having the 
jurisdiction as prescribed;
(d) "Paurashava" means the Paurashava constituted 
under the Paurashava Ordinance, 1977 (XXVI of 1977), 
and having in the matter jurisdiction as prescribed;
(e) "Prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under 
section 11;
(f) "Union Parishad" means the Union Parishad 
constituted under the Local Government (Union 
Parishads) Ordinance, 1983 (LI of 1983), and having in 
the matter jurisdiction as prescribed.
3. ORDINANCE TO OVERRIDE OTHER LAWS, ETC. -(1) The
provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect
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notwithstanding any law, custom or usage.5
(2) For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared 
that the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 
1940) , the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (ACT V of 1908) 
and any other law regulating the procedure of courts shall 
not apply to any Arbitration Council.
4. SUCCESSION -In the event of the death of any son or 
daughter of the propositus before the opening of 
succession, the children of such son or daughter, if any, 
living at the time the succession opens, shall per stirpes 
receive a share equivalent to the share which such son or 
daughter, as the case may be, would have received if alive.
5. OMITTED BY ACT LII OF 1974.
6. POLYGAMY -(1) No man, during the subsistence of an 
existing marriage, shall expcept with the previous 
permission in writing of the Arbitration Council, contract 
another marriage, nor shall any such marriage contracted 
without such permission be registered [under the Muslim 
Marriage and Divorces (Registration) Act 1974 (LII of 
1974)] .
(2) An application for permission under sub-section
(1) shall be submitted to the Chairman in the prescribed 
manner, together with the prescribed fee, and shall state 
the reasons for the proposed marriage, and whether the 
consent of the existing wife or wives has been obtained 
thereto.
(3) On receipt of the application under sub-section 
(2, the Chairman shall ask the applicant and his existing 
wife or wives each to nominate a representative, and the 
Arbitration Council so constituted may, if satisfied that 
the proposed marriage is necessary and just, grant, subject 
to such conditions if any, as may be deemed fit, the 
permission applied for.
(4) In deciding the application the Arbitration 
Council shall record its reasons for the decision, and any 
party may, in the prescribed manner, within the prescribed 
period, and on payment of the prescribed fee, prefer an 
application for revision [***] to the Munsif6 concerned and 
his decision shall be final and shall not be called in
5 The words after the words usage of section 3 of 
original section "and the registration of Muslim marriages 
shall take place only in accordance with those provisions" 
have been omitted by Act LII of 1974...;.'
6 The word "Sub-Divisional Officer" has been substituted 
by the word "Munsif" vide section 3 of Ordinance No. XIV of 
1985.
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question in any court.
(5) Any man who contracts another marriage without the 
permission of the Arbitration Council shall -
(a) pay immediately the entire amount of dower whether 
prompt or deferred, due to the existing wife or wives, 
which amount, if not so paid, shall be recoverable as 
arrears of land revenue; and
(b) on conviction upon complaint be punishable with 
simple imprisonment which may extend to one year, or 
with fine which may extend to >ten thousand taka7 or 
both.
7. TALAQ -(1) Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, 
as soon as may be after the pronouncement of talaa in any 
form whatsoever, give the Chairman notice in writing of his 
having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the 
wife.
(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section
(1) shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend 
to ten thousand taka8 or with both.
(3) Save as provided in sub-section (5) , a talaa. 
unless revoked earlier, expressly or otherwise, shall not 
be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the 
day of which notice under sub-section (1) is delivered to 
the Chairman.
(4) Within thirty days of the receipt of notice under 
sub-section (1) , the Chairman shall constitute an 
Arbitration Council for the purpose of bringing about a 
reconciliation between the parties, and the Arbitration 
Council shall take all steps necessary to bring about such 
reconciliation.
(5) If the wife be pregnant ^t the time talaa is 
pronounced, talaa shall not be effective until the period 
mentioned in sub-section (3) or the pregnancy, whichever be 
later, ends.
7 Sub-section 5 in clause (b) of section 6 for the words 
"five thousand rupees" the word "ten thousand taka" have 
been substituted vide amendment section 4 of Ordinance No. 
21 of 1982.
8 Sub-section 2 in section 7 for the words "five thousand 
rupees" the word "ten thousand taka" have been substituted 
vide amendment by section 5 of Ordinance No. 21 of 1982.
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(6) Nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been 
terminated by talaa effective under this section from re­
marrying the same husband, without an intervening marriage 
with a third person, unless such termination is for the 
third time so effective.
8. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE OTHERWISE THAN BY TALAQ -Where 
the right to divorce has been duly delegated to the wife 
and she wishes to exercise that right, or where any of the 
parties to a marriage wishes to dissolve the marriage 
otherwise than by talaa. the provisions of section 7 shall, 
mutatis mutandis, and so far as- applicable, apply.
9. MAINTENANCE -(1) If any husband fails to maintain his 
wife adequately, or where there are more wives than one, 
fails to maintain them equitably, the wife, or all or any 
of the wives, may in addition to seeking any other legal 
remedy available, apply to the Chairman who shall 
constitute an Arbitration Council to determine the matter, 
and the Arbitration Council may issue a certificate 
specifying the amount which shall be paid as maintenance by 
the husband.
(2) A husband or a wife may, in the prescribed manner, 
within the prescribed period, and on payment of the 
prescribed fee, prefer an application for revision of the 
certificate, to the Munsif9 concerned and his decision 
shall be final and shall not be called in question in any 
court.
(3) Any amount payable under sub-section (1) or (2), 
if not paid in due time, shall be recoverable as arrears of 
land revenue.
10. DOWER -Where no details about the mode of payment of 
dower are specified in the nikah nama. or the marriage 
contract, the entire amount of the dower shall be presumed 
to be payable on demand.
11. POWER TO MAKE RULES -(1) The Government may make rules 
to carry into effect the purpose of the Ordinance.10
(2) In making rules under this section, the 
Government may provide that a breach of any of the rules 
shall be punishable with simple imprisonment which may 
extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five 
thousand taka or with both.11
9 Substituted by Ordinance XIV of 1985 section 4.
10 Substituted by Ordinance 21 of 1982.
11 Id.
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(3) Rules made under this section shall be published 
in the official Gazette, and shall thereupon have effect as 
if enacted in this Ordinance.
11A. PLACE OF TRIAL12 -Notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other law for the time being in force, an offence 
under this Ordinance shall be tried by' a court within the 
local limits of whose jurisdiction - 1
(a) The offence was committed; or
(b) The complainant or the accused resides or last 
resided.
12. AMENDMENT OF CHILD MARRIAGE RESTRAINT ACT, 1929 (XIX OF 
1929) - In the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (XIX of 
1929
(1) in section 2 -
(a) "child"13 means a person who, if a male, is under 
twenty-one years of age, if a female, is under 
eighteen years of age;
(b) In clause (c) , the word "and" shall be omitted; 
and
(c) In clause (d) , for the full stop at the end a 
comma shall be substituted, and thereafter the 
following new clause be added,"namely:-
(e) "Municipal Corporation"14 means the Municipal 
Corporation constituted under the Chittagong Municipal 
Corporation Ordinance 1982 (XXV. of 1982, or the Dhaka 
Municipal Corporation Ordinance 1983 (XL of 1983), or 
the Khulna Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 1984 
(LXXII of 1984), within whose jurisdiction a child 
marriage is or is about to be solemnised;
(f) "Paurashava" means the Paurashava constituted 
under the Paurashava Ordinance 1977 (XXVI of 1977), 
within whose jurisdiction a child marriage is or is 
about to be solemnised; and
(g) "Union Parishad" means the Union Parishad 
constituted under the Local Govt. (Union Parishad)
12 Inserted by Ordinance 24 of 1986 vide section 2.
13 Vide section 2(a) of Ordinance 38 of 1984.
14 The original sub-section 12(1) (e) run as follows:
"e" "Union Council" means the Union Council or the Town or 
Union Committee constituted under the Basic Democracies 
Order 1959 (PO No.18 of 1959) within .whose jurisdiction a 
child marriage is or about to be solemnised.
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Ordinance, 1983 (LI of 1983), within whose 
jurisdiction a child marriage is or is about to be 
solemnised.
(2) Section 3 shall be omitted;
(3) "4.15 Punishment for male adult above twenty-one 
years of age or female adult above eighteen years of age 
marrying a child-whoever, being a male above twenty-one 
years of age, or being a female above eighteen years of 
age, contracts a child marriage shall be punishable with 
simple imprisonment which may extend to one month, or with 
fine which may extend to one thousand taka, or with both.
(4) In section 9, after the words "under the Act", the 
words "except on a complaint made by the Union council, or 
if there is no Union Parishad16 or Paurashava or Municipal
Corporation in the area, by such authority as the
Government may in this behalf prescribe, and such
cognizance shall in no case be taken" shall be inserted;
and
(5) Section II shall be omitted.
13. AMENDMENT OF THE DISSOLUTION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGE ACT 
1939 (VIII OF 1939) -In the dissolution of Muslim Marriage 
Act, 1939, (VIII of 1939), in section 2, -(a) after clause
(ii) , the following new clause (iia) shall be inserted, 
namely-
(a) "that the husband has taken an additional wife in 
contravention of the provisions of the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance, 1961"; and
(b) In clause (vii), for the word "fifteen" the word 
"sixteen" shall be substituted.
15 Substituted vide section 4 of Ordinance No. 38 of 1984.
16 see Ordinance XIV of 1985 section 5.
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APPENDIX - V
THE MUSLIM FAMILY LAWS RULES1 1961
Preliminary
1. These rules may be called the Bangladesh Muslim Family 
Laws Rules, 1961.
2. In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in 
the subject or context,-
(a) "Form" means a form appended to these rules;
(b) "Local area" means the area under the jurisdiction 
of a Union Council;
(c) "Ordinance" means the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961);
(d) "Section" means a section of the Ordinance; and
(e) '’Union Council" has the same meaning as defined in 
the Ordinance.
3. The Union Council which shall have"jurisdiction in the 
matter for the purpose of clause (d) of section 2, shall be 
as follows, namely -
(a) in the case of an application under sub-section
(2) of section 6, it shall be the Union Council of the 
Union or Town in which the existing wife, or where 
there are more wives than one, the wife with whom the 
applicant was married last, is residing at the time of 
his making the applicantion; ,
(b) in the case of a notice of talaa under sub-section
(1) of section 7, it shall be the Union Council of the 
Union or town in which the wife in relation to whom 
talaa was pronounced was residing at the time of the 
pronouncement of talaa; and
(c) in the case of an applicantion under section 9, it 
shall be the Union Council of the Union or town in 
which the wife is residing at the time of her making 
the application, and where application under that 
section is made by more than one wife, it shall be the 
Union Council of the Union or Town in which the wife 
who makes the application first is residing at the 
time of her making the application.
1 These rules were published in the Dhaka Gazzette on July 
11th, 1961
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4. (1) Where a non-Muslim has been elected as Chairman of 
a Union Council, the Council shall, as soon as may be, 
elect one of its Muslim members as Chairman for the purpose 
of the Ordinance.
(2) Any party to the proceedings before an Arbitration 
Council, who considers the Chairman to be interested in 
favour of the other party, may, with reasons to be recorded 
in writing, apply for the appointment of a different 
Chairman, to the Assistant Judge2 who, on behalf of the 
Government3 may, if he thinks fit, appoint any other member 
of that Council as Chairman for .the purpose of the 
Ordinance, the Assistant Judge shall, stay the proceedings 
before the Arbitration Council until he has disposed of 
such application.
5. (1) The Chairman shall conduct the proceedings of an 
Arbitration Council as expeditiously as possible.
(2) Such proceedings shall not be vitiated by reasons 
of a vacancy in the Arbitration Council, whether on account 
of failure of any person to nominate a representative or 
otherwise.
(3) Where a vacancy arises otherwise than through 
failure to make a nomination the Chairman shall require a 
fresh nomination.
(4) No party to proceedings before an Arbitration 
Council shall be a member of the Arbitration Council.
(5) All decisions of the Arbitration Council shall be 
taken by majority, and where no decision can be so taken, 
the decision of the Chairman shall be the decision of the 
Arbitration Council.
6. (1) Within seven days of receiving of an application 
under sub-section (2) of section 6 or under sub-section (1) 
of section 9, or a notice under sub-section (1) of section
7. the Chairman shall, by order in writing, call upon each 
of the parties to nominate his or her representative, and 
each such party shall, within seven days of receiving the 
order, nominate in writing a representative and deliver the 
nomination to the Chairman or send it to him by registered 
post.
(2) Where a representative nominated by a party dies, 
or is, by reason of illness or otherwise, unable to attend
2 The words "Sub-Divisional Officer" was substituted by 
the word "Munsif", Subsequently by the words Assistant 
Judge vide section 3 of Ordinance No.14 of 1985.
3 The word "Provincial Government"- was substituted for 
the words "Government" vide Ordinance No.21 of 1982.
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the meetings of the Arbitration Council, or wilfully 
absents himself from such meetings, or has lost the 
confidence of the party, the party may, with the previous 
permission in writing of the Chairman, revoke the 
nomination and make within such time as the Chairman may 
allow, a fresh nomination.
(3) Where a fresh nominatibn is made under sub-rule
(2), it shall not be necessary to commence the proceedings 
before the Arbitration Council de novo unless the Chairman, 
for reasons to be recorded in writing, directs otherwise.
7. (1) Any person, who is not below 25 years of age and who
possesses sufficient acquaintance with the Arabic language 
and the Muslim law of marriage and divorce and who is of 
good character, may apply in writing to the Union Council 
for the grant of license to act as Nikah Registrar under 
section 5. Every such application shall be accompanied by 
two certificates that he possesses sufficient acquaintance 
with the Arabic language and Muslim laws of marriage and 
divorce, signed by two Muslim gentlemen of respectability 
and position, and two certificates of good character from 
persons of respectability and position, and shall contain 
the following particulars:
(a) Name and usual signature of the applicant, date of 
application and address in full-
(b) Age of applicant-
(c) Profession or present employment of the applicant 
with present salary or pension, if any-
(d) Father's name, profession and address-
(e) Present family residence of the applicant-
(f) Whether the applicant has a masonry house for 
office-
(g) If previous employment under Government, details 
of past service of the applicant; and if ever 
dismissed from any post, particiilars of the fact-
(h) Name and address of the persons from whom 
certificates are obtained and attached to the 
application-
(i) Whether the applicant is acquainted with Arabic, 
Persian, Urdu, Bengali or English- and
(j) Whether the applicant is acquainted with Muslim 
laws and hold any certificate from any Government or 
Private Madrasah (stating its name)-
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(2) Every such application shall be considered at a 
meeting of the Union Council; and if the Union Council, 
after making such enquiries as it may consider necessary, 
is satisfied that the application is fit and proper for the 
grant of a license to him in Form I, subject to the 
conditions specified therein. In granting a license, the 
Union Council shall give preference to applicants having 
Alim. Fazil. or Title certificates from a recognised 
Madrasah:
Provided that, in the case of a person who at the time 
of the commencement of the Ordinance was already exercising 
the powers of Mohammedan Registrar under the Bencral 
Muhammadan Marriage and Divorce Registration Act. 1876, the 
Chairman of all such Union Councils over which such 
Mohammedan Registrar was exercising such jurisdiction, may 
grant him a licence to perform the duties of Nikah 
Registrar under the Ordinance within their respective 
Unions, if he so applies.
(3) A Nikah Registrar shall pursue his avocation, as 
such, from a fixed place within his jurisdiction easily 
accessible to the residents of the local area.
(4) Leave may be granted to the Nikah Registrar by the 
Chairman of the Union Council who may issue a temporary 
license to a person having requisite qualifications under 
sub-rule (1), only for the period of the absence on leave 
of the permanent incumbent:
Provided that, in the case of a nikah Registrar who 
has been granted licence to act as Nikah Registrar by more 
than one Union Council, leave may be granted to such Nikah 
Registrar by the Assistant Judge4 concerned, or, in his 
absence, by the Circle Officer.5
(5) A licence granted under this rule shall be 
permanent and revocable only when the Nikah Registrar 
contravenes any of the conditions of the licence granted 
under this rule, or is found to be guilty of a breach of 
any of the provisions of the rule, or of any misconduct. 
The Union Council shall have the power to revoke the 
licence only after regular proceedings in this behalf. Any 
Nikah Registrar aggrieved by any such order of revocation 
may prefer an appeal to the Government within 30 days from 
the date of the order of revocation.
(6) If any Nikah Registrar to whom a licence has been 
granted contravenes any of the conditions of such licence,
4 The words "Sub-Divisional Officer" was substituted by 
the word "Munsif" (now Assistant Judge) vide section 3 of 
the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance No.XIV of 1985.
5 The word "Circle Officer" are not in existence.
463
he shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to one month, or with fine which may 
extend to two hundred taka or with both:
Provided that no prosecution under the sub-rule shall 
be initiated except upon a complaint from the Chairman of 
the Union Council concerned.
8 . (1) The Union Council shall on payment of such cost as 
may be determined by the Government,6,supply every Nikah 
Registrar a bound register of nikah namas in form II, and 
a seal bearing the inscription "The seal of the Nikah
Registrar of ward * (x).........  in  **
(y).........................."
(2) Each register shall contain fifty leaves, 
consecutively numbered, each leaf having a nikah nama. in 
quadruplicate, and the number leaves shall be certified by 
the Chairman.
(3) Notwithstanding the payment of cost under sub-rule
(1) , the register and the seal shall remain the property of 
the Union Council.
9. (1) For the registration of a marriage registered under 
section 5, the Nikah Registrar shall be paid by the 
bridegroom or his representative a registration fee of two 
taka or when the dower exceeds two thousand taka a fee 
calculated at the rate of one taka for every thousand or 
part of thousand taka of such dower, subject to a maximum 
fee of twenty taka.
(2) Of the fees received under sub-rule (1) , the Nikah 
Registrar shall retain for himself eighty percent and shall 
pay the remaining twenty percent to the Union Council.
(3) Where dower consists of property other than money, 
or partly of such property and partly of money, the 
valuation of the property shall, for purposes of fees under 
sub-rule (1), be the valuations settled between the parties 
to the marriage.
(4) An extra commission fee of 4 taka shall be payable 
to a Nikah Registrar, for himself visiting any place other 
than his office for the registration of marriage, in 
addition to a travelling allowance at the rate of 50 paisa 
per mile for the distance actually travelled.
10. (1) The Nikah Registrar shall, in the case of a 
marriage solemnised by him, fill in Form II, in 
quadruplicate, in the register, the persons whose signature 
are required in the Form shall then sign, and the Nikah
6 The words "Provincial Government" were substituted by 
the word "Government" vide Ordinance No.21 of 1982.
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Registrar shall then affix his signature and seal thereto, 
and keep the original intact in the register.
Provided that in the case of an illiterate person his 
thumb impression, and not any other mark, shall be taken, 
and his name shall be recorded at length who shall also 
sign his name in attestation that thumb impression was 
affixed in his presence. ■
(2) The duplicate and triplicate of the nikah nama 
filled in as aforesaid, shall be supplied to the bride and 
the bridegroom respectively, on payment of fifty paisa 
each, and the quadruplicate shall be forwarded to the Union 
council.
(3) If any person required by this rule to sign the 
register refuses so to sign, he shall be punishable with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one 
month or with fine which may extend to two hundred taka or 
with both.
11. (1) Where a marriage is solemnised in Bangladesh by a 
person other than the Nikah Registrar, such persons shall 
fill in Form II, to be had loose on payment of such price 
as may be determined by the Government, the person whose 
signatures are required in the Form shall then sign, and 
the person solemnising the marriage shall then affix his 
signature to the Form and ensure delivery; as expeditiously 
as possible, of the same together with the registration fee 
to the Nikah Registrar of the Ward where the marriage is 
solemnised.
(2) If any person required by this rule to sign the 
register refuses so to sign, he shall be punishable with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one 
month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred taka or 
with both.
12. (1) In the case of marriage solemnised outside 
Bangladesh by a person who is a citizen of Bangladesh, such 
person shall ensure delivery of Form II, filled in 
accordance with the provisions of rule 10 to the consular 
officer of Bangladesh in or for the country in which the 
marriage is solemnised, for onward transmission together 
with the registration fee to the Nikah Registrar of the 
Ward of which the bride is a permanent resident, and in 
case the bride is not a citizen of Bangladesh, the Nikah 
Registrar of the Ward of which the bridegroom is such 
resident.
(2) In the case of a marriage solemnised outside 
Bangladesh by a person who is not a citizen of Bangladesh 
the bridegroom, and where only the bride is such citizen, 
the bride, shall, for purposes of filling in, as far as may 
be, Form II, be deemed to be the person who has solemnised 
the marriage under sub-rule (1).
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13. On receipt of Form II under rule 11 or rule 12, the 
Nikah Registrar shall proceed in the manner provided in 
rule 10, as if the marriage had been solemnised by him.
Provided that, except where the marriage has been 
solemnised within his jurisdiction, it shall be necessary 
for the Nikah Registrar to obtain the signatures of the 
necessary persons . r
14. In considering whether another proposed marriage is 
just and necessary during the continuance of an existing 
marriage, the Arbitration Council may, without prejudice to 
its general powers to consider what is just and necessary, 
have regard to such circumstances as the following, amongst 
others:
Sterility, physical infirmity, physical unfitness for 
the conjugal relation, wilful avoidance of a decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights, or insanity, on the part of 
an existing wife.
15. An application under sub-section (1) of section 6 for 
permission to contract another marriage during the 
subsistence of an existing marriage shall be in writing, 
shall state whether the consent of the existing wife or 
wives has been obtained thereto, shall contain a brief 
statement of the grounds on which . the new marriage is 
alleged to be just and necessary, shall bear the signature 
of the applicant, and shall be accompanied by a fee of 
twenty-five taka.
16. (1) An application for the revision of a decision of an 
Arbitration Council, under sub-section (4) of section 6 or 
of a certificate under sub-section (2) of section 9, shall 
be preferred within thirty days of the decision or of the 
issue of the certificate, as the case may be, and shall be 
accompanied by a fee of taka two.
(2) The application shall be in writing, set out the 
grounds on which the applicant §eeks to have the decision 
or the certificate revised, and shall bear the signature of 
the applicant.
17. All proceedings before an Arbitration Council shall be 
held in camera unless the Chairman otherwise directs.
18. (1) The quadruplicate nikah nama forwarded by the Nikah 
Registrar under sub-rule (2) of rule 10 shall be preserved 
in the office of the Union Council until such time as the 
register containing the originals, is, on being completed, 
deposited by the Nikah Registrar in such office.
(2) The completed register so received shall be 
preserved permanently.
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(3) In the office of the Union Council there shall be 
prepared and maintained an index of the contents of every 
register, and every entry in such index shall be made, so 
far as practicable, immediately after the Nikah Registrar 
has made an entry in the register.
(4) The aforesaid index shall contain the name, place
of residence and father's name of each party to every
marriage, and the dates of the marriage and registration.
(5) The Sub-Divisional Officer7 of the local area
shall inspect and audit the records and accounts of the
Nikah Registrar from time to time in course of their visit.
19. (1) Subject to the previous payment of the fees
prescribed in sub-rule (2) and (3), the index and the
register shall at all reasonable times, be open to 
inspection at the office of the Union Council by any person 
applying to inspect the same and copies of entries in the
index and the register, duly signed and sealed by the
Chairman, shall be given to all persons applying for such 
copies.
(2) The fee for the inspection of an index or register 
shall be fifty paisa.
(3) The fee for a certified copy of all or any of the 
entries relating to a marriage shall be-
(a) for those in an index ............. fifty paisa.
(b) for those in a register ............... two taka.
20. All fees payable under these Rules, except under rule 
16, shall be paid in cash on obtaining proper receipt.
7 The Sub-Divisional Officer was substituted by the word 
"Munsif" vide section 3 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 
Ordinance No.XIV of 1985, Subsequently it has been renamed 
as Assistant Judge.
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APPENDIX - VI
THE MUSLIM MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES 
(REGISTRATION) ACT 1974
(Act No. LII of 1974)
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to 
Registration of Muslim marriages and divorces.
Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the 
law relating to registration of Muslim marriages and 
divorces;
It is hereby enacted as follows:
1. SHORT TITLE AND APPLICATION -(1) This Act may be called 
the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act, 1974.
(2) It applies to all Muslim citizens of Bangladesh 
wherever they may be.
2. DEFINITIONS -In this Act, unless there is anything 
repugnant in the subject or context-^
(a) "Inspector-General of Registration" and 
"Registrar" respectively mean the officers so 
designated and appointed under the Registration Act, 
1908 (XVI of 1908);
(b) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under 
this Act.
3. REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGES -Notwithstanding anything 
contained in any law, custom or usage, every marriage 
solemnised under Muslim law shall be registered in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
4. NIKAH REGISTRARS -For the purpose of registration of 
marriages under this Act, the Government shall grant 
licenses to such member of persons, to be called Nikah 
Registrars, as it may deem necessary.for such areas as it 
may specify;
Provided that not more than one Nikah Registrar shall 
be licensed for any one area.
Provided further that the Government may, whenever it 
deems fit so to do, extend, curtail or otherwise alter the 
limits of any area for which a Nikah Registrar has been 
licensed.1
1 Added by the Ordinance XLIX of 1982.
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5. MARRIAGES NOT SOLEMNISED BY NIKAH REGISTRARS TO BE 
REPORTED TO THEM -(1) Every marriage not solemnised by the 
Nikah Registrar shall, for the purpose of registration 
under this Act, be reported to him by the person who has 
solemnised such marriages.
(2) Whoever contravenes the provision of sub-section
(1) shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to three months, or with fine which may 
extend to five hundred taka, or with both.
6. REGISTRATION OF DIVORCES -(1) A Nikah registrar may 
register divorces effected under Muslim law within his 
jurisdiction on application being made to him for such 
registration.
(2) An application for registration of a divorce shall 
be made orally by the person who has or have effected the 
divorce;
Provided that if the woman be a pardanashin. such 
application may be made by her duly authorised Vakil.
(3) The Nikah Registrar shall not register a divorce 
of the kind known as talacr-i-tafweez except on the 
production of a document registered under the Registration 
Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), by which the husband delegated the 
power of divorce to the wife or of an attested copy of an 
entry in the register of marriages showing that such 
delegation has been made.
(4) Where the Nikah Registrar refuses to register a 
divorce, the person or persons who^ applied for such 
registration may, within thirty days of such refusal, 
prefer an appeal to the Registrar and the order passed by 
the Registrar on such appeal shall be final.
7. MANNER OF REGISTRATION -The Nikah Registrar shall 
register a marriage or divorce in such manner as may be 
prescribed.
8. REGISTERS -Every Nikah Registrar shall maintain separate 
registers of marriages and divorces in such forms as may be 
prescribed and all entries in each register shall be 
numbered in a consecutive series, a fresh series being 
commenced at the beginning of each year.
9. COPIES OF ENTRY TO BE GIVEN TO PARTIES -On completion of 
the registration of any marriage or divorce the Nikah 
Registrar shall deliver to the parties concerned an 
attested copy of the entry in the register, and for such 
copy no charge shall be made.
469
10. SUPERINTENDENCE AND CONTROL -(1) Every Nikah Registrar 
shall perform the duties of his office under the 
superintendence and control of the Registrar.
(2) The Inspector-General of Registration shall 
exercise a general superintendence over offices of all 
Nikah Registrars.
11. REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION OF A LICENCE -If the
Government is of the opinion that a Nikah Registrar is 
guilty of any misconduct in the discharge of his duties or 
has become unfit or physically incapable to discharge his 
duties, it may, by order in writing, revoke his licence, or 
suspend his licence for such period, not exceeding two 
years as may be specified in the order.
Provided that no such order shall be made unless the 
Nikah Registrar has been given a reasonable opportunity of 
showing cause why that order should not be made.
12. CUSTODY OF REGISTERS -Every Nikah Registrar shall keep 
safely each register maintained by him under section 8 
until the same is filled, and shall then or earlier if he 
leaves the district or ceases to hold a licence, make over 
the same to the Registrar for safe custody.
13. INSPECTION OF REGISTERS -Any person may, on payment of 
prescribed fee, if any, inspect ,at the office of the Nikah 
Registrar or of the Registrar any register kept in such 
office or obtain a copy of any entry therein.
14. POWER TO MAKE RULES -(1) The Government may, by 
notification in the official Gazette, make rules to carry 
into effect the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide 
f or-
(a) qualifications to be required from persons to whom 
licences under section 4 may be granted:
(b) fees payable to a Nikah Registrar for registration 
of a marriage or divorce:
(c) any other matter for which rules are required to 
be made.
15. AMENDMENT OF MUSLIM FAMILY LAWS ORDINANCE, 1961 (VIII 
OF 1961) -In the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 (VIII 
of 1961) -
(a) in section 3, in sub-section (1), the comma and 
words, "and the registration of Muslim marriages shall 
take place only in accordance with those provisions" 
shall be omitted;
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(b) section 5 shall be omitted;
(c) in section 6, in sub-section (1) , for the words 
"under this Ordinance" the words, comma, figures and 
brackets "under the Muslim Marriages and Divorces 
(Registration) Act. 1974 (LII of 1974) " shall be 
substituted.
16.REPEAL -The Muslim Divorce Registration Act. 1876 (Beng. 
Act I of 1876), is hereby repealed.
17. PROVISION RELATING TO EXISTING NIKAH REGISTRARS -All 
Nikah Registrars licensed under the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961), before the commencement of 
this Act, shall be deemed to have been licensed as Nikah 
Registrars under this Act.
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APPENDIX - VII
THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT 1980
(Act No.XXXV of 1980)1
The following Act of Parliament received the assent of 
the President on 26th December, 1980 and is hereby 
published for general information:
An Act to prohibit the taking or giving of dowry in 
marriages. Whereas it is expedient to make provision to 
prohibit the taking or giving of dowry in marriages:
It is hereby enacted as follows:
1. SHORT TITLE AND COMMENCEMENT-
(1) This Act may be called the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980.
(2) It shall come into force on such date as the Government 
may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint.
2. DEFINITION -In this Act, unless there is anything 
repugnant in the subject or context, "dowry" means any 
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given 
either directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to 
the marriage, or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by 
any other person to either party to the marriage or to 
any other person; at the time of marriage or at any 
time2 before or after the marriage as considered for 
the marriage of the said parties but does not include 
dower or mehr in the case of persons to whom the 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation I -For the removal of doubts, it is hereby 
declared that any presents made at the time of 
marriage by any person other than a party to the 
marriage to either party to the marriage in the form 
of any articles the value of which does not exceed 
five hundred taka, shall not be deemed to be dowry 
within the meaning of this, section, unless they are 
made as consideration for the marriage of the said 
party.
1 Published on 26.12.80 in the Bangladesh Gazette 
(extraordinary).
2 In section 2 the words "at or" have been substituted by 
the words "at the time of marriage or at any time" vide 
Ordinance No.LXIV of 1988- Sec.2.
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Explanation II -The expression "valuable security" has 
the same meaning as section 3 0 of the Penal Code (Act 
XLV of 1860)
3. PENALTY FOR GIVING OR TAKING DOWRY -If any person, after 
the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the 
giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall not 
be less than one year, or with-fine, or with both.3
4. PENALTY FOR DEMANDING DOWRY -Any person, after the 
commencement of this Act, demands, directly or indirectly, 
from the parents or guardian or a bride or bridegroom, as 
the case may be any dowry he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall not 
be less than one year, or with fine, or with both.
4* * * * *
5. AGREEMENT FOR GIVING OR TAKING DOWRY TO BE VOID -Any 
agreement for giving or taking of dowry shall be void.
§ # ^  ★ ★ ★ *
3 In section 3 and 4 for the words and commas "one year or 
with fine which may extend to five thousand taka or with 
both" the word and commas "five years and shall not be less 
than one year or with fine or with both" has been 
substituted vide section 2 of Ordinance No.xxiv of 1986.
4 The Proviso of section 4 was omitted by section 2 of 
Ordinance No.XLIV of 1982. The original proviso ran as 
follows:
"Provided that no court shall take cognizance of any 
offence under this section except with the previous 
sanction of an officer authorised by the Goverment or of 
such officer as the Goverment may, by general or special 
order, specify in this behalf".
5 Section 6 was omitted by Ordinance LXIV of 1984- Sec.3. 
of the original section ran as follows-
6. DOWRY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WIFE OR HER HEIRS -(1) When 
any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in 
connection with whose marriage it is given, that person 
shall transfer it to the woman-
(a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within one 
year after the date of marriage; or
(b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the 
marriage, within one year after the date of its receipt; or
(c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, 
within one year after she has attained the age of eighteen 
years; and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust 
for the benefit of the woman.
(2) If any person fails to transfer any property as
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7. COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCES -Notwithstanding anything 
contained in Criminal Procedure Code 1898, (Act V of 1898) .
(a) no court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the 
first class shall try any offence under this Act;
(b) no court shall take cognizance of any such offence 
except on complaint made within one year from the date 
of the offence;
(c) it shall be lawful for a Magistrate of the first 
class to pass any sentence authorised by this Act on 
any person convicted of an offence under this Act.
8. OFFENCE TO BE NON-COGNIZABLE, NON-BAILABLE AND
COMPOUNDABLE -Every offence under.this Act shall be non- 
cognizable, non-bailable and compoundable .6
9. POWER TO MAKE RULES -(1) The Government may, by
notification in the official Gazette, make rules for
carrying out the purpose of this Act.
(2) Every rule made under this section shall, as soon 
as may be after it is made, be laid before Parliament 
and if Parliament, before the expiry of the session in 
which it is laid, agree in making any modification in
the rule or agree that the rule should not be made,
the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such
modified form or be of effect as the case may be,
subject that any such modification or annulment shall 
be without prejudice to the validity of anything 
previously done under that rule.
required by sub-section (1) .and within the time limited
thereof, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may 
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five 
thousand taka, or with both; but such punishment shall not 
absolve the person from his obligation to transfer the 
property as required by sub-section (1).
(3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub­
section (1) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the 
woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding 
it for the time being.
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall effect the 
provisions of section 3 or section 4-.
6 In section 8 words "bailable and non-compoundable" have 
been substituted by the words "non-bailable and 
compoundable" vide section 4 of Ordinance XXVI of 1986.
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APPENDIX - VIII
THE CRUELTY TO WOMEN 
(DETERRENT PUNISHMENT) ORDINANCE 1983
(Ordinance No. LX of 1983)
An Ordinance to provide for deterrent punishment for 
cruelty to women. Whereas it is expedient to provide 
deterrent punishment for cruelty to women and for matters 
connected therewith;
Now, therefore, in pursuance of the Proclamation of 
the 24th March 1982, in exercise of all powers enabling him 
in that behalf, the Chief Martial Law Administrator is 
pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance-
1. SHORT TITLE AND APPLICATION -(1) This Ordinance may be 
called the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) 
Ordinance, 1983.
(2) It shall apply to all citizens of Bangladesh 
wherever they may be and to any other person living for the 
time being in Bangladesh.
2. ORDINANCE TO OVERRIDE OTHER LAWS -The provisions of this 
Ordinance shall have effect * notwithstanding anything 
contained in any other law for the time being in force.
3. DEFINITION -Words and expressions used in this Ordinance 
shall have the same meaning as in the Penal Code (Act XLV 
of 1860) .
4. PENALTY FOR KIDNAPPING OR ABDUCTION OF WOMEN FOR 
UNLAWFUL OR IMMORAL PURPOSES, ETC. -Whoever kidnaps or 
abducts any woman of any age-
(a) with intent that such woman, shall be employed or 
used for the purpose of prostitution or for any 
unlawful or immoral purpose or knowing it to be likely 
that such woman shall be employed or used for any such 
purpose; or
(b) with intent that such woman may be compelled, or 
knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to 
marry any person against her will; or
(c) in order that such woman may be forced or seduced 
to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be that she 
will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse shall 
be punishable with imprisonment1 for life or with
1 The word "imprisonment" was substituted for the word 
"transportation" by Act No.37 of 1988, section 2.
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rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to
fourteen years and shall also be liable to fine.
5. PENALTY FOR-TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN -Whoever imports or 
exports, or sells, lets to hire or otherwise disposes of, 
or buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of, any 
woman of any age with intent that such woman shall be 
employed or used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit 
intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral 
purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such woman will be 
employed or used for any such purpbse shall be punishable 
with [death or with imprisonment for life or with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years 
and shall not be less than seven years]2 and shall also be 
liable to fine.
Explanation I -When a woman is sold, let for hire, or 
otherwise disposed of to a prostitute or to any person who 
keeps or manages a brothel, the person so disposing of such 
woman shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to 
have disposed of her with the intent that she will be used 
for the purpose of prostitution.
Explanation II -Any prostitute or any person keeping 
or managing a brothel, who buys, hires or otherwise obtains 
possession of a woman shall, until the contrary is proved, 
be presumed to have obtained possession of such woman with 
intent that she will be used for the purpose of 
prostitution.
6. PENALTY FOR CAUSING DEATH, ETC. FOR DOWRY -Whoever, 
being a husband or parent, guardian or relation of the 
husband of any woman, causes or attempts to cause death or 
grievous hurt to that woman for .dowry shall be punishable 
with death or with imprisonment3 for life or with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years 
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation -In this section "dowry" means any 
property or valuable security demanded from the wife or her 
parent, guardian or any other relation as consideration for 
the marriage, but does not include dower or mahr in the 
case of a person to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
applies.
7. CAUSING DEATH IN COMMITTING RAPE, ETC. -Whoever in 
committing or attempting to commit rape, causes death to
2 The words under section E> "punishable with 
transportation for life or with rigorous imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to 14 years have been substituted 
vide section 3 of Amendment Act 37 of 1988.
3 The word "transportation" under section 6 has been 
substituted by "imprisonment" vide.^section 4 of Amendment 
Act 37 of 1988.
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the woman or after committing rape murders the woman, shall 
be punishable with death or with imprisonment4 for life and 
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation -A person shall be deemed to have caused 
death to a woman in committing or attempting to commit rape 
if the woman raped or in respect of whom the attempt to 
commit rape was made dies as a result of rape or hurt 
caused at the time of committing or attempting to commit 
rape . ■. i ,r
8. ATTEMPTS TO CAUSE DEATH OR CAUSING GRIEVOUS HURT IN 
COMMITTING RAPE, ETC. -Whoever, in committing or attempting 
to commit rape, attempts to cause death or causes grievous 
hurt to the woman shall be punishable with imprisonment5 
for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to 
fine.
[8 A.6 ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT OFFENCES UNDER SECTIONS 4 AND 5 -
Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable under 
section 4 or section 5 or to cause such an offence to be 
committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the 
commission of the offence, shall be punishable with the 
punishment provided for the offence.]
9. ABETMENT OF OFFENCES -Whoever abets any offence 
punishable under this Ordinance shall if the act abetted is 
committed in consequence of the abetment, be punishable 
with the punishment provided for the offence.
10. AMENDMENT OF ACT XIV OF 1974 -In the Special Powers Act 
1974 (XIV of 1974), in the schedule, after paragraph 4A, 
the following new paragraphs shall be, inserted namely:
"4B. Offences punishable under the Cruelty to women 
(Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance 1983 (LX of 1983). 
4C. Offence punishable under section 376 of the Penal 
Code (XLV of 1860) .
'/
4 The word "transportation" has been substituted by the 
word "imprisonment" vide the Amendment Act 37 of 1988.
5 Id.
6 A new section 8A has been inserted vide section 7 of 
the Amendment Act 37 of 1988.
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